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Introduction 
Introduction 
Internationally, environmental protection has increased through time. Despite this 
phenomenon, environmental problems have expanded as developments in technology 
have occurred. This is true both in peace time and in war time. Warfare, historically, is 
considered the major enemy of the environment. Pollution and environmental devastation 
are common consequences of almost every military battle.  
The international community’s awareness of this sad fact has led that community 
to try to address this dilemma and to set legal frameworks determining liability for 
environmental damage caused by military activities. In international law, the 
responsibility for environmental devastation occurring during armed conflict can be 
attributed to both states and individuals. While the state’s responsibility is civil, the 
individual’s responsibility encompasses both civil and criminal. 
By and large, the individual’s criminal responsibility for environmental 
destruction during armed conflict can be enforced on either the international or the 
national level. This study aims to appraise the legal remedy the international community 
should take in order to meet its needs on this issue, the protection of the environment 
during the time of armed conflict. 
In addition, the paper aims to provide a comparative study of the existing 
international criminal law framework and its relation to environmental protection during 
armed conflict. To approach this objective, the study will review the environmental crisis 
that occurred during the armed conflict in the Arabian Gulf in 1990-1991 as a case study 
for determining whether the international community adequately responds to these 
events.   
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Thus, this study is divided into five main parts. Part I assesses the justifications 
for a remedy, the criminal remedy, that is more adequate than the United Nations remedy 
taken toward Saddam Hussein’s actions against the environment, a civil remedy. Part II 
grapples with when the criminal remedy is warranted. Part III deals with the substantive 
aspects of international criminal prosecution. Part IV reviews procedural issues 
pertaining to international criminal prosecution. Part V examines the criminal remedy 
before interested national judicial bodies, the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems.  
In Part I, this study discusses the question whether the U.N. remedy taken, a civil 
remedy, was adequate, through six steps: the origin of the problem, the environmental 
damage that occurred, the remedy taken, the nature of the remedy, the weaknesses of the 
remedy, the adequacy of the remedy and alternative remedies. In conclusion, this part of 
the study proposes that a criminal remedy (holding war crimes trials for environmental 
offenses) should have been used in Saddam Hussein’s case as a suitable remedy to 
accomplish the international community’s policy goals. 
In Part II, the study encounters several questions: when the criminal remedy is 
warranted and whether there are clear guidelines controlling international policy 
regarding the prosecution of environmental offenses, more specifically guidelines 
determining the gravity of the offense. After concluding that there are no definite 
guidelines at the international level concerning the gravity of the offense, the study 
examines the source to which international prosecutors should resort and the international 
legal basis of this resort.   
In Part III, the study appraises the substantive aspects of international criminal 
prosecution. This part is divided into two questions. The first question grapples with the 
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international criminal basis for prosecuting superiors. Since Saddam Hussein did not 
commit actus reus of the environmental offenses, the questions that might have been 
raised are: what are the bases for a superior’s criminal responsibility and were they 
applicable to the case of Saddam Hussein.  
Then, the study reviews those international instruments upon which the 
indictments can be based without prejudice to the defendant’s rights, specifically the right 
not to be tried under retroactive principles. Subsequently, in Part IV, the study examines 
the procedural aspects of international criminal prosecution by addressing those issues 
relating to principles of legality, jurisdiction, immunity, the statute of limitations, the 
right to be tried without undue delay and the surrender of the defendant to international 
criminal tribunals.  
After reaching the conclusion that commencing international criminal prosecution 
in the case of Saddam Hussein was unlikely to have occured, Part V of this study directs 
the process of assessment to the national level. The study’s goal in this part is to explore 
whether national legal systems can be substituted for the international legal system; in 
other words, whether facing environmental crimes committed during armed conflict is 
better done at the national level. Therefore, the study will look at both the positive and 
the negative sides of the question at the national level.   
Since both are interested states, the study will include both Kuwaiti and Iraqi legal 
systems. Kuwait would have been interested in holding this trial since it was the main 
party harmed, economically and environmentally, by the environmental offenses. On the 
other side, Iraq would have been interested in having this trial within its judicial legal 
system because Saddam Hussein was an Iraqi citizen. Referring particularly to the Iraqi 
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legal system, the study mainly aims to assess the existing system before adopting an ad 
hoc solution, issuing ad hoc national war crimes legislation. However, reviewing the ad 
hoc legislation is important to avoid its deficiencies in future Iraqi legislative 
amendments.     
In this part, the research examines common issues between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi 
legal systems. These issues are: the status of international law within the two systems, the 
availability of national legislation, the defendant’s immunity before national courts, the 
possibility of inflicting the death penalty and some issues relating to evidence and the 
defendant’s rights.   
Reviewing the Kuwaiti legal system, the study will consider Kuwait’s 
international basis to exercise its judicial jurisdiction regarding environmental offenses 
committed within its territory. Later on, the review will face the first problem within the 
system, obtaining custody of the defendant and the possibility of extradition of the 
defendant. Afterward, concluding that the possibility of extradition of the defendant 
would have been slight, the study will examine the possibility of having held the trial in 
absentia and executing the Kuwaiti sentence within Iraqi territory.  
The review of the Iraq legal system begins with a discussion of Iraq’s 
jurisdictional basis concerning environmental offenses committed in Kuwaiti territories. 
Then, comments will be made concerning environmental offenses regarding the Iraqi 
statute issued by the new Iraqi regime after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
After an overall assessment of the research, this study concluded that both 
international and national prosecutions for environmental offenses committed during 
warfare have their own positive and negative sides.  
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At the international level, substantively, the positive side of the story is 
represented by the existence of international bases for individual responsibility, 
criminality and the priority of the international trend to pursue senior offenders. 
Moreover, the positive side is not exclusive to the substantive aspect, but extends to 
include the procedural aspect as well. Procedurally, the flexibility of the application of 
principles of legality, the existence of defendants’ rights which are unfamiliar to some 
national legal systems, and the establishment of an international legal precedent might 
have been deemed the positive side of this judicial proceeding. 
Nevertheless, while certain factors in the international legal system encourage 
prosecuting war crimes; including environmental offenses, there are shortcomings in 
addressing this prosecution. These shortcomings include the lack of political will, 
jurisdictional bases, definitive criminal punishments, and clear guidelines ensuring the 
fairness of international prosecution. 
On the other hand, at the national level, the negative side of prosecution prevails 
over the positive side. National prosecutions might have some advantages which are not 
available to international prosecutions. These are the ability to gather evidence, having 
local judges and prosecutors who apprehend the origin of the problem and the seriousness 
of the offense, and the prevailing culture and tradition in the region of the offense.  
However, other obstacles addressing national prosecutions can be expected. These 
include the lack of statutes criminalizing the harmful conduct, extradition, the statute of 
limitations, inability to execute penal sentences issued in absentia and the non-availability 
of the defendant (being in power.) In addition, both limited national sentences as legal 
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precedents and the high risk of infringing the defendant’s rights can be considered 
negative factors at the national level.  
In the end, the view toward pursuing war crimes, including environmental crimes, 
differs depending upon the corner from which the view is seen and a battle between 
different values should be expected. If the desire to accomplish environmental justice is 
the prevailing goal of the prosecution policy, there is no question, at least to some extent, 
that achieving the goal will be at the cost of a human rights value, specifically the 
defendant’s rights.  
If the human rights value becomes unbeatable, then environmental justice will 
face some obstacles either nationally or internationally. Therefore, reaching harmony 
between international and national legal frameworks is a necessity for the near future. 
This does not suggest that the compromise between the two values, environmental justice 
and human rights, is impossible, but it is a difficult task to achieve in light of current 
developments reached by both some national legal systems and the international legal 
system.  
Until a compromise between the two values is reached, and the fact that legal 
development is not free of suffering is accepted, private interests (defendants’ rights) 
should cede priority to common interests (environmental justice) for at least some period 
of time.  
 
 
Sufficiency of the U.N. Remedy 
Chapter I 
Devising an Adequate Remedy for  
Using Environmental Damage as a Strategy in  
the 1990-1991 Gulf War   
 
Introduction 
I. Environmental Impacts on the Gulf Region  
II. United Nations Remedy for Environmental Devastation 
III. The Nature of the United Nations Remedy  
IV. Difficulties with and Disadvantages of the United Nations Remedy 
V. The Sufficiency of the United Nations Remedy    
VI. Arguments against a Criminal Remedy for Environmental Destruction in the 
Gulf Region  
 
Conclusion and Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Sufficiency of the U.N. Remedy 
Chapter I 
 
Devising an Adequate Remedy for  
Using Environmental Damage as a Strategy in  
the 1990-1991 Gulf War   
 
Introduction 
On August 2, 1990 Iraqi troops, executing Saddam Hussein’s orders, invaded 
Kuwaiti territory. He based his orders on several justifications. Before the invasion, Iraq 
claimed that Kuwait had exploited Iraq’s diversion by a war with Iran by constructing 
military and petroleum facilities on Iraqi territory.1 This claim of sovereignty 
infringement was not Iraq’s only justification; it claimed other theories as well.2 
However, the international community rejected all of these justifications after the Iraqi’s 
announcement that it annexed Kuwait on August 6, 1990.3    
 One of the remarkable steps the United Nations took to preserve and maintain its 
goals was its response to the crisis caused by the then Iraqi president. Before 1945, use of 
force was legal and often represented a tool to achieve governmental policy. In 1945, 
however, the international community established the United Nations to maintain 
international peace and security.4 Article (2) of the United Nations Charter requires all 
                                                 
1 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem, Kowiet Wjood Wa Hodooda [Kuwait’s existence and borders: Impartial facts 
and Iraqi allegations] 17 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 3rd ed. 1997)(Arabic). 
2 Iraq claimed that its annexation of Kuwait represented the justice doctrine requiring Arab states to share 
wealth “oil” among themselves. Iraq argued that its annexation of Kuwait supported Islamic maxims 
obligating every Muslim to fight against corrupted rulers. Lastly, Iraq contended that both the state of 
Kuwait and United Arab Emirates were in a conspiracy against Iraq to increase their production of oil to 
decrease the price to harm the Iraqi economy. Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem, Kowiet Wjood Wa Hodooda 
[Kuwait’s existence and borders: Impartial facts and Iraqi allegations] 32 (Center for Research and Studies 
on Kuwait, 3rd ed. 1997)(Arabic).    
3 Security Council Resolution (662) provides that “… annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and 
whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void.” See S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 
45th Sess., 2934st mtg, P.1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990).   
4 Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter provides “ The Purposes of United Nations are: 1. To maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
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members to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” 5 The Charter lists 
several mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution in lieu of force of arms.6  
As a general rule, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”7 
However, the use of force in self-defense has always been recognized as legitimate in 
international law.8  
 Within the United Nations framework, the Security Council has primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.9 From 1945 to 1990, the 
Security Council rarely invoked its power under chapter VII because conflicts during this 
period usually involved one of the two “superpowers,” the United States or the Soviet 
Union, or their clients, and both superpowers were permanent Members10 of the Security 
Council with veto power. During this period, the only Security Council authorization to 
                                                                                                                                                 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace.” U.N. Charter art.1, para. 1.   
5 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.  
6 U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. Although at time states continue to resort to the use of military force against 
other states to resolve disputes, however, implicating further Charter provisions. U.N. Charter arts. 39-45.  
7 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. See J. G. Merrills, The Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in The 
United Nations and the Principles of International Law 49-65 (Vaughan Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds., 
Routledge 1994).   
8 The United Nations Charter states “Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council..” U.N. Charter art. 51. See Adams Roberst, The Use of Force in The UN Security 
Council 133 (David M. Malone ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2004).   
9 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. See Max Hilaire, United Nations Law and the Security Council 5-24 
(Ashgate Publishing Company 2005).  
10 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. See Susan C. Hulton, Council Working Methods and Procedure in The UN 
Security Council 237 (David M. Malone ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2004); see Pual Kennedy, The 
Parliament of Men 51-76 (Penguin Books Ltd 2007).   
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use force against a “breach of peace” was in response to North Korea’s attack on South 
Korea in 1950 (at a time when the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council and 
therefore was unable to cast a veto.)11 After the Soviet Union returned to the Security 
Council, the General Assembly passed a resolution stating that if the Security Council 
failed to exercise its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security, the General Assembly “shall consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.”12  
Beginning in 1990, with the end of the Cold War and the decline of West-East 
tension, the Security Council became much more active in authorizing the deployment of 
military forces. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Security Council 
adopted a resolution that it “1) condemns Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; and 2) demands that 
Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which 
they were located on 1 August 1990.”13  
After Iraq ignored the international community’s resolution, the Security Council 
resorted to stronger mechanisms by imposing trade sanctions14 and authorizing forcible 
maritime interception operations by states acting in defense of Kuwait.15 Ultimately, the 
Security Council authorized states “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement” 
                                                 
11 The Security Council recommended that states furnish “such assistance” to South Korea as necessary to 
repel that attack and restore international peace and security in the area. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th  
Sess., 474st  mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (1950). 
12 G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,  302 mtg, U.N. Doc.  (1950).  
13 S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2932st  mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). 
14 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2933st  mtg, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).  
15 S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2938st  mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).  
10 
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Security Council decisions that demanded Iraq’s immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal.16  
Under that authority, the United States, leading a multinational coalition in 
January 1991, commenced an air campaign that concluded 42 days later after coalition 
ground forces swept through Kuwait and into southern Iraq, setting up a buffer zone 
between the two states. During that armed conflict, Saddam Hussein used all available 
tools attempting to prevent the coalition forces from liberating Kuwait. One of these tools 
was environmental destruction accomplished primarily by releasing and burning oil 
which caused massive pollution to all environmental elements (hydrosphere, lithosphere, 
and atmosphere.)17 This destruction of the environment represented a unique event in the 
history of warfare.18   
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a perfect example of the breach of peace and 
international security cited by the United Nations Charter and reflects clear violations of 
both international and regional treaties.19 It is, as described by the first U.S. President 
                                                 
16 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2963st  mtg, para. 2 U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). See Frank 
Berman, The Authorization Model: Resolution 678 and Its Effects in The UN Security Council 153 (David 
M. Malone ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2004).   
17 Hydrosphere means the aqueous vapor of the atmosphere. Lithosphere includes the outer part of the solid 
earth composed of rock essentially like that exposed at the surface, consisting of the crust and outermost 
layer of the mantle, and usually considered to be about 60 miles (100 kilometers) in thickness. Atmosphere 
encompasses the whole mass of air surrounding the earth .  
18 A detailed study of the causes and effects of the pollution are included in appendices 2. See infra. app. 2  
19 For instance, it violates article 2 (4) of U.N. Charter. This article provides “The Organization and its 
Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles…. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations …” U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The invasion infringes the 
League of Arab States. Article V of the League provides “Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes 
between two or more member-states of the League is prohibited.” Charter of the League of Arab States art. 
V; In addition, the invasion was a clear violation of Islamic Brotherhood Rules. See Dr. Abdullah Al-
Gneem, Kowiet Wjood Wa Hodooda [Kuwait’s existence and borders: Impartial facts and Iraqi allegations] 
18 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 3rd ed. 1997)(Arabic); Indeed, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
implicates the General Assembly’s definition of aggression and its examples. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. 
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974). Art 1, 3(a).   
11 
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Bush, “a blatant use of military aggression.”20 The legality under international law of the 
Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait is crucial 21 to establishing Iraq’s responsibility for 
those environmental impacts. This legality is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Chapter I of this thesis examines the sufficiency of the U.N. remedy for the 
environmental damage caused by Saddam Hussein during the 1990 conflict and whether 
a better remedy could have been devised. Part I of this chapter briefly surveys the 
environmental impacts caused by Saddam Hussein during the conflict. Part II describes 
the U.N. remedy imposed for that deliberate environmental destruction and Part III 
examines whether this remedy was civil or criminal.  Part IV investigates the difficulties 
and disadvantages of the U.N. remedy. Part V addresses whether the U.N. remedy was 
sufficient to meet the international community’s need to protect the global environment 
during armed conflict. Finally, Part VI responds to arguments against the proposed 
remedy, a criminal remedy.                                 
I. Environmental Impacts on the Gulf Region  
 Armed conflict is an enemy of the environment. One observer wrote “the worst of 
all polluters is war.”22 Another said that “[i]t is a truism that warfare is detrimental to the 
environment.”23 Although “the environment has been a repeated victim of military 
strategy,”24 we did little about it. Environmental destruction in war has been caused in 
                                                 
20 Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and It’s Oil, N.Y. TIMES, August 3, 1990, at A1, Col. 6.  
21 Some argue that using the oil during the Gulf armed conflict represents a clear violation of the laws on 
use of force. A prerequisite for this argument is that the use of force from the beginning must be unjustified 
and illegal according to international law. See Anthony Leibler, Delibrate Wartime Environmental 
Destruction: New Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67 (1992). 
22 Elisabeth Mann-Borgese, The Protection of the Marine Environment in the Case of War, in the Future of 
the International Law of the Environment 105-106 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1985).  
23 Aruther H. Westing, The Environment Aftermath of Warfare in Viet Nam, 23 NAT. RECOURCES J. 
365, 387 (1983).   
24 Marc Ross, Environmental Warfare and The Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat 
International Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT’L L. 515, 517 (1992). 
12 
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many ways.25 The Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 is an ideal example of environmental 
destruction as a military tactic.  
 In setting fire to Kuwaiti oil wells, Saddam Hussein invented a new military 
weapon. He used it to destroy the environment and Kuwaiti property. His attack on oil 
was unlimited and indiscriminate; it pervaded the entire biosphere. Saddam Hussein’s 
actions exceeded environmentalists’ greatest fears.26 He proved that his threat to destroy 
the environment27 was not a “joke”. With regard to Iraqi actions against the environment, 
the wonder was “What kind of people would do this? That’s what we kept asking 
ourselves in Kuwait City yesterday. Day had been turned into night, so thick was the 
canopy of smoke as the nation’s oil wells burned gold and orange along the black-fringed 
horizon.” 28 
 This environmental crisis was caused on Saddam Hussein’s orders.  Destruction 
of oil, a natural resource, was one of the strategic aims of the Iraqi aggression. According 
to captured Iraqi documents,29 this destruction plan was called the "Deferred Destruction 
Plan." Therefore, it is clear that the destruction was not inadvertent nor imposed by 
pressing circumstances nor the result of aerial bombardment by the Coalition Forces as 
Iraqi authorities claimed.30 In short, it was a premeditated crime and it was calculated as 
part of the overall strategic plan of the Iraqi invasion. 
                                                 
25 Marc Ross, Environmental Warfare And The Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat 
International Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT’L L. 515, 517-520 (1992). 
26 Whatever Happened to….Chemical Weapons, TIMES, March 11, 1991, at 19. 
27 Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, Febraury 23, 1991, at A10.  
28 Robert Fisk, Crisis in the Gulf: Something Evil Has Visited Kuwait City, The INDEPENDENT, 
February 28, 1991, at 1. 
29 See infra. App. 3.  
30 Letter dated 17 June 1993 From The Permanent Representative of Iraq to The United Nations Addressed 
to the President of Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25976 (1993). ¶ 9, 11.   
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 The extent of the then Iraqi leader’s role or involvement in the destruction plan is 
derived through direct and indirect (circumstantial) evidence. The indirect connection is 
based upon the following analysis: according to Iraqi documents, since the Republican 
Guard was responsible for implementing the destruction plan31 and these forces received 
their orders directly from the head of the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein masterminded 
this plan or ordered that it be created. In addition to the indirect connection theory, there 
were several captured Iraqi documents which indicate that this plan was ordered by the 
Iraqi leader personally. The plan caused massive pollution in the region. 
Hydrosphere pollution was caused by several sources (oil fires, oil lakes and 
fallen substances). This type of pollution resulted in severe and expected health risks to 
both human beings and other creatures. Lithosphere pollution resulting from oil lakes 
caused further damage. Atmosphere pollution was another result of the oil fires and oil 
lakes. This pollution injured human and animal health without warning. The pollution 
caused by Saddam Hussein’s actions had no temporal or jurisdictional limit in harming 
the environment.32  
 Even fish eggs and larva were affected by air pollution caused by the fire from oil 
wells. One of the studies reported that some dangerous petroleum materials were found in 
                                                 
31 Item 2 of document 5 provides “Appointed sabotage squads to mine the oil wells and power and 
electricity stations that have been prepared for deferred destruction, and preparing and finalizing all the 
requirements for their destruction, so that every group is stationed in its designated place in order to blow 
up these targets as soon as orders are issued.” This document is a memo issued 10 days after the invasion 
by the Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces, Republican Guard Infantry Brigades 19, 20, 22 and 23, 
Artillery Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Air Defense Command of Nubu-
khath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Armored Battalion Command, Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of 
Republican Guard. This document shows the involvement of the Republican Guard in implementing the 
Deferred Destruction Plan. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5.   
32 A detailed study of the causes and effects of the pollution are included in appendix 2. See infra. App. 2.  
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high concentration on the water surface.33 It is well established that these materials cause 
harm to fish eggs and larva.34 Moreover, oil may cover and the block gills of fish causing 
fish martality.35  
 Oil lakes also affect soil adversely. Toxic substances resulting from the oil lakes 
may accumulate in plant tissue, constituting a carcinogen which causes death to any 
animal eating such plants.36 Areas within the boundaries of the oil lakes were considered 
biologically dead.37 After the oil lake dried, oil tar or sludge remained, causing severe 
disturbances in the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the soil 
environment.38  
 Dark coloration of the soil surface leads to greater heat absorption, increased soil 
temperature, and consequently increased water loss by evaporation.39 A study 
acknowledged that damages to natural vegetation were caused by the increased 
temperature of atmosphere and soil, the decrease of photosynthetic activity from the 
                                                 
33 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 249 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).   
34Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 249 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).   
35 Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil Pollution 
in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 47 (Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 2001)(Arabic).  
36 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 (Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
37 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert 
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi 
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).   
38 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert 
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi 
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).   
39 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert 
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi 
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).   
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burning of many oil lakes.40 Finally, oil lakes affected the ground water aquifer.41 Sea 
water used to extinguish the oil-well fires also contributed to the loss of soil 
productivity.42   
 As for the effect on public health, some studies show that asthma and respiratory 
system problems increased after the pollution occurred.43 These studies concluded that 
children were more vulnerable to these types of disease than adults.44 Also, an increase in 
allergies of the eyes, skin, and nose was noticed during 1991.45 Smoke caused by oil fires 
reached the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.46 
 A decrease in natural childbirth and an increase of short-weight children were 
recorded.47 One of the studies suggests that air pollution caused by the burning oil wells 
was one of the causes of increasing natural abortions and of congenital deformities.48 
These are some of the short term health effects reported after the invasion. Now there is a 
                                                 
40 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some Desert 
Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi 
Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 174 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996). 
41 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells 
in Iraqi Documents] 271-296 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic); See also Dr. 
Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ Natural 
Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 202 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).   
42 The amount of sea water used to extinguish oil-well fires was estimated at about 1.5 billion gallons 
(25,000 gallons daily) Due to temperature increase, water evaporates and salt remains in soil which 
prevents plant growth. The amount of salt added to soil due to the use of sea water was about 76,500 tons 
of salt. It cannot be washed out by a little of rain water (100-150 millimeters annually). See Dr. Abdullah 
Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in Iraqi 
Documents] 261,266 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).    
43 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells 
in Iraqi Documents] 231 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
44  See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 232 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
45 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells 
in Iraqi Documents] 234 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
46 Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 261 (Kuwait University, 1992).  
47 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells 
in Iraqi Documents] 234 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
48 M. Maqseed, The Effects of the Aggressive Iraqi Invasion on the Obstetric Practice in Maternity Hospital 
of Kuwait, 47 (Kuwait Foundation For the Advancment Science, ed. 1995).  
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long-term study of 400 families in Kuwait being conducted to examine the long-term 
effects of air pollution caused by the burning of the oil wells and this study is expected to 
last from 15 to 25 years.49  
Sadly, “The newest victims of this war wear no dog tags. They carry no proof of 
nationality. They espouse no conviction that God or Justice or history is on their side. 
Indeed they took no side.”50 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
cautioned “What is being destroyed today-and the damage which has been and could be 
caused stay with us-all of us- for a very long time. It will affect generations to come 
which have had no say in the matter.”51 It was not surprising that environmental damages 
caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait were cited clearly in the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 687 for the first time in history as compensable damages for which 
Iraq is liable.52     
II. United Nations Remedy for Environmental Devastation 
 Iraq’s international liability for the environmental damages it caused during the 
Gulf armed conflict was established by the Security Council Resolution 687 stating 
“Iraq… is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign 
Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait.”53  
                                                 
49 Dr. Mustafa Al-Desouky, Impact of Oil Well Fires on the Air Quality in Kuwait, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, 26 
(on file with author).    
50 Ellen Goodman, A Crime Against Humanity and Nature, CHI. TRIB. February 3, 1991, at 4. 
51 United Nations Program, Gulf War Oil spill: UNEP Appeal for International Action, News Release, 1991 
No. 1. 
52 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2981st  mtg, P.19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).  
53 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2981st  mtg, P.19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). 
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 Iraq accepted this liability in a letter directed to both the Secretary-General and 
the President of the Security Council three days after Resolution 687 was passed. To 
create a mechanism to implement Iraq’s liability, the Security Council created “a fund to 
pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above [direct loss claims as a 
result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait] and to establish a commission to 
administer the fund.”54  
 Thus, the Security Council directed the Secretary-General to “develop and present 
to the Security Council for decision… [and] recommendations for the fund to meet the 
requirement for the payment of claims… and for a programme to implement the 
decisions, including: administration of the fund, mechanisms for determining the 
appropriate level of Iraq’s contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of 
the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be 
suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements 
of the people of Iraq, Iraq’s payment capacity assessed by international financial 
institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi 
economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by 
which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating 
losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect 
of Iraq’s liability, and the composition of the commission.”55  
 On May 20, 1991 the Security Council passed Resolution 692 adopting the 
Secretary-General’s recommendations to establish the commission and the fund 
                                                 
54 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2981st  mtg, P.18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).    
55 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2981st  mtg, P.19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). 
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administration.56 Less than three months later, the Security Council approved the 
suggestion of the Secretary-General that the fund receive up to 30% of the annual value 
of petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq.57  
 The United Nations Compensation Committee (UNCC), suggested by the 
Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council, is not “a court or arbitral 
tribunal before which the parties appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially 
fact-finding function of examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, 
assessing payments and resolving disputed claims; it is only in this last respect that a 
quasi-judicial function may be involved.”58 The UNCC is a subsidiary organ of the 
United Nations Security Council.  
Establishing the UNCC was a unique and unprecedented event59 in international 
law. The UNCC differs from the mixed claims commissions commonly used to resolve 
international disputes for over 200 years. First, the UNCC’s commissioners were not 
chosen by disputing parties, but were appointed by the Governing Council, the supreme 
body of the UNCC, after nomination by the Secretary-General. Second, the UNCC did 
not follow adversary procedures permitting parties to appear before panels of 
commissioners. Importantly, commissioners are independent to ensure impartiality of the 
process.60  
                                                 
56 S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2987st  mtg, P.3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991).  
57 S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 3004st  mtg, P.3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/705 (1991).  
58 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution (687) 1991, 
May 2, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22559.     
59 See David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Tradition of 
International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 2 (1994); Stanley J. glod, International 
Claims Arising Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, 25 INT’L L. 713, 719 (1991). 
60 See Robert C. O’Brien, The Challenge Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United 
Nations Compensation Commission, 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 9 (1998).    
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 The UNCC consists of three main bodies: the Governing Council, Panels of 
Commissioners, and the Secretariat. The claims process begins with the Secretariat and 
ends before the Governing Council. The Governing Council, whose membership reflects 
the composition of the Security Council at any given time, is charged with “establishing 
guidelines on all policy matters... Organizing the work of the commission and the 
procedures to be applied to the processing of claims and to the settlement of disputed 
claims…”61 In addition, the “amounts recommended by the panels of commissioners are 
subject to approval by the Governing Council.”62 The Governing Council’s decisions are 
final and not subject to appeal.63  
 Panels of commissioners consisting of three members have to “report in writing 
[to]the Governing Council on the claims received and the amount recommended to be 
awarded for each claimant.”64 The Secretariat provides administrative, technical, and 
legal services to the Governing Council and panels of commissioners.65  
 Regarding claims resolution, panels of commissioners are required to apply 
“Security Council Resolution (687) and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, the 
criteria established by the Governing Council for particular categories of claims, and any 
                                                 
61 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution (687) 1991, 
May 2, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22559, at 19, II/M-4.   
62 Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council, 
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 40 (1), U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).  
63 Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council, 
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 40 (4), U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).   
64 Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council, 
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 38 (e), U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).  
65 Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council, 
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 34, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).  
20 
 
Sufficiency of the U.N. Remedy 
pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In addition, where necessary, 
commissioners might apply other relevant rules of international law.” 66  
 As a general matter, panels of commissioners are required to reach decisions 
regarding claims within six months from the date the commissioners receive the claims. 
However, where claims are “large and complex”, a panel is allowed to review them for 
up to 18 months. Environmental claims were considered “large and complex claims.” 
Deadlines were established to file claims.67 
III. The Nature of the United Nations Remedy  
 In municipal law, when violation of the law causes environmental damages, 
administrative, civil, and criminal remedies are available to natural legal persons. Some 
of these remedies may not be available in international law due to state sovereignty or to 
the lack of legal structure or political will. 
 It can be argued that the U.N. remedy imposed on Iraq is civil. However, if 
international law creates criminal responsibility for violating states, one of the remedies 
would be payment of compensation. The similarity of the compensatory remedy in 
criminal and civil actions makes it difficult to determine whether the U.N. liability 
imposed is criminal or civil.  
Both types of liabilities arise from the same legal source: violation of an 
international obligation. It should be noted that under international law imposing criminal 
responsibility on a state’s nationals does not prevent imposing any other kind of 
                                                 
66 Provisional Rules for Claims Procedures, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council, 
47 [su ‘th’] Year, art. 31, U.N. Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/INF. 1 (1992).  
67 U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Claims Processing , http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm (last visited 
April 1, 2006). 
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responsibility on the state itself.68 In the context of the debate regarding the penal 
responsibility of states, proponents say that the penal responsibility of states is an 
international expression of outrage toward a state’s policy which is in conflict with 
internationally accepted norms.69 The justification for such a view is that the state’s 
population should either have prevented the commission of the international crime or 
imposed a liability that would have deterred the decision-maker and stimulated the public 
to take affirmative action to stop the crime or at least to attempt to prevent its 
commission.70  
Although the penal responsibility of states at the international level has no place 
yet in any international convention,71 it has been argued that Germany in the wake of 
World War II was subject to penal responsibility.72 Thus, the absence of this 
responsibility from international conventions has led some to argue that penal 
responsibility should be found in other sources of international law.73 Others argue that 
states may be subject to responsibility for international crimes, but that such 
responsibility is neither civil nor criminal but international.74  
                                                 
68 Article 4 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and  Security of Mankind lays down “The fact 
that the present Code provides for the responsibility of individuals for crimes against peace and security of 
mankind without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of states under international law.” Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25 
(4), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).  
69 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 86 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
70 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 85 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
71 The concept of the penal responsibility of states was not adopted in the international tribunals’ 
jurisprudence regardless of the source of such tribunal, victorious states agreement (Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals), U.N. Security Council’s decisions (international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda), or international treaty (International Criminal Court).  
72 Robert Friedlander, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law: Fact or Fiction?, 17 Case-W. Res. J. 
Int’l. L. 79, 85 (1985).  
73M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 86 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
74 Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 EJIL 425, 433 (1999).  
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The impression that the penal responsibility of states might exist on the 
international level arises from the appearance of two terms, “act of state” and 
“international crimes,” in the “1996-text of the draft code on states responsibility”75 of 
the International Law Commission (ILC). Article 19 provides: 
 1. An act of a state which constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation is an internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subject-
matter of the obligation breached.  
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a state 
of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental 
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a 
crime by that community as a whole, constitutes an international crime. 
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law 
in force, an international crime may result, inter alia, from:  
(a) A serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that 
prohibiting aggression;  
(b)  A serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance 
for safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that 
prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial 
domination;  
(c) A serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation 
of essential importance for safeguarding and preservation of the human 
environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the 
atmosphere or of the seas.  
4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in 
accordance with paragraph 2, constitutes an international delict.76  
 
Opponents of the penal liability of states claim that such liability violates a 
fundamental principal of criminal justice requiring that both liability and punishment be 
inflicted personally.77 Thus, the center of this argument is that the penal responsibility of 
                                                 
75 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 20 (g), 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. 
(No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).  
76 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Third session (Apr.23-June1 and July 2-Aug.10, 
2001), U.N. DOC. A/56/10 and corr. 1 (2001); see also Joseph Weiler et al. eds., A Crictical Anyalsis of 
the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Walter de Grayter 1989). In its approval text of 2001, 
the ILC does not recognize the penal responsibility of states.  
77 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 86 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
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states allows imposing criminal sanctions on those who play no role in planning, carrying 
out, aiding and abetting, or committing the prohibited behavior.78  
 The penal responsibility of states does not arise in every case where an 
international crime is committed. The criminal conduct should be considered a product of 
state-action. State-action would exist when “collective decision-making and actions by 
individuals who develop a policy or who execute a policy carry out acts which constitute 
international crimes under color of legal authority.”79 In some cases, when a decision is 
taken by a dictator, individual criminal responsibility will be sufficient to do justice.  
Although a review of existing international law suggests that the penal 
responsibility of states does not yet exist, even assuming that the penal responsibility of 
states does exist in international law, the question might be raised: Was Iraq held 
criminally liable for the environmental consequences that resulted from the Gulf War of 
1991? It appears that the remedy taken against Iraq as a result of deliberate environmental 
destruction is civil for two reasons. First, it seems that Saddam Hussein, as a dictator, 
made decisions regarding using the environment as a weapon in the war by himself. As a 
result, in this case, it seems that the “State-action” requirement does not exist since the 
decision to order the destruction of the environment was not taken collectively.  
                                                 
78 Professor Bassiouni poses several questions regarding the penal responsibility of states. These questions 
are: “1. Can a state criminal responsibility be established without establishing the individual criminal 
responsibility of decision-makers and of the principal executor? 2. If the individual criminal responsibility 
of decision-makers and the principal executor is required, (i) what elements of criminal responsibility are 
applicable to such individuals, and (ii) is a state criminal responsibility a consequence of individual 
criminal responsibility or is it something separate and apart from it? 3. When a state criminal responsibility 
is established, can it serve as the basis for establishing the individual criminal responsibility of persons 
other than decision-makers and principal executors, and in that case (i) what are the elements of this 
derivative individual criminal responsibility, and (ii) in what way does this derivative criminal 
responsibility arise? 4. How can state criminal responsibility exist without becoming a form of collective 
criminal responsibility that would violate fundamental principles of individual justice?”  
5. Can penalties for state criminal responsibility be developed that would not penalize individuals who had 
no part in the conduct for which criminal responsibility is to be imposed?  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Introduction to International Criminal Law 88 (Transnational Publishers 2003).  
79 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 85 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
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Secondly, under international law, in order to impose criminal liability, the 
international community is generally eager to ensure that the required international 
standards for justice are preserved. These standards emphasize which authority should 
decide that kind of responsibility (Judicial bodies), the standards of proof, and the 
defendant’s rights. In reviewing how the U.N. remedy was imposed, many of the 
standards assuring fairness in a criminal process were absent. Therefore, the U.N. remedy 
imposed in Iraq for environmental destruction was not a criminal remedy. 
IV. Difficulties with and Disadvantages of the United Nations Remedy 
 Because it was an innovation, the UNCC faced several difficulties and challenges. 
Even before the UNCC was established, some contended that the Security Council did 
not have the authority to establish such a commission since this would make the Security 
Council a judicial organ to solve disputed claims raised by the invasion.80 The argument 
pointed out that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the only judicial body in the 
United Nations system, making that Court the only mechanism to review and resolve 
such litigation. However, the argument that the ICJ must review Kuwait’s claims against 
Iraq for environmental damage ignores the obstacles this remedy could have faced.81  
 Another obstacle the UNCC had to grapple with was funding. The UNCC’s 
operation was expected to be funded by the sale of Iraqi petroleum. To support this 
method, the Security Council in 199182 allowed Iraq to sell its oil as a temporary 
                                                 
80 See Luan Low, Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to International Law 
after the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 471 (1995). 
81 These obstacles are: First, several interested governments such as Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia do not 
accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction. Time consumed to review such claims by the Court is another factor 
supporting exclusion of such an option. Affected states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia might not be able 
to devote an effort to such a litigation process since they were so busy with other burdensome obligations. 
Shiilpi Gupta, Iraq’s Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEO. INT’L EVNTL. L. REV. 251, 
268-269 (1993).  
82 S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 3004st  mtg, P.3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/706 (1991). 
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exception to the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq as a result of the invasion of 
Kuwait. Unexpectedly, Iraq refused the UN’s scheme.83 
 To facilitate UNCC operation, it was allowed access to the Working Capital Fund 
of the United Nations. In 1995, the Security Council adopted Resolution 986 providing 
Iraq with the so called “oil-for-food” agreement. After some delays, the deal began to 
function as of December 1996. The amount deducted for the UNCC was later reduced to 
25%. On May 23, 2003 when Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 1483 whereby the amount deducted for compensation was reduced to 
5% of the proceeds of the sale of Iraq’s petroleum.84 As mentioned before, the UNCC 
does not follow an adversary model. Although in practice it was proved that Iraq had 
been given some opportunity to be heard in the commission process, some contended that 
Iraq should have been given more opportunity.85 
  Another challenge the UNCC had to deal with was conflicting interests. On the 
one hand, a claim should be solved within a required time; while on the other hand, the 
process requires solving the claims in an unprejudiced manner especially for Iraq.86 
 In addition, one of the disadvantages of the U.N. remedy concerning 
environmental claims lies in the priority of these claims. Within the UNCC framework, 
claims were divided into six categories: A, B, C, D, E and F.87 Category “F” claims are 
                                                 
83 U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Claims Processing, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm  (last visited 
April 1, 2006). 
84 U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Claims Processing, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm (last visited 
April 1, 2006). 
85  See Robert C. O’Brien, The Challenge Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United 
Nations Compensation Commission, 31 Cornell Int’l L. J. 1, 23-29 (1998).   
86  See Robert C. O’Brien, The Challenge Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United 
Nations Compensation Commission, 31 Cornell Int’l L. J. 1, 27 (1998).  
87 The category “A” claims are submitted by individuals who had to depart from Kuwait or Iraq between 
the date of Iraq’s invasion on August 2, 1990 and the date of the cease-fire on March 2, 1991. Category “B” 
claims are submitted by individuals who suffered serious injury or whose spouse, children or parent died as 
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claims filed by governments and international organizations for losses incurred in 
evacuating citizens; damage to diplomatic premises and loss of, and damage to, other 
government property; and damage to the environment.88  
 In the beginning of UNCC operations, the focus was on the individual’s claims 
(A, B and C), for humanitarian reasons.89 Because these claims did not involve a large 
amount of money and Iraq did not contend its liability for these losses, these claims did 
not require a detailed review. Thus, the Governing Council adopted its first decision 
giving these claims priority for review and payment.90  
 Subsequently, the UNCC’s focus shifted to D, E and F claims very carefully and 
in a detailed manner have shifted concentration to these claims.91 The commission 
divided these claims into sub-categories depending on the type of loss and the similarity 
of factual and legal valuation factors. A sub-category of mixed E/F claims was 
recognized also.  
                                                                                                                                                 
a result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Category “C” claims are individual claims for 
damages up to US $100,000 each. These claims include losses relating to departure from Kuwait or Iraq, 
personal injury, mental pain and anguish, loss of personal property, loss of bank account, stocks and other 
securities, loss of income, loss of real property, and individual business loss. Category “D” claims are 
individuals’ claims for damages above US $100,000 each. These claims relate to loss of personal property, 
loss of real property, loss of income, and individual business loss. Category “E” are corporations’ claims 
and those of other private legal entities and public sector enterprises. These claims include construction and 
contract loss, loss from non-payment for goods and services, losses relating to the destruction or seizure of 
business assets, loss of profits, and oil sector losses. U.N. Compensation Comm’n, The Claims 
http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/theclaims.htm ( last visited April 1, 2006). 
88 U.N. Compensation Comm’n, The Claims, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/theclaims.htm (last visited April 1, 
2006). 
89 Jeffrey Jannuzzo, On Two Fast-Track UN Agreement, The TIMES (London), Dec. 24, 1996, at 29. 
90 Decision Concerning Priority of Payment And Payment Mechanism- Guiding Principles – [Dec.17], 
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council, 49 [su ‘st’] Year, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec. 
17 (1994). 
91 United Nations Information Service Press Release, United Nations Compensation Commission Appoints 
Commissioners for the Review of Higher Amount Individual Claims, Corporate Claims and Governmental 
Claims, U.N. Doc. IK/96/7 (1996). 
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 Environmental claims were classified as “F4” claims. The Commission has 
received 170 F4 claims seeking US $ 80 billion in compensation.92 “F4” claims were 
divided into two groups: first, claims related to environmental damages inflicted in the 
Gulf region as a result of setting fire to oil wells or releasing oil into the Gulf; second, 
claims by governments outside the region that assisted with the environmental disaster. 
The deadline for filing environmental claims was January 15, 2002.93  
 It is important to bear in mind that UNCC’s jurisdiction is limited to “direct loss 
or damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources…”94 
The UNCC decided that direct loss included “any loss suffered as a result of military 
operations or the threat of military action by either side during the period 2 August 1990 
to 2 March 1991.”95  
 The Governing Council established “Criteria for claims.”96 Environmental 
damages, according to the criteria, are the following: “(a) Abatement and prevention of 
environmental damages, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires and 
stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international waters; (b) Reasonable measures 
taken to clean and restore the environment; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of 
                                                 
92 U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Category F Claims, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/claims/f_claims.htm (last 
visited April 1, 2006).   
93 U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Claims Processing, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/clmsproc.htm (last visited 
April 1, 2006). 
94 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2981st  mtg, P.16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).         
95 Direct loss or damage includes any loss as a result of: (a) military action by either side; (b) departures of 
individuals from Iraq or Kuwait during the period from Aug.2, 1990 to March 3, 1991; (c) actions by Iraqi 
governmental officials, employees, or agents; (d) civil disorder; and (e) hostage taking. Decision taken by 
the governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission during its third session, at the 18th 
meeting, held on 28 November 1991, as revised at the 24th meeting held on 16 March 1992: Criteria for 
Additional Categories of Claims, U.N. Doc. S/23765 (1992). 
96 Decision taken by the governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission during its 
third session, at the 18th meeting, held on 28 November 1991, as revised at the 24th meeting held on 16 
March 1992: Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, U.N. Doc. S/23765, at 1051 (1992).  
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the environmental damage for the purpose of evaluating and abating the harm and 
restoring the environment; (d) Depletion of or damage to a natural resource.”97  
 Kuwait argued that its environmental claims should have been given priority over 
other claims since they were mentioned clearly and independently in the Security Council 
resolution.98 However, mentioning these environmental damages in a Security Council 
resolution was not sufficient to advance the rank of environmental claims for payment 
priority.99  
After reviewing the nature of the U.N. remedy and its shortcomings, the question 
is, assuming that the U.N. remedy constitutes a civil remedy, does it suffice or should we 
turn to a criminal remedy as well?     
V. The Sufficiency of the United Nations Remedy    
In Iraq’s case, recognizing the existence of a dictatorship in Iraq during the period 
of environmental destruction, the assumption is that the decisions taken regarding 
environmental destruction were taken by the then Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. The 
responsibility of the then President of Iraq is the core of this paper. 
There is no question that other members of the former Iraqi government could 
have been found liable for the environmental damage that resulted from the Gulf War 
1991. The basis of such a responsibility varies depending on the other government 
members’ involvement in taking and implementing the decision for environmental 
                                                 
97 Decision taken by the governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission during its 
third session, at the 18th meeting, held on 28 November 1991, as revised at the 24th meeting held on 16 
March 1992: Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, U.N. Doc. S/23765, ¶ d (1992).  
98 S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2950st  mtg, P.8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1991). See Dr. Badrya 
Al-Awadee, Al-Mswolia A-Dwlia Lliraq An Al-Dmaar Al-Beaee [International Responsibility of Iraq 
concerning Environmental Destruction], 64 Journal of The Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 17, 29 
(1992) (Arabic). 
99 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2981st  mtg, P.19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); For the Payment 
Procedure Priority, It is available at  http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/paymproc.htm (last visit July 17, 2007).  
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destruction. The basis of the responsibility of the then President of Iraq will be discussed 
later in this paper.100  
This part of the paper argues that the U.N. remedy for the environmental 
destruction caused by Saddam Hussein’s orders does not meet the current policy the 
international community adopted for protection of the environment. In this part of the 
paper, the focus will be on the international community’s policy for environmental 
protection. In other words, how important is the environment in the international 
community’s view? And what is the best remedy to serve this policy?  
The importance of the environment has been established by the highest judicial 
body in international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated, in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, “[T] he environment is 
not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of 
human beings, including generations unborn.”101 The Court’s statement reflects the 
increase in the importance of environmental protection on an international level.  
 International protection of the environment is constantly increasing both in peace 
time and in war time. During peace time, protection extends to many of the 
environmental elements (atmosphere, water, land, and endangered species) at 
international, regional, and national levels.102 Such protection is beyond the scope of this 
paper which focuses on the international trend to move beyond the traditional civil 
                                                 
100 See infra Ch. III.   
101 Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241, para. 29 
(8 July).  
102 For the International level developments, see Lakshman Guruswamy, International Environmental Law  
(Thomson Business 2003); For regional and national developments under the United States and the Kuwaiti 
legal systems, see Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 195-208, 242-290 (Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. 2003). 
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remedy, against responsible states, to individual criminal responsibility in the case of 
deliberate environmental destruction during armed conflict.  
 Even though international environmental law (IEL) has emerged and focuses on 
protection of the environment during peace time,103 while environmental protection 
during armed conflict has developed through the laws of war,104 the two regimes interact. 
As a result, developments in one regime contribute to developments in the other. 
Therefore, it has been argued that IEL should be considered in any process of 
interpretation of the laws of armed conflict.105 Environmental protection in war time, 
however, has developed more slowly. Probably one of the main reasons for this slow 
development is that the law of war is based on a remedy taken in case of the occurance of 
a violation. The responsibility attached to environmental violation during armed conflict 
time is usually criminal. Thus, such a remedy often touches upon a sensitive doctrine 
recognized in international law, that of state sovereignty, particularly criminal 
jurisdiction.  
 In the past, environmental protection during armed conflict depended indirectly 
on the laws of war. Protection of the environment was not the main purpose for enacting 
these international instruments. The main reason was to humanize the tools and means of 
                                                 
103 International environmental law was not meant to be applied during armed conflict because its creation 
was a response to accidental events that occurred during peace time. See Anthony Leibler, Deliberate 
Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International Law, 23 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 67, 70-
71 (1992). 
104 Developments of laws of war prove that fact. The first international warfare instrument dealing with 
environmental protection expressly is the Protocol I additional to Geneva Conventions. On the one hand, 
most international conventions dealing with environmental problems rarely mention the case of warfare. 
Probably, those conventions assume the occurrence of the problem in question during peace time.  
105 R. Malaviya, Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmental Protection: A Analysis of their Inter-
Relationship, ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law (2001).  
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war.106 In the past, protection of the environment could have been achieved indirectly 
through the prohibition on chemical warfare, 107 and the protection of objects which are 
considered important to the civilian population.108  
 Since 1972, when the United Nations held a conference on the human 
environment in Stockholm, the international community has begun to pay more attention 
to environmental issues and environmental protection has begun to gain its own 
independence.109  
 Although the Stockholm Declaration110 that resulted from the Conference is not a 
binding instrument, it was a first step toward more protection for the environment on the 
international level. The Declaration is the cornerstone on which the idea of environmental 
                                                 
106 Michael Howard, Constraints on Warfare in The Laws of War 1, 8 (Michael Howard et. al. eds., Yale 
University Press 1994).   
107 See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 94 LNTS 65 (1925). See also Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
arts. 23, 36, 187 CTS 227 (1907). 
108 The 1949 Geneva Convention protects objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, 
private and public property, and works and installations containing dangerous forces. Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, 75 UNTS 287 (1949). See also 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 56, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977). Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 4 (1), 249 UNTS 240  (1954).   
109 The Conference brought forth a declaration called the Stockholm Declaration that proclaims that “…2. 
Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the 
enjoyment of basic human rights and the right to life itself.” It adds “…2. The protection and improvement 
of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well-being of the peoples and economic 
development throughout the world; It is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of 
all Governments.” In principle 7, the declaration imposes on states an obligation to “take all possible steps 
to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to human 
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.” 
However, the states, according to Principle 21, “have ….. the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.” Concerning any harm that might result; Principle 22 of the Declaration 
urges states to develop rules controlling the civil responsibility that resulted from any violation. Principle 
26 of the Stockholm Declaration provides that “Man and his environment must be spared the effects of 
nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in 
the relevant international organs, on the elimination or complete destruction of such weapons.” Declaration 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 
ILM 1416 (1972).    
110 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972).   
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protection was laid in both peace and war time. Later on, the movement from the civil 
responsibility of the state to criminal responsibility of the individual is reflected in 
international legal instruments.111 
 Five years after the Stockholm Declaration, responding to the conduct of the 
United States military armed forces’ against the environment in the Vietnam War, two 
steps were taken in the context of environmental protection during armed conflict. The 
first was adoption of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict.112 Protocol I deals with 
environmental protection in several articles and considers environmental destruction 
during international armed conflict a violation of the laws of armed conflict.113   
 The second step taken was the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any 
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1976 and opened for signature in 1977.114 Although this 
Convention kept to the traditional remedy against a state violating the Convention’s 
provisions, it is a remarkable step affirming environmental protection when a military 
                                                 
111 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 (2)(b)(iv), UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 
1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998); Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 
20 (g), 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).    
112 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977). 
113 Article 35(3) provides “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.” Article 
55(1) prescribes “Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of the method or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and 
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.” Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
arts. 35 (3), 55 (1), 1125 UNTS 3 (1977). 
114 Article I(1) provides that “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or 
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.” Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I (1), 31 
UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152 (1977). 
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action is about to be taken. These two steps paved the way for the notion that deliberate 
environmental destruction as a military strategy during armed conflict violates the 
common conviction of the international community.  
Consequently, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)115 began an endeavor to particularize environmental protection globally by 
focusing on a specific element, water. Protection of other specific elements has also 
occurred, including the atmosphere, the ozone layer,116 biological diversity,117 climate 
change,118 and endangered species.119  
The importance of the UNCLOS is rooted in its unique features. It authorizes 
states to use criminal sanctions to protect the marine environment, imposing an obligation 
to protect and preserve it.120 The Convention calls upon states to adopt laws that prevent, 
reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, seabed 
activities, vessels, and the atmosphere.121  
The Convention authorizes monetary and stricter penalties against violations.122 
Although it is not clear whether the UNCLOS is applicable during armed conflict, since 
its terms were drafted broadly,123 the argument that the UNCLOS is applicable during 
                                                 
115 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/122.  
116 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, TIAS No. 11,097; 1513 UNTS 323; 26 ILM 1529 
(1987). 
117 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
118 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998). 
119 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 19 ILM 15 (1980); ATS 
1991/32; BTS 87 (1990), Cm. 1332 (1979). Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, 27 UST 1087; TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243 (1973).  
120 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 192, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/122.  
121 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 207-212, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 
62/122.    
122 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 230 (1), Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 
62/122.  
123 For instance, article 194 (2) stipulates “States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities 
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and 
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armed conflict can be made.124 This Convention shows the international trend toward 
criminal responsibility in the field of environmental protection and the existence of a 
criminal remedy in the minds of drafters and negotiators of international conventions.        
Protection of the environment during armed conflict was not absent when the 
U.N. Charter of Nature125 was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1982. Even 
though a U.N. General Assembly resolution is not binding, it might serve as supportive 
and as disclosing evidence of predominant international rules.126 Two decades after the 
Stockholm conference, the United Nations held its second conference on environment 
and development at Rio de Janeiro. This Conference witnessed the birth of a second 
environmental declaration called the Rio Declaration.127 This Declaration was more 
definite and expressive than the Stockholm Declaration on environmental protection 
during armed conflict.128  
                                                                                                                                                 
their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control 
does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.” 
From the previous provision, it is possible to apply it to marine activities. United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea art. 194 (2), Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/122.  
124 John B. Hattendorf, Maritime Conflict in The Laws of War 98, 114 (Michael Howard et. al. eds., Yale 
University Press 1994).   
125 Principle 5 of the Charter provides “Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or 
other hostile activities.” World Charter for Nature princ. 5, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 
No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982); 22 ILM 455 (1983).   
126 The International Court of Justice noted that General Assembly resolutions are not binding; however, 
these resolutions can “provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence 
of an opinoi juris.” Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ report 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-255 (July 8, 1996).     
127 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 
(1992).   
128 Principle 24 provides “Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall 
therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and 
cooperate in its further development, as necessary.” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
princ. 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992).   
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The Rio Declaration did not overlook the necessity for environmental protection 
during armed conflict.129 A noteworthy feature of the Rio Declaration was Principle 15 
that provides “In order to protect the environment, a precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there is a threat of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”130  
Even though it is obvious that such a clause is meant to apply to those national 
guidelines or policies governing activities that might harm the environment, especially 
industrial activities, there is no evidence that this approach does not apply to military 
activities. In any case, this principle shows the new approach that the international 
community has begun to adopt.  
This approach is called the precautionary principle. Even though the 
precautionary principle is new, it has not affected the traditional remedy for any violation 
of the Declaration, the state’s responsibility. The precautionary principle is “a policy for 
action in the face of uncertainty.”131 It has been argued that this approach is part of 
international customary law.132  
The precautionary principle is stricter in the sense that it focuses on preventing 
the occurrence of adverse activities, while the traditional remedial approach centers on 
the question of what should be done after environmental damage has occurred. These 
                                                 
129 Principle 23 of the Rio Declaration states “The environment and natural resources of people under 
oppression, domination and occupation shall be protected.” Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development princ. 23, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992).    
130 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 
ILM 874 (1992). 
131 Nicolas De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles – From Political Slogans to Legal Rules 221 (Oxford 
University Press 2002). 
132 Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law 260-86 
(Kluwer Law International 2002).  
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approaches are, to some extent, similar to the approaches of tort and criminal laws. 
Criminal law aims mainly to prevent harm from occurring. It is precautionary or 
preventive, while tort law focuses more on the victim’s compensation and is remedial,133 
although retribution and deterrence can be viewed as other goals of tort law.134 
Criminal law aims to “prevent harm to society, more specifically, to prevent 
injury to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the public order.” 135 In other words, 
criminal responsibility is imposed to achieve either general or specific deterrence.136 
Deterrence’s goal is to prevent adverse consequences from occurring. Preventing such 
consequences is the essence of the precautionary principle of the international 
community. 
Therefore, any legal remedy taken toward deliberate environmental destruction 
should recognize the contemporary international community’s precautionary or 
preventive policy. Such a remedy should focus more on deterrence than on the victim’s 
compensation. In 1996, issuing its final Draft Code on Crimes against the Peace and the 
Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the preventive 
approach by recognizing the notion that deliberate environmental destruction during 
international armed conflict is a war crime.137 Finally, international efforts to protect the 
                                                 
133 Michael Bayles, Principles of Law, A Normative Analysis 276 (D. Reidel Publishing Company 1987).   
134 Michael Bayles, Principles of Law, A Normative Analysis 210-216 (D. Reidel Publishing Company 
1987).    
135 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 10 (3ed, West Group 2000).   
136 Specific deterrence means to prevent the criminal himself from committing a crime in the future, while 
general deterrence is meant to deter others through punishing the criminal.  
137 Article 20 (g) provides the fruit of 24 years of development regarding environmental protection during 
armed conflict. Article 20 (g) provides “Any of the following war crimes constitute a crime against the 
peace and the security of mankind when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale: (g) in the 
case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the intent 
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby gravely 
prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage occurs.”  Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 20 (g), 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).  
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environment were crowned by the inclusion of environmental protection during armed 
conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.138 
This movement towards criminalization of environmental destruction during 
armed conflict is not unique in international law. The emergence of international criminal 
law is a fact at the current time.139 It is a movement toward criminal protection for the 
environment during armed conflict does not affect or prejudice the civil responsibility of 
states regarding environmental damage caused by warfare.  
Again, to best accomplish deterrence against environmental damage, the stake of 
potential violators must be raised and the responsibility must be narrowed and personal. 
The required remedy must attack the defendant’s interests, monetary or non-monetary. 
Thus, remedies must be directed toward real defendants, those who made decisions 
resulting in environmental destruction, to deter others from making such environmentally 
harmful decisions in the future.  
Unlike municipal jurisdiction, international law does not offer many remedies 
which narrow the responsibility for environmental destruction. The lack of remedy is due 
to the structure of international law and to other hindrances such as state sovereignty. The 
legal remedies anticipated under international law, whether civil or criminal remedies, 
assume that the conduct constitutes an international crime. These remedies, including 
national remedies, will be examined in light of the circumstances of Iraq’s case. 
                                                 
138 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) provides “….2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:… (b) Other 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established 
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: ….(iv)  Intentionally launching an 
attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause….. injury to …. damage to…. widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated…” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 
(2)(b)(iv), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).  
139 See Theodor Meron, Is International Law Moving towards Criminalization? 9 EJIL 18 (1998), 
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol9/No1/index.html (Last visited June 30, 2006). See Antonio Cassese, 
International Criminal Law 16 (Oxford University Press 2003).    
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If this proposition is applied to the U.N. remedy for environmental destruction in 
the Gulf War, unfortunately the remedy was directed toward the wrong defendant, the 
Iraqi people. Thus, in this case and in future cases, neither deterrence nor retribution will 
be accomplished since in fact the responsibility was transferred from the then president of 
Iraq to the Iraqi people. The compensation was paid from the public’s pockets. 
In order to narrow down the responsibility in the case of Saddam Hussein several 
remedies were proposed. They shared a common feature in that all of them were directed 
toward the then Iraqi president. The first suggestion did not differ much from the U.N. 
remedy. This remedy was to pursue Saddam Hussein civilly before municipal courts 
other than Iraqi courts.140  
 This remedy would not have been enforceable against Saddam Hussein if he had 
lacked the funds to pay compensation, especially after his capture. In addition, even 
assuming he had had the funds, such a remedy might have posed a serious question 
regarding compensation already paid under the U.N. remedy, for that could amount to a 
double recovery by claimants for the same damage.   
A second proposal was extremely aggressive and most widely unlawful. It has 
been argued that, in the case of Saddam Hussein, assassination should have been an 
option.141 The proposal relied on military means to pursue political objectives and, 
assuming it was permissible under international law, was not helpful. One of the goals of 
a legal regime is to let people know what is wrong and to determine wrongful behavior 
by imposing a legal remedy. Assassination is per se extra legal. Moroever, it is generally 
                                                 
140 Jordan Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage Taking, 31 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 351 (1991).   
141 Chris Anderson, Assassination, Lawful Homicide and the Butcher of Baghdad, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L. & 
Pol’y 291 (1992).   
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available only during armed conflict. This option, assuming its legality, would not have 
been available after the capture of Saddam Hussein. In 2003, because he was no longer at 
war with the Coalition, killing him extra legally would not have constituted assassination, 
but would instead have been an act of cold-blooded murder. In addition, this suggestion 
would have raised a serious question: who would have been in charge of applying this 
remedy? Did the U.N. Security Council or any state have this right? Such a proposal 
would have created international tension and a threat to international peace and security. 
The same dilemma would have occured if Saddam Hussein were expelled.142  
Holding a criminal trial was the only acceptable remedy remaining in the case of 
Saddam Hussein. While there may be some impediments to criminal prosecution 
generally,143 they were not present in the case of Saddam Hussein. Although, this option 
had proponents144 and there was discussion of the idea of having an international criminal 
trial of Saddam Hussein,145 the U.N. Security Council failed to take action for several 
                                                 
142 Alfred Rubin, Milosevic and Hussein on Trial, 38 Cornell Int’l L. J. 1013, 1017 (2005).  
143 Common hindrances facing international criminal trials are either the lack of political will or peace 
agreements concluded following the cease fire in any armed conflict. See Anthony Leibler, Deliberate 
Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67, 
118 (1992); Captain Peter Masterton, The Persian Gulf War Crimes Trials, 1991-JUNE ARMY LAW 7, 18 
(1991). 
144 The U.S. Senate approved a bill asking the Bush administration to propose an international tribunal that 
would try Iraqi war criminals. See Richard Berkes, Senate Urges War-Crimes Trials, N.Y. Times, Apr.19, 
1991, at A8. A group of lawyers claims that Saddam Hussein should be brought to justice, See Lawyers 
Ask Trial of Hussein Before War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1991, at A4. Saddam Hussein’s  
criminal responsibility was raised by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg at the meetings of heads of 
governments of  the European Community. Philippe Sands et al., The Gulf War: Environment as a 
Weapon, 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 214, 229 (1991).     
145 The question of having a criminal trial derives its existence from the U.N. Security Council resolution 
(674) that requests from all nations gathering documents show evidence of war crimes, human rights 
violations, and economic damages perpetrated by Iraqi authorities and occupying forces during the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait. See Michael Greenberg, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. INT’L L. 
J. 119, 120(1992). It has been argued that the U.N. Security Council could have established an international 
tribunal in its cease-fire resolution. See Howard Levie, War Crimes in the Persian Gulf, 1996 St. Louis-
Warsaw Transatlantic L. J. 153, 136 (1996).                
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reasons.146 As a result of this failure, some conclude that the failure to establish an 
international criminal court for the Gulf War will be a serious precedent in international 
law against criminal prosecution for environmental damage during armed conflict.147   
After obtaining custody of Saddam Hussein, this remedy should have been 
reconsidered for several reasons. First, assuming that deliberate environmental 
destruction is an international crime,148 the maxim, “no crime without punishment,” 
should be followed. Therefore, some believe that establishment of such an international 
criminal court is a peremptory norm under international law.149  
Additionally, in a criminal trial, the stakes are very high since the responsibility is 
personal. Thus, there is a probability that the chance for deterrence through a criminal 
case will be greater than through a civil case.150 It has been said that a criminal remedy 
does not deter in all cases; this has been proved by an increase in recidivism.151 The 
response to this argument is that it is impossible to have a general rule providing effective 
deterrence in all cases. There are a number of factors influencing any criminal, having to 
do with the criminal himself or with his circumstances. Therefore, a criminal remedy 
might not work in some cases, while working in others. 
The criminal remedy meets the current international policy protecting the 
environment. Such a policy requires a tool prohibiting harmful action, not a policy 
                                                 
146 It has been stated that the Bosnia crisis is one of the events that caused the international community to 
overlook the establishment of criminal tribunals. See James Robbins, War Crimes: The Case of Iraq, 18 
fALL FLETCHER F. World AFF. 45, 57 (1994).   
147 Major Arian De Saussure, The Role of Law of Armed Conflict during the Persian Gulf War: an 
overview, 37 A.F.L. Rev. 41, 69 (1994).    
148 This paper concluded in chapter III that Saddam Hussein’s action against the environment could have 
been prosecuted internationally only based upon those provisions protecting property in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. See infra Ch. III.  
149 Louis Beres, Iraq: Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to Punish, 21 DEN. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 335 (1993). 
150  See Michael Bayles, Principles of Law, A Normative Analysis 280 (D. Reidel Publishing Company 
1987).  
151 Michael Bayles, Principles of Law, A Normative Analysis 283 (D. Reidel Publishing Company 1987).   
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requiring care or remedy when the action is taken.152 Criminal remedy is crucial to 
accomplish deterrence, retribution, and education. Criminal remedy is meant to prevent 
harmful actions to the environment from being committed.  More likely, international 
prosecution of crimes against the environment will constitute an importantly persuasive 
precedent in the field of international law. This precedent will enhance and strengthen the 
field of international criminal law regarding environmental violations.153 
Saddam Hussein’s case concerning the environment was a clear case, in light of 
both the intentionality of his behavior and the seriousness of the damage. Hopefully, such 
an egregious case will not often occur on the international level. As a result, the 
opportunity to apply international criminal law to protect the environment will not occur 
again in the near future. This would require taking this unique opportunity to protect the 
environment by a stronger tool, the criminal remedy. Unfortuntly, even though Saddam 
Hussein’s case was a unique chance for the international community to express a strong 
policy, this chance was lost. 
Finally, assuming that deliberate environmental destruction during the armed 
conflict of the Gulf War is an issue that threatened international peace and security,154 or 
that the prohibition of massive and international environmental destruction without 
military necessity was jus cogens norm,155 Saddam Hussein’s action should have been 
addressed with a strong tool to preserve the Rule of Law. For all the above reasons, a 
                                                 
152 Michael Bayles, Principles of Law, A Normative Analysis 281 (D. Reidel Publishing Company 1987).  
153 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 37 (Oxford University Press 2003); See generally Claire 
Harris, Precedent in the Practice of the ICTY in Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence 263 (Richard 
May et al eds. 2001). 
154 Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International 
Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67, 91 (1992).  
155 The author argues that cogens norms need criteria to be identified. One of these criteria is the state 
community interest that preservation of a sound environment serves as a typical example of these interests. 
Eva Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens And Protection of the global Environment: 
Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms, 11 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. Rev. 101, 109 (1998).     
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criminal remedy was a peremptory remedy that should have been taken by the 
international community. 
VI. Arguments against a Criminal Remedy for Environmental Destruction in the 
Gulf Region  
 
Although the criminal remedy has its advantages, it has been criticized as well. 
For instance, in the case of Saddam Hussein, several arguments have been made against 
prosecuting war crimes. Some of those arguments lost their merit after the collapse 
ofSaddam Hussein’s regime and his capture.156  
One of the arguments raised against establishing war crimes trials is that 
“…identifying specific individuals (for prosecution) is very difficult.”157 Such an 
argument is not new in international law. This argument did not prevent the establishment 
of special tribunals at Nuremberg, in the former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda. Generally, a 
trial can be designated to be specific concerning those offenses and criminals over which 
the tribunal would have jurisdiction.  
At the Nuremberg trials, the four big powers (the United Kingdom of Britain, the 
United States, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) made it clear that the 
tribunal would have jurisdiction over major criminals “whose offenses have no particular 
geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacities as 
members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.”158 While other criminals “will 
                                                 
156 These arguments are: the difficulty of extraditing Saddam Hussein while he was in power, the fear that 
changing the political system in Iraq would lead to a political regime allied to Iran and the lack of political 
will to hold the trial. See Louis Beres, Iraq: Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to Punish, 21 
DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 345 (1993); See also for general arguments against international criminal 
prosecution. John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for The Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative 
to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 1, 14 -17 (1999).        
157 Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Said to Withhold Evidence of War Crimes Committed by Iraq, N.Y. Times, Jul. 6, 
1992, at A6.  
158 The Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal art. 1, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 258 
(1945). 
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be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that 
they may be judged and punished according to the laws of those liberated countries and 
of the free Governments that will be created therein.”159  
Environmental offenses committed during the Gulf War involved thousands of 
defendants. Thus, bringing these criminals before one jurisdiction would have been so 
heavy a task that it would probably have caused the failure of the process. There is no 
question but that this process would require cooperation among several countries and 
international organizations. But this argument does not apply to a criminal prosecution of 
Saddam Hussein.  
A second argument against criminal prosecution was that the creation of a 
criminal tribunal would have raised “the risk of visiting “victor’s justice” upon the loser 
of a conflict.”160  Such an argument assumes that the tribunal judges would represent 
only those countries that were against Iraq in the war. To minimize this risk, it has been 
suggested that some of the tribunal judges should have been from countries that took no 
part in the conflict.161  
Another argument claimed against holding war crimes trials is the difficulty of the 
evidence-gathering process.162 This argument might have been valid in other cases, but 
not in the case of environmental offenses committed by the then president of Iraq. These 
                                                 
159 The Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 258 (1945) 
Preamble.   
160 Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War: A Introduction, in Environmental Protection and the 
Law of War: A “Fifth Geneva” Convention on the Protection of the Environment in the Time of Armed 
Conflict 172 (Galen Plant ed. 1992).  
161 Mark J. T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in the Modern Warfare: Customary 
Substances over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. Rev. 479, 506 (1993).   
162 John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for The Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative to 
Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 22 (1999).      
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offenses are well documented in both aspects, plan and effect.163 Moreover, they have 
been subjected to a lengthy investigative process.164 
The last argument was that of cost. It has been said that the cost of the trial would 
have outweighed the benefits of the trial.165 In response, it has been argued that the trial 
was important since it might have played a role in shaping Iraq’s future policy concerning 
its treatment of people and the environment.166 Finally, it is a fact that: 
“[T]he prohibition of the now documented barbarous activities of Iraq falls 
under a “peremptory” rule of international law, which is an absolutely 
binding rule allowing no form of degradation whatsoever.” 167  
 
In any case, it should be noted that the availability of the criminal remedy in cases 
of deliberate environmental destruction during armed conflict is not a decisive or 
conclusive factor in determining whether to resort to this remedy at the international 
level. By and large, the question of whether to use this option should be left to the 
prosecutor’s discretion in light of his priority policy. This discretion should be enforced 
through an internationally prudent policy in order to avoid international tension. This 
policy will be the core of the next chapter.   
Conclusion and Observations 
 Warfare is an enemy of the global environment. The contemporary example of 
this notion was the Gulf War of 1990-1991, in which Saddam Hussein invented a new 
                                                 
163 Hussein Mal Allah, Mojremo Al harb Al-irquoon w Jraemhom kilal Al-ehtelal Al-Iraqi Llkuweit [Iraqi 
War Criminals and their crimes in the Iraqi’s invasion of Kuwait], (Center for Research and Studies on 
Kuwait 1995). (Arabic);  Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya 
[Destruction Oil Wells in Iraqi Documents] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
164 After the Kuwait liberation, the Kuwaiti Government decided to establish a special division within the 
Public Prosecution Office. The sole task of that division is to investigate and gather evidence concerning 
Iraq’s violation of international humanitarian law, including those offenses relating to environment.    
165 Captain Peter Masterton, The Persian Gulf War Crimes Trials, 1991-JUNE ARMY LAW 7, 18 (1991). 
166 Captain Peter Masterton, The Persian Gulf War Crimes Trials, 1991-JUNE ARMY LAW 7, 19 (1991). 
167 Louis Beres, Iraq: Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to Punish, 21 DEN. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 340 (1993). 
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weapon against the environment called oil. Using that weapon, he caused massive 
pollution in the region, extending to the hydrosphere, lithosphere and atmosphere.  
 Addressing environmental impacts and other damage, for the first time in its 
history, the U.N. Security Council established a Commission to determine the scope of 
Iraq’s responsibility and to establish fair compensation for the damages it caused. 
Because the penal responsibility of states does not exist at the current time in 
international law, the Security Council’s remedy is a civil remedy. 
 The Security Council’s remedy faced several difficulties and disadvantages 
resulting from lack of cooperation by the Iraqi Government and the low priority of 
environmental claims. Moreover, the remedy probably would not have served the 
contemporary goals of the international community’s policy of deterring future 
environmental damages from armed conflicts.  
 As an alternative, it is proposed that a criminal remedy should have been sought 
against the real culprit, the then Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. A criminal remedy would 
have reflected the importance the international community places on environmental 
protection. In addition, this remedy could have been a tool to narrow the responsibility as 
a required prerequisite for deterrence, complimenting the precautionary approach the 
international community has begun to adopt for environmental protection. 
 This remedy against Saddam Hussein would have served as a persuasive 
precedent in international criminal law. Applying this remedy to Saddam Hussein’s 
destruction of the environment would not have encountered the obstacles common in 
international criminal remedies. Because the availability of a criminal remedy for the 
environmental devastation of war does not determine when such a criminal remedy will 
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be warranted, the determination should be left to international prosecutors, guided by 
prudent prosecutorial policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Crimes and International Prosecutorial Policy 
Chapter II 
 
International Crimes 
and International Prosecutorial Policy 
 
I. International and Domestic Prosecutors: Similarities and Differences  
II. Prosecutorial Considerations under International Law  
1. Sufficiency of Evidence 
2. The Gravity of the Crime 
III. The International Legal Basis for Adoption of Domestic Prosecutorial 
Considerations  
 
1. The “Gravity of the Offense” and Domestic Considerations 
a. The Impact of the Crime 
b. The Manner of the Commission  
c. Mens Rea 
d. Motive 
Conclusion and Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
International Crimes and International Prosecutorial Policy 
Chapter II 
International Crimes  
and International Prosecutorial Policy 
 International prosecution differs from national prosecution due to differences in 
the structures of international and domestic law. It is necessary to understand similarities 
and differences between both domestic and international prosecutions. With that 
understanding, we can review the legal considerations and determine whether an 
international prosecution is warranted in a particular case. Since some of these 
considerations are not sufficiently clear under international law instruments, however, it 
is important to find a well-developed basis as a guide for international prosecutors in 
making the decision as to whether or not to prosecute.  
 Before adopting a basis for international prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute, a 
legal basis for it should be established under the framework of international law. This 
chapter will be divided into three parts. In Part I, the similarities and differences between 
international and domestic prosecutions will be explored. In Part II, the considerations 
international prosecutors use in making the decision to prosecute will be reviewed, 
including sufficiency of evidence and gravity of the crime under international law.  
In Part III, because the latter consideration is not sufficiently clear within the 
framework of international criminal law, international prosecutors must look to how 
domestic legal systems deal with it. Therefore, the study reviews the international basis 
for adoption of domestic factors determining the gravity of the crime. Finally, domestic 
factors determining when a crime is grave are explored and applied to the case of Saddam 
Hussein’s actions against the environment.  
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I. International and Domestic168 Prosecutors: Similarities and Differences  
 An increase in harmful actions against the environment is well known, both 
during peacetime and in time of armed conflict. Environmental crimes committed during 
peacetime might include illegal dumping of domestic waste, trafficking in toxic waste, 
smuggling of substances that deplete the ozone layer, trafficking in nuclear materials and 
illegal trade in and poaching of endangered species.169  
 Environmental crimes committed during peacetime are left to domestic 
authorities. These violations are controlled by domestic policies and jurisdictions.170 On 
the other hand, environmental offenses committed during international armed conflict can 
be prosecuted by either domestic or international prosecutors. In addressing 
environmental offenses in war, there is interaction between international and domestic 
courts and prosecutors. International and domestic prosecution share common features 
and differ in some characteristics. In the context of criminal justice, both judges and 
prosecutors exercise wide discretion in their actions.171 Such discretion is not exclusive to 
judges and prosecutors. Defendants, in some domestic systems, might have such 
                                                 
168 For the purpose of this paper, domestic law or prosecution means legislation or prosecution relating to 
the practice of one state’s jurisdiction. In federal states, domestic law or prosecution means federal 
legislation or prosecution.   
169 Svend Soyland, Criminal Organizations and Crimes against the Environment: a Desk study, United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (June 2000). 
170 These crimes are left to national jurisdiction. Thus, they cannot be reviewed by an international court or 
tribunal unless they are deemed to be international crimes. The Rome statute does not confer upon the 
International Criminal Court jurisdiction to review those environmental violations that occurred during 
internal armed conflict. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 (c), UN Doc. A/CONF. 
183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998). However, those crimes committed during internal 
armed conflicts were included within the war crimes in the ILC’ Draft since the term that was used was “In 
case of armed Conflict.” Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 20 (g), 1996, 
51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).      
171 Edmond Gabbay, Discretion in Criminal Justice (4th ed., London 1995).    
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powers.172 The same can be said of the international level.173 Conferring prosecutorial 
discretion upon both domestic and international prosecutors is essential.  
International prosecutors have discretion at both the investigative and the 
prosecutorial stages. Such discretion may involve: whether to initiate an investigation 
based on information a prosecutor already has, whether to proceed to trial, with what 
offense to charge the defendant, what evidence to use, and whom to prosecute.   
Discretionary prosecutorial powers are necessary for several reasons. Prosecution 
of violations of the laws of war following armed conflict could involve thousands of 
defendants and hundreds of crimes, making it impossible to prosecute all violators. The 
limited resources available to a prosecutor adds to that impossibility, emphasizing the 
necessity for the prosecutor to exercise discretion.174  
In addition, prosecutorial power “forms the cornerstone of prosecutorial 
independence.”175 A prosecutor, in some domestic legal systems, is part of the executive, 
as in the United States. This prompts the view that “prosecutorial discretion is needed to 
insulate the prosecutor from political interests and to prompt impartiality and 
independence.”176 Moreover, it has been argued that “[T]he exercise of discretion may 
also function as an informal means of testing public reaction to a change in enforcement 
                                                 
172 Under the United States legal system, a defendant has the right to exercise his discretion in fundamental 
issues such as having a lawyer, accepting a plea, appealing his conviction and waiving his constitutional 
rights such as the right to a jury trial and the privilege against self-incrimination.    
173 See Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General 
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35 (1994).   
174 Luc Cote, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 162, 176 (2005).  
175 Mathew Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’ L CRIM. 
JUST. 71, 77 (2004). 
176 Mathew Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 71, 77 (2004). 
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practice that may lead to legislative revision in the area.”177 Finally, such discretion is 
required to “individualize justice.”178  
Accepting the prosecutor’s discretionary power does not mean that this power is 
absolute.  Thus, considerations bounding the exercise of this power are necessary. Yet, 
before examining these considerations, the differences between international and 
domestic prosecutions should be clarified.  
In determining whether to initiate an investigation, an international prosecutor 
should consider international public policy. At the ICC, therefore, “[T]he prosecutor may 
still determine that a full investigation is not warranted if taking into account the gravity 
of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nevertheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”179  
The term, “the interests of justice” is vague. The term may include the question 
whether initiating an investigation will have any effect on the political environment of the 
state over which the prosecutor is exercising jurisdiction.180 Balancing political and legal 
considerations may place the prosecutor in a dilemma in some circumstances. Weighting 
political interests over legal interests may affect the credibility of the criminal justice 
process. 
Unlike domestic prosecutors, an international prosecutor often must create a 
cooperative environment with states that are interested in the prosecution. To fulfill his 
duties, an international prosecutor must follow a prudent policy in the investigation, 
                                                 
177 Leslie Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 265 n.22 (2001).    
178 Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. LAW 532, 533-
35 (1970).   
179 Mathew Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 71, 81 (2004). 
180 Mathew Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 71, 82 (2004). 
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during trial, and after the trial in order to execute the trial’s sentence.181 It has been said 
that “[T]he principal problem with the enforcement of international humanitarian law 
through the prosecution and punishment of individuals is that the implementation of this 
method ultimately hinges on, and depends upon, the goodwill of the states.”182 Moreover, 
unlike domestic prosecutors, an international prosecutor’s power to initiate an 
investigation depends upon how the case reached the prosecutor.183  
 Under domestic jurisprudence, prosecutorial power differs from one legal system 
to another.184 The national prosecutor’s power to charge is not free of tension.185 
Domestic prosecutors have a wider power to decide whether to initiate an investigation 
than do international prosecutors. For instance, domestic prosecutors are not supervised 
by courts in their decision not to go to trial, as they are at the international level.186 
                                                 
181 Mathew Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’ CRIM. 
JUST. 71, 93-94 (2004). 
182 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law, 9 EJIL 2 (1998), http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol9/No1/index.html (last 
visited June 30, 2006). (Examining advantages and disadvantages of international trials in the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. He argues that state sovereignty is 
a major obstacle to the effective enforcement of international criminal justice.)  
183 Under the ICC statute, a Prosecutor may receive notitia crimins through a referral by the Security 
Council, or by a state or any other resources such as nongovernmental organizations, U.N. organs or crime 
victims. After receiving the information from any source other than the Security Council or a state, the 
prosecutor may initiate an assessment whether a prima facia case exists or not. If a prosecutor believes that 
a prima facia case exists, he must submit the case to the Pre-trial Chamber for authorization before 
launching an in-depth investigation. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53 (1), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).     
184 In common-law system countries such as the United States, prosecutors have tremendous powers in all 
criminal justice stages including the sentencing process. See Bennett Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 
U. PITT. L. REV. 393 (1992); See also Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial 
Assistance and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105 (1994). While in civil-law 
system countries, a prosecutor’s power shrinks when a decision to charge is taken. In sum, a prosecutor’s 
status before the court is equivalent to a defense’s attorney’s status.    
185 Theodora Galacatas, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case 
Study of Inter-And Intrabranch Conflict over Gongressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (1995).    
186 After the initiation of an investigation, although the international prosecutors’ power to decide whether 
to prosecute or drop the case is broad, such power is supervised judicially. See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 53 (3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 
(1998).  
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In addition, the domestic prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can be based on 
several justifications such as: the attitude of the victim, the cost of the trial, undue harm 
to the suspect; alternative procedures providing the potential for adequate punishment, 
effective civil sanctions, the willingness of the suspect to cooperate in achieving other 
system goals, or informal administrative procedures that more satisfactorily achieve the 
objectives underlying the criminal statutes.187 Some of these justifications are available 
for international prosecutions, while others are not. 
Domestic and international prosecutors’ powers interact with each other. For 
instance, within the framework of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, international 
prosecution has primacy over domestic prosecution, while, within the framework of the 
International Criminal Court, primacy is given to domestic prosecution.188 After 
examining the similarities and differences between domestic and international 
prosecutions, this study will examine aspects of international prosecutorial power. The 
legal considerations reviewed in this part are the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
gravity of the offenses in light of the case of Saddam Hussein’s actions against the 
environment. Before reviewing these considerations, it should be clear that the purpose of 
                                                 
187 For more information, see Frank Miller, Prosecution, the Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 
(Little, Brown and Company 1969).  
188 This relationship is noticeable in the supremacy of the jurisdiction. In the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, tribunals have a primacy jurisdiction over national 
courts and at any stage of the proceeding, tribunals may request national courts to defer to the competence 
of the tribunals. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991 art. 9 (2), SC res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); See 
also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute art. 8 (2), SC res. 955, UN SCOR 49th sess., 
3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994). While in the ICC, the Court is considered 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
1, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).   
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reviewing these considerations and focusing on environmental offenses is to propose a 
guideline for ICC prosecutors.189       
II. Prosecutorial Considerations under International Law   
 International prosecution decisions take into account several considerations, both 
political and legal. Some of these considerations pertain to the authority of the U.N. 
Security Council, the Assembly of States Party to ICC, and jurisdiction or public policy 
interests190 while others relate to the sufficiency of evidence and the gravity of the crime. 
The two latter considerations will be the focus of the following part.  
1. Sufficiency of Evidence  
 The first question an international prosecutor must ask in determining whether to 
prosecute is whether there is sufficient evidence to secure conviction. Under most 
domestic laws, the question of the sufficiency of evidence is left to the prosecutor to 
decide. However, such a position is not true in international criminal law jurisprudence. 
Even under international criminal statutes governing international criminal courts (ICC 
and ad hoc tribunals), the position differs.  
 Under ad hoc international criminal tribunal statutes, a question regarding 
evidence may arise twice before any international prosecutor. First, the prosecutor 
considers the evidence when he decides whether to initiate an investigation regarding 
                                                 
189 In applying these considerations to Saddam Hussein’s case, it does not follow that there are available 
international bases for criminality in his case regarding the environment. Thus, using the terms “crimes 
against the environment” or “environmental crimes” means actions which are criminal under international 
law, regardless of the legal term. Therefore, “environmental crimes” might mean either those actions 
against the environment that are criminal under the ICC Statute or those actions deemed criminal as crimes 
involving destruction of property.  
190  Mathew Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 71, 93-94 (2004). 
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specific facts he has received.191 Second, the prosecutor again considers evidence when 
he has to decide whether to prosecute. There is no doubt that the standard between the 
two stages, initiating an investigation and initiating a prosecution, differs.  
However, in determining whether to prosecute, the prosecutor’s view regarding 
evidence is not sufficient since “Upon determination that a prima facie case exists, the 
prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of facts and the 
crime or crimes with which the accused is charged under the statute. The indictment shall 
be transmitted to a judge of trial chamber.”192 The judge of trial chamber can confirm or 
dismiss the indictment.193 The judge’s decision depends upon whether he is satisfied that 
a prima facie case has been established by the prosecutor. 
Under the ICC statute, the prosecutor resolves the question of evidence in three 
stages. The first and third stages are similar to those stages under ad hoc tribunal statutes 
mentioned above. Between these two stages, initiating an investigation and prosecuting, 
there is an additional stage in the International Criminal Court’s statute. The statute 
distinguishes between two kinds of investigations, preliminary investigation and in-depth 
                                                 
191 Art. 18(1) of the ICTY statute provides “The Prosecutor shall initiate investigation ex-officio or on the 
basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations organs, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information 
received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed. Art. 17(1) of the ICTR statute 
is identical to art. 18(1) mentioned above. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 18 (1), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 
(1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute art. 17 (1), S.C. 
Res. 955, UN SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).     
192 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 18 
(4), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); See also 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute art. 17 (4), S.C. Res. 955, UN SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd 
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).     
193 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 19 
(1), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); See also 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute art. 18 (1), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 
3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).   
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investigation. Initiation of a preliminary investigation is left to the prosecutor’s 
discretion,194 while an in-depth investigation requires the prosecutor to get judicial 
authorization.195 Such approval is required only when a prosecutor decides to initiate an 
investigation proprio motu.196 Such approval is not required when the case reaches the 
prosecutor through the U.N. Security Council or a state party.197  
Returning to the standard of evidence the prosecutor applied in deciding whether 
to prosecute under ad hoc tribunal statutes; “prima facia case” is the standard.198 This 
standard should be understood in conjunction with the standard provided by article 47 of 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.199 Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, in explaining the 
standard the trial judge should apply in reviewing the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute, 
stated “Although the meanings are close, I am not completely convinced that “prima 
facie case” fits exactly the standard of “reasonable grounds.”200 The “reasonable 
                                                 
194 Article 104 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence Provides that “1. In acting pursuant to article 
53, paragraph 1[ initiation of an investigation], the prosecutor shall, in evaluating the information made 
available to him or her, analyze the seriousness of the information received….” Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the International Criminal Court art. 104, ICC-ASP/1/3, at 10, and Corr. 1 (2002), U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000).  
195 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15 (3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).   
196  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 61 (7), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).  
197 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13 (a)-(b), UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 
1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998). Such approval disappeared in the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Statute.  See art. 47 of The Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Reprinted in 
John Jones & Steven Powles, International Criminal Practice 1001 (Transnational Publishers Inc. 2003).  
198 Article 18 (4) of the ICTY’s statute provides “Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the 
Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes 
with which the accused is charged under the Statute. The indictment shall be transmitted to a judge of the 
Trial Chamber.” Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 18 (4), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 
1159 (1993).  
199 Article 47 (E) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides “ The reviewing Judge shall 
examine each of the counts in the indictment, and any supporting materials the Prosecutor may provide, to 
determine, in applying the standard set forth in Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Statute, whether a case exists 
against the suspect.” ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006)    
200 John Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 186 
(Transnational Publishers 1998).   
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grounds” standard is a prosecutorial standard used in determining whether to prosecute. 
According to this standard, a prosecutor has to have reasonable grounds to believe that an 
accused committed the action charged with the existence of the required mens rea.    
Judge McDonald adds “[T]he prima facie case has the same meaning provided by 
the Draft statute for an international criminal court adopted by ILC.”201 Under that Draft, 
prima facie case is understood to be a credible case which would, “if not contradicted by 
the Defense” be a sufficient basis upon which to convict the accused on the charge.202 In 
connection with this standard, whether there is sufficient evidence, Saddam Hussein’s 
case will be discussed in the next chapter of this research.203 
2. The Gravity of the Crime 
 After satisfying the requirement for sufficiency of evidence, the international 
prosecutor must determine whether the criminal actions in question are grave enough to 
trigger the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals. 
Internationally, the gravity of the crime is an issue which plays a significant role 
in different parts of the criminal justice process. It may affect the admissibility of the case 
before the International Criminal Court204 and the prosecutorial power. If the gravity of 
the crime is so great compared to the interests of justice, the prosecutorial power may be 
reviewed by the Pre-trial Chamber. The prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with 
                                                 
201 Quoted in John Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda 96 (Transnational Publishers 1998).     
202 John Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 96 
(Transnational Publishers 1998).   
203 See infra Ch. III.  
204 Article 17(1)(d) of the ICC statute provides “ Having regard to paragraph 10 of the preamble and article 
1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:…The case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court.” See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17 (1)(d), 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).    
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prosecution is not effective until it is confirmed by the Pre-trial Chamber.205 Thus, the 
prosecutor is bound to proceed with either the investigation or the prosecution if the Pre-
trial Chamber does not agree with the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed.206 
Since “the gravity of the crime” is a very important factor in the process of 
international criminal justice, this factor’s meaning should be made clear for prosecutors 
investigating international crimes, particularly environmental crimes that require 
investigative skills and special training. The gravity of environmental crimes should be 
understood since many international judges, as well as domestic judges, are not well 
versed in environmental protection and therefore may not be sensitive to the seriousness 
of environmental crimes.  
Some judges may believe that environmental cases are more appropriately 
handled by means of international settlements than by criminal prosecution. This attitude 
may affect their ability to consider punishment adequate to achieve deterrence as a 
primary goal for prosecution. At the international level, the gravity of the offense is 
determined on a case-by-case basis without clear guidelines. For example, it has been 
ruled that: 
“[I]n order for violation of international humanitarian law to be “serious” 
within the meaning of the Statute [ICTY Statute], two elements must be 
fulfilled. First, the alleged offense must be one which constitutes a breach 
of a rule protecting important values. Secondly, it must also be one which 
involves grave consequences for the victim.” 207   
 
                                                 
205 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53 (3) (b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 
1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).  
206 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court art. 110(2), ICC-ASP/1/3, at 10, 
and Corr. 1 (2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000).  
207 The charge in this case was plundering a village. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 
¶ 1154 (November 16, 1998).  
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Unfortunately, the Tribunal in the previous case did not provide guidelines outlining 
when those consequences are “grave.” However, the Tribunal adopted the value of the 
stolen property as a standard for determining whether the violation was “serious.”208 
Nevertheless, where the gravity of the crime is important, there is no single international 
criminal instrument providing a benchmark for criminal gravity. The importance of the 
gravity of the crime is also vital in the sentencing stage, since a sentence may be appealed 
by the prosecutor or by the convicted person on the grounds of disproportion between the 
crime and the sentence.209  
Although adoption of a policy in pursuing prosecution is not new for the 
international community,210 in order to avoid tension between domestic jurisdiction and 
international judicial intervention, guidelines instructing international prosecutors 
concerning the gravity of the crime are critical. The purpose of these guidelines is to 
establish a priority policy for the pursuit of prosecution and to protect human rights.211 
                                                 
208 The Tribunal dismissed the charge based on the fact that “the evidence before the Trial Chamber fails to 
demonstrate that any property taken from the detainees in the Celebici prison-camp was of sufficient 
monetary value for its unlawful appropriation to involve grave consequences for the victims.” Prosecutor v. 
Delalic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 1154 (November 16, 1998).    
209 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 78 (1), 81 (2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 
ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Court art. 145 (1)(c), ICC-ASP/1/3, at 10, and Corr. 1 (2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000).    
210 Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of the Crime and the Treatment of the Offenders 
calls upon such guidelines. It argues that “….17. In countries where prosecutors are vested with 
discretionary functions, the law or the published rules or regulations shall provide guidelines to enhance 
fairness and consistency of approach in taking decisions in the prosecution process, including institution of 
a waiver of prosecution.” U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1 at 189(1990).    
211 Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 provides “ All [including defendants] are 
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are 
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any 
incitement to such discrimination.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc 
A/810 at 71 (1948). Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 21(1), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 
1159 (1993); See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute art. 20 (1), S.C. Res. 955, UN 
SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); see the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone Statute art. 17 (1), S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 
(2000).  
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Moreover, the guidelines will be useful for international prosecutors since international 
criminal law, substantive and procedural, is not yet well-developed. 
An international prosecutor has only one place to seek guidelines concerning the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion: the domestic level. In the criminal justice process, 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in domestic legal systems is the appropriate 
discipline from which to extract prosecutorial guidelines at the international level. Before 
examining these domestic considerations regarding the concept of “the gravity of the 
crime,” the basis for adoption of domestic considerations in the international legal system 
should be established. 
III. The International Legal Basis for Adoption of Domestic Prosecutorial 
Considerations  
 
 Article 38 (1)(c) of the International Court of Justice statute provides that “The 
Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.”212 Relying on these “general principles” as a source, the drafters of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice statute intended to avoid a situation in which the 
Court would announce that the claim is non-liquet, i.e, it could not be upheld or rejected, 
because of the lack of international rules governing the issue in dispute.213 Although 
neither the Permanent Court of International Justice nor the International Court of Justice 
has issued a judgment based on such a source,214 this does not undermine the source’s 
                                                 
212 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL Supp. 215 
(1945).   
213 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 130 (Malcolm Evans eds., 
Oxford University Press 2003).  
214 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 131 (Malcolm Evans eds., 
Oxford University Press 2003).  
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importance. This source is expected to play an important role in developing international 
law on both the procedural and the substantive sides.  
 This source can be interpreted in several ways. It might mean that these rules can 
be derived from a comparison among different domestic legal systems and the discovery 
of those considered common to all or to a majority of those systems.215 Another 
interpretation is that these general principles are those rules applied by the ICJ, including 
rules applicable directly to international legal relations such as pacta sunt servanda, i.e, 
what has been agreed to must be respected.216 Some have classified these rules into three 
groups: general principles of interpretation, procedural standards of fairness and 
substantive general principles.217  
 Accepting the view that general principles are those derived from national legal 
systems, it has been said that they can be identified through three approaches: a 
comparative approach, a categorical approach and a mixed approach.218 A comparative 
approach requires conducting a comparative-law project. Thus, “general principles,” 
according to this approach, are rules which are recognized by all major systems of law 
and are applied by the most representive systems of domestic law. Such an approach has 
been criticized as being burdensome.219  
 The categorical approach focuses on those principles which are “inherent in the 
very nature of law and might be discernible from a single legal system or without 
                                                 
215 See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 131 (Malcolm Evans eds., 
Oxford University Press 2003).  
216 See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in International Law 132 (Malcolm Evans eds., 
Oxford University Press 2003).  
217 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law, 57 
AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 287 (1963).  
218 Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General 
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 66-81 (1994).  
219 Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General 
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 68 (1994).   
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reference to any municipal system at all.”220 A third approach would adopt those rules 
which are inherent in the legal order and which have been examined by judges to 
evaluate their character as a candidate for these general principles.221  
This paper adopts the categorical approach in identifying those principles which 
fall within the concept of “general principles recognized by civilized nations.” As a 
matter of fact, these principles are recognized as a source in international law and furnish 
international law with many procedural and substantive rules in different fields of law. 
The international rules governing contracts provide an example.222 
Per contra, there is no doubt that “Direct translation between domestic and 
international jurisprudence may well do violence to the real values and policies served by 
principles ostensibly accepted at both levels.”223 Therefore, these domestic principles can 
be adopted only as long as they do not contradict international standards of fairness and 
the structure of international law, especially if they serve internationally recognized 
interests regarding the protection of human rights, such as defendants’ rights to be equal 
before the law.  
 In the context of international criminal law, Professor Mohammed Cherif 
Bossiouni has stated that “Increasingly, comparative criminal procedure furnishes 
international law with general principles of law, which are identified from national laws 
                                                 
220 Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General 
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 74(1994).  
221 Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General 
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 75(1994).  
222 See Lord McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y. B. 
INT’L L. 1, 16 (1957).  
223 Christopher Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and “General 
Principles of Law,” 5 DUKE. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 77(1994).  
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with norms of general part and the procedural part of domestic criminal law and which 
apply to the direct enforcement system.”224  
An international resort to domestic criminal laws is common as shown in the 
practice of international judicial bodies such astribunals and courts. Such a resort occurs 
in the several stages of criminal justice proceedings such as crime concept and 
sentence.225 More recently, the “general principles” source was adopted expressly in the 
Rome Statute. Article 21(1)(c) provides that “The Court shall apply:(c) Failing that, 
general principles of law derived by the Court from the national laws of the legal systems 
of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws by which the States would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards.”226  
The motive for the establishment of procedural safeguards such as the 
prosecutorial guidelines derived from domestic criminal laws based on the “general 
principles” source is the desire to protect human rights. This desire allows international 
law to borrow from an area of law which was formerly governed exclusively by domestic 
laws.  
                                                 
224 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 5 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
225 For instance, in respect of crime concept, article 5 of the Special Court for Sierra Leone statute provides 
“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed the following crimes 
under Sierra Leonean law…” See the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute art. 5, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. 
SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (2000); regarding the sentence adoption, article 24(1) 
of ICTY statute states “ 1. …in determining the terms of imprisonment, The Trial Chambers shall have 
recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the Courts of the former Yugoslavia……”   
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 24 
(1), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); See also 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute art. 23 (1), S.C. Res. 955, UN SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd 
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).  
226 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 21 (1)(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 
1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).   
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For instance, several procedural guarantees in international criminal justice owe 
their existence to domestic legal systems. Their adoption has been accomplished through 
the judicial experience more than through the legislative process. These guarantees are 
varied and belong to all stages of judicial proceedings. Examples of these safeguards are 
the right to life, liberty, and security; the right to be recognized before the law and to 
equal protection of the law; the right to be free from arbitrary arrest; the right to be free 
from torture, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment; the right to be 
presumed innocent; the right to a fair trial; the right to legal assistance; the right to a 
speedy trial; the right to appeal; the right to be protected from double jeopardy and the 
right to be protected from ex post facto laws. The rules of evidence have passed through a 
similar progressive process as well.227  
In conclusion, taking into account the common practice international criminal law 
draw upon to domestic criminal justice systems, and concepts the desire to protect human 
rights in international prosecutions, specifically the right to equal application of the law, 
requires adopting international prosecutorial guidelines defining the gravity of the crime 
from the domestic law source of “General Principles.”  
1. The “Gravity of the Offense” and Domestic Considerations 
At the outset, it should be clear that the presence of other considerations affecting 
the decision to prosecute, such as the availability of investigative and litigation resources, 
the existence of non-criminal remedies and the anticipated ends of the criminal 
                                                 
227 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 591-626 (Transnational Publishers 
2003). 
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prosecution, is assumed.228 As with international law, under domestic jurisprudence, if a 
crime is deemed serious, this characteristic can affect many aspects of the criminal justice 
process, especially the procedural side. The gravity of the crime affects statutory 
limitations for both the prosecution and the execution of the sentence,229 the jurisdiction 
of judicial and investigative bodies,230 the defendant’s rights,231 the prosecutor’s power 
to dismiss or drop the case,232 custody,233 the speed of both the investigation and the 
trial,234 the manner of the investigation235 and both the available punishment and the 
process of sentencing.236 
                                                 
228 Professor Gershman divides these considerations into legal, political, experimental and ethical 
considerations. See Bennett Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging 
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 513 (1992).  
229 In the French criminal justice system, there is a statute of limitations on initiating prosecution. Such  
limitations depend on whether the offense is serious: if the offense is serious, such prosecution should be 
brought within ten years, while if the offense is minor, the prosecution should be brought within one year 
from the day when the offense was committed. C.PR.PEN. arts. 7, 9 (fr.). In addition, in serious crimes, an 
issued sentence should be executed within 20 years, while minor offenses’ sentences should be executed 
within 2 years. C.PEN. arts. 133-2, 133-4 (fr.).    
230 In the Kuwaiti criminal justice system, if a felony is committed, the case will be investigated by the 
Public Prosecution Office before the first instance court for felonies, while when a misdemeanor is 
committed, the case will be investigated by the police officers before the first instance court for 
misdemeanors. Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, arts. 4, 7, 
9 (Kuwait).    
231 Due to the gravity of the offense, several defendants’ rights are affected. For instance, under the U.S. 
criminal justice system, the defendant’s right to be tried by a jury does not apply in the case of petty 
offenses. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 284 U.S. 373, 86 S. Ct. 1523, 16 L. Ed. 2d. 629 (1966). Under the 
Kuwaiti system, the right to legal assistance does not attach when the trial concerns a minor offense. 
Moreover, the Kuwaiti Criminal Procedure Code does not confer upon a defendant the right to appeal 
where the punishment does not exceed 40 Diner as fine ($120). Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal 
Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, arts. 4, 5, 7, 9 (Kuwait). In French criminal jurisprudence, generally, 
a defendant has the right to appeal his or her conviction based on either factual or legal grounds. However, 
this right is limited to the legal grounds in minor offense convictions. See Catherine Elliott, French 
Criminal Law 49 (William Publishing 2001).    
232 Under Japanese criminal jurisdiction, the prosecutor has the power to dismiss or drop the case when it is 
minor due to its consequences. KEISOHO [Japanese Criminal Procedure] art. 248 (Japan). The same 
provision is in the German system; see StPO [Germany Criminal Procedure Code] art. 153 (F.R.G.) 
233 The French prosecutors can confine a suspect if the offense is serious. Catherine Elliott, French Criminal 
Law 25 (William Publishing 2001). 
234 In the case of serious crimes, the power to expedite the investigation can be given to the French 
prosecutor if the suspect was caught shortly after the commission of the offense, if the suspect was found in 
possession of incriminating objects soon after the commission of the offense, or if the offense was 
committed in a private home. C.PR.PEN. art. 53 (fr.).   
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Moreover, the gravity of the crime can be one of those factors that guide pre-trial 
judges in deciding the issue of pretrial or provisional release.237 Also, the gravity of the 
crime s
se principles from domestic 
stem
importance of these considerations varies from one 
territor
                                                                                                                                                
hould be considered by prosecutors when they have to decide whether to enter 
into a guilty plea agreement with any potential defendant.238 
 This part of the paper assumes that general principles are derived from domestic 
legal systems. However, the methodology of extracting the
sy s is based on the categorical approach which focuses on the nature of the national 
law and does not require attributing those principles to any specific domestic legal 
system. Thus, it is enough that these principles or considerations are inherent in the 
nature of any domestic criminal law. 
Some of these considerations may not apply in some circumstances (crimes), 
while they may apply in others. The 
y to another239 and from time to time. Whether prosecutors adopt any of these 
considerations as policy or guidelines governing the power of the prosecution differs 
depending on how much the domestic legal system has developed in that country.  
 
235 Under French criminal law, “A social investigation destined to shed light on the personality of the 
offender is compulsory for serious offenses.” See Catherine Elliott, French Criminal Law 36 (William 
Publishing 2001).  
236 See Catherine Elliott, French Criminal Law 51 (William Publishing 2001).  
237 Within the United States laws, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (g)(1). While under the ICC statute, the Pre-trial 
Chamber, in determining whether to release the defendant, will consider the following questions: Whether 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant has committed the crime with which he is 
charged, whether it is necessary to hold the defendant to ensure his appearance at the trial, and whether 
holding the defendant will prevent him from obstructing or endangering the investigation or the court 
proceedings, whether holding the defendant will prevent him from continuing with commission of the 
crime or related crimes. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 58 (1), 60 (2), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998). See ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence art. 65 (b), UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).    
238 U.S. Principles of Federal Prosecution, Section 9-27-420 (A)(3), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm (Last visited July1, 2006).  
239 William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: the Limits of 
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument to Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1993). (arguing that 
an attempt to limit prosecutorial discretion in the U.S. to the European Model is unlikely to work).  
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 In countries that have an undeveloped legal system, these general principles, upon 
which prosecutorial considerations concerning the gravity of the crime are based, do not 
ers these considerations are in the prosecutor’s minds but not in 
their m
ant to be used 
require direct adoption by the domestic legislatures for a decision as to whether to 
prosecute. Therefore, these considerations can be indirectly extracted from either 
legislation or policy.   
So, these considerations might be adopted expressly by prosecutors in some 
countries, while in oth
anuals. In the latter case, prosecutors resort to both laws and legislative history in 
order to determine when the crime is considered grave or serious. On the other hand, 
some countries have developed specific considerations for environmental crimes, while 
other countries are satisfied with general considerations controlling prosecutorial decision 
or discretion towards all kinds of crimes including environmental crimes.  
 By and large, these considerations can be used in either direction, either for 
prosecution or to dismiss the case. Some of these considerations are me
only against the decision to prosecute.240 There is no doubt that some domestic 
considerations are not suitable for adoption at the international level mainly because of 
the structure of the international legal system.241  
                                                 
240 In England, the Code of Crown Prosecutors provides examples of these considerations, such as whether 
the court is likely to impose a nominal penalty, whether the defendant has already been made the subject of 
a sentence and whether any further conviction would be unlikely to result in the imposition of an additional 
sentence or whether the offense was committed as a result of a genuine mistake or misunderstanding of the 
law. However, these considerations do not include the gravity of the crime. See the Code of Crown 
Prosecutors § 5.10,  http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/code.html. (last visited July2, 2006).  
241 These considerations are, for instance, whether a defendant voluntarily disclosed violations, whether a 
defendant (corporation) has its own compliance program, whether a defendant (corporation) has taken any 
internal disciplinary action toward negligent employees, whether there is any concealment of misconduct or 
falsification of required records or whether there has been tampering with monitoring or control equipment. 
These considerations assume that there is a complete legal system regarding environmental problems and 
that it has been issued by a legally recognized legislature.     
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In some countries, such as England, Australia and South Africa, these 
considerations are called “Public Interest” considerations. Some public interest 
considerations have no relation to the issue of the gravity of the crime.242 However, the 
above countries have reduced the prosecutorial screening stage to a couple of questions. 
The first inquiry concerns the sufficiency of evidence, while the second is reached when 
a prosecutor answers the first question in the affirmative. The second question is whether 
the public interest requires the decision to prosecute.243 The public interest can be 
measured through examining several considerations, some of them relating to the gravity 
of the crime.  
Moreover, in order to extract general principles, “In certain cases it may be 
necessary to examine some of the non-Western legal systems, such as Muslim or Hindu 
Law, now actively represented in the family of nations.”244 Gravity considerations are 
present as well in certain religious legal systems such as the Islamic Criminal Justice 
system.245 Some countries, such as Australia, set criteria determining which one of the 
suspects should be the target of the prosecution.246 
                                                 
.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/code.html
242 Those factors are the age of the defendant, whether the defendant tried to pay the compensation, and 
whether details that could harm sources of information or national security….etc may be made public.  See 
the Code of Crown Prosecutors § 5.10 (g)(h)(i),  http://www . (last 
visited July2, 2006). 
243 See the Code of Crown Prosecutors available at  http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/code.html. 
(last visited July2, 2006); In Australia, see Public Prosecution Policy available at 
http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/prosecution_policy_guidelines.pdf#search='Public%20Policy%20Prosecution
%20Australia' (Last visited July 3, 2006). In South Africa, see Prosecution Policy, 
http://www.npa.gov.za/default_06.htm (Last visited July 3, 2006).   
244 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law, 57
AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 285 (1963).  
245 The Islamic Criminal Justice system consists of two parts: subst
 
antive and procedural. The substantive 
ral part of the enforcement process. Both parts, “rather than a uniform 
part deals with acts punishable by the Koran or by the Kalifah’s order (the ruler’s legislation). The 
procedural part governs the procedu
and unequivocal formulation of the law, are a scholarly discourse consisting of the opinions of religious 
scholars, who argue, on the basis of the text of the Koran, prophetic tradition and the consensus of the first 
generations of Muslim scholars, what the law should be.” Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in 
Islamic Law, Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century 1 (1st ed., Cambridge 
2005). See also Dr. Ghaouti Benmelha, Ta’azir Crimes in The Islamic Criminal Justice System 219 (M. 
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Again, these considerations should not be viewed as exclusive considerations and 
an application of them should not be done strictly. Some considerations might apply in 
some circumstances, while they might not in other circumstances. In sum, these 
considerations will serve as a luminous tool to seek and to do justice. In this part of the 
paper, the considerations reviewed are: the impact of the crime, the manner of its 
commission, mens rea, and motive.  
a. The Impact of the Crime 
 The first consideration determining whether the crime is serious is the harm or 
damage resulting from the commission of the offense. The more serious harm leads to the 
charge of a more serious offense, assuming the similarity of the elements of the offense 
except for the resulting damage.247 The consideration of harm might not apply in some 
offenses that do not result in harm when just committed.248 The extent of the harm may 
affect the classification of the offense and the sentence.249 This consideration is shown 
clearly in those policies governing prosecutorial decisions.250  
                                                                                                                                                 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Ocean Publishers Inc. 1982). See also Mathew Lippman ET AL., Islamic Criminal 
Law and Procedure, An Introduction (Praeger 1988).    
246 See Australian Public Prosecution Policy, 
http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/prosecution_policy_guidelines.pdf#search='Public%20Policy%20Prosecution
%20Australia' (Last visited July 3, 2006). 
247 For instance, in any legal system, murder
defendant in either case, murder or attempted murder, has committed the same conduct; however, the
punishment is different due to the consequ
 is punishable more seriously than the attempt to murder. A 
 
ences of the offense (the death of the victim). This is true as well 
ovides that “A person who, in violation of the provisions of 
 disease of Class A under any of the following circumstances, shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years of criminal detention and; if the result is especially 
serious, to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than seven years.” China 
Criminal Code art. 330 (P.R.C.).   
250 In South Africa, England, Australia and United States, public policies regarding prosecution adopt the 
nature and seriousness of the offense as one of the factors that should be considered by prosecutors in 
deciding whether to prosecute or not. See the guidelines of the Code of Crown Prosecutors,   
in environmental offenses. Under the U.S. legal system, specifically within the Clean Water Act, compare 
between 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (C)(2)& (C)(3).  
248 These crimes are various such as tampering with monitoring equipment or destroying records required 
by the law to be held. 
249 Article 330 of the China Criminal Code pr
the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases, causes the spread or a great risk of the 
spread of an infectious
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More importantly, in international environmental offenses, the impact of the 
crime may affect the question as to the existence of an international crime. Under 
interna
to both
tional jurisprudence, deliberate environmental destruction during armed conflict 
does not constitute an international war crime unless the impact of the crime is serious.251   
In determining when the harm or damage is gross in the context of crimes, a 
prosecutor has to consider both actual and potential harm, and short and long-term effects 
 the environment and to human health.252 In addition, a prosecutor has to take into 
account the social and economic impact of the offense.253  
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/code.html. (last visited July2, 2006); South African Prosecution 
Policy, http://www.npa.gov.za/default_06.htm (Last visited July 3, 2006); see Australian Prosecution 
Policy, 
http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/prosecution_policy_guidelines.pdf#search='Public%20Policy%20Prosecution
%20Australia' (Last visited July 3, 2006); U.S. Principles of Federal Prosecution, Section 9-27-420 (A)(3), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm (Last visited July1, 2006).       
251Deliberate environmental destruction that does not meet certain requirements concerning the harm that 
occurred is not criminal behavior under international law. Nevertheless this requirement regarding the 
seriousness of the harm appears in all international legal instruments dealing with environmental 
destructi
to another. For instance, the ENMOD Convention provides that “Each State Party to this convention 
undertakes not to engage in military or any hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of the destruction, damage or injury to any other 
on during international armed conflict. The rigidity of this requirement differs from one legal text 
State Party.” “Widespread” encompasses an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers. “Long-
lasting” means that environmental impact would last for a period of months or approximately a season. 
“Severe” would require that the environmental damages involve serious or significant harm to human life, 
natural and economic resources or other assets. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I (1), 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152 (1977). On 
the other hand, the meaning of these requirements (widespread, long-lasting and severe) differs from the 
meaning of the same adjectives required by other international instruments (Protocol I, Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and the security of Mankind and the ICC statute.) These instruments require that 
any environmental destruction during international armed conflict should be widespread, long-term and 
severe. In other words, these adjectives should be present concurrently. Plus, the meaning of these 
adjectives is more rigid than the ENMOD meaning mentioned above. For differences between ENMOD 
and Protocol I. See Yoram Dinstein, Protection of the Environment in International Armed Conflict, 5 Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 523, 542 (2001). 
252 Environmental impact might mean dead fish from polluted water, loss of threatened or endangered 
species or their habitats that may be irreplaceable; contamination of land, air and water; poor plant health 
due to the pollution; and an impact on flora, fauna and the ecosystem, while the human impact may include 
looking at death, serious injury or other health problems such as persistent respiratory problems or the 
spread of disease.    
253 The economic impact may include replenishing fish stocks, effects on business and employment, crop 
damages, lose of tourism and the costs of cleanup.    
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In terms of the impact resulting from the 1990-91 Gulf War, there was massive 
environmental destruction. Such severity is unique on several grounds. First, the 
environ
re, the lithosphere, the biota and the public health. In terms of 
atmosp
ures in the areas surrounding the oil wells caused the 
destruction of vegetation.259 Soot caused by the oil-well fires hindered the growth of 
mental pollution occurred as a result of more than one pollution source, both the 
oil fires and the oil lakes.  
Secondly, the pollution affected all of the environmental elements including the 
atmosphere, the hydrosphe
heric impact, the concentration level of sulfur dioxide exceeded the safe levels 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO).254 Also, hydrocarbons were 
found in a high concentration in some areas of Kuwait.255 One of the effects of smoke 
from the fires was a decrease in the regional temperature.256 This drop is due to the 
increased concentration of pollutants in the atmosphere which dimished the amount of 
sunlight stored by the soil.257 
Plants were victimized by the oil-well fires. Oil rain killed plants in Kuwaiti 
territory.258 Higher temperat
                                                 
254 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait] 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 31 (1992)(Arabic).   
255 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
al Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).     
al Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).   
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait] 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 32 (1992)(Arabic).   
256 Dr. Yosef Al-Ebraheem ET AL., Al-eqtesadyaat Alarbia Wa Al-Kazoo al-Iraqi to Kowiet [Arabic 
Economies and Iraqi Invasion to the State of Kuwait] 29 (Arabic Planning Institution, December 1992 
ed.)(Arabic). 
257 Dr. Yosef Al-Ebraheem ET AL., Al-eqtesadyaat Alarbia Wa Al-Kazoo al-Iraqi to Kowiet [Arabic 
Economies and Iraqi Invasion to the State of Kuwait] 29 (Arabic Planning Institution, December 1992 
ed.)(Arabic). 
258 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL. 37 
(UNEP,Region
259 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL. 41 
(UNEP,Region
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plants.2
lnerable to these kinds of disease than adults.266 
Also, a
60 Lack of oxygen due to heat was an additional source of loss of vegetation.261 
As for the impact on the lithosphere, oil lakes played a role in affecting the soil adversely. 
Some toxic substances resulting from the oil lakes accumulated in plant tissue and 
constituted a carcinogen which kills any animal eating those plants.262 Areas within the 
boundaries of the oil lakes were considered biologically dead.263 After drying, oil tar or 
sludge remained, causing severe disturbances in the physical, chemical, and biological 
properties of the soil environment.264  
With regard to the effect on public health, some studies showed that asthma and 
respiratory system problems increased after the pollution occurred.265 These studies 
concluded that children were more vu
n increase in allergies of the eyes, skin, and noise was noticed during 1991.267 As 
                                                 
260 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
L Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
aya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
ental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some 
enter for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL. 41 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).   
261 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia L
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait] 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 34 ( 1992)(Arabic).   
262 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabe
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
263 M. El-Din ET AL., Environm
Desert Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the 
Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).   
264 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some 
Desert Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the 
Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).    
265 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 231 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
266  See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 232 (C
267 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 234 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).  
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for the economic impact, the cost of the burned oil was estimated at approximately 200 
billion dollars.268     
b. The Manner of the Commission  
By and large, the manner of commission of the offense should be considered as 
offense. Although the manner plays a role in 
determ
noticed is the use of oil as a weapon. This 
weapon accomplished two fundamental aims of Iraq’s then President, targeting his 
well in determining the gravity of the 
ining the harm or damage that results from the offense, it becomes more important 
when the offense does not cause any harm at all. In determining this matter, there are 
several factors which can be classified by the manner of the commission of the offense 
such as the nature of the weapon269 (in case of environmental offenses, the pollutant), the 
crime scene or location,270 the time of the crime271 and the commission of the offense by 
more than one person. Some national criminal laws aggravate an offense solely because it 
was committed by more than one person.272  
In the Gulf War of 1991, the way the offense was committed has contributed to 
the massive pollution. The first point to be 
                                                 
268 Dr. Yosef Al-Ebraheem ET AL., Al-eqtesadyaat Alarbia Wa Al-Kazoo al-Iraqi to Kowiet [Arabic 
Economies and Iraqi Invasion to the State of Kuwait] 29 (Arabic Planning Institution, December 
1992)(Arabic). 
269 In environmental offenses, what kind of pollutant was used? How great was the concentration of 
pollutants? How many pollutants were used? All these questions must be reviewed by a prosecutor in 
determining the gravity of the offense. In Italy for instance, if the waste is highly radioactive, the 
punishment is aggravated. Organized Environmental Crime in EC Member States, final Report, at 334 
(2003), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/crime/pdf/organised_member_states.pdf  (Last visited July10, 
2006). 
270 In the context of the location of an environmental crime, commission of the crime in an area with a 
fragile ecosystem is graver than commission of the crime in an area with a fairly stable ecosystem.  
271 With regard to the time of commission of an environmental crime, commission of an environmental 
crime during a low flow period of time should make the crime graver than commission during a high flow 
period.   
272 The French Penal Code aggravates theft when the offense is committed by two persons or more. C.PEN. 
art. 311-4-1 (fr.). Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art. 221 (6) (Kuwait). 
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oppone
l lakes around the country.276 Some of these 
and tons of sulfur 
                                                
nts’ wealth and their environment. It is well established that oil is a substance that 
is very dangerous to water, air and soil.273 
 The concentration of the pollution is another consideration for this review. Some 
estimated the flow of oil at 60 million barrels;274 others reckoned it at 24 million.275 The 
flow of oil formed approximately 570 oi
lakes were 5 kilometers in length and 500 meters in width.277 They covered a space of 49 
Km/square.278 The depth of these lakes ranged from 60 to 120 Cm.279  
  The amount of oil burned was estimated at 2.5 to 6 million barrels daily.280 
Assuming that 2.5 million barrels were burned daily, the resulting substances were; 20-40 
thousand tons of black smoke, 250 tons of carbon monoxide, 20 thous
dioxide, 1500 tons of toxic substances, and 500 tons of nitric oxide.281 Soot and oil mist 
were noticed on soil as a result of the burning oil.282  
 
273 See infra. App. 2. 
274 Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 266 (Kuwait University 1992). 
275 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 192 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).    
276 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
 Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 192 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
ronment and Development 266 (Kuwait University 1992). 
 October 1991, 18 
e State of Kuwait] 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
 for West Asia, Sep. 1991).    
Natural Resources and
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).    
277 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 258 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).   
278 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 192 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).    
279 Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Envi
280 Dr. Mustafa Al-Desouky, Impact of Oil Well Fires on the Air Quality in Kuwait, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th
(on file with author).    
281 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for th
Journal 20, 23 ( 1992)(Arabic).  
282 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 30, 
(UNEP,Regional Office
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Three types of oil flames were formed: black smoke, white smoke, and a clean 
flame without smoke.283 In addition, the means used to set the fire in the oil well heads is 
a partic
ed to execute this operation and cause so great an impact is thousands of 
individ
 the gravity of a crime arises from the 
tentional offense is graver than an unintentional offense, whether such 
offense
en a crime is committed 
intentio
commit it.”287  
    
ularly wicked one. The means was dynamite, used to ensure either the fire or the 
flow.284  
According to captured Iraqi documents,285 it is estimated that the number of 
actors us
uals, including military, technical, and non-military personnel. This fact indicates 
the seriousness of the crime and its intentionality.     
c. Mens Rea 
Another general principle in determining
fact that an in
s are based on recklessness, negligence or strict liability.  
In most offenses, such as those relating to life (murder and assault), property 
(property destruction and arson), as against the environment, wh
nally, the punishment is more serious. Thus, the intention of the offender is an 
indicator of the gravity of the crime.286 In the same context, the French Penal Code 
stipulates that “There is no serious crime or major crime in the absence of an intention to 
                                             
pment 266 (Kuwait University 1992). 
al system, specifically within the Clean Water Act, compare between 33 U.S.C.A. § 
283 Jassem Al-Besharah, The Kuwaiti Oil Fires and Oil Lakes: Facts and Numbers, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, at 
14; Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Develo
284 Jassem Al-Besharah, The Kuwaiti Oil Fires and Oil Lakes: Facts and Numbers, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, at 14 
(on file with author). 
285 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
286 Under the U.S. leg
1319 (C)(1) - (2). 
287 C.PEN. art. 121-3 (fr.). 
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In the Gulf War of 1991, it was reported by the Australian Foreign Minister that 
there is “Credible evidence that the spill was deliberately engineered by the 
Iraqis…..These particular environmental consequences are not to be attributed ….to the 
inadver
onnel and civilians were 
real defendant, the 
the war. 
This plan can be inferred from the threat of Iraq’s then president to destroy the 
                       
tent effect of artillery action or things of this kind.”288  
 Iraq tried to deny the link between the environmental impact and its actions by 
claiming that the oil fires were caused by Coalition forces and that, even if environmental 
destruction had been caused by Iraqi troops, “military pers
brought to trial for acts committed in Kuwait and the competent courts pronounced 
sentences against them, up to and including capital Punishment…”289  
 The response to these claims is the following. First, the plan to set fire to the oil 
wells is documented in materials captured after the liberation of Kuwait. Secondly, 
holding trials of low-ranking military personnel does not exempt the 
then president of Iraq, from responsibility as long as this responsibility is proven. 
Internationally, it is well-established that calling the person who commits the crime to 
account does not exonerate the person who orders the commission of the crime.  
 Concerning mens rea, it has been ruled that the mens rea of the accused can be 
inferred from general circumstances.290 Based upon Saddam Hussein’s orders, Iraq had 
set a plan for environmental destruction in motion long before the beginning of 
                          
rate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International 
presentative of Iraq to The United Nations Addressed 
r 16, 1998).   
288Anthony Leibler, Delibe
Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67, 128 n.266 (1992).  
289 Letter dated 17 June 1993 From The Permanent Re
to the President of Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25976 (1993). ¶ 9, 11.   
290 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 386 (Novembe
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environment if the Coalition forces compelled the Iraqi forces to withdraw from 
Kuwait.291  
The plan to commit this environmental disaster was discovered after the liberation 
of Kuwait. Such a plan is well-documented in evidence seized after the liberation. These 
documents, in addition to linking Saddam Hussein to this plan, contain details about 
destruction groups, the names of group members, specific missions for each group, the 
substan
ll this evidence and these events in their 
general
s a general rule in criminal law jurisprudence, a motive is not considered in 
decidin  whether a crime has been committed.293 However, in some domestic legal 
system tablished that motive can be deemed one of the factors that play a 
                                                
ces used to blow up the oil wells and the names of commanders who had the 
power to issue orders to execute the plan.292  
Moreover, some of the documents seized are dated prior to 1991, proving how the 
plan was arranged from the beginning. In addition, the number of oil wells set on fire 
refutes Iraq’s argument that the pollution which resulted was a foreseeable consequence 
of armed conflict or an unplanned event. A
 circumstances serve to prove the intentionality of the crimes committed based 
upon Saddam Hussein’s orders.  
 
 
 
d. Motive 
A
g
s, it is well es
 
, 1991, at A10.  
a 
291 Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, Febraury 23
292 For those documents. See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqy
[Destruction Oil Wells in Iraqi Documents] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
293 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 12 (3ed, West Group 2000). 
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role in aggravating the offense. For instance, under the German criminal justice system, a 
crime i
he motive of the defendant.296 The same 
can be 
e rules of armed conflict. Thus, considering the environment as public 
propert
                                                
s aggravated when an environmental offense is committed or if the defendant was 
driven by “greed for profit.”294 Motive is included in prosecutorial policies especially 
when the motive has a discriminatory basis.295  
In England, in the sentence stage, the Magistrates must determine first whether 
the gravity of the crime requires more than the punishment within their powers. If the 
crime is so grave, they must transfer the case to the trial court for sentencing. One of the 
factors determining the gravity of the crime is t
said when the crime is committed with a wicked motive such as vengeance. The 
adoption of reprisal as a basis for criminalization is not new in the international law field 
as well.297   
Understanding Saddam Hussein’s motive for actions committed against the 
environment during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 raises the question of military necessity 
which is essential to prove the defendant’s motive and to determine the nature of the 
breach of th
y, it is illegal to destroy public property unless there is a military necessity 
justifying such destruction.298 This characteristic, whether a grave breach or not, imposes 
 
 See the Code of Crown Prosecutors,  http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/code.html
294 See StGB [German Criminal Code] art 330 (F.R.G.).  
295 . (Last visited 
July2, 2006).  
296 Organised Environmental Crime in EC Member States, final Report, at 446 (2003), 
tes.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/environment/crime/pdf/organised_member_sta   (Last visited July10, 2006).  
ainst the natural environment by way of reprisals 
ictims of International Armed Conflicts art. 55 (2), 1125 UNTS 3 (1977).  
ther 
297 Article 55 (2) of Protocol I provides that “Attacks ag
are prohibited.” Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of V
298 Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV provides “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or 
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to o
public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is 
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, 75 UNTS 287 (1949).  
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stricter obligations on states regarding the criminal responsibility of those who violate the 
laws of armed conflict.299 
The principle of necessity requires that military actions involving the use of force 
must be reasonably necessary to achieve the desired goals.300 The purpose of such a 
require
g certain weapons is strictly 
prohibi
necessity - are applicable to this kind of destruction whether the destruction was caused 
ment of necessity basically is to avoid undue or unnecessary injury or suffering. 
The military necessity doctrine is subjective.301 As a result, such justification is widely 
criticized by commentators.302 Consequently, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine when the military action or tactic is excessive.303  
The customary law of armed conflict rejects the argument that any military action 
that causes victory is deemed necessary.304 For instance, usin
ted even if refraining from using these weapons would cause the loss of the 
war.305 Regarding environmental destruction during the time of armed conflict, it is 
settled that the four main principles - humanity, discrimination, proportionality and 
                                                 
299 Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV states “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall 
t is broad. See Richard A. Falk, Revitalizing 
aw of War 11 (1984).  
be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the 
present Convention:….. extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” In addition, article 146 of the same Convention 
provides “……Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to 
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the 
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party 
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a ' prima facie ' case.”  Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, 75 UNTS 287 (1949). 
300 See Ingrid Detter Lupuis, The Law of War 336 (1987). 
301 See Ingrid Detter Lupuis, The Law of War 335 (1987). 
302 It has been argued that the military necessity concep
International Law 168, 169 (1989). 
303 Donald Wells, War Crimes and L
304 Sheldon Cohen, Arms and Judgments 35 (1988). 
305 Sheldon Cohen, Arms and Judgments 35 (1988). 
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intentionally or recklessly.306 The common practice proves that environmental 
destruction should be taken into account when the question, “Is there a military necessity 
to execute a military action or tactic?” is raised.307 The ICJ states that: 
“States must take environmental considerations into account when 
military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements 
of necessity and proportionality.”
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate 
that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles 
 
f the 
environ sident 
regardi ar in light of the question as to whether 
there w
alition’s pilots to locate and bomb Iraqi troops.310 
The res
                                                
308    
Therefore, achieving limited military gains is not justified by necessity i
mental damages are gross.309 Evaluating the decision of Iraq’s then Pre
ng the environment during the Gulf W
as a military necessity requires examining those arguments produced by some 
commentators to justify Iraq’s action.  
While Saddam Hussein did not actually plead military necessity, such a claim 
would most likely fail if he had done so. The first justification for blowing up the oil 
wells is to hinder the efforts of the Co
ponse to such an argument is that any military action used, under the necessity 
doctrine, should be capable of regulation and limitation.311 Blowing up oil wells does not 
satisfy this requirement because the military goal in this case would depend entirely on 
 
306 Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War: A Introduction, in Environmental Protection and the 
Protection of the Environment in the Time of Armed 
d to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct are Permissible during 
 the 1991 Gulf War: A Law of Armed Conflict Analysis, 
Law of War: A “Fifth Geneva” Convention on the 
Conflict 84 (Galen Plant ed. 1992).   
307 See generally Bernard Schafer, The Relationship between International Laws of Armed Conflict and 
Environmental Protection: The Nee
Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 287 (1989).  
308 Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 , ¶ 30 (July 8). 
309 Jonathan Edwards, The Iraqi Oil “Weapon” in
40 NAVAL L. REV. 118 (1992). 
310 Philip Shenon, Coalition Forces Moving toward Kuwait Front… 10,000 Stories, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 
1991, at A1, A4.  
311 Philip Shenon, Coalition Forces Moving toward Kuwait Front… 10,000 Stories, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 
1991, at A1, A4. 
81 
 
International Crimes and International Prosecutorial Policy 
the wind which is unpredictable. Consequently, there is no ability to regulate such an 
action.  
The second argument that has been made to justify the setting of these fires is to 
eliminate resources that would otherwise be available to Coalition forces on the 
ground.
ity, Saddam 
Hussein
                        
312 It would seem that this argument has merit. However, the argument fails 
because of the unlimited availability of the fuel needed to carry out the war and because 
the Coalition forces could not have used the oil because it was not refined.313 Even if we 
assume that the Coalition forces could have refined the Kuwaiti oil, a review of Iraqi 
documents314 shows that the manner of the commission of the crime, blowing up the oil 
wells, was not meant to prevent Coalition forces from using the oil. It was meant instead 
to destroy this natural and financial resource. Otherwise, the goal, preventing Coalition 
forces from using the oil wells, could have been accomplished by means of destroying 
the oil well heads, without the need to set the oil on fire. In addition, the tremendous time 
Coalition forces would have needed to refine Kuwaiti oil is another factor supporting the 
exclusion of the possibility that Coalition forces would use the Kuwaiti oil.   
Moreover, it has been contended that the means, blowing up oil wells, was not in 
proportionality to the objectives sought.315 In the absence of military necess
’s motive for committing this action should have been determined by both the 
present and historical circumstances existing at the time of the crime. 
                         
312 Rex J. Zedalis, Burning of the Kuwait: Oilfields and the Laws of War, 24 VAND. J. TRANSANT’L. L. 
711, 739 (1991).  
313 Rex J. Zedalis, Burning of the Kuwait: Oilfields and the Laws of War, 24 VAND. J. TRANSANT’L L. 
711, 739 (1991).  
314 See infra. Ch. III. Sec. (I)(d). See infra. App. 3.   
315 Jonathan Edwards, The Iraqi Oil “Weapon” in the 1991 Gulf War: A Law of Armed Conflict Analysis, 
40 NAVAL L. REV. 118, 120-121 (1992).   
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Historically, Iraqi administrations, including Saddam Hussein’s regime, showed 
their desire to annex Kuwait for financial advantage, since annexation would give them 
control
 deemed a grave breach of the laws of 
armed 
“…[A]l nations bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are required by 
existing international treaty obligations to search out and prosecute or 
                                                
 of Kuwaiti oil.316 Moreover, one of the arguments Saddam Hussein used to justify 
his invasion of Kuwait was that both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were 
conspiring against Iraq to increase their production of oil, thus decreasing the price and 
harming the Iraqi economy.317 This argument demonstrated Saddam Hussein’s desire to 
annex Kuwait to improve the Iraqi economy by controlling Kuwait’s share of oil in the 
market and to pay Iraq’s debt which was a result of its war against Iran. In addition, 
Saddam Hussein threatened318 to blow up Kuwaiti oil wells if an attempt to liberate 
Kuwait was made. Taking into consideration all the above circumstances, one can 
conclude that Saddam Hussein’s main concern was the oil and his desire to retaliate 
against his enemy, Kuwait, by inflicting greater injuries, destroying Kuwait’s main 
natural and financial resource, as reprisal for the United Nations effort to liberate Kuwait 
and enhance the rule of law at the international level. In sum, the destruction of the 
environment was driven by one motive - reprisal.  
If one reaches the conclusion that military necessity was absent in Iraq’s actions, 
it is logical to conclude that the destruction must be
conflict. This grave breach is a war crime that triggers the Universal Jurisdiction 
doctrine.319 As a result: 
 
316 See infra. App. 1. 
317 See Ch. I note 2.  
318 Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, Febraury 23, 1991, at A10.  
International Co-Operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of 
ar Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N.GAOR, 28th Sess., 
319 See Principles of 
Persons Guilty of W
Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N.Doc. A/9030 (1973).    
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extradite persons alleged to have committed “grave breaches” of these 
320
 
Conventions.”   
 
Conclu
 etion differs between domestic and international levels. There 
 no question that, internationally, prosecutorial discretion is essential. However, this 
olute. Therefore, proposing legal considerations in 
eterm
f the evidence differs between ad hoc 
 As a result of this legal absence, a resort to domestic criminal justice systems, as 
 
sion and Observations 
Prosecutorial discr
is
discretion should not be abs
d ining when international prosecution is warranted is necessary to avoid 
international tension and to protect human rights.  
 In terms of legal considerations, an international prosecutor, before pursuing a 
criminal charge, must resolve two questions: the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
gravity of the offense. The scheme for evaluation o
international criminal tribunals and the framework of the International Criminal Court. In 
light of the evidence required, it is enough for international prosecutors, to pursue a 
criminal case, to have a credible case which would be sufficient to convict an accused.
 As a second requirement, an international crime must be sufficiently grave in 
order to commence an action or prosecution before international criminal tribunals or 
courts. In spite of the fact that the gravity of the offense is an important element in 
international criminal practice, there is no single international instrument providing 
guidelines to clarify for international prosecutors under what circumstances the criminal 
actions in question may be considered grave. 
well developed sources of law, becomes necessary. It is motivated by the desire to protect 
                                                 
320 John Norton Moore, War Crime and the Role of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 403, 404 
(1991).  
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85 
 
ems brings us to the conclusion that several 
ions shows that Saddam Hussein’s actions against 
the env
 
                                                
human rights. The phenomenon of resorting to national systems is a legally recognized 
necessity in international criminal law. 
An examination of domestic legal syst
considerations, including damage, intent, the manner of commission, mens rea and 
motive are common considerations for domestic prosecutors who must decide whether 
the offense in question is grave. An evaluation of Saddam Hussein’s case against the 
environment in light of these considerat
ironment are grave crimes and grave breaches of the laws of armed conflict. This 
situation would trigger the Universal Jurisdiction doctrine.321                 
 
 
321 The Universal Jurisdiction principle means that each state is required, based upon an international 
customary obligation, to look for and to prosecute individuals accused of international crimes without the 
need to link such authority to a territorial or national nexus concerning committed crimes or their parties.     
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Chapter III 
Substantive Aspects of  
International Criminal Prosecution 
 
 Substantive analysis of Saddam Hussein’s liability for international environmental 
crimes raises two issues. The first is whether he satisfied the actus reus aspect of the 
crime, i. e., whether he can be vicariously liable for the environmental crimes of his 
subordinates acting under his direction. The second issue is whether Saddam Hussein’s 
criminal responsibility requires that the actions committed by his subordinates against the 
environment be criminal. If so, by which international instruments are their actions to be 
considered criminal?       
I. The International Basis of Criminal Responsibility 
 Although the issue of whether an individual may enjoy rights and incur 
obligations under international law is not yet settled,322 it is a different question than 
whether an individual can be criminally liable for international crimes. 323 Individual 
criminal responsibility for international crimes is currently the universally accepted 
norm.324 An individual’s international criminal responsibility may arise during both 
peace time and war time. During armed conflict, crimes can be committed by both 
subordinates and superiors. In the context of the responsibility of superiors, both military 
                                                 
322 Mark S. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM J. INT’L L. 533 
(1956); Leslie C. Green, International Law 91 (1984).   
323 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that “[C]rimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced.” See NAZI CONSPIRACY And JUDGMENT of THE 
IMT 66 (1947) Quoted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 65 
(Transnational Publishers 2003).     
324 See Farhad Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of Individual in International Criminal Law, 
Vol. I, 153, 57 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999). 
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and political leaders may be included. 325 
                                                
 In the wake of World War I, the first attempt to try individuals responsible for the 
war, including heads of state, was begun by establishing the Commission on the 
Responsibility of Authors of the War. This Commission was charged with considering 
certain questions about the origins of the war.326 The Commission concluded, “All 
persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, 
without distinction of rank, including Chiefs [of] States, who have been guilty of the 
offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to 
criminal prosecution.”327  
On 28 June 1919, the Treaty of Versailles ended World War I.328 For a number of 
reasons, the provision regarding prosecuting the German Emperor, William II, included 
 
325 In some cases, it has been held that the responsibility of a person who can affect the decision to commit 
the crime is graver than the responsibility of the executor. Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-R6, 
Decision of Trial Chamber I- Review of indictment pursuant to Rule 61 (March 6, 1996).   
326 The commission’s task was to determine: “1. The responsibility of the Authors of the war. 2. The facts 
as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their 
Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war. 3. The degree of responsibility for those 
offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staff, and 
other individuals, however highly placed. 4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the 
trial of these offences. 5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may be raised in the 
course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.” 
See M. Adatci & S. Tachi, Commission on The Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties, 14 
AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (1920).    
327 M. Adatci & S. Tachi, Commission on The Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties, 14 
AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 117 (1920).       
328 The Treaty of Versailles (1919) was the peace treaty which officially ended World War I between the 
Allied and Associated Powers (France, Russia, Italy, Britain, United States) and Germany. In the treaty, 
Germany recognized the Allied Powers’ right to prosecute and punish those individuals who violated the 
laws and customs of war. The pertinent articles in the treaty are 227-230. Article 227, relating to the 
responsibility of the head of state, provides “The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II 
of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the 
guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of 
the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan…..”  
The treaty contains as well articles 228-230 which imposed on Germany obligations concerning 
extradition, production of documentary and other evidence, and the personal jurisdiction of the military 
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in the treaty, was not implemented,329 “[T]he failures of post-World War I justice were 
transformed into a partially valid precedent because that was what was needed to justify 
raising expectations of the international society.”330  
No doubt, the failure to bring those who were responsible for World War I to 
international justice contributed to the subsequent direct enforcement of international 
criminal law rules, including those relating to individual criminal responsibility, after 
World War II. The desire to deter the occurrence of war crimes was motivated by the 
atrocities committed in World War II.331 Since the criminal trials of World War II, the 
appearance of provisions relating to the criminal responsibility of the head of state in 
international instruments has increased. These international instruments may take the 
form of international criminal tribunals’ statutes, draft codes, or international treaties. 332 
                                                                                                                                                 
tribunal. See Treaty of Versailles signed June 28, 1919. Art. 228 available at 
http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html (Last visited June 30, 2007). 
329 Those grounds were “[1] The political climate of that time was not prepared for the prosecution and 
punishment of individuals of other states; [2] there was no expressly pragmatic consent by all the greater 
powers of the time for the establishment of an international criminal court; [3] the principles of 
international criminal law were not clear to the international legal community as a whole; [4] public 
opinion in Germany was against any form of prosecution of its individuals.” See Farhad Malekian, 
International Criminal Responsibility of Individual in International Criminal Law Vol. I, 153 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 1999); In addition, another factor contributing to this failure is the refusal of the Government 
of the Netherlands to surrender William II of Hohenzollern based on the argument that the Versailles treaty 
was not binding since the Netherlands was not a party to the treaty. See Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: 
History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,92 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999); 
while others believe that the non-establishment of a criminal tribunal after World War I has also been 
attributed to “…the World “was not internationally mature,”…improper drafting of the war crimes clauses 
the priority of the Allies to maintain peace and political agendas which prevailed over the justice norms.” 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War to End All Wars” and the Birth of a Handicapped 
International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 244, 289 (2001).    
330 M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War to End All Wars” and the Birth of a Handicapped 
International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 244, 290 (2001).   
331 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions: From Verailles to Rwanda 
in International Criminal Law Vol. III, 31, 39 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).  
332 Affairmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal, 
G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951); Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid art. III, (Nov. 30, 1972),  http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/11.htm (Last visited 
June 29, 2007);  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
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Before examining these instruments, a distinction should be drawn between the 
question of responsibility, a substantive question, and the question of immunity, a 
procedural question.333 The former question concerns whether heads of states can be 
guilty of committing international crimes, while the latter focuses on whether judicial 
proceedings can be commenced against heads of states.334 
The statutes of almost all international criminal tribunals contain provisions 
rejecting the status of head of state as the basis for immunity, mitigation, or 
exoneration.335 The best examples of these tribunals are the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR).336 Moreover, the 
International Criminal Court statute or Rome Statute, which is the fruit of an international 
treaty, adopts the view that the status of the accused does not affect the question of his or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991 art. 7 (2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); 
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453rd 
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
art. 27 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (2002). 
333 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 60.   
334 For the immunity issue, see Infra Ch. IV, Sec. III. 
335 For instance, article 7 of IMT Charter provides “The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of 
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from 
responsibility or mitigating.” See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 
1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 258 (1945); This norm, with the exception of the “mitigating role,” has 
been recognized as one of the rules of international law by the United Nations General Assembly. See 
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment 
of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950); 1950 ILC Yb 374, vol. II; 
44 AJIL 126 (1950). 
336 Article 7(2) of ICTY statute provides “The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of 
state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7 (2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 
32 ILM 1159 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 
49th Sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).  
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her criminal responsibility.337 In addition, several international treaties emphasize the 
same doctrine.338  
  By and large, although legal norms for the criminal responsibility of heads of state 
for war crimes exist, it has been said that “[T]he hard task is to implement those norms by 
bringing those criminals before courts.”339 Thus, the availability of legal norms alone is 
not sufficient under the regime of international law to bring these norms into practice 
before judicial organs. A decision to commence an international criminal prosecution is a 
decision with political and legal dimensions.  
Only political reasons can justify the International Military Tribunal’s 
prosecutions of Admiral Erich Raeder, appointed Chancellor (Head of State) as successor 
to Adolph Hitler, and other German high-ranking officials,340 while the Japanese 
Emperor Hirohito was not indicted before the Far East Military Tribunal.341 In any case, 
this paper is concerned only with the legal side of the story.  
                                                 
337 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). The International Law Commission, in both drafts concerning these 
crimes against Peace and the Security of Mankind, adopted the notion that the head of state can no longer 
defend himself from criminal responsibility by claiming that because of his or her status he is not 
responsible. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 7, 1996, 51 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); Draft Code of Offences Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind art. 3, 1954, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954); 
45 AJIL 123 (1951).                   
338 For instance, article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
provides “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, 
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”                  
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951). 
339 Farhad Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of Individual in International Criminal Law, 
Vol. I, 153, 189 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).  
340 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 73 (Transnational Publishers 2003).  
341 For reasons not to indict the Japanese Emperor, see Kerry Creque O’Neill, A New Customary Law of 
Head of State Immunity: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 289, 299-306 (2002).  
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Under the current rules of international criminal law, the criminal responsibility of 
a superior, including a head of state, can be based either on an act or a failure to act, as 
summarized by the United Nations Secretary-General’s report:  
A person in a position of superior authority should, therefore, be held 
individually responsible for giving the unlawful order to commit a crime 
under the present statute. But he should also be held responsible for failure 
to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behavior of his subordinates. 
This imputed responsibility or criminal negligence is engaged if the person 
in superior authority knew or had reason to know that his subordinates 
were about to commit or had committed crimes and yet failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or repress the commission of 
such crimes or to punish those who had committed them.342  
In addition to these statute-based grounds, a third basis has emerged through ad hoc 
practice of international criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTY). This basis is called “Joint 
Criminal Enterprise” or “Common Plan.”343 
As a result, the criminal responsibility of the superior, including a head of state, 
can be assigned by claiming that his or her involvement in the commission of the 
international crime in question was direct involvement by: (1) issuing an unlawful order; 
(2) participating in a criminal common plan; or (3) indirect involvement through his or 
her failure to either prevent the commission of the offense or punish the responsible 
subordinates.” These three theories for the criminal responsibility of the superior will be 
examined in depth in the following part of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
342 Report of The Secretary-General Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, ¶ 56; Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 
1998) ¶ 333.  
343 Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 292 (Oxford University Press 2005). 
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1. Superior Responsibility Based on an Unlawful Order 
The criminal responsibility of a superior, including a head of state, may arise from 
various actions.344 One of those actions is issuing an unlawful order by a superior to his 
subordinates to commit an action which is considered a violation of the laws of war. This 
form of responsibility is considered a form of accessorial responsibility.345  
The superior’s order to his subordinates to commit an offense was reaffirmed as a 
basis for criminal responsibility after World War I.346 During World War II, the Allies347 
announced their intention to punish indivduals of the Axis348 forces who were “guilty of 
or responsible for these crimes [committed in occupied territories], whether they have 
ordered them, perpetrated them, or participated in them”(emphasis added).349 After the 
cessation of hostilities, article II (2) of the Control Council Law No. 10, governing the 
trials of World War II criminals, implemented this intention by including this basis.350  
                                                 
344 Participation in the commission of the crime can be, as summarized by the ICTY, through planning, 
instigating, ordering, committing, or aiding and abetting. See Prosecutor v.  Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-
98-33-1 (August 2, 2001) ¶ 610. 
345 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 103 (2005). 
346 Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,91 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999). 
347 The Allied powers were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom. 
348 The Axis countries were Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan.  
349 Editorial Comment: Retribution for War Crimes, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 81, 84 (1943). 
350  It provides “….Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to 
have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an 
accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same”(emphasis added).  See 
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946).   
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An order, as a basis for the charge of criminal responsibility, appears in most of 
the World War II trials without objections or denial of it as grounds for the charge.351 In 
some cases, the responsibility even included unexecuted orders.352 An example of an 
unlawful order is the execution of partisans on suspicion only and without proof.353 The 
defense of misinterpretation of orders by subordinates was raised during the World War 
II trials. This defense, however, does not appear to have been accepted by the British 
Military Court at Hamburg, in Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle.354  
                                                 
351 See count I in Trial of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VI, Trial 
of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst, Case No.36, P. 111; Trial of Albert Kesselring. Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, Vol. VIII, Case No.44, P. 9; See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VIII, Trial of 
Wilhelm List and others “The hostage Case”, Case No.47, P. 35; See Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, Vol. XII, The Germen High Command Trial, Case No.72, P. 2-3.  
352 The United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held, in The Hostage Case, that “The order was 
clearly unlawful and so recognized by the defendant. He contends, however, that no captured Commissars 
were shot by troops under his command. This is, of course, a mitigating circumstance but it does not free 
him of the crime of knowingly and intentionally passing on a criminal order.” See Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, Vol. VIII, Trial of Wilhelm List and others “The hostage Case”, Case No.47, P. 90 
However, this rule is not absolute. Concerning the responsibility of the superior who issued an unlawful 
order that was impossible to carry out, the British Military Court, in Trial of Generalobrest Nickolaus Von 
Falkenhorst Case, held that “The question of the state of mind of the accused when he issued the order 
becomes important from the point of view of mens rea, because if he knew that the order could not be 
carried out, then no question of criminality should arise.” See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. 
XI, Trial of Generaloberst Nickolaus Von Falkenhorst, Case No.61, P. 29.  
353 Providing examples of unlawful orders, the United States Military at Nuremberg, in The German High 
Command Trial, laid down that “[the defendant] held the executive power for his area, and it was his duty 
to exercise it for the protection of the population. He was obligated not to deport them, not to despoil them 
of their property, nor to send both those innocent and those guilty of aiding the so-called bands to 
concentration camps…..The orders to do those things were criminal orders, and they were fully 
implemented by him.” See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XII, The German High Command 
Trial, Case No.72, P. 121.  
354 The responsibility for unexecuted orders was raised in this case. The order was “(1) No attempt of any 
kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water 
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs 
counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews. (2) Orders for 
bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply. (3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements 
would be of importance for your boat. (4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for 
women and children in his bombing attacks on German Cities.” The charge was “he [the accused],….., 
when senior officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla, in violation of the laws and usages of war, gave orders to 
commanding officers of U-boats who were due to leave on war patrols that they were to destroy ships and 
their crews.” The Defence argued that the order was ambiguous and that it prohibited saving crews but was 
not an order to kill them. However, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five years 
imprisonment. See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. IX, Trial of  Karl-Heinz Moehle, Case 
No.54, P. 76-78.  
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After the World War II trials, the international obligation of states to criminalize 
the conduct of those who ordered a crime became part of international customary law.355 
Later on, charges based on orders continued to play a role in ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals.356 Subsequently, the “Individual’s responsibility based on an order” rule has 
been reaffirmed in several international criminal instruments. 357  
 Rules governing criminal responsibility based on an order under the jurisprudence 
of ad hoc tribunals are not fundamentally different from those established during the 
World War II trials. Under ICTY jurisprudence, commission of a crime by an order 
means “A person in a position of authority using that position to convince another to 
commit an offense.”358 While the ICTR views giving an order as “[A] third form of 
participation, implies [implying] a superior-subordinate relationship between the person 
                                                 
355 Geneva Convention IV article 146(1) provides “The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any 
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article”(emphasis 
added). Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
(1949).  
356  The U.N. Commission of Experts laid down that “A person who gives the order to commit a war crime 
or crime against humanity is equally guilty of the offence with the person actually committing it. This 
principle, expressed already in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, applies to both the military superiors, 
whether of regular or irregular armed forces, and to civilian authorities.” See Final Report of the 
Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security, Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc, 
S/1994/674. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991 art. 7 (1), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159, (1993); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (1), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 
3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); The Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute 
art. 6 (1). S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (2000).   
357 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 2 (3), 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 
10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); The same occurs with the International Criminal 
Court statute. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25 (c)(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 
37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). 
358 Prosecutor v.  Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-1  (August 2, 2001) ¶ 610.  
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giving the order and the one executing it, with the person in a position of authority using 
such position to persuade another to commit an offence.”359  
 The actual presence of the superior while the crime is committed is not necessary 
for conviction.360 Responsibility can be imposed on the person who gave the order upon 
proof that he directly or indirectly intended that the crime be committed.361 In other 
words, the mens rea of the person who issued the order matters, not that of the person 
who executed the order.362 Even a person who ordered an act or the omission of an act 
with awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed in the 
execution of that order holds the required mens rea for responsibility based on that 
order.363 There is no requirement for the specific form of order and it need not be given 
directly by the superior to the subordinate.364 Moreover, the superior’s responsibility 
includes all that naturally results from the commission of the act in question.365   
To overcome the difficulty of proving environmental offenses, some have 
suggested the creation of a presumption by which commanders are deemed to have 
ordered crimes committed by subordinates although proponents of this proposition admit 
                                                 
359 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3 (December 6, 1999) ¶ 39; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, 
Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (June 7, 2001) ¶ 30; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T 
(December 1, 2003) ¶ 763; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T (January 22, 2004) ¶ 594; 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (September 2, 1998) ¶ 483.     
360 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7,  1997) ¶ 691. 
361 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 278;  Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkezi, 
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 386; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T 
(June 7, 2001) ¶ 31; Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24 (July 31, 2003) ¶ 445.  
362 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 282.  
363 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment (July 31, 2004) ¶ 42; Prosecutor v. 
Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24 (July 31, 2003) ¶ 445. 
364 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 281; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkezi, 
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 388.  
365 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997) ¶ 692. 
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that such an approach would violate the principle of the presumption of innocence.366 
Adoption of this approach is an unsettled question, and the debate continues among 
international and regional judicial authorities.367 
2. Principles of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) 
 This form of responsibility holds an individual responsible for all crimes 
committed pursuant to a common plan or design involving the commission of a crime, if 
the individual participated with others in the common design. Thus, even if the crime was 
committed by particular participants, other participants in the design may be held 
responsible.368  
In the World War II trials, a similar term, called “common design,” was used. 
“Common design” is defined as “a community of intention between two or more persons 
to do an unlawful act.”369 Under international ad hoc criminal tribunals jurisprudence, 
JCE became a regular form of responsibility for political and military leaders.370  
JCE is a form of liability which is not explicitly described by the tribunal’s statute 
but is implicit in Article 7/1 of the ICTY statute and in the World War II trials.371 The 
                                                 
366 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 84 (Cambridge University 
Press 2001). 
367 Although the European Court of Human Rights permitted this approach in some cases, article 67 of the 
Rome statute rejects it. For the European Court of Human Rights view, see Salabiaka v. France, Series 
App. No. 141-A, 7 October 1988; Pham Hoang v. France, Series App. No. 243, 25 September 1992, ¶ 28; 
see as well  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 66, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 
1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). 
368  Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-95-27  (March 15, 2002) ¶ 82. 
369 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XV, The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Case 
No.60, P. 14. 
370 Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 292 (Oxford University Press 2005). 
371 The ICTY Chamber held that “Joint criminal enterprise” liability is a form of criminal responsibility 
which the Appeals Chamber found to be implicitly included in Article 7(1) of the Statute. It entails 
individual responsibility for participation in a joint criminal enterprise to commit a crime.” Prosecutor v.  
Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-1 (August 2, 2001) ¶ 610.  
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conclusion, reached by the ICTY, that JCE derived its existence from the practice of the 
World War II trials, has been criticized.372 Before examining the required elements for 
this basis of criminal liability, it is necessary to distinguish between this concept and 
other concepts which might cause confusion due to the similarity of their elements.      
The first concept which might be compared to JCE is the conspiracy concept. 
Conspiracy as a substantive crime appears in several international instruments 
criminalizing conduct such as the international drug trade, slavery, apartheid, and money 
laundering.373 In the World War II war crimes trials, conspiracy was considered a 
substantive crime (conspiracy to commit a crime against peace) and as a theory of 
liability under which each defendant could be convicted for any acts committed by co-
consipirators “in the execution of such a plan.”374 However, the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials rejected conspiracy as a substantive crime in war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.375  
 Both conspiracy and joint criminal enterprise require the existence of an 
agreement. The difference is that joint criminal enterprise, unlike conspiracy, requires 
                                                 
372 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 113 (2005) 
(arguing that the World War II trials support the second category “Camp Concentration”  but not the rest).  
373 Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in 
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 58 (2003).    
374 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 117 (2005). 
375 Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in 
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 58 (2003); see Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
Vol. VI, The Justice Trial, Case No.35, P. 5;  the ICTY statute provides for conspiracy in only the genocide 
charge. See art. 4 (3) (b) of the ICTY Statute. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 4 (3)(b), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 
(1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).  
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that each defendant participate in an action in furtherance of the agreement.376 
Consequently, conspiracy is viewed as an easier basis on which to prosecute than JCE 
since the former does not require proof of participation in an action.377 In addition, unlike 
conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise is not a substantive crime.378  
The second concept which is similar to JCE is the criminal organization basis 
used in the World War II trials.379 According to this basis, the prosecutor must establish 
that the accused “became or remained a member of the [criminal] organization with 
knowledge that it was being used for the commission of [criminal] acts.”380 Thus, the 
criminality of the organization must be proved first. Then, the prosecutor must prove that 
the accused freely joined the organization and that he or she knew the organization was a 
tool through which crimes were committed. 
Although both concepts have a common feature, collective responsibility, the JCE 
theory does not require the existence of an organization. Moreover, to be convicted based 
on JCE, an accused, unlike a criminal organization, must participate in the commission of 
the crime.  In sum, the criminal organization charge is a membership charge or offense. 
During the World War II trials, there was debate as to whether an accused must hold a 
leading position in the criminal organization in order to convict him or her based upon 
                                                 
376 Prosecutor v. Multinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion 
Challenging Jurisdiction- Joint Criminal Enterprise, Appeal Decision  (May 21, 2001) ¶ 23.     
377 Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in 
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 34-35 (2003).     
378 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 119 (2005). 
379 The concept of “Criminal Organizations” adopted in Nuremberg Charter (Articles 9, 10.) however, it 
was not included within those rules adopted by General Assembly. John R.W.D. Jones & Steven Powles, 
International Criminal Practice 410 (Transnational Publishers, Inc 2003). 
380 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. IX, The Flick Trial, Case No.48, P. 28. 
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this position.381 In conclusion, the argument that joint criminal enterprise amounts to 
either conspiracy or organizational responsibility is rejected by the ICTY.382 
While under international criminal ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, situations in 
which a JCE-based conviction can be accomplished are divided into three categories.383 
The so-called Concentration Camp cases are most pertinent here because they are a 
precedent for charging Saddam Hussein in his actions against the environment. This 
category, derived from the World War II trials, is represented by “[A] ‘Systemic’ form of 
joint criminal enterprise. It is a variant of the basic form, characterized by the existence 
of an organized system of ill-treatment. An example is extermination or concentration 
camps, in which the prisoners are killed or mistreated pursuant to the joint criminal 
enterprise.”384 
                                                 
381 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VII, The Trial of Obersturmbannfuhrer Rudolf Franz 
Ferdinand Hoess , Case No.38, P. 11; for a review regarding the emergence of the concept see Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XIII, The Trial of Ulrich Greifelt and others, Case No.73, P. 42-67. 
382 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic ET Al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeal Decision on Dragoljub Ordanic’s 
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction- Joint Criminal Enterprise (May 21, 2003) ¶ 23, 25.  
383 “The first such category is represented by cases where all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common 
design, possess the same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a plan among the co-
perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a 
different role within it), they nevertheless all possess the intent to kill. The objective and subjective 
prerequisites for imputing criminal responsibility to a participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have, 
effected the killing are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the common 
design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by providing material assistance to 
or facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting the 
killing, must nevertheless intend this result.” The second category is the so-called extended responsibility 
which “concerns cases involving a common purpose to commit a crime where one of the perpetrators 
commits an act which, while outside the common purpose, is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the effecting of that common purpose. An example is a common purpose or plan on the part 
of a group to forcibly remove at gun-point members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to 
effect “ethnic cleansing”) with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is 
shot and killed. While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common 
purpose, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result 
in the deaths of one or more of those civilians.” See Prosecutor v.Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal 
Judgment (February 25, 2004) ¶ 97, 99. 
384 Prosecutor v.Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal Judgment (February 25, 2004) ¶ 98. 
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More than one participant, the existence of a common purpose, and the 
participation of the defendant in that common purpose are the three requirements for the 
JCE actus reus. The participants need not be organized in a military, political, or 
administrative structure and the common plan need not be previously arranged or 
organized.385 
The required element of participation “[I]nvolves the perpetration of one of the 
crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not involve commission of a 
specific crime under one of the provisions (for example, murder, extermination, torture or 
rape), but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the 
common purpose.”386 Moreover, the difference between participating in a joint criminal 
enterprise as a co-perpetrator or as an aider and abettor depends upon the depth of 
involvement.387 Lastly, it has been ruled, regarding the required mens rea, that “With 
regard to the basic form of joint criminal enterprise what is required is the intent to 
                                                 
385 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeal Judgment (July 15, 1999) ¶ 227; Prosecutor v. 
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-95-27 (March 15, 2002) ¶ 79.   
386 Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-98-32  (February 25, 2004) ¶ 100. 
387 The Court provided that “Participation in a joint criminal enterprise is a form of “commission” under 
Article 7(1) of the Statute. The participant therein is liable as a co-perpetrator of the crime(s). Aiding and 
abetting the commission of a crime is usually considered to incur a lesser degree of individual criminal 
responsibility than committing a crime. In the context of a crime committed by several co-perpetrators in a 
joint criminal enterprise, the aider and abettor is always an accessory to these co-perpetrators, although the 
co-perpetrators may not even know of the aider and abettor’s contribution. Differences exist in relation to 
the actus reus as well as to the mens rea requirements between both forms of individual criminal 
responsibility: (i) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend 
moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton 
destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the 
crime. By contrast, it is sufficient for a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to perform acts that in some 
way are directed to the furtherance of the common design. (ii) In the case of aiding and abetting, the 
requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the 
commission of the specific crime of the principal. By contrast, in the case of participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise, i.e. as a co-perpetrator, the requisite mens rea is intent to pursue a common purpose.”  
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal Judgment (February 25, 2004) ¶ 102. 
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perpetrate a certain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all co-
perpetrators).”388    
3. Command Responsibility 
Command responsibility is described in the statement, “Clearly, assignment to 
command military troops is accompanied by broad authority and heavy responsibility.”389 
This responsibility requires “a balance” between military necessity and the dictates of 
justice or humanity.390 Criminal command responsibility is imposed in order to ensure 
respect for the rules of armed conflict by controlling commanders.391 Command 
responsibility, which originated in national military law, gradually became the basis of 
the international law on responsibility. Nationally, it can be traced back to 500 B.C.392 
At the international level, the dubious legality and uncertainty about this 
responsibility was one cause of the failure to establish an international criminal tribunal 
after World War I.393 As a result, command responsibility, or “failure to act” 
                                                 
388 Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32, Appeal Judgment  (February 25, 2004) ¶ 101. 
389 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).   
390 It has been said that “The Customary International Legal norms that have evolved reflect a balance of 
the principles of military necessity and humanity. With respect to the first principle, a modern army 
requires delegation of authority and control and a large degree of decentralization to function effectively. 
[H]e [commander] has a right to assume that details entrusted to responsible subordinates will be legally 
executed. At the same time, the military commander is not permitted, solely through his delegation of 
authority and control, to escape criminal liability for war crimes committed by subordinates.”  Lieutenant 
Commander Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility 
of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, 107 MIL. L. REV. 71, 131 (1985). 
391 The U.S. Supreme Court in the General Yamashita case stated that, “The law of war presupposes that its 
violation is to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to some 
extent responsible for their subordinates.” In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 348-49 (1946); see also Prosecutor 
v. Hadzihasanovic ET AL., Case No. IT-1-47-AR72, Appeal Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging 
Jurisdiction in relation to Command Responsibility (July 16, 2003) ¶ 16.  
392 For the developing history of the command responsibility doctrine, see Major William Huges Parks, 
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
393 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 298 (Transnational Publishers, Inc 
2003).   
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responsibility, existed for the first time internationally only after World War II. 394 Since 
World War II, many international instruments dealing with criminal aspects of 
international law contain a provision explicitly governing command responsibility.395 In 
short, under contemporary international criminal law, command responsibility is a well-
established norm of international customary and conventional law.396 
The doctrine of command responsibility emerged from the leading case, the 
General Yamashita case,397 after World War II. It developed through subsequent 
international cases held before international ad hoc criminal tribunals. Examining this 
basis requires reviewing the Yamashita case and concept under the ad hoc tribunals’ 
jurisprudence.  
The doctrine of command responsibility was not enunciated in the Far East 
Tribunal Charter, but was developed through the trials conducted according to the 
Charter.398 One of those cases was that of General Tomoyuk Yamashita. Tomoyuk 
Yamashita, formerly Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the 
                                                 
394 Although the Nuremberg trials have been criticized, the trials have had their positive aspects in 
establishing new international criminal rules. Command responsibility is one of them. M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
The Nuremberg Legacy: Historical Assessment in War Crimes: The Lagacy of Nurmeberg 291(Belinda 
Cooper ed., TV Books, LLC. 1999).  
395 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 3, 1954, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 
9) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954); 45 AJIL 123 (1951); Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 86 (2), 1125 
UNTS 3 (1977); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7 (3), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 
1159 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6 (3), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. 
SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 6, 1996, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996); the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute art. 17 (1). S.C. Res. 1315, 
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (2000). 
396 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 333.  
397 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).  
398 Major Michael Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary 
Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 176 (2000).   
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Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, was “charged with unlawfully 
disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as commander to control the acts of 
members of his command by permitting them to commit war crimes.”399 The basis of the 
charge was not an unlawful order issued by the defendant, but the prosecutor’s theory 
that the defendant must have known of the crimes committed by his subordinates in the 
Philippine Islands and that he failed to prevent them. The various crimes include 
starvation, execution without trial, torture, murder, rape, and the burning and demolition 
of large numbers of buildings, places of business, places of worship, and educational 
institutions without adequate military necessity.400  
 The defense argued that the basis of the charge, command responsibility, was not 
recognized by international law and did not constitute a war crime and that consequently 
the Commission did not have jurisdiction to try his client. In addition, the defense 
contended that the prosecutor had failed to establish a link between the defendant’s act 
and the alleged crimes or at least to establish that the defendant knew about the alleged 
crimes.401  
 The evidence presented in the trial concerned the crimes committed by the 
defendant’s subordinates. It established that the alleged crimes were widespread with 
regard to both space and time. By stipulation, both the prosecutor and the defense agreed 
that the defendant occupied the commanding position at the time the crimes were 
                                                 
399 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).  
400 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita 1, 4 (1946). 
401 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita 1, 28-29 (1946). 
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committed. The prosecutor tried only a few times to prove the connection between the 
defendant’s act and the committed atrocities.402 
 The Commission’s verdict was issued 7th December 1945. The Commission 
commented on the Prosecutor’s evidence by stating: 
“The prosecutor presented evidence to show that the crimes were so 
extensive and widespread, both as to time and area, that they must either 
have been willfully permitted by the accused, or secretly ordered by the 
accused…….Nevertheless, where…., revengeful actions are widespread, 
and there is not [an] effective attempt by a commander to discover and 
control the criminal acts, such commander may be held responsible, even 
criminally responsible.”403  
The Commission’s statement indicates that it attributed knoweldge to the 
defendant because of the widespread nature of the offences. A staff judge who daily 
reviewed a summary of the evidence stated “The pattern of….destruction of property is 
widespread in point of time and of area to the extent a reasonable person must logically 
conclude the program to have been the result of deliberate planning..”404 It seems, as 
well, that the Commission was not convinced by the defendant’s argument that, during 
                                                 
402 The evidence is summarized in the following paragraph: On the sixth day of the trial, Narciso Lapus, 
imprisoned by the United States as a collaborator, attempted to connect Yamashita directly to the 
commission of atrocities on the islands. As private secretary to General Artemio Ricarte, an elderly 
compatriot of the legendary Emillio Aguinaldo, around whom the Japanese had hoped to rally the Filipino  
people, Lapus insisted he had gained information that would incriminate Yamashita. That ruthless, cruel 
officer, he swore, had notified Ricarte twice in October 1944 that he had ordered his officers “….wipe out 
the whole Philippines if possible…”He also testified that Ricarte had informed him that Yamashita had 
refused to modify that order. The old general, according to Lapus, also claimed that Yamashita had rejected 
one appeal by arguing that “war is war and the enemy should not be given quarter …..”See Richard L. Lael, 
The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility 84 (Scholarly Resources Inc. 1982); 
See also A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita 120-123 (The University of Chicago Press 1949).      
403 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 35 (1946).   
404 Quoted in Major William Huges Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 32 
(1973); The Canadian Regulations 10 (4) make the following provisions:" (4). Where there is evidence that 
more than one war crime has been committed by members of a formation, unit, body, or group while under 
the command of a single commander, the court may receive that evidence as prima facie evidence of the 
responsibility of the commander for those crimes.” Canadian Law Concerning Trials of War Criminals by 
Military Courts Reprinted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (1948), Volume IV, Annex, P.128.   
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the war, communication between him and his subordinates was cut off. The 
Commission’s statement, “willfully permitted by the accused or secretly ordered by the 
accused,” is confusing as to the basis of the charge. Is it “an order” or is it a “failure to 
act”? The evidence presented regarding the defendant’s act and the alleged crimes 
supports the order basis. 
The Commission convicted the defendant and sentenced him to death. After the 
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands rejected the defendant’s petition on appeal, the 
defendant petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States. The latter Court reviewed 
the defendant’s arguments concerning the legality of the establishment of the 
Commission and the legality of the charge, “failure to act.” The Court did not review the 
issue of the sufficiency of evidence.405 
 The Court derived its view of the commander’s duty to prevent the commission of 
the crime from several international conventions,406 rejecting the defendant’s arguments. 
Although he was in agreement with the Court on the issue of the legality of the 
establishment of the Commission, Justice Murphy, in his dissenting opinion, rejected the 
                                                 
405 As a response to the defendant’s argument concerning the legality of his charge, the Court responded: 
“But it is urged that the charge does not allege that petitioner has either committed or directed the 
commission of such acts, and consequently that no violation is charged against him. But this overlooks the 
fact that the gist of the charge is an unlawful breach of duty by petitioner as an army commander to control 
the operations of the members of his command by 'permitting them to commit' the extensive and 
widespread atrocities specified. The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army 
commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops under his 
command for the prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law of war and which are 
likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be 
charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take such measures when violations result. That this 
was the precise issue to be tried was made clear by the statement of the prosecution at the opening of the 
trial.” In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946). 
406 In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1946). 
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existence of the theory of command responsibility in international law.407 On 23rd 
February 1946, the defendant was executed.408 The noteworthy point of this case is the 
evidence presented and the way the Commission inferred the defendant’s mens rea from 
several facts including the number of illegal acts, their location, their scope and the time 
during which they occurred.  
At least two objections might be raised to the theory of command responsibility. 
The first objection is to linking commanders to all crimes committed by their 
subordinates.409 Consequently, conspiracy is viewed as an easier basis for a superior’s 
criminal responsibility for a subordinate’s conduct than command responsibility.410 The 
argument based on command responsibility is more difficult because the prosecutor has 
to prove that suordinates committed crimes, but conspiracy liability can be established 
without the need to prove that others committed underlying offenses.411 The second 
objection concerns those offenses requiring a specific intent.412  
Although command responsibility based on the “failure to act” theory was not 
included in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in 1977 the Protocol I Additional to the 
                                                 
407 Justice Murphy, in his dissenting view, stated that “… International Law makes no attempt to define the 
duties of a commander of any army under constant and overwhelming assault; nor does it impose liability 
under such circumstances for failure to meet the ordinary responsibilities of command. The omission is 
understandable. Duties, as well as liability to control troops, vary according to the nature and intensity of 
the particular battle. To find unlawful deviation from duty under battle conditions requires difficult and 
speculative calculations….” In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 30-42 (1946). 
408 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminal, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), Volume IV, Case No. 21, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 2 (1946).  
409 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 83 (Cambridge University 
Press 2001). 
410 Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in 
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 34-35 (2003).     
411 Richard P. Berrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslavia Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in 
International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 47-53, 56 (2003).     
412 It has been argued that no command responsibility can be imposed in crimes requiring specific intent, 
such as murder, or genocide, unless the command has such intent. Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes 
and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 306 (Oxford University Press 2005). 
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Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, filled the gap by including the doctrine of command 
responsibility in its provisions.413    
 Unlike the Joint Criminal Enterprise basis, the command responsibility is 
explicitly provided in the ICTY statute.414 The statute does not distinguish between 
command responsibility and superior responsibility. The former is mainly meant to 
address the responsibility of indirect superiors such as the commander in chief while the 
superior responsibility encompasses the responsibility of the direct superior of the 
criminal subordinates.415 Therefore, it is logical to assume that rules controlling the 
superior responsibility are applicable to command responsibility with the exception of 
rules requiring or assuming a direct or close relation between the superior and 
subordinates.   
                                                 
413 Article 86 (2) provides “The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by 
a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if 
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the 
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible 
measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.” Article 87 provides those duties the 
commander shall fulfill.  Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977). 
414 Article 7 (3) provides “The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”   
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7 (3), 
S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993). 
415 For instance, the International Criminal Court Statute makes this distinction. Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
(1998); see as well The Canadian Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act defines a military 
commander as “a person effectively acting as a military commander and a person who commands police 
with a degree of authority and controls comparable to a military command.” While a superior is “a person 
in authority, other than military commander.” Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act S. C. 24 § 5.4 
(2000)(Can.). 
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 Command responsibility can be raised only when there is a legal duty or 
obligation to act.416 Moreover, as a general rule, members of the armed forces are subject 
to national military laws and to international regulation of armed conflicts. However, 
non-military personnel, including political leaders, are not subject to international laws of 
armed conflict unless an agency relationship can be established between those persons 
and the armed conflict.417 
Although command responsibility is the legal and logical concomitant to the 
defense of “obedience to superior orders,”418 conviction of the subordinate does not 
relieve the commander of responsibility. On the other hand, exonerating the subordinate 
based on the defense of “obedience to superior orders” does not necessarily support 
conviction of the superior because orders can be either wrongly understood or wrongly 
applied.   
Under the ICTY jurisprudence, there are three elements of superior responsibility 
“(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) the superior knew or had 
reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) the 
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act 
or punish the perpetrator thereof.” 419 
                                                 
416 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 334. 
417 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 196; 
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A (January 27, 2000) ¶ 148.  
418 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity 449-83 (Kluwer Law International 1999); see also 
D’Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility and Levie, “Some Comments on Professor 
D’Amato’s Paradox,” 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 604-II (1986).    
419 Prosecutor v. Delalic et Al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 346. The source of the three 
conditions is International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary regarding Geneva Protocol I. 
See ICRC commentary ¶ 3543 available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750112?OpenDocument 
(last visited July 15, 2006).   
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 The superior-subordinate relationship requires a hierarchical relationship, direct 
or indirect, and the prosecutor must show that the accused has exercised “effective 
power” over those said to be his or her subordinates and to have committed crimes.420 
“Effective control” means that the superior, whether de jure or de facto, military or 
civilian, has the power or authority to prevent the offense or to punish subordinates. This 
effective control does not need to be permanent.421 Based on this standard, two or more 
superiors can be held criminally liable for the same crime if it can be shown that the 
perpetrator was under both of their commands at the relevant time.422   
 The fact that the superior might have been de jure superior to the offender, or that 
he had the ability to give orders, is not enough or conclusive to prove that he had 
effective control. Other relevant factors can be considered to determine whether there 
was a superior-subordinate relationship.423 The superior-subordinate relationship must be 
distinguished from a lower form of influence or authority. Some individuals may be 
respected enough to persuade others to follow them, exercising some influence over these 
others. This lower level of influence, however, is not sufficient to prove a superior-
subordinate relationship.424  
 Regarding the temporal existence of the superior-subordinate relationship, the 
majority of the ICTY Appeal Chambers believe that there should be a perfect temporal 
                                                 
420 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeal Judgment (July 3, 2002) ¶ 50.     
421 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, 22 February 2001, ¶ 399;  Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. 
IT-97-24 (July 31, 2003) ¶ 459; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 300; 
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeal Judgment (July 3, 2002) ¶ 50;  Prosecutor v. 
Delalic et el., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 251-252; Prosecutor v. 
Kajelijeli , Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T (December 1, 2003) ¶ 771.  
422 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 303; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. 
IT-95-27 (March 15, 2002) ¶ 93.  
423 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T (February 22, 200) ¶ 396.  
424 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 263, 266.   
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coincidence between the time of the commission of the crime and the existence of a 
superior-subordinate relationship.425 This view overlooks the fact that responsibility is 
based on whether a superior failed to prevent the crime or to punish the offender. The 
latter should include a defendant who was not the subordinate’s superior at the time the 
offense was committed but was the subordinate’s superior subsequently when the offense 
could have been punished but was not. Consequently, command responsibility should be 
enforced on those who failed to punish the offender even if their superior-subordinate 
relationship existed only after the commission of the crime.426  
 In addition to the requirement  for a superior-subordinate relationship, it must be 
shown that the superior, military or civilian, knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate had committed the crime or was about to do so.427 The knowledge 
requirement is satisfied either by actual knowledge or knowledge putting the superior on 
notice of the probability of the comission of such an offense.428 Actual knowledge means 
that a superior was aware that a relevant crime had been committed or was about to be 
committed. Such awareness can be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence.429 
                                                 
425 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeal Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility (July 16, 2003) ¶ 45.    
426 Prosecutor argues in his brief before the trial court. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-
AR72, Appeal Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command 
Responsibility  (July 16, 2003) ¶ 43. 
427 The court derived the mental element from the Commission of Experts Report which provides “The 
forms of command’s knowledge are “It is the view of the Commission that the mental element necessary 
when the commander has not given the offending order is (a) actual knowledge, (b) such serious personal 
dereliction on the part of the commander as to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible 
consequences, or (c) an imputation of constructive knowledge; that is, despite pleas to the contrary, the 
commander, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, must have known of the offences 
charged and acquiesced therein.” Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc, S/1994/674; see as well Prosecutor v. Delalic ET Al., 
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 222. 
428 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 223. 
429 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 427. 
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 The information which puts the superior on notice regarding the risk of the 
offense is not required to be in a specific form and it can be oral or written. There is no 
need for specific information. It is enough that the information simply be in general.430 In 
determining whether a superior had knowledge, several factors should be considered. 
These factors were derived from the final report of the Commission of Experts for the 
former Yugoslavia Tribunal.431 Regarding the commander’s knowledge “one might 
consider a number of indices, including: …the number of illegal acts; the type of illegal 
acts; the scope of illegal acts; the time during which the illegal acts occurred; the number 
and type of troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical location of 
the acts; the widespread occurrence of the acts; the tactical tempo of operations; the 
modus operandi of similar illegal acts; the officers and staff involved; and the location of 
the commander at the time.”432 Some of these factors are reminiscent of those factors 
adopted in the Yamashita case.  
 The third requirement is the superior’s failure to prevent or punish. This means 
that the superior failed to take reasonably necessary measures to do so. The required 
measures are those which are foreseeable in all circumstances and are within the 
                                                 
430 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001)  ¶ 238; failure 
to obtain such information or the argument that a superior “should have known” or that the superior failed 
to exercise his duty to be informed of the criminal behavior of his subordinate are not valid grounds to base 
the responsibility under the command responsibility doctrine. Prosecutor v. Delalic ET Al., Case No. IT-
96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 222-241. However, some national military legislation has 
adopted a different view.  See for instance Canadian law, under which criminal negligence in failing to 
obtain the information regarding the violations is sufficient. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 
S. C. 24 § 5.1.b (2000)(Can.). 
431 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc, S/1994/674 (1992).  
432 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc, S/1994/674 (1992).  
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superior’s power.433 Necessary and reasonable measures, of course, vary from case to 
case and the urgency with which a commander is expected to act depends partly on the 
seriousness and nature of the offense.434  
 Failure to act can include “failure to control troops, disregard of troop conduct, 
acquiescence in troop activity, dereliction of duty, general complicity (incitement, 
approval, aiding and abetting, accessory responsibility, conspiracy), failure to educate 
troops or suppress crime, failure to prosecute troops who violate the law, failure to 
enforce the law generally, failure to maintain troop discipline, failure to investigate 
incidents, failure to report incidents to higher authorities…”435 
 It is enough for a superior to fail to prevent or punish a crime. Although the duty 
to prevent concerns future crimes of subordinates while the duty to punish concerns past 
crimes of subordinates, punishing is not enough if prevention was available, but was not 
undertaken. 436 The duty to prevent encompasses both that the superior knew that a crime 
was planned or that he had reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime would be 
committed.437 
                                                 
433 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-95-27 (March 15, 2002) ¶ 95; Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case 
No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment (February 20, 2001) ¶ 226.  
434 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1 (June 25, 1999) ¶ 81; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment (July 31, 2004) ¶ 72.  
435 Jordan Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 176 
(1972) Quoted in Lieutenant Commander Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study 
of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, 107 
MIL. L. REV. 71, 132 (1985). 
436 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 336; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment (July 31, 2004) ¶ 83. 
437 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 445.  
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 Nevertheless, causation is not required.438 Between the failure to act and the 
commission of the crime, such a nexus might be considered “inherent in the requirement 
that the superior failed to prevent the crimes which were committed by the 
subordinate.”439    
 Finally, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals split on the issue of whether a 
commander can be found guilty for the same crime on two grounds, command 
responsibility and other bases of responsibility such as an order. Even ICTY Chambers 
differ in this regard.440 On the upper level, rejecting an approach which considers the 
position of the accused, as a commander, an aggravating circumstance in the sentencing 
stage, the ICTY Appeal Chamber gave indictment priority to the active basis such as an 
order.441 On the other hand, the ICTR convicted the same defendant based on two 
theories for the same conduct.442 
4. Saddam Hussein's Role in the Environmental Offenses 
 Several questions might have been raised regarding whether Saddam Hussein 
intentionally committed crimes against the environment. Were his actions driven by 
pressing military circumstances? Did Saddam Hussein order a premeditated plan to be set 
in motion to commit those crimes? Was there a connection between the crimes and the 
                                                 
438 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 398.  
439 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 339. 
440 In Kordic and Cerkez case, the Court convicted Cerkez in both counts, while in Blaskic, the Court 
rejected such approach. See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 
842; Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 337.   
441 Compare between Prosecutor v. Blaskici, No. IT-95-14-T, Appeal Judgment Case (July 31, 2004) ¶ 91 
& Prosecutor v. Furundizja, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (December 10, 1998) ¶ 283. 
442 Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T (January 22, 2004).  
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activities of the Coalition forces? The answers to these questions can be found in Iraqi 
documents captured in Kuwait after the liberation of Kuwait.443  
 Saddam Hussein‘s case is similar to the case of most of the Nuremberg 
defendants. As put by Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials:  
Few of the defendants committed atrocities with their own hands, and in 
fact they were rarely visible at or within many miles of the scene of their 
worst crimes. They made plans and transmitted orders, and the most 
compelling witnesses against them were the documents which they had 
drafted, signed, initialed, or distributed.444 
 To be admitted before international criminal tribunals, documentary evidence 
must be relevant and authentic, and have probative value.445 Iraqi documents captured 
after the liberation of Kuwait are likely to satisfy the above requirements for admission of 
evidence. Without question, Iraqi documents are relevant. They have probative value 
because they contain the plans for destruction and the names of the perpetrators.446 
Concerning the authenticity of the documents, because originals were seized and because 
they were signed by well-recognized Iraqi officers, they would have been accepted before 
the court.447 This part will examine the destruction plan and the link between that plan 
and Saddam Hussein in light of those documents.     
 The destruction of Kuwaiti oil, a natural resource, was one of the strategic aims of 
the Iraqi aggression. According to captured Iraqi documents, this destruction plan was 
                                                 
443 This evidence was documented in detail through several references. See Devastating Oil Well As 
Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting 
Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait 1997).  
444 Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under 
Control Council Law No. 10, at 68 (G.P.O., Aug. 15, 1949).  
445 See infra. App. 5. 
446 All Iraqi documents show the sending persons and the receiving persons. In addition, all the documents 
show those individuals who are responsible for ordering and executing the destruction plan.  
447 See infra. App. 3.  
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called the "Deferred Destruction Plan."448 Therefore, it is clear that the destruction was 
not inadvertent or imposed by pressing circumstances or the result of aerial bombardment 
by the Coalition forces as Iraqi authorities claimed. In short, it was a premeditated crime. 
It was calculated as part of the overall strategic plan of the Iraqi invasion. 
 Document 2449 proves that the task of the Destruction Guard Team, established by 
the Iraqi regime during the invasion, was not only to safeguard the oil wells against any 
internal or external danger, but to safeguard the explosives attached to the wells to 
guarantee their detonation. Document 3 required "…immediate consideration, prevention 
of infringements, and continuous surveillance in order to preserve these installations." 450 
In other words, all actions possible were to be taken to preserve the wells while they were 
in Iraqi possession, but all actions possible were to be taken to destroy them when they 
were to escape Iraqi possession.  
 A careful review of Iraqi documents reveals that the mechanism for implementing 
the "Deferred Destruction Plan" was accurate and comprehensive. A number of steps 
were planned to guarantee its execution. These steps were: identifying and preparing the 
targets designated for destruction; preparing materials and equipment used for 
destruction; selecting types of destruction methods; naming the destruction elements and 
specifying their responsibilities and duties; selecting the destruction guard groups; 
nominating the ignition groups; conducting drills of the destruction operations; 
                                                 
448 See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and 
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 28 (Center for Research and 
Studies on Kuwait 1997). 
449 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 2. 
450 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 3. 
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nominating patrols for follow up; and timing the implementation of the plan and its 
mechanism.451  
 Identifying the targets was the first step in the plan. The targets, according to Iraqi 
documents, were oil wells and other oil installations including assembly centers and oil 
terminals. In addition, vital strategic installations such as power stations, water 
desalination plants, and petro-chemical industries were included as targets for 
destruction.452 This step included determining suitable sites for the placement of 
explosives at the control valves at the underground well heads. These valves control the 
flow of oil from the well. Destroying them was calculated to result in a flow of oil so 
strong that it would be impossible to stop the leakage or to extinguish the resulting 
fire.453 This experience drew on the assistance of Field Engineering Corps personnel.454  
                                                
 Preparing the targets for destruction required two diagrams for placing and fixing 
the explosive charges at the head of the well.455 This process required daily inspection to 
ensure the presence of the explosives and the safety of the circuit. Materials and 
equipment used in the plan showed the intentionality of the offense. Explosives or filling 
bursting charges, electric destruction wires, igniters or kindlers, an ignition fuse, a safety 
cord, explosion capsules, a detonator, sand bags, and a wireless set were the materials 
used.456 In addition to daily inspection, an experiment was conducted on the explosive 
 
451 See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and 
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 53 (Center for Research and 
Studies on Kuwait 1997). 
452 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 9 Para. 1.  
453 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 11. 
454 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 10 Sec. (b) Sub.Sec. “Suggestion”  Fourth.   
455 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 13. 
456 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 13. 
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charges to check for their safety and degree of explosiveness. 457 Two basic methods of 
destruction were used as well as other alternatives.  
 These methods showed the keenness of the Iraqi regime to successfully achieve 
the plan. One of the two basic methods was an electric deferred-destruction circuit458 
while the second method is called an "Ordinary Deferred-Destruction Circuit."459 Other 
alternatives were: destruction by the artillery batteries, destruction by direct or indirect 
shelling by tanks, and destruction by shots fired from the destruction guard in case other 
methods were impracticable.  
 To exercise full control and to limit responsibility to assure success of the 
deferred-destruction plan destruction personnel were named and their responsibilities and 
duties were specified. For instance, the "Destruction Guard Group" was established 
during the invasion. These groups of one or two infantry companies and one field 
engineering company were assigned to each oil compound.460  
 These groups had their own structure and mission. Every destruction group had a 
commanding officer whose title was Commanding Officer of the Destruction Guard or 
Commanding Officer of Protection. This Commanding Officer received the orders for 
                                                 
457 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 21. 
458 This method operates by connecting a group of neighboring wells in a certain area, an oil assembly 
depot, or a number of destruction points in the vital installations to an electric destruction circuit. This was 
done through a network of electric wires which was connected to the detonator.  
459 An ordinary method operates by using an ignition cord. This method was used when there were enough 
wires available for the electric circuit.  
460 See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and 
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 111 (Center for Research 
and Studies on Kuwait 1997). 
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destruction and had other jobs.461 In addition, other groups, called the "Regiment's 
Destruction Groups" or the "Ignition Groups," were established for each target. These 
groups were responsible for implementing orders for detonation or ignition. Assigning 
any other jobs to personnel of the destruction groups was prohibited. Prohibition shows 
the insistence of the Iraqi regime that the destruction plan should be implemented quickly 
and with maximum success. Moreover, these groups were headed by commanding 
officers.462  
 These groups conducted explosion experiments in order to determine the plan’s 
positive and negative points. Times were set for these groups to implement the plan. 
According to Iraqi documents, the plan was to be carried out to prevent oil resources and 
other facilities from falling into enemy hands it and when the enemy threatened to end 
the Iraqi occupation.463  
 In case communication was disrupted and contact became impossible, the 
Commanding Officers in charge of destruction would make the decision. Otherwise, the 
plan would be implemented in the following sequence: the Division Commander would 
issue the destruction order to the Brigade Commander who in turn would issue it to the 
                                                 
461 These jobs are: securing protection for the site against any attack by saboteurs or infiltrators, controlling 
wayfarers and refugees within the site, reporting the activities of preparing and fitting the targets, ensuring 
the presence of sentries day and night to foil possible enemy attempts to neutralize the plan, and when 
destruction orders were given, submitting a detailed report describing the effect and success of the 
destruction carried out.  
462 See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and 
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 141 (Center for Research 
and Studies on Kuwait 1997). 
463 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5. 
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Commander of the Destruction Guard Force who would relay it to the Commander of the 
Ignition Regiment Group.464  
 These steps are clear evidence that the destruction of oil and the petroluim 
infrastructure was intentional. The remaining question is whether there was a link 
between this plan and the then Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. In other words, did Saddam 
Hussein issue the order to commit these offenses? If not, is it possible that these offenses 
were committed without his knowledge? Would he have been responsible under the 
doctrine of command responsibility?  
 The extent of the Iraqi leader’s role in the destruction plan is derived through 
direct and indirect (circumstantial) evidence. The indirect connection is based upon the 
following analysis: according to Iraqi documents, since the Republican Guard was 
responsible for implementing the destruction plan465 and these forces received their 
orders directly from the head of the Iraqi regime,466 Saddam Hussein masterminded this 
plan or ordered that it be created. 
 In addition to the indirect connection theory, there are several captured Iraqi 
documents which indicate that this plan was ordered by the Iraqi leader personally. For 
                                                 
464 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 4, 6.  
465 (Document 5)The pertinent document item 2 provides “Appointing sabotage squads to mine the oil 
wells and power and electricity stations that have been prepared for deferred destruction, and preparing and 
finalizing all the requirements for their destruction, so that every group is stationed in its designated place 
in order to blow up these targets as soon as orders are issued.” This document is a memo issued 10 days 
after the invasion by the Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces, Republican Guard Infantry Brigades 19, 
20, 22 and 23, Artillery Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Air Defense 
Command of Nubu-khath Nasr Forces of Republican Guard, Armored Battalion Command, Nubu-khath 
Nasr Forces of Republican Guard. This document shows the involvement of Republican Guard in 
implementing the Deferred Destruction Plan. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5.   
466 See Devastating Oil Well As Revealed by Iraqi Documents- Economic and Environmental Damage and 
Kuwaiti Efficacy in Protecting Oil Wealth, Prepared by A Panel of Specialists 39 (Center for Research and 
Studies on Kuwait 1997). 
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instance, Document 4 notes in its introduction that the directives concerning the 
destruction of oil wells and vital installations were “at the orders of our leader the 
President in his meeting with the Armed Forces General Command on 
13/1/1991”(emphasis added).467 The same statement is prescribed in Document 6 which 
provides “The leader our President …in the meeting of the Armed Forces General 
Command on 13 January 1991 ordered the following:…..Oil installations prepared for 
destruction are to be blown up when the situation is too dangerous, in order not to leave 
them intact to the enemy as they should be completely devastated” (emphasis added).468 
 In terms of the Iraqi documents, Saddam Hussein might have been responsible 
according to several theories. The basic theory is that Saddam Hussein issued the orders 
for destruction. It is clear that the orders for destruction were unlawful since they were 
issued without legal limitations or justifications such as military necessity.469 The only 
incentive for destruction was “not to leave them [oil installations] intact to the enemy as 
they should be completely devastated”(emphasis added).470 Saddam Hussein was 
responsible even though he was not present when the crimes were committed. These 
orders need not be in specific forms. Moreover, the message of the orders was clear. As a 
result, the defense of misinterpretation of these orders by subordinates would have been a 
long-shot defense. 
                                                 
467 Document 4 is a memo 2/122 dated 25/1/1991 and sent by Captain Amir Sotyati Mutlak, PP. 
Commander, Commando Battle Group, Division 42, and addressed to all companies. See infra. App. 3. 
Doc. 4.  
468 Document 6 is a memo issued on 18 January 1991 by Lt. Colonel (Armor) Ghidan Khalf Abdullah, 
Commander of the Ninth Tank Battalion and addressed to all companies. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 6.  
469 All Iraq documents show no “military necessity” requirement on the execution of the destruction plan. 
See infra. App. 3.  
470 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 6. 
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 As an alternative basis for responsibility, Saddam Hussein might have been 
assigned responsibility based on Common Design or Criminal Joint Enterprise (JCE). 
From the structure of the groups, their missions and the steps of the plan, it is obvious 
that “systemic form” exists here. Therefore, the court might have been convinced that a 
common plan was present and Saddam Hussein was part of this plan. The participation 
attributed to him was forming the plan and shaping the groups, or at least facilitating the 
plan by providing all available materials and technical assistance to the criminals. 
 The final basis of responsibility would have been command responsibility. This 
form of responsibility requires three elements. First, the superior-subordinate relation 
must exist between the accused and the executor of the offense. Indeed, Saddam Hussein, 
as the formal Iraqi president or leader of Iraqi forces, was the superior of any individual 
belonging to the Iraqi forces. From the Iraqi documents, this authority was not de jure, 
but de facto. This could have been inferred from statements contained in Iraqi documents 
mentioning his orders.  
 The second requirement for command responsibility is the extent of knowledge 
held by the accused. The prosecutor must prove that the accused knew or had reason to 
know his subordinate was about to commit such acts or had already done so. If the court 
would respect documents indicating a link between Saddam Hussein and the destruction 
plan,471 it might have been sufficient for a court to make this finding. If not, the court 
might have been convinced that Saddam Hussein was involved through constructive 
knowledge. The court could have found Saddam Hussein’s constructive knowledge based 
upon several factors, such as: the number of illegal acts; the type of illegal acts; the scope 
                                                 
471 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 4, 6.    
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of illegal acts; the time during which the illegal acts occurred; the number and type of 
troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical location of the acts; the 
widespread occurrence of the acts; the tactical tempo of operations; the modus operandi 
of similar illegal acts; the officers and staff involved; and the location of the commander 
at the time.472  
 The crimes committed were extensive and widespread in terms of time and area. 
They involved the explosion of more than 700 oil wells and other illegal acts. In terms of 
time, the plan had been constructed at the beginning of the invasion and was executed at 
the end of the invasion. This plan, from construction through execution, lasted about 8 
months.473 
 As mentioned before, the involvement of Republic Guard troops, the closest 
military troops to Saddam Hussein, and the high rank of the commanders (General and 
Colonels of different main sectors) participating in the deployment of the team in 
different roles, including planning, preparing, and executing,474 support the conclusion 
that Saddam Hussein was aware of the plan.   
 Concerning the modus operandi or pattern of commission of the crimes, there was 
similarity among all these illegal acts. This similarity can be seen in the methods used to 
                                                 
472 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc, S/1994/674 (1992). 
473 A review of Iraqi documents shows that the earliest document relevant to the destruction plan was dated 
August 12, 1990, ten days after the invasion. This proves that the plan was established by the occurrence of 
the invasion or during the first days of the invasion.  See infra. App. 3. Doc. 5.  
474 The high-rank of the commanders can be inferred from several Iraqi documents. See infra. App. 3. Doc. 
3, 5, 6, 10 and 11.  
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blow up the oil wells. All the explosions were created by the same type of explosive 
charges placed at the same location at each oil well.475 
 Regarding the geographical location of these illegal acts, they occurred in two 
parts of the Kuwaiti territory, the southern and northern parts of the country where the oil 
wells were located. In sum, these illegal acts and the damage they caused were 
widespread around the country. It is hard to claim that they were committed without the 
knowledge of the Iraqi leader. Finally, Saddam Hussein’s location when the crimes were 
committed was not essential, since it is unlikely that a head of state would be at the scene 
of a war crime.  
 The last requirement of command responsibility is the superior’s failure to take 
the necessary remedy either to prevent the crime from occurring or to punish the culprits. 
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein was capable of stopping or preventing the crime 
from occurring, if he knew a subordinate was about to commit a crime. Saddam Hussein 
had complete authority to issue an order to prevent the occurrence of the crime. In 
addition, he had a legal obligation to act in order to stop the crime. If Saddam Hussein 
knew of the crime only after its commission, he was required to punish the culprits. He 
punished none of the culprits. The required remedy depends on the time of the 
defendant’s knowledge; if the defendant knew before the commission of the crime, the 
defendant’s claim that he or she punished the culprits is not an acceptable defense.  
 Saddam Hussein’s knowledge before the commission of the crime, as mentioned 
before, could have been derived from several factors. Moreover, it could have been 
                                                 
475 See infra. App. 3. Doc. 13. 
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proved through his well-known threat before the beginning of the liberation war that if 
the United States forced him to leave Kuwait, he would burn up Kuwait’s oil.476 
Moreover, he clearly knew of the commission of the crime subsuequently; the whole 
world knew from news reports and pictures. 
II. International Legal Sources of Criminality 
 All the previous theories of responsibility are not sufficient if acts attributed to 
Saddam Hussein’s subordinates were not criminal under international law. Under 
international law, the bases of criminality are:  
(1) existing international conventions which consider the act in question 
an international crime; (2) recognition under Customary International Law 
that such conduct constitutes an international crime;(3) recognition under 
general principles of international law that such conduct is or should be 
deemed violative of international law and about which there is a pending 
draft convention before the United Nations; and (4) prohibition of such 
conduct by an international convention though not specifically stating that 
it constitutes an international crime and which is also recognized in the 
writings of  scholars as such.477  
The intention of the international community is a decisive factor in identifying the 
causes of criminality.478 To avoid a dilemma of whether there is a violation of principles 
of legality, this paper adopts the proposition that international crime is “any conduct 
which is designated as a crime in a multilateral convention recognized by a significant 
                                                 
476 Carlyle Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installation Ablaze, WASH. POST, February 23, 1991, at A10 
477 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE. 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 28 (1983). 
478 It should be foreseeable that the objectives of international criminal conventions are not only to 
criminalize certain conduct either at the international or national levels, but also to impose a duty to 
prosecute or extradite on states. Punishing those found guilty of international crimes, creating an 
environment of international judicial cooperation between states in criminal matters, setting a priority of 
exercising jurisdiction between states, and excluding a defense of superior orders can be considered other 
objectives of these conventions. Friedl Weiss, Time Limits for the Prosecution of Crimes against 
International Law, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 163 (1982). 
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number of states.”479 In addition, international crimes, unlike domestic crimes, require 
either an international or a transnational element; the act in question must have been 
committed against the international community or have affected the interests of more 
than one state. 
Traditionally, international crimes are divided into several categories: crimes 
against peace, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.480 
Violation of the laws on the use of force (crimes against peace) and violation of the laws 
on human rights (crimes against humanity) are not applicable to the case of Saddam 
Hussein’s crimes against the environment for several reasons.481 This leaves war crimes 
                                                 
479 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE. 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 29 (1983). 
480 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).  
481 Crimes against peace are those acts conducted in violation of the laws on the use of force. Even though 
it has been argued that the use of oil during the Gulf War in 1990 represents an example of the use of force, 
this argument does not find support and clear evidence in international conventional law. See  Anthony 
Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL. 
W. INT’L L. J. 67 (1992). Crimes against humanity are those acts which are deemed a serious violation of 
human rights. There are some views that link environmental protection to human rights. As a result of this 
linkage, an argument has been made that environmental devastation can be fought through provisions 
within the ICC framework dealing with genocide and crimes against humanity. See Linada A. Malone & 
Scott Pasternack, Defending the Environment – Civil Society Strategies to Enforce International 
Environmental Law 234-37 (Island Press 2006). In spite of the fact that linking the environment and human 
rights has its advantages, in some cases, a conflict between the two values is expected. For instance, the 
right of each family to decide the number and spacing of its children might be contradicted by the 
sustainable development concept which requires lowering the national birthrates. Dinah Shelton, The 
Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals in Linking Human Rights and the 
Environment 1, 1-2, 22 (Romina Pichlotti & Jorge Daniel eds., 2003). Moreover, it is said that “While the 
environment is known to have an impact on human health, little has been accomplished to include health 
criteria in the mushrooming international instruments on environmental protection so as to identify those 
environmental hazards that have a direct- and detrimental- bearing on human health. Katarina Tomasevski, 
Environmental Rights in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 257, 267 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 
1995). Nevertheless, human rights, including the right to have a clean environment, are various; 
developments in international criminal law have not yet reached the notion that protecting the environment 
is protecting a human right. Indeed, reaching the conclusion that the existing international law regime is not 
adequate to protect the environment, an argument has been made that environmental crimes should be 
prosecuted when they were conducted to accomplish another atrocity, such as genocide or crimes against 
humanity. Tara Weinstein, Prosecuting attacks that destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes and 
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 17 GEO. INT’l ENVTL. L. REV. 697 (2005).   
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as the only viable basis for criminal prosecution of Saddam Hussein for environmental 
damages caused by his destruction of the Kuwaiti oil and petroluim infrastructure.482   
Reviewing the actions of Saddam Hussein’s subordinates during the invasion 
leads to the conclusion that Iraq’s violations of the laws of armed conflict are many and 
can be categorized into three major groups:  initiation of aggressive war; abuse of 
Kuwaiti citizens, foreigners, diplomatic personnel, and prisoners of war; and property 
damage and confiscation.483 In this part, the focus will be on those offenses committed 
against the environment, which primarily fall into the third category. 
This paper concludes that the only source of law that could have been expected to 
define criminality in the case of Saddam Hussein’s actions against the environment is 
found in provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 protecting property. Other 
conventions might be applicable to other and future cases, but not to the case of Saddam 
Hussein for several reasons.484  
                                                 
482 In addition to these disciplines, the laws on the use of force and the laws on human rights, there is a third 
discipline, the International Environmental Law regime. This regime emerged following the World War II 
era and in response to the occurrence of serious accidents that had occurred. The fruit of this regime is the 
establishment of care standards and levels of liability in order to minimize a future environmental crisis and 
to clarify their legal framework. In considering the environmental devastation that has occurred in armed 
conflict, the International Environmental Law regime left to the laws of armed conflict the task of 
minimizing the possibilities that these actions would occur. Moreover, the International Environmental 
Law discipline failed to address the individual’s criminal responsibility at the international level and left the 
use of a criminal remedy in some cases to national policies. A detailed study of the weakness of the of the 
international environmental law regime is included in appendix 4. See infra. App. 4.   
483 Thomas R. Kleinberger, The Iraqi Conflict: An Assessment of Possible War Crimes and the Call for 
Adoption of an International Criminal Code and Permanent International Criminal Tribunal, 14 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. INT’L L. & COMP. L. 69, 77-102 (1993). 
484 These conventions are the Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
Protocol I would not apply to the Saddam Hussein case since Iraq was not party to the Protocol and these 
provisions protecting the environment were not considered part of international customary law at least 
when the actions were committed.  The ENMOD Convention does not provide for a basis for criminality 
and the subject matter of the Cultural Property Convention does not cover oil wells.  See infra. App. 6.   
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1. Geneva Convention IV (relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War) 1949 485 
The first attempt to define war crimes was during the trials that followed World 
War II.486 The Control Council Law No. 10 Article II (1)(b) provides:  
War Crimes [are] [a]trocities or offenses against persons or property 
constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not 
limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any 
other purpose of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill 
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity…..487 
Wanton destruction of property, as a war crime, was included within the war 
crimes list prepared by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of World 
War I488 Indeed, the destruction of property as a war crime had been identified even 
before World War I.489  
  After the horrors committed during World War II, the need for rules which protect 
victims became exigent. As a result, four Geneva Conventions were signed in 1949 by 
sixty- four nations. Those conventions extended protection to the wounded and sick in the 
                                                 
485 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (1949. 
486 Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition  in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,93 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999). 
487 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946). 
488 Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87, 91 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999). 
489 At the initiative of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907, the Hague conference was held. This 
conference resulted in four conventions that control the means of war. The first convention (Huge I) is 
related to asphyxiating gases, the second convention (Huge II) dealt with the use of expanding bullets, the 
third convention (Huge III) prescribes the rights of neutral powers and persons, and the fourth convention 
(Huge IV) describes the laws and customs of war on land. The conclusion of those conventions is 
restriction of the means that can be used during the armed conflict. The relevant convention, here, is the 
fourth. Although this convention does not explicitly protect the environment, this protection might be 
gained through indirect means. For instance, article 23 (g) prohibits destruction of property without military 
necessity. Article 3 of the fourth convention imposes monetary compensation for any violation of the 
convention provisions. This convention does not provide a basis for criminal responsibility and no one had 
been held liable according to article 3.  
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field (Geneva I), the wounded and sick at sea (Geneva II), prisoners of war (Geneva III), 
and civilians (Geneva IV). Principles stipulated by the Geneva and Hague conventions 
formalize the modern law of armed conflict.490 Both Kuwait and Iraq are parties to the 
Geneva conventions and are bound by their terms, including property destruction 
offenses.491 The focus here will be on the Fourth Geneva Convention, primarly 
concerning civilian protection. Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV provides:  
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property 
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or 
to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is 
prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary 
by military operations.492 
Violation of article 53 is considered a grave breach of the Geneva Convention and 
these grave breaches are deemed criminal.493 The only accepted justification for property 
destruction during armed conflict is military necessity. As mentioned before, while the 
Iraqi regime could have claimed this justification, it did not exist.494 Therefore, the only 
remaining question is whether the elements of the offense, the destruction of properties, 
were present.    
To establish violation of Article 53, several requirements are necessary. These 
requirements are divided into categories. The first category includes general requirements 
                                                 
490 Col. James P. Terry, The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert Storm, 45 NAVAL 
WAR COLLEGE REV. 62 (1992).   
491 States party to the Geneva Conventions are available at 
http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visit July 20, 2007).  
492 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (1949). 
493 Article 147 provides “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any 
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention….. and 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 146 requires the contracting parties or states to enact domestic 
legislation criminalizing the grave breaches of the convention. Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287 (1949). 
494 See supra. Ch. I. Sec. IV.  
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such as the existence of both armed conflict and the nexus between armed conflict and 
the alleged crimes or actions.495 
The existence of armed conflict is a precondition to the application of the article. 
An armed conflict exists “Whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups within a State.”496 Moreover, the second general requirement is 
the existence of a nexus between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict. This nexus 
exists when the crime is committed because of the armed conflict or as a result of the 
armed conflict.  
Both requirements, armed conflict and nexus, are present in the case of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. It is clear from decisions issued by the U.N. Security Council that 
Iraq’s invasion or occupation of Kuwait was “….a resort to armed force between 
States.”497  
In addition, the crime against the environment committed by the Iraqi forces 
requires a nexus between the criminal act and armed conflict. Explaining this 
requirement, the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled that “There must be an obvious link between 
the criminal act and the armed conflict. Clearly, if a relevant crime was committed in the 
course of fighting or the take-over of a town during armed conflict, for example, this 
would be sufficient to render the offense a violation of international humanitarian law. 
                                                 
495 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 22-35. 
496 Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L., 249, 274 -275 (1984). 
497 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 94-1- AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Appeal Chamber (October 2, 1995) ¶ 79-84. 
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Such a direct connection to actual hostilities is not, however, required in every 
situation.”498  
In applying this requirement to Saddam Hussein’s case, it was likely that a court 
would have found that this nexus requirement had been met. From earlier discussion,499 
most of the Iraqi documents suggest that Saddam Hussein’s action, blowing up oil wells, 
was committed in the course of fighting. In addition, this action, as previously mentioned, 
was part of a policy or strategy followed by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 
1991. All Iraqi documents showed that this action was committed based upon a deliberate 
destruction plan ordered by Saddam Hussein. This plan was deferred during the invasion 
until the appropriate time for its execution. That time was the time of war as one of the 
Iraqi documents suggests.500      
In addition to the general requirements, Article 53 protects only property within 
occupied territories. The ICTY Trial Chamber states: 
Article 53 describes the property that is protected under the Convention in 
terms of the prohibitions applicable in the case of an occupation. 
Accordingly, an occupation is necessary in order for civilian property to 
be protected against destruction under Geneva Convention IV. The only 
provisions of Geneva Convention IV which assist with any definition of 
occupation are Articles 2 and 6. Article 2 states: "The Convention shall 
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation . . . even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance" while Article 6 provides that 
Geneva Convention IV "shall apply from the outset of any conflict or 
occupation mentioned in Article 2.501  
                                                 
498 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21 (November 16, 1998) ¶ 193. 
499 See Ch. III. Sec. (I)(d).  
500 See infra. App. 3 Doc. 5.  
501 Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules 
of Procudre and Evidence ( September 13, 1996); See also Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-
95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001). 
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The protection of property conferred by the Geneva conventions is less than the 
protection conferred by the Hague Conventions because Article 53 protects only property 
in occupied territory from destruction by an occupying power, while the Hague 
Convention protects enemy property more generally.502 Occupied territory is defined as 
existing “when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The 
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and 
can be exercised.”503 There is no doubt that Iraq’s action in interfering with Kuwait’s 
territory is considered an occupation.504 
Property encompassed by Article 53 includes “real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public 
authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations.”505 This raises the question of 
whether natural resources, such as oil, soil, forest, or air, are considered property. 
                                                 
502 It is held that “…[i]n order to dissipate any misconception in regard to the scope of Article 53, it must be 
pointed out that the property referred to is not accorded general protection ; the Convention merely 
provides here for its protection in occupied territory. The scope of the Article is therefore limited to 
destruction resulting from action by the Occupying Power. It will be remembered that Article 23(g) of the 
Hague Regulations forbids the unnecessary destruction of enemy property; since that rule is placed in the 
section entitled “hostilities,” it covers all property in the territory involved in a war; its scope is therefore 
much wider than that of the provision under discussion, which is only concerned with property situated in 
occupied territory…” See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 
337. 
503 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, 187 CTS 227 (1907); Adam Roberts, What is a 
Military Occupation?, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 274 -275 (1984). 
504 This fact can be inferred from these words prescribed by the Security Council’s decisions concerning the 
Kuwait-Iraq case. These decisions include either the word “invasion” or “occupation.” See for instance, 
S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2932st  mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. 
SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2933st  mtg, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th 
Sess., 2934st mtg, P.1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990);  S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th  Sess., 2938st  mtg, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).     
505 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 191. 
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The Hague Conventions or Regulations, as part of international customary law,506 
considered forests and agricultural estates as protected properties.507 In addition, raw 
materials were included within the meaning of property in the World War II trials.508 
During the World War II trials, protecting the environment through the provisions for 
protecting properties was obvious.509 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that these 
materials are included within the meaning of properties.  
 Offenses against property, like other war crimes, can be committed through 
plunder or destruction. Destruction of property can be done through the means of 
explosive “dynamite.”510  To be a war crime, destruction of property must be extensive 
and committed wantonly.511 The standard of the extent of the damage is determined by 
the facts of the case. A single act might be sufficient in some cases.512  
 In determining when the destruction of property is extensive, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber ruled:  
[T]he crime of extensive destruction of property as a grave breach 
comprises the following elements, either: (i) Where the property destroyed 
is of a type accorded general protection under the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, regardless of whether or not it is situated in occupied territory; and 
the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy the property in question or 
in reckless disregard of the likelihood of its destruction; or (ii) Where the 
                                                 
506 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X, The Krupp Trial, Case No.58, P. 133. 
507 Hague Convention (IV) article 55 provides “The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator 
and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile 
State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer 
them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 187 CTS 227 
(1907). 
508 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X, The Krupp Trial, Case No.58, P. 69. 
509 For instance, monuments were considered property during these trials. See Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, Vol. IX, The Trial of  Karl Lingenfelder, Case No.51, P. 67. 
510 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. IX, The Trial of  Hans Szabados, Case No.49, P. 59. 
511 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 157.    
512 Prosecutor v. Blaskici, Case No. IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000) ¶ 157.    
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property destroyed is accorded protection under the Geneva Conventions, 
on account of its location in occupied territory; and the destruction occurs 
on a large scale; and (iii) the destruction is not justified by military 
necessity; and the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy the property 
in question or in reckless disregard of the likelihood of its destruction.513  
In applying the previous requirements for violation of article 53 to Saddam 
Hussein’s action during the invasion, one sees thatall the required elements to establish 
offenses are present. First, the action was taken extensively since it was taken on a large 
scale on occupied territory with the intent to destroy without the legally accepted 
justification of military necessity. Second, the offense was directed toward natural 
resources and the environment which is included within the meaning of property 
according to conventional, customary and judicial international law. Finally, this action 
was committed during an international armed conflict and with a link or connection to 
this armed conflict.   
However, the Fourth Geneva Convention contains no provisions for penalties. 
Therefore, the question that might have been raised here is procedural; does conviction 
based upon this Convention violate the principles of legality? This issue will be reviewed 
in the next chapter.514 
Conclusion and Observations 
 In international law, criminal responsibility concerning the violation of the laws 
of armed conflict encompasses both superiors and subordinates. Superior responsibility 
includes political and military leaders. This responsibility can be based upon issuing 
unlawful orders, joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. 
                                                 
513 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (February 26, 2001) ¶ 341.   
514 See infra. Ch. IV, Sec. I . 
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 The theory of unlawful orders requires that a superior use his position which has 
empowered him with the authority to be followed by subordinates. This use entitles him 
to issue orders for which he is responsible as long as mens rea is present.515 The joint 
criminal enterprise theory, developed by ad hoc international criminal tribunals, requires 
the existence of an organized system of ill-treatment.516 Under the theory of command 
responsibility, a superior is criminally responsible if he knew or had reason to know that 
a subordinate was about to commit a criminal action or had done so and he failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent that act or to punish the perpetrator.517  
 Applying any of these theories to Saddam Hussein’s actions, supported by 
documentary evidence captured after the liberation of Kuwait, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the then Iraqi president was criminally responsibility for the environmental 
devastation that occurred during the Gulf War of 1991.518  
 As a prerequisite for the then Iraqi president’s criminal responsibility, actions 
committed by Saddam Hussein’s subordinates against the environment must be criminal 
under international law. If the view that international criminality requires an international 
conventional basis is accepted, that basis exists in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
convention provisions protecting properties.519 The argument that conviction based upon 
this convention might violate the principle of nulla poena sine lege or no punishment 
without a law authorizing it will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
515 See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (a).  
516 See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (b). 
517 See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (c). 
518 See supra. Ch. III, Sec. I (d). 
519 See supra. Ch. III, Sec. II (a). 
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Chapter IV 
The Procedural Aspects of  
International Criminal Prosecution 
   
International custom has recognized the right of a victorious power to bring to 
trial individual members of enemy armies accused of violating international laws of 
war.520 Recently, this right to prosecute has been excersied by the United Nations 
Organization.521 
Assuming that the political will to try the now-deceased Saddam Hussein for 
environmental offenses had existed internationally, several procedural issues might have 
arisen if a trial had been proposed. These issues would have involved the legality of 
punishment, jurisdiction, immunity, a statute of limitations, the right to be tried without 
undue delay and the issue of the transfer of the defendant to an international tribunal. 
These issues are analyzed separately in this chapter. Part I deals with the principle of 
legality in the context of international law. Part II reviews the capability of the existing 
international judicial bodies to try Saddam Hussein’s case. Parts III and IV grapple with 
the issues of the defendant’s immunity and the statute of limitations. Part V reviews the 
right to be tried without undue delay, a right which is not recognized by some national 
legal systems. Finally, in Part VI, the discussion focuses on the ability of international 
tribunals to gain custody of defendants.     
 
 
                                                 
520 Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87, 89 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).  
521 This right is confirmed by creating international criminal tribunals (Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) by 
the U.N. Security Council to try the suspected war criminals.   
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I. The Legality Issue 
 The principle of legality is one of the fundamental principles in national criminal 
justice systems around the world. Its source is Roman law.522 This principle prohibits 
retroactive penal legislation. This prohibition includes creation both of new offenses, 
“Nullum Crimen Sine Lege,” and of new punishments, “Nullum Crimen Poena Legali,” 
presumably heavier punishments.523 This part of the paper concerns the second pillar of 
the principle, Nullum Crimen Poena Legali, or no punishment without existing law.  
The purposes of the principle are various.524 In the context of international 
criminal law, the importance of the principle is shown by the number of international 
instruments including it. For instance, article II, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 provides: 
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the penal offense was committed.525 
           
Other international and regional human rights instruments contain this principle.526 
Recognizing its importance, the ICTY Trial Chamber wrote, “Without the satisfaction of 
these principles [no crime and punishment without law] no criminalization process can be 
                                                 
522 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 183 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
523 The principle of legality is not applicable to legislation which is deemed to be in favor of the accused. 
Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr. Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The 
Handbook of Explaining General Rules] 134 (2003).   
524 The purposes are “to enhance the certainty of the law, provide justice and fairness to the accused, 
achieve the effective fulfillment of the deterrent function of the criminal sanction, prevent abuse of power 
and strengthen the Rule of Law.” See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 180 
(Transnational Publishers 2003). 
525 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3ed Sess., 183 plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN. 
4/AC.1/SR.2 (1948). 
526 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights art. 15. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967); Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, ETS 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221(1950); African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; 21 
ILM 58 (1982); American Convention on Human Rights art. 9, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123; 9 ILM 99 (1969).    
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accomplished and recognized.”527 The importance of the principle in the Rome Statute is 
manifiested by its occurrence in several provisions of the Statute.528  
Nationally, the principle of nullum crimen poena legali requires that the 
punishment for a criminal act must be prescribed in advance in a written law enacted by a 
competent legislature.529 Internationally, while the application of the principle of nullum 
crimen poena legali partly reflects the national application,530 it does not apply in the 
same strict sense. This was reaffirmed recently when the ICTY Trial Chamber provided 
that “It could be postulated, therefore, that the principles of legality [nullum crimen 
poena legali] in international criminal law are different from their related national legal 
systems with respect to their application and standards.”531 As a result, the ICTY 
Appellate Chamber ruled that “individual criminal responsibility is not barred by the 
absence of treaty provisions on punishments for breaches.”532  
There are several reasons for applying this principle differently in national and 
international law regimes. These reasons relate to the nature of the international law 
                                                 
527 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment  (Nov. 16, 1998) ¶ 402. 
528 Articles 11, 22, 23 and 24 of the Rome statute.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 (1998).    
529 Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr. Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The 
Handbook of Explaining General Rules] 99 (2003).  
530 Several national rules relating to the legality principle such as (1) the requirement of strict judicial 
interpretation, (2) if the text is not explicit, the judge cannot create law, and (3) if the text is ambiguous, it 
must be interpreted in favor of the accused, were reaffirmed by ICTY. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 
IT-96-21-T, Judgment  (Nov. 16, 1998) ¶ 410-413. Moreover, it is ruled that the principles of legality do 
not apply to procedures and evidence matters. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-99-I-A-R77, 
Appeal Chambers Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel Milan Vujin, (January 31, 
2000) ¶ 24. It seems that the Court did not consider the issue broadly. In some cases, issuing an evidence 
rule imposing upon the accused a heavier burden of proof concerning his excuse or defense, like military 
necessity, may affect the existence of the offense which violates the principle of legality. Therefore, 
excluding a defense explicitly or implicitly, by imposing a heavier burden of proof, represents a clear 
violation of the principle. For instance, during the World War II trials, excluding the defense of “superior 
orders” was a clear violation of the principle of legality. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International 
Criminal Law 159(Transnational Publishers 2003).               
531 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998) ¶ 405. 
532 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Juridiction (Oct. 2, 1995) ¶ 128.  
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system. Among international law sources, the principle applies only to conventions. Since 
these conventions are drafted by diplomats, who are not experts in the field of 
international criminal law, and since there is no uniformity of drafting techniques, it is 
reasonable to expect that these conventions will not meet the principal requirement that 
they be specific and unambiguous in respect of punishments.533   
 Lack of uniformity in the punishment policy between states also contributes to the 
absence of penalty provisions in international conventions.534 The assumptions of 
international law that international criminal rules will be enforced through national 
systems, and that these national systems will redraft the rules in styles that satisfy the 
requirements of different states are additional factors that lead to different applications of 
the principle of legality in the national and international contexts.535  
 In international criminal law, it is not necessary for an individual to know in 
advance the precise punishment for a crime, so long as his actions constitute a crime of 
extreme gravity for which there will be severe punishment.536 This does not completely 
address the seriousness of the Fourth Geneva Convention’s lack of penalty provisions for 
crimes against property. If Saddam Hussein had been charged with environmental war 
crimes in a special international tribunal, he could have raised the legality issue, even if 
the instrument creating the tribunal had prescribed a punishment.   
To address this issue at the international level, a commentator argued that “[The 
absence of specific penalties provisions in international criminal instruments] confirms a 
                                                 
533 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 201 (Transnational Publishers 2003).               
534 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 157 (Oxford University Press 2003).  
535 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law in International Criminal 
Law, Vol. I, 3, 103 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999). 
536 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May- July 26 
1996’ U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 29-30.   
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customary rule of international practice that penalties by analogy [to national 
punishments] are valid.”537 A problem with this approach might occur, however, when 
there is no national legislation criminalizing the conduct which is considered an 
international crime. While national systems differ in adopting the analogy approach, 
differences between national and international systems discussed earlier suggest that this 
is of little importance in using it at the international tribunal.538   
 A problem in resorting to national sentencing systems is illustrated by Rwanda. 
The ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Rwanda accepted the view that “The 
principle of legality concerning the punishment will be respected if the international 
tribunals harmonize their sentences with those in force in the territories where the crimes 
where committed.”539 The tribunal statute contained reference to the practice of 
sentencing within territories where the crimes were committed.540 This reference, 
incorparating national sentence systems, led to various difficulties and uncertainties.541 
                                                 
537 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 158 (Kluwer Law 
International 1999). 
538 In terms of the permissibility of analogy in criminal matters including penalties, the application of the 
principle differs among national criminal justice systems. The treatment of the principle can be divided into 
three directions. The first group of states permits judicially created crimes through interpretative analogy 
while the second group allows analogy for foreseeable analogous crimes. Followed by most national 
modern criminal justice systems, the third group of states disallows using analogy entirely, including the 
penalties issue. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 179-180 (Transnational 
Publishers 2003).      
539 Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. 
J. INT’L. L. 783, 824 (1995).  
540 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 23, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 
3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).  
541 Regarding these problems, professor Schabas said, “Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence suggested a timeframe for the application of ‘general practice.’ Was the reference to the law at 
the time of the crime, or to the law at the time of the trial? Nor was it evident whether the Statute 
contemplated the actual practice of the court in sentencing offenders, or simply the legislation in force.” In 
addition, reviewing the practice of both tribunals in sentencing issue, the author concluded that this 
approach results in more severe sentences. Therefore, the principle of legality, instead of being in favor of 
the accused, became prejudicial to the interests of the accused.  See William A. Schabas, Preserve Effects 
of the Nullu Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, EJIL Vol. 11 No.3 521, 26 
(2000).   
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To avoid these difficulties, judicial decisions held that the approach was not 
mandatory.542  
 The Rwandan experience suggests that leaving punishments for international 
crimes to national legal systems might not serve the interests or goals which international 
criminal law aims to accomplish. Probably, this is because the objectives of international 
criminal law, regarding punishment, differ from those of domestic laws.543 Moreover, 
even within national systems, the objectives of punishments differ from one territory to 
another or within the same jurisdiction from time to time.544 Therefore, this difference 
does not sustain the certainty of law as an objective of international criminal law. 
Rwanda’s objection, in the Security Council, to excluding the death penalty punishment 
from its international tribunal statute represents the best example of this contradiction in 
goals.545                 
 In the context of direct enforcement or international criminal trials, Professor 
Mohammed Cherif Bassiuoni said that “[T]he requirements of the principles of legality, 
nulla poena sine lege, is that the penalty be specific.”546 Since the principle of nullum 
crimen poena legali does not apply to some sources of international law, such as custom 
                                                 
542 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Sep. 4, 1998) ¶ 23. 
543 Although Rwanda claimed, supporting an argument for including the death penalty within the ICTR 
statute, that it would be unfair to expose suspected war criminals tried before its national courts to 
execution, while others tried before the international tribunal would be subject only to life imprisonment, it 
appears that the real motive for Rwanda’s argument was revenge on those criminals who were at the same 
time political opponents. See William A. Schabas, Preserve Effects of the Nullu Poena Principle: National 
Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, EJIL Vol. 11 No.3 521, 27 (2000). On the contrary, the U.N. position 
was formulated out of fear that this punishment would be used as a tool for extralegal execution of political 
opponents. William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 ALB. L. 
Rev. 733, 740 (1997).          
544 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 157 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
545 See William A. Schabas, Preserve Effects of the Nullu Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals, EJIL Vol. 11 No.3 521, 27 (2000).  
546 M. Chreif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law in International Criminal 
Law, Vol. I, 3, 103 (M. Chreif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999). 
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and laws created by precedents,547 and since national sentencing systems might not 
achieve the goals of the international criminal law system, then international customary 
law might be a suitable source to determine a fair and globally accepted punishment for 
international crimes, including war crimes, consistent with the legality principle. 
 Although during the World War II trials several authorities considered the death 
penalty acceptable for those convicted of war crimes,548 this is not the case in current 
international law. Developments occurring in international human rights instruments have 
caused a change in the trend of the international community toward appreciation of the 
death penalty as an appropriate punishment for war crimes.549 This development has led 
to the abolition of the death penalty in recent international criminal trials, ad hoc tribunals 
and the ICC, and in some national legal systems.550 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, for instance, did not make 
any exception to the right to life.551 On the contrary, article 2 of the European Convention 
                                                 
547 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullm Crimen Sine Lege and the 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 216 (Transnational Publishers 2002).  
548 See William A. Schabas, International Sentencing: From Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996) in 
International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 171 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 
1999). 
549 William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 ALB. L. Rev. 
733, 769-70 (1997).     
550 It can be inferred from the trend of international instruments relating to human rights, the right to life 
and the right not to be subject to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. For countries’ 
position toward the death penalty, see William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
International Law 155-210 (Cambridge University Press 2002); Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 77, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998); Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 24, S.C. Res. 827, 
U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda art. 23, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 
1598 (1994).     
551 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 3ed Sess., 183 plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN. 
4/AC.1/SR.2 (1948). The only exception which can be inferred regarding punishment from the Declaration 
is article 5 which stipulates “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” Since the death penalty is a controversial issue in international law, it is logical 
to assume that the death penalty would not fall within the prohibition of Article 5 unless it were applied in 
an arbitrary manner.    
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on Human Rights made the death penalty an exception to this right.552 Both the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention impose upon states a duty to inflict effective or appropriate penalties 
regarding their violation.553  
Later on, the death penalty disappeared from instruments constituting 
international criminal judicial bodies.554 It does not follow from this international 
movement toward elimination of the death penalty, that all national legal systems have 
eliminated this penalty. But the movement suggests that this penalty will not be 
acceptable to an international criminal tribunal created by the U.N. Organization. Thus, it 
is probable that punishment for those who commit war crimes, including crimes against 
property, would not have reached the level of death penalty punishment if an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal had been created in Saddam Hussein’s case. Inclusion of 
the death penalty in the statute of a contemproary ad hoc criminal tribunal violates the 
principle of nullum crimen poena legali.   
II. The Jurisdiction Issue 
Jurisdiction means “A court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree.”555 
Jurisdiction is a precondition for any court to try any case and the existence of 
jurisdiction is an aspect of international as well as of national prosecution. However, 
                                                 
552 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2 (1), Nov. 4, 
1950, 78 U.N.T.S. 222, 224 (entered into force Sep. 3, 1953).  
553 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of the 
Civilians in Time of War art. 147, Aug.12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).  
554 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 24, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 
ILM 1159 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 23, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. 
SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994). 
555 Black’s Law Dictionary 855 (7 th ed. 1999). 
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since a complete judicial system does not exist in the international criminal law regime 
and since principles of legality do not apply to the jurisdiction issue,556 in most 
international war crimes cases, the court’s jurisdiction was established after the 
commission of the crime. This phenomenon will gradually disappear after the creation of 
the ICC.    
Examining the jurisdiction issue under international law requires reviewing the 
existing international judicial bodies and their capacity to try the case of Saddam 
Hussein. This does not negate the possibility of a trial of Saddam Hussein within a 
national judicial system. Indeed, some war crimes trials have been conducted before 
either internationally modified municipal courts, ad hoc national tribunals or domestic 
courts.  
 A comparison of national and international trials for international crimes leads to 
the conclusion that guarantees of impartiality in the punishment of war crimes can be 
achieved in one of three ways: (1) an International Criminal Court; (2) appropriate 
modifications of the organization of the municipal courts; or (3) a system of quasi-
international courts.557 The existing international courts which will be reviewed in this 
part of the paper are the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court 
and the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
1. The International Court of Justice 
 The International Court of Justice or the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations Organization. The Court is a permanent court to which states may bring 
                                                 
556 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullm Crimen Sine Lege and the 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 210 (Transnational Publishers 2002). 
557 H. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 
80 (1944). 
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their disputes and which is empowered to provide United Nations organs and specialized 
agencies with advisory opinions. The Court’s decision is binding on the parties in a case, 
but not otherwise. The Court is a treaty-based institution, created and regulated by the 
United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Court. Therefore, the Court’s jurisdiction is 
governed by these instruments.  
 Article 34 (1) of the Statute of the Court limits the Court’s jurisdiction by 
providing that “Only States may be parties to cases before the Court.”558 As a result, no 
individual or non-governmental organization may bring a case before the Court against 
an individual, a non-governmental organization, or a state. Some argue, however, that the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should be open to cases brought by states 
against individuals.559 Nevertheless, the Court does not have a jurisdictional basis upon 
which to decide criminal cases.560 Perhaps the Court may consider criminal cases against 
states, if and when the criminal responsibility of states becomes a recognized norm under 
international law. The ICJ could not have tried Saddam Hussein’s case due to lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  
2. International Criminal Court 
Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, it has taken the international community 
nearly fifty years to create international institutions to bring individuals responsible for 
international crimes to account. In 1994, the International Law Commission submitted a 
                                                 
558 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34 (1), 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; 39 AJIL 
Supp. 215 (1945).   
559 Mark W. Janis, Individuals and the International Court in The International Court of Justice-Its Future 
Role after Fifty Years 205, 209-12 (A.S. Muller ET AL. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997).    
560 Since the only parties before the Court are states and since the criminal responsibility of states does not 
exist at the international level at the current time, the Court has no jurisdiction to review this type of case. 
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draft statute for an international criminal court to the United Nations General Assembly. 
After several years of negotiations, the General Assembly convened a Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which met in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998, to 
finalize and adopt an international convention establishing an international criminal 
court. After receiving the required sixty ratifications, the International Criminal Court 
Statute, or so- called Rome Statute, entered into force in April 2002. 561 
 The ICC is the first attempt of the international community to create a criminal 
court with a general jurisdictional scope and application. Unlike the ICC, the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had a personal jurisdiction562 while ad hoc 
tribunals, such as those in the Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have territorial and personal 
jurisdiction. 
 Before examining the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction, it is important 
to understand that a state’s jurisdiction is determined differently from an international 
tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under international law, a state may exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction based on several principles.563 However, international tribunals derive their 
competence only from the instruments creating them. Thus, the jurisdiction of 
international tribunal is not confined to the jurisdictional bases principles applicable to 
                                                 
561 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).  
562 Article 6 of Nuremberg Charter provides “The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in 
Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries 
shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, 
whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes…” See 
Nuremberg Charter art. 6, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 258 (1945).  
563 These grounds are: the Territorial Principle, the Active Personality Principle, the Passive Personality, 
the Protective Principle, and the Universal Jurisdiction. See Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International 
Criminal Law 143-160 (Cavendish Publishing 2003).  
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states.564 The reason behind this distinction is as summarized by the Appeal Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: 
A narrow concept of jurisdiction may, perhaps, be warranted in a national 
context but not in international law. International law, because it lacks a 
centralized structure, does not provide for an integrated judicial system 
operating an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals, 
where certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a power could be 
centralized or vested in one of them but not the others. In international 
law, every tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise provided). 
This is incompatible with a narrow concept of jurisdiction, which 
presupposes a certain division of labour. Of course, the constitutive 
instrument of an international tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional 
powers, but only to the extent to which such limitation does not jeopardize 
its "judicial character", as shall be discussed later on. Such limitations 
cannot, however, be presumed and, in any case, they cannot be deduced 
from the concept of jurisdiction itself. 565 
 The ICC has narrower jurisdiction than the state with respect to the same crimes 
committed in the state’s territory. Unlike ad hoc criminal tribunals, national jurisdiction 
has priority over the ICC in exercising the judicial function.566  
It is important to understand the distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction 
before the ICC. The difference is that: 
“Jurisdiction refers to the legal parameters of the Court’s operation, in 
terms of subject matter (jurisdiction rationiae materiae), time (jurisdiction 
ratione temporis), and space (jurisdiction ratione loci) as well as over 
individuals (jurisdiction ratione personae). The question of admissibility 
                                                 
564 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law 163 (Cavendish Publishing 2003).  
565 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction (October 2, 1995) ¶ 11.    
566 Such function is derived from the statement provided by article 1 of the Court Statute, “An International 
Criminal Court is hereby established. It shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions…” See 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. The reason for the difference between the jurisdiction of ICC and that of ad hoc tribunals, in 
relation to the national jurisdiction, is that ad hoc tribunals have been established by the U.N. Security 
Council resolution while the ICC has been established by an international treaty where a degree of 
compromise is expected. In other words, the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction is imposed while ICC 
jurisdiction is an issue which depends upon the state’s will.     
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arises at a subsequent stage, and seeks to establish whether matters over 
which the court properly has jurisdiction should be litigated before it.”567  
Even though the Court might have jurisdiction over a particular matter, it may refuse to 
admit the case because the accused is being charged before the national courts or because 
the offense is not so grave that it requires the Court to take an action. In sum, the 
admissibility question allows the Court discretion, while the jurisdiction question is 
confined by bright-line rules. However, these two questions sometimes overlap.568 ICC 
jurisdiction can be classified into several aspects; territorial, personal, subject matter, and 
temporal.  
In light of the territorial jurisdiction, the Court has jurisdiction over the states 
parties’ jurisdiction. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the non-party states, if the 
U.N. Security Council refers the case to the Court.569 In the context of commencing the 
proceeding before the Court, even though non-state actors might approach a state party to 
bring a case before the Court or a prosecution might seek information from governmental 
organizations or an NGO,570 the notion that a non-state actor cannot bring a case before 
the Court has been criticized.571 As an alternative, governmental organizations or an 
NGO might play the role of amicus curiae or a friend of the Court.572       
                                                 
567 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 68 (Cambridge University 
Press 2004).  
568 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 68-69 (Cambridge University 
Press 2004). 
569 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13 (b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).  
570 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 44 (4), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90(1998).  
571 Linada A. Malone & Scott Pasternack, Defending the Environment – Civil Society Strategies to Enforce 
International Environmental Law 234-37 (Island Press 2006).  
572 International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 103 (3), ICC-ASP/1/3, at 10, and 
Corr. 1 (2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000). 
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The Court’s personal jurisdiction encompasses these who ordered that the crimes 
be committed, persons acting with a common criminal purpose or plan, and commanders 
who failed to prevent or punish their subordinates who committed the statute crimes.573  
In terms of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court’s statute provides:  
For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means: (b) Other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, 
any of the following acts: ….(iv)  Intentionally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause….. injury to …. damage to…. 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment 
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated…574  
There is no need to examine whether these requirements, “widespread, long-term and 
severe,” are met by the environmental consequences resulting from Saddam Hussein’s 
action against the environment during the Gulf War of 1991 because there are other legal 
obstacles, explained below, preventing the applicability of the ICC statute in the Saddam 
Hussein case. However, even if we assume that these obstacles did not exist and that the 
environmental consequences resulting from Saddam Hussein’s action did not meet the 
above requirements of the Statute, the attempt to inflict such damages could have been 
another basis for indictment.575   
 In terms of temporal jurisdiction, article 11(1) of the statute provides “The Court 
has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
                                                 
573 Article 25 (3) (b), (d) deal with order and common plan bases while article 28 of the Statute deals with 
the command responsibility. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 25 (3) (b), (d), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).      
574 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 8 (2) (b) (iv), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 
1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).  
575 Knut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes, Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Sources and Commentary 162 (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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Statute.”576 In addition, article 24(1) of the statute states “No person shall be criminally 
responsible…..under this Statute for conduct prior [to] the entry into force of the 
Statute.”577 The statute has been criticized for preventing the Court from addressing 
atrocities, committed before its entry into force.578 In harmony with the provisions of 
article 11(1), it has been said that, “Unless an International Criminal Court is already in 
existence at the time of the cessation of hostilities, those who link the punishment of all 
war crimes to the establishment of such a court run the danger of sacrificing the 
substance of an urgent task for what may well prove to be the shadow of its intricate 
machinery.”579  
A review of the Court’s statute shows that, although the Court might have a basis 
for both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, it could not have tried Saddam 
Hussein’s case concerning the crimes committed against the environment. First, neither 
Iraq nor Kuwait is a party to the ICC statute.580 Even though the case could have reached 
the Court through referral by the U.N. Security Council, temporal jurisdiction would have 
prevented the Court from trying the case as all offenses against the environment during 
the Iraqi invasion were committed before the entrance of the Statute into force in April 
2002.          
                                                 
576 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). 
577 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 24 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). 
578 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 70 (Cambridge University 
Press 2004). 
579 This argument is based upon the fact that establishing an international criminal court is a task which 
cannot be accomplished within a short period of time. In addition, trying war criminals by this court shortly 
after war, even if the court were composed of neutral judges, would not be considered an impartial trial 
since in most cases there would be few neutral or even nominally neutral states left. H. Lauterpacht, The 
Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 81 (1944). 
580 States party to the International Criminal Court Statute are available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited July 19, 2007).  
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3. Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Jurisdiction  
 The practice of using military tribunals to prosecute individuals accused of war 
crimes was established after World War II.581 After World War II, a number of 
significant war crimes cases also were pursued in domestic courts, with varying degrees 
of success.582 One of the most important developments since then has been the creation 
of specialized international tribunals to pursue those individuals accused of war crimes. 
                                                
 The first specialized tribunal, established by the United Nations Security Council 
resolution 827 of May 25, 1993, was the “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.”583 The establishment 
of this tribunal was challenged before the tribunal itself,584 which held that it had the 
authority to review the legality of its establishment to the extent necessary to determine 
its primary jurisdiction.585  
 
581 A.P.V. Rogers, War Crimes Trials under the Royal Warrant: British Practice 1945-1946, 39 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 780 (1990).  
582 Christopher Amerasinghe, The Candian Experience  in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 243 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999); Leile Sadat Wexler, The French Experience  
in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 273 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 
1999); Graham T. Belwitt, The Australian Experience in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 301 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999); Jane Garwood-Cutler, The English 
Experience in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 325 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, 
Inc. 2ed 1999). For head of state cases, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 
76-80 (Transnational Publishers 2003).                                
583 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. 
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, Sess. 48th , 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); generally see O’Brian, 
The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 
AM. J. INT’L L. 639 (1993).    
584 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeal Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction (October 2 1995). For a critical commentary, see Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: 
Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031 (1999).    
585 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction (October 2, 1995) ¶ 21.    
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The personal jurisdiction of the tribunal encompasses prosecuting “persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991....”586 The subject matter jurisdiction of the 
tribunal, the “serious violations,” encompasses grave breaches of the Geneva conventions 
of 1949, violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity.587 The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is concurrent with national courts, but can 
assume primacy over national investigations and prosecutions.588 Despite the fact that the 
tribunal was slow to start,589 it has made considerable progress in its investigations and 
prosecutions. Tribunal indictments range from low-level soldiers and camp guards to 
senior military and government officials.590   
The Tribunal commented that “[I]nternational prosecution should be directed to 
leaders…more than minor actors.”591 The Tribunal’s new policy focuses international 
prosecutions on persons in the position of some military or political authority. To 
implement this policy, the prosecutor and the Trial Chamber reviewing the decision to 
prosecute take into account the status of the accused at the time of the commission of the 
                                                 
586 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 1, 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).  
587 See arts. 2-4 of the ICTY statute. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 arts. 2-4, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 
32 ILM 1159 (1993). 
588 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 
11, SC res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993). 
589 Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial in Essays on ICTY Procedure and 
Evidence 197 (Richard May ET Al., Kluwer Law International 2001). 
590 These senior military and government officials include former Yugoslavia President Slobodan 
Milosevic; Radovan Karadzic, Former President of the Bosnian Serb Republic; and General Rudislov 
Krstic, Former Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps in the Army of the Republika Srpska. 
591 S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR 55th Sess., 4240th mtg.  (2000). 
153 
 
Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution 
crime.592 As for the prosecution of non-leadership figures, the Tribunal has ruled that 
“named accused [non-leadership figures] could appropriately be tried in another forum, 
such as a State forum.”593  
Only a year and a half after the establishment of the ICTY, the United Nations 
Security Council, relying on its powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, passed 
resolution 955 by which an international tribunal was created “for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and 
December 31, 1994.”594 The Tribunal or ICTR also has jurisdiction over Rwandan 
citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of 
neighboring states.595 
 The ICTR differs from the ICTY in terms of jurisdiction in two aspects. First, its 
jurisdiction is personal and territorial. Second, it has jurisdiction over genocide and 
crimes against humanity, but only in view of the “internal” character of the events in 
Rwanda. It covers only violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva conventions of 
1949 and crimes listed in additional Protocol II. Thus, neither grave breaches of the 
Geneva conventions nor violations of the laws and customs of war are included in the 
                                                 
592 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence arts. 9-10, 
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). 
593 Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica ET AL., Case No. IT-95-8, Order Granting Leave for Withdrawal of 
Charges (May 5, 1998). Moreover, ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence article 11 (C) bis provides “ In 
determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), the Referral Bench shall, in 
accordance with Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) , consider the gravity of the crimes charged and 
the level of responsibility of the accused.” Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 11 (C) bis, UN Doc. 
IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).  
594 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994). 
595 Article 1 of the ICTR statute. S.C. Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 
(1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994).  
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tribunal’s statute. Like the ICTY, the ICTR indicted and convicted senior governmental 
officials as well.596 After reviewing the jurisdiction of the two tribunals, ICTY and ICTR, 
one can conclude that neither tribunal could have tried those crimes against the 
environment committed during the Gulf War of 1991. Both tribunals have limitations in 
exercising their jurisdiction and these limitations are based on subject matter, territorial, 
temporal, and personal grounds.597 
 Nevertheless, the U.N. Security Council’s precedent in creating ad hoc tribunals 
might have paved the way to create an ad hoc tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and other 
members of the Iraqi regime for all international offenses, including the environmental 
offenses. The Security Council would create such a tribunal, however, only in response to 
demands by interested states, especially both regional states such as Kuwait, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and the new Iraqi regime and Security Council member states. 
                                                 
596 Jean Kambanda, the Former Prime Minister of Rwanda and the first head of government to be convicted 
of genocide, and Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor, were convicted of genocide. See Prosecutor v. 
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 4 September 1998; see also Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-
23-A, Appeal Judgment (October 19, 2000). For the appeal decision discussion see 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 656 
(2001); For Akayesu case, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (September 2, 1998); 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Appeal Judgment (June 1, 2001).      
597 Although the ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes against property and may have jurisdiction over 
environmental war crimes, this jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. The ICTY statute does not explicitly include environmental crimes or violations of the 
Protocol I within its text; however, the Tribunal has convicted based upon violations of the Protocol I. 
These violations were legally justified based upon Articles 1 and 3 of the Statute. Article 1 extends ICTY 
jurisdiction to “serious violations of international humanitarian law.” Article 3 stipulates “The International 
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations 
shall include, but not be limited to:” (emphasis added). See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, 
Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (October 2, 1995) ¶ 87, 91. 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 arts. 1, 3, 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993). In regard to ICTR, 
it has territiorial, personal and temporal limitations. Article 1 of the ICTR statute confers upon the Tribunal 
jurisdiction over “serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan Citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, 
between January 1994 and 31 December” (Emphasis added). Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda art. 1, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 
1598 (1994).      
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 Several factors suggest why this kind of court was not created. One of the 
difficulties relates to the origin of the process which led to the Iraqi leader’s capture. This 
capture was the result of internationally unauthorized interference598 in Iraqi internal 
affairs by the United States which invaded Iraq without an express decision from the 
U.N. Security Council. This unauthorized interference raised the possibility that one or 
more of the Security Council’s permanent member states could have used its veto against 
any decision proposing the creation of an ad hoc tribunal.  
 In addition, both ad hoc tribunals faced financial hardships.599 U.N. financial 
involvement in the budget for an ad hoc Iraq tribunal probably would not have been 
accepted globally, requiring contributions to the budget from those regional states most 
interested in the creation of the tribunal. 
 Finally, Saddam Hussein’s case was greatly complicated by the tremendously 
serious offenses attributed to him, especially those offenses committed against the Iraqi 
people. Consequently, it is logical that the Iraqi Provisional Authority rejected the idea of 
creating an international ad hoc tribunal to try Saddam Hussein.600 As an alternative, the 
new Iraqi regime welcomed the idea that all criminal allegations against Saddam 
Hussein, including his crimes against Kuwait and Iran, be tried either before Iraqi 
national courts or before modified national courts without external intrusion.  
                                                 
598 Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murders: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes 
against Humanity 3 (Pluto Press 2004). For a contrary view, see Jason Pedigo, Rogue States, Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, And Terrorism: Was Security Council Approval Necessary for the Invasion of Iraq? 32 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 199 (2004).    
599 See William A. Schabas, The U.N. International Criminal Tribunals: former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone 622-23 (Cambridge University Press 2006).   
600 Mark R. Shulman, Preface to Recommendations Related to the Trial of Saddam Hussein in The Imperial 
Presidency and the Consequences of 9/11, Vol. I, 173-74 (James R. Silkenat & Mark R. Shulman eds., 
Praeger Security International 2007).    
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III. The Immunity Issue 
As a general matter, immunity from jurisdiction means that a court cannot 
entertain a suit, not that a defendant is immune from criminal responsibility. In other 
words, immunity is a procedural obstacle but not a substantive one. 601 Immunity can be 
granted at both the national and international levels. At the national level, legislators, 
prosecutors, and judges can be immune.602 Under international law, there are two types 
of immunity. First, immunity is related to the status of persons, which is called ratione 
personae or personal immunity. Second is subject-matter immunity or so-called ratione 
materiae which is attached to official acts.  
  The difference between the two immunities is that “Immunity ratione personae 
prevents domestic authorities, be they judicial or not, from enforcing local laws, either 
criminal or civil, on internationally protected individuals. Immunity ratione materiae 
prevents local judicial authorities from adjudicating cases based on the nonjusticeability 
of the internationally sensitive subject matter.”603 
Rationae materiae immunity applies when the head of state leaves office. It is 
deemed a limited immunity because it attaches only to official acts regardless of who 
committed the act. Thus, immunity ratione materiae offers two-pronged protection: 
                                                 
601 Both the International Court of Justice and the Special Court of Serra Leone reached this conclusion. 
See Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 60; Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeal 
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004) ¶ 27.    
602 For an official’s immunity under the U.S. legal system, see Donald L. Doernberg, Sovereign Immunity 
or The Rule of Law- The New Federalism’s Choice 119-24 (Carolina Academic Press 2005).   
603 Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 110 (Ashgate Publishing Company 2004). 
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personal immunity for the person committing the act, and non-justiceability for the act 
itself under the “act of state” doctrine.604  
Rationae Personae immunity applies to heads of state, diplomats and officials on 
state missions.605 It covers all of a person's actions, whether they were done in official or 
in private capacity. This immunity is temporary because it lasts only until the individual 
leaves office.606  
Although the inviolability of the head of a state or government is considered erga 
omnes,607 the view that international criminals cannot claim immunity began to emerge 
after the first attempt to prosecute a head of state after World War I through the Treaty of 
Versailles. Later on, the World War II trials made this view the reality.608 Within the 
                                                 
604 The traditional view is that, “Head of state immunity can be looked at as an aspect of state immunity.” 
As a result, his or her act constitutes the act of the state. “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the 
acts of the government of another within its territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be 
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers themselves.” Yitiha Simbeye, 
Immunity and International Criminal Law 93 n.15, 123, 252 (Ashgate Publishing Company 2004). The aim 
of immunity is to protect state acts from review by foreign courts based on the claim that the act was done 
by the individual not the state. 
605 United Nations Convention on Special Missions art. 21, 29, 31, 34, 42, Dec. 16, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 
231 (entered into force June 21, 1985); Vienna Convention on the Law of Diplomatic Immunity, Apr. 18, 
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 12 
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Belgium) (2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.  
606 The purpose of this immunity is to enable people to do their jobs without fear of being prosecuted due to 
political conflict. Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 110, 113-14 (Ashgate 
Publishing Company 2004). 
607 Erga omnes are obligations that all states are held to have a legal interest in protecting. See Barcelona, 
Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, (Belgium v. Spain) (1970) ICJ Reports, 3.   
608For instance, the International Military at Nuremberg prosecuted both Admiral Erich Raeder, who was 
appointed as head of state by Adolph Hitler, and Vice President and Foreign Minister Fritz von Pappen. 
Although the Far East tribunal did not prosecute Japan’s head of state, Emperor Hirohito, it prosecuted a 
former head of government, cabinet officers and diplomats. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to 
International Criminal Law 73 (Transnational Publishers, Inc 2003); in fact, the Nuremberg Charter, and 
other international legal instruments, rejected official status as a defense. Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal art. 7, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 258 (1945); Control 
Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Against 
Humanity art. 11(4)(a), 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946); Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948); International 
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context of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the notion of non-recognition of 
immunity in international crimes became well recognized. 609 
The current development of most sovereign immunity for international crimes has 
occurred before two courts. The first court is a domestic court, the House of Lords in 
England, the highest English Court, while the second is the International Court of Justice.  
The Pinochet case,610 dealing with the former Chilean president, concerns the domestic 
prosecution of international crimes. Therefore, the case will be discussed in the next 
chapter, which deals with domestic trials.  
In 2002, the ICJ issued a decision regarding the immunity issue.611 The parties to 
the case were Congo and Belgium. The case was raised when the latter issued a warrant 
to arrest the Foreign Minister of Congo for grave breaches of the Geneva conventions of 
1949 and other crimes against humanity committed before he assumed that position. By 
the time the case was decided, he was no longer Foreign Minister. The essential argument 
of Congo was that the Belgian action interfered with Congo's sovereignty and was 
                                                                                                                                                 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. 3 reprinted in International 
Criminal Law: A Collection of International and European Instruments 37 (Christine Van den Wyngaert & 
Guy Stessens eds., Kluwer Law International 1996).    
609 As a result of the fact that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal tribunals depends on their 
constitutive instruments, the tribunals are not bound by the rules controlling immunity and privileges that 
bind national jurisdictions. As recent examples, ICTY and ICTR prosecuted both Jean Kambanda, the 
former Prime Minister of the Government of Republic Rwanda, and Slobodan Milosevic, the former head 
of the Republic of Yugoslavia, before he died. See Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal 
Law 176 (Cavendish Publishing 2003); see also Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 6 (2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 
(1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 7 (2), S.C. Res. 
955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Prosecutor v. 
Kambanda Case No. ICTR-97-23; For Milosevic cases see IT-99-93-I (May 24, 1999) (Kosovo); IT-01-50-
I (Oct. 8, 2001)(Croatia); and IT-01-51- I (Nov. 22, 2001)(Bosnia).     
610 R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, [1999] 2 UKHL 97. 
611 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.  
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contrary to international law. As a result of this violation, Congo sought an injunction for 
relief and compensation.       
The ICJ equated the immunity of the Foreign Minister to the immunity of a head 
of state.612 The Court distinguished between immunity in prosecutions before 
international courts and before national courts. It ruled that international criminal 
tribunals have priority in exercising their jurisdiction according to the Universal 
Jurisdiction over national domestic courts.613 It has been argued that the Court failed to 
recognize the Universal Jurisdiction doctrine for national prosecutions.614  
The Court affirmed that immunity is a procedural issue. Thus, it is a judicial bar 
to trying the case. Granting immunity does not mean granting impunity. Therefore, 
criminal responsibility as a substantive question is not affected by the question of 
immunity.615 The Court, in its decision, did not make any distinction among international 
crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace. 
Presumably, the decision is applicable to all international crimes. The Court agreed with 
the view that “There is no way to compromise between human rights law and the law of 
jurisdictional immunities”616 and also agreed that the denial of immunity should be 
                                                 
612 Although the Court limited its decision to the Foreign Affairs Minister, its decision is presumably 
applicable to heads of state since the Court used a justification which is applicable equally to the Foreign 
Affairs Minister and the Head of State. The Court considered both of them as representative of the state. 
Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (2002) 
ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 53. 
613 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 61.   
614 Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments 
on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EJIL 853-875 (2002).  
615 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 60. 
616 Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EJIL 237, 277 (1999).  
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extended not only to the former head of state, but to the incumbent head of state as 
well.617  
Therefore, unlike domestic prosecution of international crimes, the Court denied 
immunity to both incumbent and former Foreign Affairs Ministers before the 
international tribunals. At the international level, the Court did not recognize the fact that 
“Political necessity and state sovereignty appear to be entrenched factors in the battle 
between more traditional principles of absolute immunity and the new norms of 
international law.”618  
However, the Court decision to equalize the ad hoc tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court is troublesome.619 The ICJ decision raised tension between Articles 27(1) 
and 98 of the Rome statute concerning extradition.620 It has been argued that although the 
ICC statute is not yet part of international customary law, it will be so after it has been 
                                                 
617 Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EJIL 237, 261 (1999).  
618 Kerry Creque O’Neill, A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 289, 318 (2002). 
619 Such a view was criticized on the basis of the difference between ad hoc tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court in light of their constitutive instruments. The point, here, is that the ad hoc tribunals were 
established by U.N. Security Council decisions that are obligatory to all United Nations members. Per 
contra, International Criminal Court was established through a treaty which is not obligatory except for 
those states that ratified it. Michael J. Kelly, No Where to Hide, Defeat of the Sovereignty Immunity 
Defense for Crimes of Genocide and the Trials of Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein 79 (Peter Lang 
Publisher 2005).   
620 Concerning immunity before ICC, there is tension between art. 27(1) and 98. It has been argued that 
Article 27 (1) deals with immunity as a substantive defense for criminal responsibility and rejects official 
status as a defense. Meanwhile, article 27(2) asserts that immunity should not constitute a bar to the Court's 
exercise of its jurisdiction. Article 98 of the ICC statute imposes an obligation on state parties to extradite 
any individual who is accused of committing any of the statute offenses. There is no dilemma regarding the 
state party nationals. Per contra, the problem concerns those non- party state nationals who are entitled to 
immunity and who are located within the state party territory. Is the state party obligated to extradite them 
to the ICC when a request is made? See Dapo Akande, International Immunities and the International 
Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 419 (2004) (arguing that the state is not obligated since such 
extradition action will impose upon the state international responsibility).    
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ratified by two-thirds of the U.N. members.621 At that point, the International Criminal 
Court statute will remove the immunity issue completely from the international law 
dictionary.  
Based upon the ICJ decision, the Special Court for Sierra Leone rejected Charles 
Taylor’s argument that he was the head of the State of Liberia when he was indicted. 
Thus, he argued, immunity prevented the court from exercising its jurisdiction.622 The 
rejection was based on the fact that the Special Court of Sierra Leone is an international 
criminal tribunal, not bound by immunity rules according to the ICJ decision.623 In 
Saddam Hussein case, according to the ICJ decision, he could have claimed neither 
ratione personae nor ratione materiae immunities concerning his actions against the 
environment if the trial had been held before an ad hoc international criminal tribunal.  
IV. The Statute of Limitations Issue 
The Saddam Hussein case is unique because a long period of time, about thirteen 
years, had passed between the time of the commission of the crime and the time of his 
capture. Therefore, the statute of limitations on either prosecution or execution might 
have been raised as an objection to such a trial. The statute of limitations means “A 
statute establishing a time limit for prosecuting a crime, based on the date when the 
offense occurred.”624 The statute of limitations serves several purposes. 625 
                                                 
621  M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 81 n.102 (Transnational Publishers, 
Inc 2003). 
622 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeal Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004) ¶ 53.  
623 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Appeal Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction  (May 31, 2004) ¶ 38, 41.  
624 Black’s Law Dictionary 1422 (7th ed. 1999).   
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 International Criminal Law does not recognize a statute of limitations. For 
instance, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention626 did not include 
a statute of limitations. The reason is that World War II criminals were brought to justice 
within a short time. Another reason is that in most common-law jurisdictions the statute 
of limitations does not exist for murder and other serious crimes.627  
A 1966 U.N. study reached the following conclusion: “International crimes are 
fundamentally different from ordinary domestic crimes and the reasons normally invoked 
in favor of statutory limitation for crimes under municipal law do not apply to them.”628 
In 1968, the U.N. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity629 opened for signature. The U.N. Convention 
entered into force on November 11, 1970. Iraq is not a party, but Kuwait has been a party 
since 1995.630 This Convention is not part of customary international Law.631 No 
                                                                                                                                                 
625 The U.S. Supreme Court stipulated that “The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to 
criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature 
had decided to punish by criminal sanction. Such a limitation is designated to protect individuals from 
having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the 
passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. 
Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to 
investigate suspected criminal activities.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S. Ct. 858, 25 L. Ed. 
2d 156 (1970). There are other objectives that can be sought from the limitations such as preventing 
prosecution of those who obeyed the law for some years, avoiding prosecution when the community’s 
retributive impulse has ceased, and lessening the possibilities of blackmail. Wayne R. LaFave ET AL., 
Criminal Procedure 875 (West Publishing Co. 2004).            
626 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948). 
627 Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community (Christine Van Den Wyngaert et. Al. eds., 
1993) cited in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 233 n. 38 (M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. 1999).     
628 Report on the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. 
No.12, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1953) quoted in Scott R. Morris, Killing Egyptian Prisoners of War: Does 
the Phrase “Lests We Forget” Apply to Israel War Criminals?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 903, 931 
(1996). 
629 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); 
754 U.N.T.S. 73; 18 ILM 68 (1979). 
630 States party to the Convention are available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/6.htm 
(last visited July 19, 2007) 
163 
 
Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Prosecution 
international instrument contains a statute of limitations for any international crime.632 
Therefore, it is logical to assume that the U.N. Convention is meant to apply only to 
domestic laws, for they are the only sources of law containing a statute of limitations. 
It is argued, however, that the Convention violates the principles of legality633 
because the Convention violates principles of non-retroactivity, adopted by several 
international human rights instruments.634 This is not the case, however, because the 
statute of limitations controls the temporal jurisdiction of the court, while the principles 
of legality have to do with creating a new crime that did not exist when the action was 
committed. In other words, the statute of limitations relates to procedural rules, while the 
principle of legality relates to substantive law rules. 
A statute of limitations was included in the International Law Commission’s 1991 
draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991).635 However, this 
provision was deleted in the 1996 draft.636 The ICC statute rejects the application of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
631 Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of International Customary Law: 
The U.S. BombArdment of Cambodia and Laos, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 429, 468 (2001) 
632 Scott R. Morris, Killing Egyptian Prisoners of War: Does the Phrase “Lest We Forget” Apply to Israeli 
War Criminals?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 903, 930 (1996). 
633 Art. 1 of the Convention laid down “No statutory limitations shall apply to the following crimes [war 
crimes and crimes against humanity], irrespective of the date of their commission…”(Emphasis added). see 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, G.A. res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).   
634 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967); European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, E.T.S. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 
221 (1950). This violation led the European Community, in 1974, to sign its own convention in this matter 
stipulating that the convention will not be applicable to those offenses committed before its entry into force. 
European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity art. 2, Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 (1974).  
635 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 7, A/CN.4/L.459 [and corr.1] and 
Add.1 (1991). 
636 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).  
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statute of limitations to its crimes.637 The ICTY adopts the view that crimes against 
humanity may not be covered by a statute of limitations.638 
Based upon the fact that international crimes are not covered by a statute of 
limitations, Saddam Hussein could not have claimed before an international criminal 
tribunal that his crimes against the environment or property were covered by a statute of 
limitations.  
V.      The Right to Be Tried Without Undue Delay 
In the context of international criminal law, there are several defendants’ rights 
which are not recognized in some national legal systems, including the Kuwaiti and Iraqi 
legal systems.639 The right to be tried without undue delay is one of these fundamental 
rights.640 Consequently, international criminal trials might have this advantage over some 
national trials in the context of human rights protection. The right to “be tried without 
undue delay” differs somewhat in wording in international and regional instruments.641  
                                                 
637 Article 29 of the ICC statute provides “Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to 
any statute of limitations.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). 
638 Prosecutor v. Furundizja, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (December 10, 1998) ¶ 157.  
639 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960 (Kuwait).  Kanon Al-
Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971 (Iraq). 
640 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, arts. 102-104 
(Kuwait). Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, arts. 130-136 
(Iraq). 
641 Under the following instruments, the term is “the right to be tried within reasonable time.” European 
Convention on Human Rights art. 6 (1), E.T.S. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221(1950); art. 14 (3) International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights art. 14 (3), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967); African Charter art. 7 (1), O.A.U. 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5; 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; 21 ILM 58 (1982); American Convention on Human 
Rights art. 8 (1), O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; 9 ILM 99 (1969). In addition, under the 
U.S. legal system, the right is called “the right to speedy trial.” The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. 
Constitution provides “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial…..” U.S. Const. amendment VI. The right to “be tried within a reasonable time,” which exists in the 
European human rights convention, was distinguished from the right “to be tried without undue delay,” on 
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The fair trial standards, including the right to be tried without undue delay, are 
problematic before international courts, including the ICC, due to the lack of international 
law sources to which a judge may resort to interpret and define fair trial standards.642 
Because of the lack of international law on the topic, national and regional cases 
regarding the right, such as the U.S. and the European Court for Human Rights cases, 
have been used in international criminal tribunals.643 Therefore, this part of the research 
will examine the right to be tried without undue delay before the ICTY and national or 
regional cases when necessity requires it. 
By and large, the right to be tried without undue delay is meant to protect the 
defendant because commencing trial after a long time has passed may affect the 
defendant’s ability to prepare his defense.644 It has been ruled that the delay’s effect on 
the trial can be anticipated “(1) where delay has made a fair trial for the accused 
impossible; and (2) where in the circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the 
trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial 
impropriety or misconduct.”645 Although the right to be tried without undue delay is 
                                                                                                                                                 
the basis, that the former is meant to be applied to those defendants who are in detention while the latter 
applies to all defendants regardless of the detention issue. Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an 
International Criminal Procedure 251 (Oxford University Press 2001).  
642 Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 111, 117 (2002).   
643 Prosecutor v. Barayagwize, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeal Decision (November 3, 1999) ¶ 96. 
644 The Secretary-General’s Report provided that “the Tribunal [Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] must 
fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its 
proceedings.” Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 
808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) ¶ 106. In the same context,  it is ruled that the accused may not waive his or 
her right to be tried without undue delay because this right is an essential element of the right to a fair trial. 
Prosecutor v. Kovac and others, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal by the Accused Zoran Zigic against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I Dated 5 December 2000, 25 May 2001 cited in John R. W.D. Jones & Steven 
Powles, International Criminal Practice 586 (3d  ed. 2003). 
645 Prosecutor v. Barayagwize, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeal Decision ( November 3, 1999) ¶ 71. 
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mainly meant to benefit the accused, it accomplishes other goals such as gaining the 
public’s confidence in the proceedings and their credibility.646  
In the context of international criminal tribunals, “The influence of the 
international community over the practice of the Tribunal [ICTY] is, therefore, not only 
important with regard to its noted preference for more expeditious proceedings, but also 
for its potential indifference to the fair trial rights of the accused.”647 Thus, exaggerated 
protection of this right might prejudice the defendant’s interests on some occasions.  
Since the right to be tried without undue delay does not attach until the arrest 
takes place, it may be seen from different angles. The first situation is when the defendant 
is in custody and the trial does not begin until a long period of time has passed. The 
second situation is when the defendant’s trial has already begun, but the proceeding 
consumes a long time.648    
Internationally, the right to be tried without undue delay has been provided by all 
international criminal tribunals, from Nuremberg to the ICC.649 Guarantees to preserve 
                                                 
646 Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W. 
INT’L L. J. 47, 63 (2003). Under the U.S. legal system, it is ruled that the right to speedy trial protects “at 
least three basic demands of Criminal Justice in the Anglo-American system: ‘[1] to prevent undue and 
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, [2] to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation 
and [3] to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” 
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969).    
647 Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W. 
INT’L L. J. 47, 62 (2003).   
648 The European Court of Human Rights rules that the right to be tried within a reasonable time lasts at 
least until acquittal or conviction, even if this decision is reached on appeal. Wemhoff v. Germany, App. 
No. 2122/64, ¶ 18 (June 27, 1968).   
649 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 16, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 
AJILs 258 (1945); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 21(2), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 
1159 (1993); Security Council Resolution 955 art. 20(2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd 
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this right have been provided by customary international law as well.650 Within the 
framework of the ICTY statute, article 20 provides, “The Trial Chambers shall ensure 
that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with 
the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and 
due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”651  
Meanwhile article 21 (4) (c) of the same statute provides, “In the determination of 
any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:…. to be tried without 
undue delay.”652 The difference between article 20 and article 21(4)(c) is that the former 
governs the stage after commencing the trial while the latter controls the stage both 
before and after commencement.653    
Regarding reasons that might lead to infringement of the right, Cassese attributed 
the delay in ICTY trials to “Adoption of the adversarial system, which requires that all 
the evidence be scrutinized orally through examination and cross-examination.”654 
Moreover, the causes of the delay cannot be attributed to one single source. The delay 
                                                                                                                                                 
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
art. 67 (1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).  
650 Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 99-108, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
(1949).  
651 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 
20, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993).   
652 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 21 
(4)(c), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993).   
653 This conclusion can be derived from the title of each article. The title of article 20 is “Commencement 
and Conduct of Trial Proceedings” while article 21 is titled “The Rights of the Accused.” Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. 
SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993).   
654 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 442 (2003).   
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might occur because of difficulties in obtaining evidence, hurdles to securing defendants, 
language difficulties, proof of “predicate conditions” to establish the court’s jurisdiction, 
and the rare use of the guilty plea.655 The fact that international courts depend upon other 
entities, such as states and relevant international and regional organizations, in their 
operations should be considered when the court is determining whether the defendant’s 
right to be tried without undue delay has been violated or not.656 To solve part of this 
dilemma, the ICTY amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the expense of live 
testimony.657 In addition, judges have adopted several measures to respect this right.658   
Also, one of the stages which contribute to delay in starting the trial is the 
screening of evidence by the pre-trial judge. However, this stage has its own importance. 
It assists the court in avoiding those cases which lack sufficient evidence and in avoiding 
the problem of overcrowding the courts.659  
European case law identifies causes of delay in criminal proceedings held 
nationally. These are the complexity of the case,660 the conduct of the accused,661 and the 
                                                 
655 Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W. 
INT’L L. J. 47, 63-64 (2003).   
656 Several issues such as money, access to evidence, defendants, witnesses, witness protection, court 
personnel, prison facilities, and the enforcement of the court’s orders and judgments may contribute to 
delaying the commencement or to the length of the judicial proceedings. In sum, states’ cooperation with 
international judicial organs is a significant factor in obtaining a speedy trial.  
657 Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. W. 
INT’L L. J. 47, 64-66 (2003).   
658 For instance, the tribunals prefer that motions be made in writing and disposed of in writing, without an 
oral hearing. The justification for this practice is “the need to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.” Even if 
the defense counsel requested an oral hearing, it does not mean he will be granted that request. The 
chambers define the issue in dispute before them by means of pre-trial briefs. The use of a pre-trial judge is 
another means to assist in expeditious trials. The right to be tried without undue delay leads the chambers to 
limit the amount of time allocated to each party to present the evidence.  
659 Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure 184 (Oxford University Press 
2001).  
660 The complexity of the case may be due to the seriousness of the offense, the number of acts constituting 
a pattern of criminal behavior, and the distance in both time and location between the commission of the 
offense and the investigations. Pelissier and Sassi v. France, App. No. 25444/94, ¶ 67 (March 25, 1999).  
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conduct of the relevant authorities.662 The reasonableness of the length of the judicial 
proceeding should be assessed in light of these criteria.663   
In regard to a remedy to be taken in case of a violation of this right, international 
courts, like national courts, have discretion in determining whether exercising further 
jurisdiction in the case of a serious violation of the defendant’s rights will affect the 
fairness and integrity of the process.  
In spite of the fact that the court might find that there is a violation of the right to 
be tried without undue delay, the ICTY statute does not explicitly provide for a sanction 
for the violation of this right. In addition, it has been noted that the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the ICTY have failed to ensure compliance with the right to be tried 
without undue delay by establishing a time limit such as is done in some military 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regarding the complexity of the case, the need for parties to prepare their cases should be taken into 
account in determining whether the right to an expeditious trial has been violated. The European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that a period of delay of five years, due to the complexity of the case and the 
defendant’s requests, is not unreasonable. Ringeisen v. Austria, App. No. 13/71, ¶ 110 (July 16, 1971).  
661 The behavior of the accused might also play a role in the delay of the proceedings. This behavior can be 
anticipated either because of the defendant’s overuse of his available means or his failure to co-operate. In 
the same context, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that “Article 6 [European Convention on 
Human Rights] does not require accused persons actively to co-operate with the judicial authorities. Neither 
can any reproach be levelled against them for making full use of the remedies available under domestic 
law.” Ledonne (No 1) v. Italy, App. No. 35742/97, ¶ 21 (May 12, 1999). 
662 Regarding a delay attributed to the behavior of the prosecution, it has been noted that, due to the 
complexity of the ICTY statute defining the crimes, the prosecution took the position of transferring as 
many appearances and as much evidence as possible in order to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This practice contributes to prolonging the pre-trial and trial proceedings. In addition, 
motions to amend and joint indictments and their responses from the defense council are other sources of 
delay. In addition, this right may affect part of the international prosecutor’s prescribed power. In ICTY 
practice, it has been held that “The prosecutor’s right to submit a request for leave to amend the indictment 
….must not be exercised to the prejudice of the defendant’s right to be tried without undue delay.” 
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14-2, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Hold Pre-
trial Motions in abeyance (January 28, 1998).  
663 Ledonne (No. 1) v. Italy, App. No.35742/97, ¶ 25 (May 12, 1999). 
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courts.664 Disregarding this time limit can be permitted in some circumstances with 
advance judicial approval. As a result, it has been suggested that dismissing the relevant 
charges should be the remedy if the time limit requirement has been ignored.665 
Unfortunately, this suggestion has not been adopted by international criminal tribunals. 
The ICTY judges are in favor of granting provisional release if there is 
excessively long detention with no prospect of coming to trial.666 Analogizing to the 
remedy for the violation of the right to be informed promptly of charges against the 
defendant, it has been argued that the remedy for the violation of the right to be tried 
without undue delay should be discontinuance.667 Unless some national modifications 
were adopted in the case of Saddam Hussein, the right to be tried without undue delay 
would have provided an argument supporting holding the trial internationally.    
VI.     The Issue of the Transfer of Defendants to International Tribunals  
 This part of the paper will not include the question whether an international 
obligation exists to surrender persons accused of international crimes to international 
criminal tribunals. Rather, the discussion assumes the existence of such an obligation, 
and examines developments before international criminal tribunals regarding obtaining 
                                                 
664 Joseph L. Falvey, United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 475, 504-05 (1995).   
665 Joseph L. Falvey, United Nations Justice or Military Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 475, 504-05 (1995).   
666 Prosecutor v. Simic ET Al., Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Milan Simic’s Application for 
Provisional Release (May 19, 2001).   
667 Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial in Essays on ICTY Procedure and 
Evidence 197 (Richard May ET Al., Kluwer Law International 2001); For the case deciding on 
discontinuance for violation of the defendant’s right to be informed promptly of charges against him, see 
Prosecutor v. Barayagwize, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeal Decision (November 3, 1999) ¶ 71. (ruling that 
the right to be informed promptly concerning the charges had been violated by the 96 day interval between 
the transfer of the accused and his initial appearance before a trial court).   
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custody of the defendant and its relationship to extradition principles under international 
law.  
 Since an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the Iraqi invasion was the only 
international judicial body that might have been expected to try Saddam Hussein’s case, 
the discussion will focus on the practice of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, mainly 
the ICTY, in dealing with the issue of obtaining custody of the defendant. Since Saddam 
Hussein was in custody at the time these lines were written, this review concentrates on 
the surrender issue rather than the arrest issue.   
 The establishment of international criminal tribunals is one of those exceptional 
departures from Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter authorizing the Security Council acting 
under chapter VII to interfere in the internal affairs of States.668 The necessity to bring 
those persons responsible for international crimes to justice justifies this interference.669 
However, since international criminal tribunals do not have their own police or military 
forces, they cannot fulfill their functions and duties without the cooperation of the 
governments of states. Such cooperation is not perfect all the time.670  
Contemplating the necessity of States’ cooperation, the Security Council, in its 
decision establishing the ICTY, emphasized that “…..[A]ll states shall cooperate fully 
                                                 
668 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Request of the Republic 
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (October 29, 1997) ¶ 64.  
669 Kenneth S. Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants before the International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557, 562 (1994). 
670 It is said that “[T]he experience of the Yugoslavia Tribunal demonstrates that state co-operation and 
Security Council support are inextricably linked issues, and are themselves dependent on the court’s image 
as a powerful institution.” Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law  393 (Cavendish 
Publishing 2003).  
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with the International Tribunal and its organs…..”671 Such cooperation encompasses “all 
stages of the proceedings.”672 This cooperation, as prescribed by Article 29 of the ICTY 
statute, includes, but is not limited to, both the investigation and the prosecution stages 
concerning “(a) the identification and location of persons;(b) the taking of testimony and 
the production of evidence;(c) the service of documents;(d) the arrest and detention of 
persons; and (e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International 
Tribunal.”673 Moreover, this cooperation is not limited to orders issued by the trial 
Chambers, but extends to include the assistance of the prosecutors.674 The Security 
Council’s request to cooperate led some states to enact new legislation to avoid conflict 
between their national legal systems and the obligations established by the Security 
Council.675 Other states, such as the Republic of Croatia and the former Republic of 
                                                 
671 Security Council Resolution 827, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 
ILM 1159 (1993).  
672 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
U.N. Doc. S/25704& add. 1 (1993), ¶ 125. 
673 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. 
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993). A comparison of the ICC 
statute and the ICTY statute on this issue shows that the state’s obligation to transfer defendants to the ICC 
is narrower than the obligation prescribed by the ICTY statute since, unlike the ICTY obligation which 
extends to all states that are members of the U.N. Organization, the ICC obligation is limited to those states 
which are parties to the ICC statute. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 86, 87(5), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).   
674 ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 39 (iii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). In the same 
context, between the ICTY and the ICTR, there is disagreement regarding whether the obligation to 
cooperate includes international organizations. For instance, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that the 
obligation prescribed by Art. 29 does not apply to international organizations. Prosecutor v. Simic and 
others, Case No. IT-95-9, Decision on the Prosecution Motion under r 73 for a Ruling Concerning the 
Testimony of a Witness (July 27, 1999) ¶ 78. On the contrary, the ICTR Trial Chamber recognized the 
Registrar’s right to seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Prosecutor 
v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Decision on the Motion for the Protection of 
Defence Witnesses (October 6, 1997) Sec. D (ii).      
675 England is one of these states. Concerning the new English legislation implementing the Security 
Council’s decision, see Colin Warbrick, Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia, 45 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 947 (1996).  
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Yugoslavia, failed to enact such legislation and this failure was judicially considered a 
violation of their international obligations.676  
While a state cannot be ordered to act by another state or international 
organization, it is the obligation of states to cooperate and to provide judicial assistance 
to an international tribunal as an orga omnes obligation which every member of the U.N. 
must fulfill.677 In addition, orders issued by the international trial Chambers, including 
transfer orders, are considered “the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”678 As a result, these orders are binding on all 
members of the U.N. organization.679  
                                                 
676 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-, Decision on the Motion of the Defence Filed Pursuant to 
Rule 64 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (April 3, 1996) ¶ 9. However, the primacy of international 
criminal tribunals is limited to specific issues: jurisdiction, investigation, transfer of defendants and 
punishment. To ensure primacy in the matter of the transfer of defendants, article 58 of the ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provides that “The obligations laid down in Article 29 of the Statute shall prevail 
over any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which 
may exist under the national law or extradition treaties of the State concerned. Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence art. 56, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). Within the ICC statute, article 102 distinguishes clearly 
between extradition and surrender to the international tribunals. This distinction is based upon the authority 
which makes the request to surrender. If such a request is made by the International Criminal Court, it is 
considered a request for surrender. However, if a state makes a request to another state, then this request is 
deemed extradition. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 102, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 
37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998). For reasons behind the ICC statute distinction between 
extradition and surrender, see Claus Kreb, Penalties, Enforcement and Cooperation in the International 
Criminal Court Statute (Parts VII, IX, X), 6 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM JUST. 126, 135 (1998); 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision on the Motion of the Defence Filed Pursuant to Rule 64 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (April 3, 1996) ¶ 7; Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, Case No. 
IT-95-13a, Decision on the Motion of the Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic (October 22, 1997) 
¶ 38. In the Dokmanovic case, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has argued that 
its constitution forbids the extradition of its nationals.              
677 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Request of the Republic 
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (October 29, 1997) ¶ 25. The 
Trial Chamber’s order requested the Republic of Croatia to submit documents which were considered, by 
Croatia, to be documents which would jeopardize its national security.      
678 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
U.N. Doc. S/25704& add. 1 (1993) ¶ 126.  
679 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
U.N. Doc. S/25704& add. 1 (1993) ¶ 125-26.  
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In the milieu of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the states’ obligation to 
surrender and transfer accused persons found on their territories to international tribunals 
is not extradition, a cooperative tool between states in criminal matters. As a result, 
extradition principles between states under international law are not applicable before 
international criminal tribunals as long as they are not expressly included within the 
tribunals’ statutes or within the meaning of customary international law principles.680 
The reason behind the trend of not recognizing extradition principles in the 
context of international criminal tribunals is the fear that a state’s prosecution of its own 
nationals will not be conducted in good faith. Therefore, “The formula aut dedere aut 
judicare is replaced by a mandatory requirement of transfer to the Tribunal at its 
order.”681  
The process of transferring defendants begins with an order issued by the judge of 
the trial Chamber after confirmation of the indictment and the prosecutor’s request.682 
The order to arrest and transfer can be internationally addressed to all states.683 Upon the 
issue of an international warrant for arrest and transfer, all states shall “act promptly and 
with all due diligence to ensure proper and effective execution thereof, in accordance 
                                                 
680 Geoff Gillbert, Responding to International Crime 45 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006). 
681 Kenneth S. Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants before the International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557, 569 (1994). 
682 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 19 
(2), S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).  
683 Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 55 bis, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995). Within the ICTY 
framework, a specified article for international warrants for arrest and transfer does not exist. Other 
administrative procedures relating to execution of the transfer order, procedures after arrest and 
transmission of transfer orders are prescribed by articles 55, 57 and 59 bis of ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 56, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).    
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with Article 29 of the Statute.”684 The state to which a transfer order is transmitted cannot 
review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order and it cannot either appeal or 
challenge the transfer order. It is argued that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence must 
be amended in order to avoid any human rights violations in the transfer of defendants by 
allowing such challenges.685 
The remaining question is, what remedy is available when a state fails to execute, 
or purposely refrains from executing, the surrender and transfer order? International 
criminal tribunals do not have the power to impose financial fines on those states.686 
However, the tribunals’ statutes contemplated the occurrence of this issue and provided 
procedures to be followed when it occurred.  Article 59 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence furnishes the tribunal with the power to notify the Security Council when, 
in a reasonable time after transmission of a surrender and transfer order, the state does not 
report its inability to execute the orders and the reasons for this inability.687 
                                                 
684 The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 56, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). 
685Kenneth S. Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants before the International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557, 587 (1994). Unlike the ICTY statute, the ICC 
statute provides a person sought for surrender with a challenge (ne bis in idem). Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 89 (2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (1998).   
686 The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 59, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).  
687 The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 56, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006); Prosecutor v. 
Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-IT, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for 
Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (October 29, 1997) ¶ 33. Within the ICC 
statute, article 87 (7) provides “Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court 
contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and 
powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly 
of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.” 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 87 (7), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 
(1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998).       
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From ICTY experience, it seems that this tool, the notification of the Security 
Coucil, was not effective.688 As a result, it is suggested that the Security Council should 
have imposed sanctions against the governments of those states.689 One commentator has 
proposed a set of procedures to enhance and strengthen compliance with the requests and 
orders of an international criminal tribunal to gain custody of defendants.690 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, an overall assessment of ICTY accomplishments in 
obtaining the custody of defendants shows great success. Among 161 defendants indicted 
by the ICTY, only 6 defendants are at large.691  
In the case of Saddam Hussein, if an ad hoc international criminal tribunal had 
been established, it is more likely that the custodial state, the United States, would have 
welcomed his transmission to the tribunal. Otherwise, the United States would have 
added to its violation of international obligations one more violation. In sum, within the 
framework of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the first so-called problem, namely, 
obtaining custody of the defendant, which can block international justice, does not exist. 
                                                 
688 Regretting the fact that, in the ICTY experience, political pressures were not effective in making states 
comply with the surrender and transfer of defendants, in her final reports to the Security Council 
Concerning Outstanding Issues of State Non-Compliance, Judge McDonald, the President of the ICTY, 
stated that “On the verge of the twenty-first century, it is simply unacceptable that territories have become 
safe-havens for individuals indicted for most serious offenses against humanity. It must be made absolutely 
clear to such states that this behavior is legally- as well as morally- wrong. …..For the benefit of all peoples 
of the former Yugoslavia, I urge you to act.” Letter from President McDonald to the President of the 
Security Council Concerning Outstanding Issues of State Non-Compliance, 2 November 1999, U.N. 
Doc.S/1999/1117. Judge McDonald’s reflections resulted from the fact that the Security Council did not 
adequately respond to the Court’s reports concerning a state’s non-compliance with ICTY surrender and 
transfer orders. The strongest response to non-compliance reports was the Security Council’s resolution 
1207 which condemns the failure of the former Republic of Yugoslavia to arrest and surrender the Vukovar 
Three. See Resolution 1207 (17 November 1998) U.N. Doc. S/Res/1207 (1998).  
689 Lyal S. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law 301 (Kluwer Law International 
1997); Geoff Gillbert, Responding to International Crime 49 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006).  
690 Lyal S. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law 303-06 (Kluwer Law International 
1997).  
691 See ICTY website. http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm (last visited July 27, 2007). 
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Otherwise, this quandary would have been bucked by the international community with 
several options.   
Conclusion and Observations 
 Generally, the principle of legality or nullum crimen poena legali is not applicable 
in the field of international law in the same strict sense as in national legal systems, 
particularly with regard to jurisdiction. Having reached the conclusion that the existing 
judicial bodies did not have jurisdiction to try Saddam Hussein, the only means of trying 
such a case internationally would have been the establishment of an ad hoc international 
criminal tribunal. 
The trial of Saddam Hussein by an ad hoc tribunal would not have been in 
contradiction to head of state immunity, since that immunity is a procedural issue which 
bars only national foreign judicial authorities and not international foreign judicial 
authorities from judging the immune individual case for a limited time. In short, there is 
no immunity before international criminal tribunals regardless of its type as long as the 
actions in question are considered international crimes.  
Moreover, international crimes are not subject to, nor governed by, a statute of 
limitations, which exists only in national legal systems. However, international law 
protects human rights to some extent, even more than some national legal systems, since 
the former recognizes some defendant’s rights which are unfamiliar to the latter, such as 
the right to be tried without undue delay.  
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Ad hoc criminal tribunals should not confront a traditional problem facing 
international or foreign courts regarding obtaining custody of the defendant. The 
international law process of surrender and transfer of defendants to an international 
tribunal does not amount to an extradition process. The surrender and transfer of 
defendants is usually accomplished under the Security Council’s supervision. This 
supervision can lead to stronger tools or remedies when needed.  
In the end, the political will did not exist to create an ad hoc international tribunal 
for the Iraqi invasion. Consequently, national prosecution was the only way to try 
Saddam Hussein for environmental crimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution 
Chapter V 
 
War Crimes against the Environment 
and a National Criminal Remedy 
 
Introduction 
I. Common Issues 
1. International Law as a Source of Law within the Kuwaiti and the 
Iraqi Legal Systems  
2. The Availability of National Criminal Legislation 
3. Saddam Hussein’s Immunity before National Courts                                 
4. The Death Penalty Issue 
5. The Issues of Evidence and of Defendant’s Rights 
II. The Kuwaiti Trial 
1. The Basis for Jurisdiction 
2. Obtaining Custody of the Defendant 
3. Trial in Absentia or Transferring the Whole Judicial Proceeding 
III. The Iraqi Trial 
1. The Basis for Jurisdiction 
2. Comments on the Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal  
Conclusion and Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
 
Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution 
Chapter V 
War Crimes against the Environment  
and a National Criminal Remedy 
Introduction 
 Since courts of the state where the crimes were committed, Kuwait, or courts of 
the nationality state, Iraq, would have been interested in holding Saddam Hussein’s trial 
concerning crimes against the environment committed during the Gulf War of 1990-
1991; 692 the focus in this chapter will be on the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems. 
 Since these two legal systems operate under the civil-law regime, there is much in 
common between the two systems. There are also differences with respect to Saddam 
Hussein’s case. This chapter examines common aspects in Part I while Part II deals with 
the Kuwaiti trial and its difficulties. Part III reviews the basis of Iraqi jurisdiction and the 
flaws found in the Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal established after the 
collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Iraqi part intends to review the ad hoc statute 
and the statute in force when the crimes were committed to evaluate advantages and 
disadvantages of both statutes.        
I. Common Issues 
 This part of the chapter reviews how the Kuwaiti and Iraqi legal systems take 
common approches to the status of international law, the availability of national 
legislation, immunity, the death penalty, and issues of evidence and defendant’s rights.  
 
 
                                                 
692 This conclusion arises from the fact that the most common bases for jurisdiction claimed by states are 
the territorial principle (the location of the crime state) and the active personality principle (the nationality 
of the accused state.) Lyal S. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law 252 (Kluwer 
Law International 1997).    
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1. International Law as a Source of Law within the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi Legal 
Systems  
 
The relationship between international law and national legal systems is governed 
by two schools of thought. Adopting either of these approaches is a matter which is left to 
the state itself based upon the nature of its own legal system. The two approaches are the 
monist and the dualist approaches.693  
 The first approach, the monist approach, considers the two systems, international 
law and domestic law, as parts of a single legal system. As a result, no express municipal 
adoption of international law principles is required. The United States is one of those 
states which have adopted the monist view.694  
 The second approach, the dualist approach, views international law and the 
internal law of a state as totally separate legal systems. Based upon this distinction, 
international law would not form part of the internal law of a state. Consequently, the 
principles of international law apply within the internal system only when they are 
expressly adopted as part of the internal law of the state.695 This approach avoids the 
question as to the supremacy of one system over the other since there is no common 
sphere of application of the two systems. Both Kuwait and Iraq follow this approach.696  
 The Kuwaiti Constitution explicitly refers to international conventions but does 
not mention other sources of international law. Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution 
states “The Emir [the ruler] shall conclude treaties by decree and shall transmit them 
immediately to the National Assembly [the Congress] with the appropriate statement. A 
                                                 
693 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,  Oppenheim’s International Law 53 (LongMan 1992). 
694 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,  Oppenheim’s International Law 54 (LongMan 1992). 
695 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,  Oppenheim’s International Law 53 (LongMan 1992). 
696 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 217 (Transnational Publishers 2003); 
Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr. Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The 
Handbook of Explaining General Rules] 109 (2003).  
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treaty shall have the force of law after it is signed, ratified and published in the official 
Gazette.”697 This reference, however, does not preclude Kuwaiti recognition of other 
sources of international law; all international law sources are valid as long as they are 
adopted by national legislation.698  
Without mentioning the status of international agreements within the national 
legal system, Article 43 (d) of the Interim Iraqi Constitution of 1990 provides that “The 
Revolutionary Command Council exercises the following competencies by the majority 
of its members: …..Ratifying treaties and international agreements.”699 In addition, the 
same Constitution confers upon the Iraqi president the power to conduct negotiations and 
to conclude agreements and international treaties.700 
 Both the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems grant adopted treaties the force of 
national law. These treaties are then controlled by the constitutional principles of the 
adopting state and cannot contradict them. Having acknowledged the position of both 
systems concerning international conventions as a source of national law, the focus of 
this paper now will move toward those rules governing international conventions as a 
source of the definition of criminality within the two systems.  
Crimes and their sanctions are controlled by the fundamental principle of 
“legality.” This principle is expressly recognized as a constitutional principle in both 
                                                 
697 Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 70 (1962). 
698 Article 2 of the Constitution stipulates that “The religion of the State is Islam, and the Islamic Sharia 
shall be a main source of legislation.” This article is interpreted as other sources are available to be sources 
of legislation. Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 2 (1962); Al’Mothkrah 
Al’Tfseer’iah L Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Explanatory Memorandum of the Constitution of the State 
of Kuwait].    
699 AL-Dostor Al-Moakaat Lljomhoriah  Al-Iraqiah [The Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] 43 
(d)(1990). 
700 AL-Dostor Al-Moakaat Lljomhoriah  Al-Iraqiah [The Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] 57 
(j)(1990).  
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legal systems.701 Because international conventions have the status of the national 
legislation adopting them as the source of the definition of criminality, they are bound by 
the principle of legality in terms of meaning and extent. In terms of meaning the process 
of defining criminality must be done through legislation.702 Criminality cannot be defined 
by a decree or a rule issued by the executive power.  
The principle of legality is especially important in the Kuwaiti legal system703 
because the definition of criminality in Saddam Hussein’s case is the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which was negotiated and adopted by the executive branch (the Emir) 
without any participation by the legislative branch. In the Kuwaiti legal system, the Emir 
and the National Assembly share legislative power.704 Consequently, the process of 
enacting law requires a proposal from the National Assembly and approval of the Emir. If 
                                                 
701 Article 32 of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides “No crime and no penalty may be established except by 
virtue of law, and no penalty may be imposed except for offenses committed after the relevant law has 
come into force.” Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 32 (1962). Article 21 
(b) of the Interim Iraqi Constitution states “There can be no crime, nor punishment, except in conformity 
with the law. No penalty shall be imposed, for acts punishable by the law, while they are committed. A 
severer penalty than that prescribed by the law, when the act was committed, cannot be inflicted.” AL-
Dostor Al-Moakaat Lljomhoriah Al-Iraqiah [The Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] 21 
(b)(1990).      
702 Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr. Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The 
Handbook of Explaining General Rules] 95 (2003).  
703 In the Iraqi system, the Constitution does not explicitly deal with the way by which international 
conventions may be incorporated within the legal system. However, some assumptions can be made based 
on those constitutional articles dealing with both international agreements and the principle of legality. 
Article 38 (a) of the Iraqi Constitution provides that “The Command Revolutionary Council exercises the 
following competencies by two-thirds of its members: Electing a President from its members, called 
President of the Revolutionary Council, who is President of the Republic.” Article 42 of the Iraqi 
Constitution stipulates that “The Revolutionary Command Council exercises the following competencies: 
(a) Issuing laws and decrees having the force of the law.” Article 43 (d) lays down that “The Revolutionary 
Command Council exercises the following competencies by the majority its members: ratifying treaties and 
international agreements.” Finally, article 57 (j) confers upon the President of Iraq the authority to negotiate 
and conclude international treaties. In the Iraqi legal system, although it was theoretically foreseeable that 
conflict between Saddam Hussein and other members of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council might 
have occurred regarding enactment of a law implementing an international convention, as a practical 
matter, in a dictatorship system, this conflict might not have been contemplated. AL-Dostor Al-Moakaat 
Lljomhoriah  Al-Iraqiah [The Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] 38, 42 (a), 43 (d), 57 (j) (1990).         
704 Article 51 of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides “Legislative power shall be vested in the Emir and the 
National Assembly in accordance with the Constitution.” Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of 
the State of Kuwait] 51 (1962). 
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the Emir disapproves of a legislative action, however, and the National Assembly 
repasses it with a two thirds vote, approval of the Emir becomes mandatory.705 This 
raises the question of whether the Emir can conclude international conventions 
criminalizing actions without legislative approval, when the principle of legality requires 
legislative action to criminalize them. Answering this question requires a review of the 
position of the Kuwaiti Constitution concerning compromise between the Emir’s power 
to conclude a treaty criminalizing certain acts and the National Assembly’s power to do 
.   
le but require 
legislat
                                                
so
 By and large, national constitutions differ in their treatment of the process of 
ratification of international conventions. Some constitutions leave the task of negotiation 
and conclusion exclusively to the executive power without the need for approval by the 
legislative power.706 A second group of constitutions requires that all international 
conventions be ratified by the legislature.707 Others follow this general ru
ive approval of international agreements in some exceptions.708        
Compromising between the Emir’s power to ratify a treaty and the National 
Assembly’s power to criminalize, the Kuwaiti Constitution embraces the approach of the 
last group. Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides that “The Emir [the ruler] 
shall conclude treaties by decree and shall transmit them immediately to the National 
 
705 Article 66 of the Kuwaiti Constitution stipulates that “Reference [from the Emir to the National 
Assembly] of a bill for reconsideration shall be by a decree stating the grounds therefore. If the National 
Assembly confirms the bill by a two-thirds majority vote of its members, the Emir shall sanction and 
promulgate the bill within thirty days from its submission [from the National Assembly] to him.” Dostor 
Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 66 (1962).  
706 Examples of these constitutions are the French Constitution of 1814 and the German Constitution of 
1871. See Adel Al-Tabtbaee, Al-Netham Al-Dostorey Fee Al-Kuweit [The Constitutional System in 
Kuwait] 555 (2001).  
707 This happened in the Swiss experience. Dr. Othman Abdul’Malik Al-Saleh, Al-Netham Al-Dostorey Wa 
Al-Moa’s’saat Al-Dostoriah Fe Al-Kuweit [The Constitutional System and Political Institutions in Kuwait] 
439 (2003).   
708 See Adel Al-Tabtbaee, Al-Netham Al-Dostorey Fee Al-Kuweit [The Constitutional System in Kuwait] 
556 (2001).  
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Assembly [the Congress] with the appropriate statement. A treaty shall have the force of 
law after it is signed, ratified and published in the official Gazette. However, treaties of 
peace and alliance; treaties concerning the territory of the state, its natural resources or 
sovereign rights, or public or private rights of citizens; treaties of commerce, navigation 
and residence; and treaties which entail additional expenditure not provided for in the 
budget, or which involve amendment of the laws of Kuwait; shall come into force only 
when m
me exceptional treaties require legislative 
approv
citizens.” The principle of legality is provided in Part III of the Kuwaiti Constitution, 
                                                
ade by a law.”709  
In any event, the Emir has the power to ratify an international treaty. Under the 
international law system, Kuwait, by the Emir’s ratification, will be bound by the treaty’s 
obligations. However, implementing and incorporating the ratified treaty’s rules into the 
Kuwaiti legal system in some issues requires legislative action. In other words, based on 
the above constitutional article, the general rule is that a decree issued by the Emir is 
sufficient to incorporate international principles within the framework of the national 
legal system as enforceable principles. So
al in order to be part of Kuwaiti law.  
International conventions criminalzing actions fall within the purview of these 
exceptional treaties requiring legislative action for several reasons. First, since criminal 
law represents one aspect of “sovereign rights,” conventions criminlazing certain actions 
concern sovereign rights. Second, such conventions also touch the “public rights of 
 
709 Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 70 (1962). It should be clear that in 
international law, the general rule is that a state is not bound by a treaty unless it ratified it. Signing or 
initialing a treaty is not sufficient to consider a state as being bound by the treaty unless a treaty decides 
otherwise. Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law 74-75 (Kluwer Law International 
1996). Both the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its first additional Protocol adopts a rule requiring 
ratification. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 153, 75 
UNTS 287 (1949); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 95 (2), 1125 UNTS 3 (1977). 
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“Public Rights and Duties.”710 Third, international conventions adding new crimes 
introduce amendment of the laws of Kuwait. The Fourth Geneva Convention and its first 
additional Protocol are international conventions requiring legislative approval because 
they fall within those categories of treaties for which article 70 of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution requires legislative action. Although Kuwait is a party to both the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and its first Protocol, it signed these treaties pursuant to the Emir’s 
decree without legislative approval.711 While the failure of the Kuwaiti legislature to 
enact war crimes legislation might violate Kuwait’s international obligations,712 it would 
have undercut any attempt to prosecute Saddam Hussein in a Kuwaiti court for 
environmental war crimes under those international conventions. 
2. The Availability of National Criminal Legislation 
  
The lack of national war crimes legislation is a disadvantage of prosecuting war 
crimes nationally because enactment of new national legislation on war crimes could 
violate the principle of legality operating at the national level. National legal systems that 
                                                 
710 Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 27-49 (1962). 
711 Those two decrees were issued without a comprehensive framework concerning the convention 
violations and their punishments. Marsoom Be Qanon Be’sh’an Al-Mowaafqah Ala Enzmaam Al-Kweit 
Ala Etifaqiaat Genv [A Decree of Law concerning Approval of Joining  the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 
12, 1949] Aug. 8, 1967; Marsoom Be Qanon Be’sh’an Al-Mowaafqah Ala Enzmaam Al-Kweit Ala Al-
Brotokolien [A Decree of Law concerning Approval of Joining the two Protocols Additional to Geneva 
Conventions] Dec. 3, 1984.  
712 International law requires that states fulfill their obligation to pursue persons accused of international 
crimes. In holding a state responsible, it is a well-established rule of international law that a state cannot 
justify its failure to fulfill an international obligation based upon the argument that its failure is due to 
defective internal law or to an internal law that contradicts international law. The same rule applies to a 
state’s failure to secure the changes in its law necessary to meet its international obligations. Based on this 
international rule, the Kuwaiti approach might be criticized. This criticism would be based upon the 
argument that a policy disagreement between the Emir and the National Assembly concerning whether an 
international convention falls within the category of exceptional treaties or not might result in the 
international responsibility of Kuwait. Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s 
International Law 84-85 (LongMan 1992); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or Between International Organizations art. 46(1), 25 ILM 543 (1986).   
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had no war crimes legislation when these crimes were committed would violate the 
principle of legality.713    
Even though Iraq is a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it did not enact any 
national legislation concerning war crimes.714 As mentioned above, although Kuwait is a 
party to both the Fourth Geneva Convention and its first Protocol, it also failed to enact 
national legislation implementing the obligations of those conventions and criminalizing 
their violations.   
The problem of a state’s failure to enact domestic criminal legislation 
implementing and fulfilling its international obligations is not new in international law. 
When states lacking national war crimes legislation are called to prosecute war criminals, 
they adopt contradictory approaches. The first approach ignores the principle of legality 
by prosecuting under national criminal legislation enacted after the complained actions. 
This occurred in national trials after World War II. The second approach respects the 
principle of legality by prosecuting under limited legislation already in force when the 
complained action was committed. An example is the trials held before Rwanda’s 
national courts.715 Violations of rules applicable before commission of the action are the 
only basis for national trials complying with the principle of legality. 
In the case of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait or Iraq could have avoided international 
responsibility for violation of their obligations to enact legislation enabling them to 
prosecute international war criminals, or for violation of their international obligation to 
                                                 
713 Violation of the principle of legality occurs when national authorities enact new war crimes legislation 
to conduct trials when their international obligation to prosecute suspected war criminals found in their 
territories arises.   
714 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 217 (Transnational Publishers 2003). 
715 See William A. Schabas, Preserve Effects of the Nullu Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals, EJIL Vol. 11 No.3 521, 26 (2000).   
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protect human rights (the principle of legality,) only by prosecuting Saddam Hussein for 
violating criminal legislation in force when the offense was committed.  
In addition, to ensure the fairness of the proceedings, some domestic 
modifications, procedural and substantive, are necessary. Some of these modifications 
will be clarified in this chapter. In the Kuwaiti and Iraqi criminal justice systems, the core 
legislation controlling criminal trials is the Penal Code.716 This legislation deals with the 
substantive aspect of criminal proceedings. In the procedural part of criminal 
proceedings, the Criminal Procedure Code controls the action from the original complaint 
to the execution of the sentence.   
In both Kuwaiti and Iraqi core legislation, the principle of legality is 
reaffirmed.717 It is the standard by which a distinction between a State where “law” is 
arbitrary and a State which abides by the rule of law is made. Unlike the requirement for 
the principle on the international plane, any crime and its punishment must be prescribed 
in advance by written law. This written law must be issued by the legislature and 
published in the official Gazette. Despite the fact that this principle has been criticized, it 
still benefits defendants to some extent.718 Pre-existing national criminal legislation could 
have been used as a basis for prosecuting Saddam Hussein criminally for his actions 
against the environment and could have been found in the Penal Code. These laws, 
however, do not refer to war crimes.719 Avoiding failure to fulfill the state’s international 
obligation to prosecute for international war crimes justifies interpretating these pre-
                                                 
716 The substantive part grapples with principles of the application of the Code, with the elements of the 
crime, defenses, excuses, and crimes and their sanctions. 
717 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.1-14 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The 
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 1 (Iraq).  
718 Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr. Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The 
Handbook of Explaining General Rules] 98 (2003).  
719 Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr. Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The 
Handbook of Explaining General Rules] 162 (2003).  
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existing laws to apply during both peace and war. At the same time, the texts of these 
laws do not indicate that they apply only during peace time. 
Even though there is a lack of national legislation criminalizing environmental 
war crimes, national prosecutors have several tools with which to prosecute the accused 
for underlying actions. Specifically, in the matter of Saddam Hussein’s actions against 
the environment, the prosecutor may consider those actions to be crimes against property, 
arson, harming animals or offenses against the public health.  
Under the Kuwaiti criminal justice system, a proceeding could have been 
commenced based upon the charge that Saddam Hussein’s actions are considered crimes 
against property. Article (250) of the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides that “Any person who 
willfully destroys a public installation or a resource of national wealth, causing the 
closure of the installation or a reduction in its utility or damage to that resource entirely 
or partly, is punishable by life imprisonment.”720 
  This provision differs in two aspects from Article 53 of the Geneva Convention 
IV721 which criminalizes destruction of property during war. First, it does not require that 
the proscribed action be conducted during international armed conflict, nor does it require 
a connection between the action and the event (warfare.) Secondly, this provision does 
not furnish the accused with the defense of military necessity. Consequently, it would 
have been easier to use national legislation to prosecute the defendant since it does not 
require the prosecutor to prove these additional elements, the lack of military necessity, 
the existence of armed conflict and a nexus between this conflict and the committed 
crime. On the other hand, the lack of the defense of military necessity constitutes a 
                                                 
720 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.250 (Kuwait).  
721 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, 75 UNTS 287 
(1949). 
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disadvantage of the national trial approach since this provides less human rights 
protection.  Under both systems, it could have been argued that the necessity defense is 
generally available for all offenses.722  
In addition to crimes against property, a Kuwaiti prosecutor could have 
prosecuted for violation of the provisions criminalizing arson. Article (243) of the 
Kuwaiti Penal Code provides that “Any person who willfully sets on fire an oil well and 
causes damage to others is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years 
and a fine not exceeding 10,000 dinars [30,000 dollars] or any of these penalties.”723 The 
punishment is increased if explosives are used in carrying out the crime.724 
Corresponding provisions are included in the Iraqi Penal Code. The Iraqi Penal 
Code is more specific concerning the place where the fire was set or where the 
destruction occurred. Article 353(1) stipulates, “Any person who…destroys or causes 
other damage to an oil installation is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 
seven years or by detention if such damage could lead to the closure of that installation. 
The penalty will be a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years of detention if the 
crime actually causes the closure of such installations.”725  
                                                 
722 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.25 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The 
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 63 (Iraq). It is questionable whether military necessity is 
included with the general necessity defense since there is no war crimes statute or case law within the two 
systems. However, a Kuwaiti or Iraqi court might interpret the defense of necessity broadly to include 
military necessity. This interpretation is acceptable because of a well-known rule allowing broad 
interpretation of criminal statutes as long as they relate to defenses. Dr. Fayez Al-Zafeery & Dr. 
Mohammed Abu-Zoubar, Al-Wajeez Fee Shrah Al-Qwa’ed Al-Amaa [The Handbook of Explaining 
General Rules] 124 (2003).  
723 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.243 (Kuwait). 
724 The punishment is life imprisonment in this case. Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 
1960, art.247 (Kuwait).   
725 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 353 (1) (Iraq). 
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If the defendant destroys or damages an oil installation by arson, he may be 
punished by life imprisonment.726 Life imprisonment is mandatory if the arson was 
carried out by means of explosives and serious damage resulted.727  
Neither the Kuwaiti nor the Iraqi Penal Codes recognize “order” or “command 
responsibility” as a basis for criminal responsibility. However, other theories of 
responsibility could have been used. For instance, principal, accessory and conspiracy 
provisions may make someone criminally responsible for criminal actions committed by 
others. Article 47 (2) of the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides, “The following are considered 
to be principals to an offense: Any person who participates in the commission of an 
offense that consists of a number of acts and who willfully carried out one of those acts 
during the commission of that offense.”728 One of those acts might be planning an 
offense. Articles 56 and 48 (3) provide for conspiracy and deliberate assistance as bases 
for holding an individual as accessory to an offense.729 Finally, under the Penal Codes of 
both countries, an accessory to the crime receives the same punishment as that of the 
principal.730 A personal defense available to one of the principals or accessories, such as 
obedience to a superior order, does not affect the responsibility of other principals or 
accessories.731  
In conclusion, although national crimes legislation upon which the prosecution of 
Saddam Hussein could have been based exists, the lack of national war crimes legislation 
constitutes a flaw that could have been attributed to the national trials approach. More 
                                                 
726 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 342 (2) (Iraq).  
727 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 346 (Iraq).  
728 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.47 (2) (Kuwait). 
729 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 47-48 (2)(3) (Iraq).  
730 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.52 (Kuwait); Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The 
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 50 (Iraq). 
731 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 40 (2), 50 (1) (Iraq). Kanon Al-
Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.37, 50, 52 (Kuwait). 
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specifically, holding Saddam Hussein’s trial based upon national crimes legislation 
would raise doubt about some issues. Immunity is one of these issues.732   
3. Saddam Hussein’s Immunity before National Courts                                 
 Assuming that Kuwait or Iraq had enacted ad hoc legislation regarding war crimes 
to try Saddam Hussein for his actions against the environment, one might have asked to 
what extent he could successfully have claimed immunity before Kuwaiti or Iraqi courts. 
To answer this question, it is essential to review the international rules governing the 
immunity of a head of state before national courts. This issue is important because, if the 
immunity claim could have succeeded, then immunity must be considered a disadvantage 
in national trials for war crimes. 
 Saddam Hussein’s argument for immunity is a losing argument in the Iraqi legal 
system in light of the ICJ’s decision. The ICJ held that “such persons [An incumbent or 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs] enjoy no criminal immunity under international law 
in their own countries and may thus be tried by these’ countries’ courts in accordance 
with the relevant rules of domestic law.”733  
On the other side, a review of the Kuwaiti legal system shows that there is no 
national legislation controlling the immunity of a head of state except those provisions 
contained in the Kuwaiti Constitution.734 In any case, this legislative vacuum does not 
                                                 
732 International law rules governing immunity are meant to be applied to individuals accused of 
international crimes, but not national crimes.  For instance, although the ICJ’s decision regarding immunity 
is deemed to be the final word concerning the current international rules regarding immunity, it is 
applicable only to individuals accused of international crimes. Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.   
733 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 61.     
734 Article 54 provides the Emir with absolute immunity and Article 110 grants the National Assembly 
members immunity concerning those statements and actions attributed to them while they are in sessions. 
Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 54, 110 (1962). In fact, these provisions 
play a role in keeping Kuwait from joining the ICC statute. See Adel Al-Tabtabyie, Al-Netham Al-Assasee 
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provide Kuwait with an excuse to violate its obligation to respect the sovereignty of the 
state regarding immunity, laid down by international customary law. 
 Recently, the issue of conflict between the rules of immunity and the rules 
governing individual criminal responsibility in international crimes has been raised. This 
issue has been reviewed before national courts in England, in the House of Lords;735 in 
France, in the Cour de Cassation;736 and in the ICJ.737 The ICJ decision will be reviewed 
in depth because it is the most comprehensive decision of the three and the most recent.                                  
 The first national case was tried in the House of Lords and concerned a former 
head of state.738 On December 24, 1999, a panel of seven members of the House of Lords 
ruled that the defendant was not immune to a charge of torture. The decision is important 
because the Court did not consider international crimes to be official acts or acts of state 
covered by the immunity doctrine of ratione materiae. This type of immunity begins 
when an official leaves office. Consequently, it would not have been available for 
Saddam Hussein with regard to those actions committed against the environment that are 
considered international crimes. 
 The second national case was tried before the Cour de Cassation of Paris against 
Mouammar Ghaddafi, Leader of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.739  
Ghaddafi was charged with murder for complicity in a terrorist action. On March 13, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ll’mah’kamah Al-Jenaieh Wa Madaa Taarozoh Maa Al-Dostor Al-Kuwieti [Contradiction between the 
Statute of the ICC and Rules of the Constitution of Kuwait] 37-56 (Kuwait University 2003).   
735 R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, [1999] 2 UKHL 97.  
736 Cass. Crim. March 13, 2001, Bull. Crim., No. 1414.  
737 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002.  
738 The case concerned the former head of state of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Duarte. After the 
defendant entered England in September 1997, he was arrested on the basis of provisional arrest warrants 
issued by UK magistrates, at the request of Spanish courts. General Pinochet was accused of involvement 
in torture actions while he was in office. For analysis of this decision, see Andrea Bianchi, Immunity 
Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EJIL 237 (1999).  
739 Cass. Crim. March 13, 2001, Bull. Crim., No. 1414.  
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2001, the Court accepted the Prosecutor’s plea of immunity and declined jurisdiction 
over the case. This decision was criticized.740 It coincided with the conclusion of the 
House of Lords concerning the absolute immunity of an incumbent head of state from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction regardless of the gravity of offenses attributed to him.  
 In the case before the ICJ,741 the Court implicitly recognized the immunity of 
heads of state under international law.742 Although the decision was limited to the 
immunity of a Minister of Foreign Affairs, its reasoning applies to heads of state.743  
To resolve the conflict between a state’s international obligation to search out and 
to prosecute individuals responsible for international crimes and the obligation to respect 
the sovereignty of the state, the Court stated that, “[A]lthough various international 
conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on the 
state obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their 
criminal jurisdiction, such an extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities 
under customary international law.”744  
In admitting that immunity does not amount to impunity, the Court ruled that 
“[T]he immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. 
First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own 
countries…. Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the 
                                                 
740 Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case before the French Cour De Cassation, 12 EJIL 595 (2001).   
741 For the case facts, see supra. Ch. IV Sec. III.  
742 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 51. 
743 The Court considered both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of state “as representative of the 
state solely by virtue of his or her office.” Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 53.  
744 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. ¶ 59. 
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state which they represent or they have represented decides to waive this immunity. 
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, he or she 
will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other states. 
Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one state may try a 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of another state for acts committed prior to or 
subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as for acts committed during that period 
of office in a private capacity.”745 
Finally, in its response to Belgium’s argument that exceptions to an incumbent 
official’s immunity can be inferred from the Pinochet and Ghaddafi cases, the Court 
stated that, “[I]t [the Court] has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists 
under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.”746 
Two comments may be made about the ICJ decision. First, the Court did not set a 
bright-line rule concerning when the action is considered to have been committed in a 
private capacity. The Court did not expressly rule that international crimes are committed 
in a private capacity. Secondly, the decision removed immunity from any official who 
leaves office, without considering the reason for his leaving the office. Consequently, the 
decision did not address a situation in which a defendant has been forced to leave office 
as a result of an internationally illegal act. 
                                                 
745 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002, ¶ 61. 
746 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002, ¶ 58. 
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In the case of Saddam Hussein, assuming that the action of the United States in 
invading Iraq was contrary to international law, does the illegality of this action have an 
impact on Saddam Hussein’s immunity ratione personae? In other words, could Saddam 
Hussein successfully have claimed that he was still the de jure President of Iraq and that 
the illegal action of the United States did not affect his position? If so, he would have 
been immune from Kuwaiti criminal jurisdiction. 
The answer to this question depends on the issue of government recognition. It is 
well established under international law that an unrecognized government will usually be 
denied immunity as one of the consequences of its lack of recognition.747 Consequently, 
no immunity exists for an individual, including a head of state, who comes from a 
country whose government is not recognized by the state conferring immunity. Whether 
Saddam Hussein could successfully have claimed immunity before Kuwaiti courts would 
have depended on whether Kuwait recognized Saddam Hussein as the legitimate 
president of Iraq. The answer to this question should be evaluated based on the practice 
of the state of Kuwait in light of those international rules controlling the issue of 
government recognition.  
By and large, recognition of governments is subject to the discretion of a state and 
is deduced from the circumstances of each case. Some countries, such as England, adopt 
criteria by which to recognize governments.748 Other countries, such as the United States 
and Kuwait, leave the task of recognition to the executive power.749 Government 
                                                 
747 Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law 113-14 (Ashgate Publishing Company 
2004). 
748 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,  Oppenheim’s International Law 150 (LongMan 1992). 
749 Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (1994). Kuwait does not have case law or national legislation 
that clearly prescribes this issue. However, the recognition power can be inferred from article 74 of the 
Kuwaiti Constitution which dictates that “He [the Emir] shall also accept credentials of representatives of 
foreign countries.” Dostor Dwllat Al-Kuwiet [The Constitution of the State of Kuwait] 74 (1962).      
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recognition can be exercised expressly or implicitly. An implied recognition takes place 
when the acts of a state, such as the formal initiation of diplomatic relations or the 
conclusion of bilateral treaties, leave no doubt as to the intention to grant recognition.750  
Until 1990, Kuwait had formal diplomatic relations and had concluded several 
bilateral treaties with Iraq. Consequently, Kuwait had recognized the Iraqi government 
headed by Saddam Hussein. After the Gulf War of 1991, diplomatic relations between 
the two countries were severed. This severance per se did not result in the withdrawal of 
recognition of Saddam Hussein’s government as long as a formal notification by the 
Kuwaiti government announcing the withdrawal of recognition was not issued.751  
Alternatively, withdrawal may take place by the recognition de jure of a rival 
government.752 In reviewing the practice of Kuwait, it appears that Kuwait did recognize 
the new Iraqi government. Although no express notification was issued, the practice of 
Kuwait proved its recognition of the new government.753 As a result of this recognition, it 
was very likely that Saddam Hussein’s claim of immunity ratione personae would not 
have succeeded in a Kuwaiti court if his trial had been commenced. 
The matter would have been different if, after the liberation of Kuwait, had 
Saddam Hussein admitted his mistakes, voluntarily agreed to pay compensation, and 
resumed diplomatic relations with Kuwait. It is likely that such a position, taken by 
Saddam Hussein, would have affected the Kuwaiti position on the invasion of Iraq by the 
United States. If after invading Iraq, Saddam Hussein had fled to Kuwait and the latter 
                                                 
750 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,  Oppenheim’s International Law 169 (LongMan 1992). 
751 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,  Oppenheim’s International Law 176 (LongMan 1992). 
752 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,  Oppenheim’s International Law 177 (LongMan 1992). 
753 Kuwait allowed the United States to use its territory to remove Saddam Hussein from power. On several 
occasions the State of Kuwait announced its support of the new Iraqi government. The State of Kuwait 
announced its intention to resume diplomatic relations with the new Iraqi government as soon as safety was 
guaranteed in Iraq.   
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had been asked to extradite or prosecute him, his claim of immunity might have 
succeeded before the Kuwaiti courts.  
In conclusion, in some cases other than that of Saddam Hussein, immunity could 
be a disadvantage of national trials for war crimes since it might bar the commencement 
of criminal proceedings against a head of state who is recognized as the legitimate 
president of his country by the state where he is located and where the criminal complaint 
is filed. But this is not the case with Saddam Hussein.                             
4. The Death Penalty Issue 
 
Although the death penalty may be considered legitimate by some national legal 
systems, it is considered a violation of human rights by the international legal system.754 
Therefore, the availability of the death penalty in a national system disfavors use of that 
system to prosecute international crimes.  
If international judicial action had been taken in the case of Saddam Hussein’s 
actions against the environment, given the current trend of the international community, it 
is more likely that the death penalty would have been unacceptable as an appropriate 
punishment for war crimes. 
 In this part of the paper, several questions will be reviewed: whether the Kuwaiti 
and Iraqi legal systems recognize the death penalty, what factors justify infliction of this 
punishment by Kuwaiti and Iraqi courts, and the likehood that this punishment could 
have been imposed in Saddam Hussein’s case.  
                                                 
754 William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law 211 (Cambridge 
University Press 2002). 
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 Both the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems formally accept the death penalty as 
one of the primary punishments for national crimes.755 At the sentencing stage, unlike 
international criminal practice and the legal system of the United States, neither the 
Kuwaiti nor the Iraqi legal systems furnish their courts with sentencing guidelines 
ensuring the uniformity of the application of the punishments.  
In addition, within both systems, the death penalty might not be prescribed by the 
text criminalizing the committed action itself. However, aggravating circumstances can 
play a role in having this punishment for the committed action as an option in some cases 
but as mandatory in others. For instance, the punishment can be aggravated to reach death 
penalty level if the offense was committed during time of war.756 The relationship 
between the perpetrator and the victim restricts the judge’s ability to impose only the 
death penalty, requiring him to choose among several punishments. For instance, under 
the Iraqi Penal Code, in murder cases, the punishment is aggravated from life 
imprisonment to the death penalty if the victim is a parent of the offender.757 Finally, the 
circumstances of the case relating to the means of its commission, premeditation and the 
purpose for which the offense was committed, can be aggravating circumstances as 
well.758           
                                                 
755 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 85 (1) (Iraq). Kanon Al-Jazaa 
[The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.57 (1) (Kuwait). 
756 Article 8 of Law No. 31/1970 amending the Kuwait Penal Code stipulates “The following persons are 
punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of years: Any person who willfully destroys an 
oil pipeline or installation used by the armed forces. The penalty will be death if the offense occurs during 
time of war.” Kanon Besh’an Tadeel Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Law concerning Amendments to The Sanction 
Law], Law No. 31 of 1970, arts. 8 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 
1969, art. 163 (1) (Iraq). 
757 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 406 (1)(d) (Iraq). 
758 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 406 (1)(a) (Iraq). Kanon Al-
Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, arts. 149, 150, 180 (Kuwait). 
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In the case of arson and offenses involving the destruction of property, the 
punishment may reach the level of life imprisonment in some cases. For example, article 
342 (2) (b) of the Iraqi Penal Code states, “Any person who willfully sets on fire 
moveable or immoveable property…(2) The penalty will be life imprisonment if the 
following places are set on fire…(b) An oil rig or well.”759 Concerning offenses against 
property, article 346 of the same Code stipulates, “Any person who willfully uses or 
attempts to use explosives, thereby endangering the property of others, is punishable by a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years. The penalty will be life imprisonment if 
the explosion causes serious damage to such property.”760 
In addition to these specific aggravating circumstances, the Iraqi Penal Code 
recognizes general aggravating circumstances. Holding public office or public authority 
is one of those circumstances. These circumstances may raise the level of punishment in 
some cases to the death penalty. 761 Applying general aggravating circumstances such as 
those mentioned above to the crimes of arson and property destruction allows a 
sentencing court to inflict the death penalty upon those individuals condemned for these 
offenses, such as Saddam Hussein.762 In short, the imposition of the death penalty under 
national legal systems, especially the Iraqi legal system, was probable. The same could 
have been said regarding the Kuwaiti legal system, but with a different legal context.  
                                                 
759 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 342 (2)(b) (Iraq). 
760 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 346 (Iraq). 
761 Article 135 (4) of the Iraqi Penal Code provides “Without prejudice to the special conditions prescribed 
by law for an increase in the penalty; the following are considered to be aggravating circumstances: ….the 
use by the offender in the commission of an offense of his position of employment or the abuse of any 
authority or influence deriving from such position.” If any of these aggravating circumstances exist in the 
commission of an offense, the court may impose the death penalty if the penalty prescribed for the offense 
is life imprisonment.  Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 135 (4) (Iraq). 
762 Article 136 (1) of the Iraqi Penal Code provides that, “If there exist any aggravating circumstances in 
the commission of an offense, the court may rule as follows: (1) If the penalty prescribed for the offense is 
life imprisonment, the death penalty may be imposed…” Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law 
No. 111 of 1969, art. 136 (1) (Iraq). 
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Even though imposing the death penalty in the case of Saddam Hussein might 
have been considered legal in light of the principle of legality, there was a high 
possibility that this penalty would have been imposed arbitrarily due to the lack of 
sentencing guidelines within the national legal systems. Without question, the possibility 
of imposing this punishment arbitrarily constitutes a flaw which might have been 
addressed by national war crimes trials.       
5. The Issues of Evidence and of Defendant’s Rights 
 
The existence of flaws in procedural protection within national legal systems 
constitutes a problem for national war crimes trials. Examples of these flaws are the lack 
of rules governing evidence, especially documentary evidence,763 and the lack of some of 
the defendant’s rights, such as the right to be tried without undue delay. These flaws 
suggest that war crimes trials be held internationally. To examine these flaws, the 
Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal systems will be reviewed with regard to these issues.                 
There is no independent legislation in the Kuwaiti and Iraqi legal systems 
addressing the rules of evidence in criminal proceedings. Generally, evidence is 
controlled by provisions included in the Penal Procedure Code. Unlike provisions made 
in international criminal instruments, national provisions regarding evidence do not make 
a distinction between the stage at which evidence is admitted and the ruling.764 These 
provisions govern evidence which is legally recognized as the basis for conviction.  
                                                 
763 If the trial of Saddam Hussein concerning his actions against the environment had been held, it would 
have depended mainly on documentary evidence. Therefore, this part of the paper will focus on 
documentary evidence.   
764 Although it is a fact that the above distinction has no value in the light of the end of the proceedings, 
admission of almost all evidence presented might consume time. This affects a defendant’s rights to 
prepare a defense and his right to be tried without undue delay.  
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In light of the evidentiary aspect, a comparison between the two systems on one 
hand and the international system on the other hand shows that they have both 
common765 and different features.766 Even within the common sphere, the extent of 
evidentiary principles is inconsistent.767 This comparison is conducted in light of these 
evidentiary principles and their relationship to the protection of human rights, more 
specifically protection of the defendant’s rights.  
Although neither national system explicitly contains a rule requiring evidence to 
be relevant and have probative value, it is a judicial practice to enforce this principle 
during the stage when evidence is weighed. Finally, the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code has 
                                                 
765 Both national and international legislative systems have common principles governing some procedural 
issues such as the admission of written statements in lieu of oral testimony, a written defense in lieu of oral 
argument and the rejection of evidence which is not subject to parties’ argument.  
766 At the level of international criminal law, there are some rules which do not exist in either of the two 
national systems. For instance, evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct, judicial notice and lawyer-client 
privilege are not recognized by either national system. However, despite the fact that these principles are 
not recognized, it does not follow that national judges cannot apply them. The principles can be applied in 
the mental evaluation of the evidence by judges. It is more likely however, that judges will be reluctant to 
rely on them because they are not recognized by the legislature. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
arts. 93, 94, 97, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). 
767 Common principles exist within the two compared systems to a different extent in some cases. For 
example, international criminal instruments adopt the corroboration rule regarding a child’s testimony. 
Within the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code, Article 213 (B), generalizing the rule to all testimonies, stipulates, 
“One testimony is not sufficient for a ruling if it is not corroborated by other convincing evidence or a 
confession from the accused. The exception to this rule is if the law specifies a particular way of proving a 
case, which must be followed.” An example of this exception is provided by Article 181 (D) of the same 
Code. Article 181 (D) states, “If the defendant confesses to the charge against him and the court is satisfied 
of the truth of his confession and that he understands its implication, then it listens to his defense and issues 
a judgment in the case without any requirement for further evidence.” In addition, in international criminal 
law, a court may exclude any evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to 
ensure a fair trial” or “if [evidence is] obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or 
if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.” On the 
contrary, this principle, in both national systems, is limited to those confessions which are given “as a result 
of coercion, whether it is physical or moral, a promise or a threat.” Both national systems recognize the 
testimony of experts as evidence. Unlike the international system, they do not confer upon a defendant the 
right to challenge the qualifications of the testifying experts. As an alternative, a defendant may present a 
contradictory expert’s testimony or report. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence arts. 89 (D), 90 (B), 95, 
UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006); Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 
1960, arts. 159, 170 (Kuwait).  Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 
1971, arts. 181 (D), 213 (B), 218 (Iraq). 
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its own advantage over both the international and Kuwaiti systems by not permitting 
hearsay as evidence.768 
With regard to documentary evidence, both national systems assign this type of 
evidence to a principle which controls all types of evidence. This principle provides that a 
court, in its verdict, may resort to any evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry 
or the hearing.769 This evidence may consist of witnesses’ statements, written records of 
an interrogation, other official discoveries, or reports of experts and technicians. Based 
upon this principle, documentary evidence will be evaluated just as any other evidence is 
evaluated. The Iraqi Penal Procedure Code does not impose upon the court an obligation 
to examine the authenticity of the document.770 The Kuwaiti Penal Procedure contains no 
provisions dealing exclusively with documentary evidence. 
Unlike international criminal instruments, the Kuwaiti and Iraqi systems do not 
explicitly refer to certain defendant’s rights such as the right to a fair trial, the right to a 
speedy trial, the right to cross-examine witnesses and the defendant’s right not to be 
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. In spite of this fact, some rights 
can be implied from the rules mentioned above. However, some national evidentiary and 
procedural principles may raise doubt concerning their violation of the defendant’s rights 
mentioned above. For instance, Article 179 of the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code states that 
“The Court may ask the defendant any questions considered appropriate to establish the 
                                                 
768 Article 169 of the Iraqi Penal Procedure Code states “The testimony should be based upon the facts 
which the witness is able to recall through one of his senses.” Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal 
Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, art. 169 (Iraq). For the hearsay rule before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 
see Almino Rodrigues & Cecile Tournaye, Hearsay Evidence in Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence 
291 (Richard May eds. 2001)  (Examining the rule before the Tribunal and proposing guidelines to admit 
hearsay statements).   
769 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, art. 151 (Kuwait). 
Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, art. 213 (Iraq). 
770 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, art. 221 (Iraq). 
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truth before or after issuing a charge against him. A refusal to answer will be considered 
as evidence against him”(emphasis added).771 This provision clearly infringes upon the 
defendant’s right not to be compelled to testify against himself. Such a principle is not 
found in the Kuwaiti Penal Procedure Code.  
The lack of rules of documentary evidence and of the defendant’s right to be tried 
without undue delay within the two national legal systems constitute a flaw which could 
have been addressed had Saddam Hussein’s war crimes trials been held nationally. 
Unless national modifications, including procedural protection, documentary evidence 
rules and the defendant’s right to be tried without undue delay, were made, these flaws 
were reasons to hold war crimes trials internationally. Otherwise, arbitrary conviction 
would have been highly expected in the case of Saddam Hussein.      
II. The Kuwaiti Trial 
 
A review of the Kuwaiti legal system in light of the Saddam Hussein case raises 
several questions relating to the basis for jurisdiction, obtaining custody of the defendant, 
trying the defendant in absentia, and execution of the Kuwaiti sentence in Iraqi territory.  
1. The Basis for Jurisdiction 
  
Jurisdiction is necessary to make laws functional. More importantly, establishing 
jurisdiction is a prerequisite to any extradition process. Jurisdictional power encompasses 
the functions of the three powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in every nation. 
This power grants a state the authority to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce those laws and 
judgments that concern conduct occurring within the territory of that state. The 
adjudication power is discussed here.  
                                                 
771 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, art. 179 (Iraq). 
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 Under international law, a state may claim jurisdiction using one of several 
principles. These principles are the territorial principle, the active personality principle, 
the passive personality principle, the protective principle, and the universality 
principle.772 As the territorial and active personality principles are the most common 
jurisdictional principles used or claimed by the majority of states and are most clearly 
related to Saddam Hussein’s case,773 the paper will focus on them. This part of the paper 
will discuss the territorial principle. The subsquent section on Iraqi jurisdiction will 
address the active personality principle.  
 Before examining the territorial principle, it should be made clear that, unless an 
international convention establishes priority among the above principles, there is no 
international customary rule governing the hierarchy of these principles if a dispute 
concerning jurisdiction between states is raised. Concerning national crimes, the 
territorial principle is considered the primary basis for criminal jurisdiction.774 According 
to this principle, a state is competent to prosecute all offenses committed, in whole or in 
part, within its territory. A territorial nexus is a basic requirement for this principle. This 
principle rests upon the doctrine of sovereignty by which every state has the authority to 
assume power over its own territory.775 Without the territorial principle, statehood does 
not exist in international law.776  
                                                 
772 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law 143-60 (Cavendish Publishing 2003).  
773 Lyal S. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law 252 (Kluwer Law International 
1997).  
774 Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in  International Criminal Law, Vol. II, 33,43 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).   
775 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 278 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
776 Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in  International Criminal Law, Vol. II, 33,44 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).   
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 The arguments for the territorial principle are that it serves justice by allowing 
immediate access to evidence as well as minimizing expenses and judicial time.777 In the 
context of national prosecutions, under the territorial principle, Professor Cassese also 
argues that, “[I]t is more likely for the cathartic process of criminal trials to have effect: 
the victims and their families relive their tragedies; the whole society becomes aware of 
what has happened and is thus put in a position of better coming to terms with, hence of 
psychologically overcoming, past crimes.”778 
 At the international level, the territorial principle is expressly adopted in the 
context of genocide.779 Based upon this principle, national prosecutions for the crime of 
genocide were conducted in Rwanda for the first time in the history of the Genocide 
Convention.  
 Unlike international law, most often national criminal justice systems set a 
comprehensive framework governing the jurisdiction issue. Within this framework, the 
territorial principle is always prescribed as the primary rule controlling the application of 
the national criminal law. For instance, the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides, “The 
provisions of this legislation [the Kuwaiti Penal Code] apply to every individual in the 
territory of Kuwait committing an offense as prescribed by this legislation.”780 
 The territorial principle applies in two forms. Subjective territoriality requires that 
at least one of the offense’s elements be committed within the territory of the asserting 
state. Objective territoriality requires that the impact of the offense occur in the territory 
                                                 
777 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 278 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
778 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 279 (Oxford University Press 2003) 
779 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art.VI, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 
(1948). 
780 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art. 11 (Kuwait). 
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of the asserting state.781 The Kuwaiti provision above deals with the subjective form. As 
regards the objective form,782 the Kuwaiti legislation, unlike the Iraqi Penal Code, does 
not set a general rule regarding offenses which are committed abroad but impact Kuwaiti 
territory. However, the Kuwaiti system recognizes the objective form in a limited number 
of offenses, not including arson and destruction of property. 783 
 Unlike normal arson and destruction of property offenses, the objective form may 
present some difficulties in crimes against the environment because they may be 
committed within one territorial jurisdiction, but impact the environment in the other 
territorial jurisdiction.  
 Because Saddam Hussein’s order for action was given in Iraq, an argument might 
have been raised that Kuwait lacked jurisdiction (the objective form.) However, Article 
11 of the Kuwaiti Penal Code states that, “This legislation applies to all parties to the 
offense of which all or part occurs in Kuwait even though any of those parties may be 
abroad at the time of commission and regardless of whether any of those parties is a 
principal or accessory to the offense.”784 In any case, even though the territorial principle 
may be a basis for jurisdiction, it is not enforceable without obtaining custody of the 
defendant.   
2. Obtaining Custody of the Defendant 
 
At the international level, obtaining custody of the defendant is called extradition. 
Extradition is defined as, “The official surrender of an alleged criminal by one state or 
                                                 
781 Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in  International Criminal Law, Vol. II, 33,47 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).   
782 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 2 (1) (Iraq).  
783 Kanon Besh’an Tadeel Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Law concerning Amendments to The Sanction Law], Law 
No. 31 of 1970, art. 15 (Kuwait). 
784 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art. 11 (Kuwait). 
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nation to another having jurisdiction over the criminal charged.”785 Extradition represents 
an effective tool between states in criminal matters. Some believe that the obligation to 
extradite suspected war criminals exists without the requirement of a treaty while others 
believe that a treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral, is necessary to claim the existence 
of this obligation.786 As contemporary practice in international law supports and confirms 
the second view, this paper will assume that this view prevails.787 Based upon this 
assumption, the possibility of being unable to obtain custody of the defendant represents 
a difficulty in holding war crimes trials nationally. This requires a review of the 
possibility of obtaining custody of Saddam Hussein by Kuwait. 
 At the international level, the basis for extradition between states can be found 
based upon reciprocity, comity and an international convention. Between Kuwait and 
Iraq, reciprocity and comity as bases for extradition would not be appropriate methods to 
secure custody of Saddam Hussein because of the tremendous crimes Saddam Hussein 
committed against the Iraqi people. As a result, an existing treaty would have been the 
only path through which both states could have been satisfied. A review of the history of 
the relationship between the two states shows that there is no bilateral treaty in existence 
regarding this issue. However, within the Arab League Organization, there is a 
multilateral extradition treaty which both Kuwait and Iraq ratified. This treaty is the 
Extradition of Criminals Agreement between Arab Countries [hereinafter the 
Convention.]788 
                                                 
785 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 605 (7th ed. 1999).  
786 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 5-6 (Oceana Publications 
Inc. 1996). 
787 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 5-6 (Oceana Publications 
Inc. 1996). 
788 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
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 According to the Convention, each State Party is bound to deliver up a criminal 
sought by another State Party according to conditions and circumstances prescribed by 
the Convention.789 This obligation includes everything found in the possession of the 
fugitive criminal at the time of his arrest, whether the proceeds of the crime, or materials 
that will serve as evidence to prove the crime.790  
 Extradition becomes obligatory when the offense prescribed by the Convention as 
an extraditable offense is committed in the territory of the state which seeks the surrender 
of the fugitive criminal (hereinafter the requesting state).791 The Convention recognizes 
the territorial principle as a basis for both jurisdiction and requests for extradition. 
Therefore, since crimes against the environment were committed in the territory of 
Kuwait, Kuwait could have been a requesting state under the Convention. 
 The request to extradite can be made for the purpose of either prosecution or 
execution. If the request concerns prosecution, the Convention requires that the crime 
charged be punishable by imprisonment of a year or more according to the laws of both 
requesting and requested states.792 In applying this provision to arson and offenses 
involving destruction of property, both acts are considered criminal and are punishable 
according to the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Penal Codes.793 As a result, these offenses meet the 
requirement of this provision.  
                                                 
789 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art. 1, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
790 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art. 12, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
791 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.2, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
792 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.3, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
793 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.25 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The 
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, arts. 342 (2), 353 (Iraq). Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], 
Law No. 16 of 1960, arts. 243, 250 (Kuwait).  
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 If the request is made to execute a sentence issued against a fugitive criminal, the 
punishment prescribed by the sentence must be at least two months’ imprisonment.794 
Because the Kuwaiti criminal system permits criminal trials in absentia, it is possible that 
a sentence might have been issued with the punishment mentioned above.  
 Despite the fact that the Convention imposes upon state parties an obligation to 
extradite, it allows these states to reject the request for extradition based upon several 
theories. These theories pertain to the nature of the offense, the protection of human 
rights and the nationality of the fugitive criminal.  
 In terms of the nature of the offense, the Convention does not permit a claim of 
extradition for crimes of a political character nor for acts connected with such crimes.795 
The Convention also removes certain offenses, not including arson and destruction of 
property, from the definition of political offenses.796 The Iraqi Penal Code makes a 
distinction between ordinary and political offenses. Defining political offenses, Article 21 
stipulates, “A political offense is one which is committed with a political motive or which 
violates the political rights either of the public or of the individual. All other offenses are 
considered to be ordinary.”797 Based upon this standard, it seems that neither arson nor 
destruction of property meet the requirement of the standard of political offenses.  
 A statute of limitations argument is another basis upon which to refuse the 
surrender of the fugitive criminal. Article 6 of the Convention states, “A fugitive criminal 
shall not be surrendered under the provisions of this treaty, when from lapse of time, 
according to the laws of the place within the jurisdiction of which the crime was 
                                                 
794 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.3, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
795 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.4, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
796 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.4, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
797 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 21 (1) (Iraq). 
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committed, the criminal is exempt from prosecution and punishment for the crime for 
which the surrender is asked.”798 Unlike the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Kuwaiti 
system recognizes the statute of limitations in both prosecution and punishment. 
 In felony cases, such as arson and destruction of property, Article (4) of the 
Kuwaiti Penal Code states, “A prosecution for a felony must be commenced within ten 
years after the commission thereof.”799 Applying this principle to the time when Saddam 
Hussein became available for surrender, 2003, Iraq could have claimed that the time limit 
of ten years since the commission of the crime in 1990 had passed. However, the Kuwaiti 
Authorities might have responded that the Kuwaiti Penal Code provides that the statute of 
limitations stops running when an investigative step is taken.800 Therefore, since on 
November 9, 1992, Kuwait established a special division within the public prosecutor’s 
office to investigate801 those offenses committed during the Iraqi invasion, the statute of 
limitations for all those offenses stopped running from that date.  
 In addition to the statute of limitations, a double jeopardy argument might be 
raised according to the Convention. According to Article 5, a surrender shall not be 
granted when a fugitive criminal whose surrender is sought was previously convicted, 
acquitted or is actually under prosecution for the same offense for which the surrender 
request is made.802 Based on this provision, Iraq could have claimed that those offenses 
committed against the environment were currently under investigation or prosecution 
                                                 
798 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.6, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author) . 
799 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art. 4 (Kuwait). 
800 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art. 8 (Kuwait). 
801 Kuwait Seeks UN Help to Indict Saddam Aides for War Crimes, Agence France-Presse, October 28, 
2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2003/1028kuwait.htm (last visited July 12, 2007).  
802 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.5, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
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before the New Iraqi Special Tribunal. This is a valid basis upon which Iraq could have 
made a successful claim.803 
 The nationality of the fugitive criminal is recognized as one of the valid bases 
upon which to reject the surrender request, according to the Convention. Article 7 
provides that, “Under the stipulations of this treaty, none of the High Contracting Parties 
shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals providing the rejecting state conducts the 
trial before its own courts.”804 The importance of this provision is dual. First, it confirms 
an internationally recognized justification for refusing extradition of the state’s own 
nationals. Secondly, it balances the requirement to seek justice and the sovereignty rights 
of the state by imposing upon the requested state the obligation to prosecute the fugitive 
criminal. By this provision, the Convention cedes priority of the territorial principle to the 
active personality principle.  
In the same context, Professor Mohammed Cherif Bassiouni argues that a state’s 
obligation “to extradite or to prosecute” is not alternative, but coexistent.805 It was more 
likely that Iraq, in the case of Kuwait’s request to surrender Saddam Hussein, would have 
resorted to the defendant’s nationality provision of the Convention to reject the request 
since the criminal had committed tremendous offenses against the Iraqi people. This 
provision could have been used in all crimes attributed to the defendant as long as Iraq 
was willing to prosecute the defendant for the crimes upon which the request was based. 
                                                 
803 Telephone Interview with Dr. Mohammed Aby-Zabour, Member, the Kuwaiti Committee concerning 
prosecution of Saddam Hussein, in Kuwait (Mar. 3, 2005)(Confirming that the Iraqi Prosecution Office was 
reviewing and investigating the Kuwaiti file regarding Saddam Hussein’s crimes committed during the 
Gulf armed conflict of 1990-1991, including crimes against the environment). 
804 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries, art.7, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
805 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 10 (Oceana Publications 
Inc. 1996); generally see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to 
Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995). 
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These bases for rejecting a surrender or extradition request, as noted above, are 
clearly provided by the Iraqi Penal Procedures Code. However, the same legislation 
eliminates any possibility of extraditing an alleged criminal found in the territory of Iraq. 
Article 358 (2) stipulates that, “Extradition is not permitted in the following 
circumstances: If the offense could be tried before the Iraqi courts in spite of occurring 
abroad”806(emphasis added). Based upon this provision and the fact that the Iraqi Penal 
Code adopts the notion of universal jurisdiction, it is clear that in almost all cases, 
extradition is not permitted.807  
The Iraqi legal provision above does not conflict with the Convention since the 
Convention confers upon Iraq the discretion to choose between extradition and 
prosecution. Consequently, if Iraq chose, by adopting the universal jurisdiction doctrine 
to enforce its jurisdiction, to prosecute all cases which fell within its jurisdiction, there is 
no violation of the Convention as long as Iraq implemented its conventional obligations 
by prosecuting suspected criminals for the crimes for which the extradition request is 
made.     
Finally, unlike the Iraqi Criminal Procedures Code,808 both the Convention and 
the Kuwaiti Criminal Procedures Code contain a flaw in that they do not provide for 
national judicial supervision ensuring the proper application of their provisions or 
requirements. The lack of such provisions is probably due to the fact that an extradition 
decision is considered an act of sovereignty which is a nonjusticiable act according to 
                                                 
806 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, art. 358 (2) (Iraq). 
807 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 13-15 (Iraq) 
808 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, arts. 357-68 (Iraq) 
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Kuwaiti Law.809 Finally, in other cases, the difficulity of obtaining custody of the 
defendant might support holding war crimes trials internationally.810  
3. Trial in Absentia or Transferring the Whole Judicial Proceeding 
 
 Holding war crimes trials in absentia represents a regressive step in the context of 
human rights protection. Therefore, such trials should be considered a disadvantage of the 
national trial approach and a reason to conduct them internationally. Given the difficulty 
of securing custody of the defendant, the Kuwaiti Government would have had to choose 
between two options, either trying Saddam Hussein in absentia or transferring the whole 
judicial proceeding to Iraq.  
 If the former were the first Kuwaiti choice, then provisions for both legal notices 
and execution of foreign sentences must have been respected. Generally, the Kuwaiti 
Penal Procedure Code permits trials in absentia as long as provisions for legal notices are 
respected. Before going to trial, the investigating authorities have the right to seek Iraqi 
judicial assistance. The source of this right is based upon a multilateral agreement to 
which both Iraq and Kuwait are parties, The Letters of Request & Legal Notices 
Agreement between Arab Countries (hereinafter the Agreement).811  
 The Agreement recognizes the right of each state party to request [hereinafter the 
requesting state] from another party (hereinafter the requested party) to conduct any 
                                                 
809 Marsoom B’Qanon Be’Sh’an Tnzeem Al-Qdaa [A Decree of Law Concerning The Judicial Power] Law 
No. 23 of 1990, art.2 (Kuwait).    
810 In the case of Saddam Hussein, this might have occurred if Saddam Hussein had given up office 
voluntarily with an offer of immunity and Iraq had accepted its international responsibility for failure to 
prosecute him for his crimes against the environment. The same scenario might have happened in the case 
of the former Chilean President, General Augusto Pinochet Duarte, who was given immunity by Chilean 
law if he had not traveled to England and gotten caught. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to 
International Criminal Law 76-77 (Transnational Publishers 2003).  
811 The Letters of Request & Legal Notices Agreement Between Arab Countries, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file 
with author). 
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judicial procedure concerning a case pending in the requesting party’s judicial system.812 
This request is conditional upon the notion that the requested procedure does not 
contradict the public system of the requested state. There is no doubt that the term “public 
system” is a broad term which can be the basis for the rejection of any request. In any 
case, based on the above provision, Kuwait may request from Iraq that it be allowed to 
conduct any investigative procedure such as questioning witnesses or interrogating 
defendants.  
 If the procedure is conducted according to this Agreement, it is conducted as it 
would be in the territory of the requesting state.813 In addition to conducting judicial 
procedures, the Agreement allows that legal notices of judicial documents, such as 
notices of the court’s sessions and sentences, be issued in the same manner as the judicial 
procedure mentioned above.814 In this context, the legal notices are viewed as they would 
be if issued within the territory of the requesting state.815 This is important in light of 
Kuwaiti provisions governing a trial in absentia.  
 Neither the Agreement nor the Kuwaiti Penal Procedures Code account for a 
situation in which the defendant is in the custody of another country while a trial against 
him is conducted, making it impossible for him to attend the trial. So, even though there 
is an obstruction preventing the defendant from attending, a trial can be conducted as 
long as the defendant is given legal notice, probably violating his human rights.  
                                                 
812 The Letters of Request & Legal Notices Agreement Between Arab Countries art. 6, Sep. 14, 1952 (on 
file with author). 
813 The Letters of Request & Legal Notices Agreement between Arab Countries art. 8, Sep. 14, 1952 (on 
file with author). 
814 The Letters of Request & Legal Notices Agreement between Arab Countries art. 2, Sep. 14, 1952 (on 
file with author). 
815 The Letters of Request & Legal Notices Agreement between Arab Countries art. 5, Sep. 14, 1952 (on 
file with author). 
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 While allowing a sentence to be issued in absentia, the Kuwaiti Penal Procedures 
Code limits the right of the convicted person to object to the sentence issued only816 
within a week either of the arrest or of the legal notice given to the defendant.817 As a 
result, an authorized attorney may not submit an objection request on behalf of the 
defendant thereafter. If the time limit has passed without submission of the request, then 
the defendant has only the right to appeal the sentence before a higher court, the High 
Appeal Court.818  
 When a sentence in absentia becomes a decision to which no objection can be 
made, it may be appealed within the twenty days.819 When this time limit has passed 
without submission of an appeal request, the sentence becomes final and may be 
executed,820 unless the defendant appeals the sentence to the Supreme Court. This course 
of action is based exclusively upon the discretion of the defendant. Finally, the Kuwaiti 
Penal Procedures Code terminates a case if the defendant dies during any stage of an 
investigation or a trial.821 Based on both the Agreement and the provisions of Kuwaiti 
Criminal Procedure Code, a sentence in the case of Saddam Hussein could have been 
issued in absentia.  
 In terms of sentence execution, neither the Kuwaiti nor the Iraqi Codes contain 
provisions regarding the execution of foreign sentences. However, there is a provision 
included within the Extradition of Criminals Agreement between Arab Countries. Article 
17 of that Agreement stipulates that, “It is permissible to execute custodial sentences 
                                                 
816 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, art. 187 (Kuwait). 
817 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, art. 188 (Kuwait). 
818 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, art. 201 (Kuwait). 
819 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, art. 214 (Kuwait). 
820 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, art. 214 (Kuwait). 
821 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 17 of 1960, art. 191, 205 
(Kuwait). 
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between party states providing a request is submitted by the sentencing state and the state 
where the sentence is to be executed approves.”822  
 Since the authority of Iraq to execute a Kuwaiti sentence is discretionary only, it 
is highly likely that Iraq would have rejected this request. The rejection might have been 
based on the argument that Iraq had priority in exercising jurisdiction over the case 
according to the same agreement. The only advantage to trying Saddam Hussein in 
absentia in Kuwait would have been the possibility of using this case as a precedent for 
future national prosecutions of crimes against the environment throughout the world.  
 This advantage may not be available in the Iraqi criminal justice system because it 
does not recognize other trials as a basis for postponing execution of the death penalty 
issued against the defendant. This occured since the crimes against the environment 
committed in Kuwait were not covered by the trial of Saddam Hussein first conducted by 
the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Court. In any event, if Iraq had accepted execution of a 
Kuwaiti sentence, a trial in absentia would have reduced human rights protection, making 
this a disfavored option.  
 The second option which the Kuwaiti Government could have followed was to 
transfer the whole judicial proceeding to the Iraqi authorities. Although there is no 
existing agreement recognizing this option, i.e., transfer of the proceedings, Iraq was 
bound to try Saddam Hussein’s crimes against the environment according to the 
Extradition Agreement mentioned above as an alternative to Iraq’s rejection of the 
                                                 
822 The Extradition of Criminals between Arab Countries art.17, Sep. 14, 1952 (on file with author). 
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extradition of Saddam Hussein. Probably, Kuwait chose this approach because of the 
difficulties of extraditing Saddam Hussein.823    
III. The Iraqi Trial 
 
In addition to common issues already reviewed, an examination of the Iraqi legal 
system raises new issues relating to the basis for Iraqi jurisdiction and flaws in the Statute 
of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal established after the collapse of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.  
1. The Basis for Jurisdiction 
 
 Although Iraq has adopted the principle of universal jurisdiction for the same 
purpose, it could not have asserted that jurisdiction over crimes against the environment 
by Saddam Hussein during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because the Iraqi Penal Code 
limits the Universal principle to, “Destroying or causing damage to international means 
of communications or trading in women, children, slaves or drugs.”824 This provision 
omits many acts, including crimes against property, deemed criminal by international 
conventions to which Iraq is a party.  
 As an alternative, Iraq could have asserted its jurisdiction based upon the active 
personality principle. According to this principle, a state can prosecute all offenses 
committed by its nationals abroad. Although this principle is deemed to be extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it is generally accepted in international law. In fact, it has been adopted by 
                                                 
823 Kuwait Presses for Active Role in Trying Saddam Hussein, Agence France-Presse, December 18, 2003, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2003/1218active.htm  (last visited July 12, 2007).  
824 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 13 (Iraq). 
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several international criminal conventions.825 It is argued that this principle should be 
applied internationally equally with the territorial principle.826 
 The active personality principle has been adopted mainly by civil law states.827 
This principle is based upon the allegiance a citizen owes to his country. The root of the 
principle is the French view that it is essential to protect the reputation of the state before 
the whole world. In other words, the function of this principle is to compromise between 
two values, the inability to extradite nationals and the duty to prevent culprits from 
escaping punishment.828  
 States differ in implementing this principle. Some states do not adhere to the 
double criminality doctrine requiring that the act in question be criminalized according to 
the laws of both the nationality state and the locus deliciti state.829 Other states, such as 
Iraq and Kuwait, adopt the double criminality doctrine.830  
 Even among states requiring double criminality, the extent of the principle differs. 
For instance, unlike the Kuwaiti Code, the Iraqi Penal Code does not require application 
of the principle that the accused must escape a foreign trial for the same act. Also, unlike 
the United Kingdom,831 Iraq applies the principle broadly. It does not limit its application 
to certain offenses.832  
                                                 
825 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 6 
(1)(c), 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; 27 ILM 668 (1988); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment and Punishment art. 5 (1)(b) reprinted in John P. Grant & J. Graig Barker, 
International Criminal Law Deskbook 44 (Cavendish Publishing 2006).   
826 P. Arnell, The Case for Nationality Based Jurisdiction, 50 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 955 (2001). 
827 Geoff Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law 43 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991).  
828 Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in  International Criminal Law, Vol. II, 33,63 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999).   
829 One of these countries is the United Kingdom. See Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal 
Law  152 n. 69 (Cavendish Publishing 2003).   
830 Kanon Al-Jazaa [The Sanction Law], Law No. 16 of 1960, art.10 (Kuwait). Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The 
Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 12 (Iraq). 
831 See Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law 151 (Cavendish Publishing 2003).   
832 Kanon Al-Oqobaat [The Punishments Law], Law No. 111 of 1969, art. 12 (Iraq). 
220 
 
Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution 
2. Comments on the Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal  
 Although establishment of a tribunal to try individuals responsible for 
international crimes is a positive step toward achievement of post-conflict justice, this 
approach will not satisfy all interested parties. When the Iraqi Special Tribunal or IST 
was established,833 this approach of the trial was unacceptable to some.834 
 Some feared that the IST would not achieve justice nor enhance the foundations 
of current international criminal law.835 This fear was attributed to the complexity of the 
prosecution of international crimes, the nature of Iraqi society, the Iraqi judicial system’s 
lack of experience and impartiality, and the probability of the government’s interference 
in the tribunal’s work.836 This fear arose from the fact that the Statute of the IST was the 
product of a decree by an occupying power. On December 9, 2003, this statute was 
drafted and approved by both the Governing Council (GC) and the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), two authorities established by an occupying power, the United States. 
A day later, CPA administrator Paul Bremer signed the Statute order and published it in 
the CPA’s official Gazette.837 
                                                 
833 An ad hoc international tribunal was not an available option because it was considered costly and time-
consuming. Establishing an ad hoc national tribunal “(1) would allow the people of Iraq to assume 
responsibility for trying high-ranking Iraqi Ba’ath officials for past political violence; (2) such a tribunal 
would provide a strong foundation for a system of government based on the rule of law; and (3) a tribunal 
is likely to deliver a message regarding impunity.” M. Cherif  Bassouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An 
Appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 INT’L L. J. 327, 344 (2005). 
834 Others believe that the tribunal would constitute a form of victor’s justice. Some believe that one reason 
for not trying Saddam Hussein before the ICC is the fear of the United States that its soldiers in Iraq would 
be subject to prosecution before the ICC.  Olaoluwa Olusanya, The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal for 
Crimes against Humanity- Progressive or Regressive? 5 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL No. 7, ¶ 18, 21 
(2004), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=462 (last visited June 27, 2007). 
835 Olaoluwa Olusanya, The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes against Humanity- Progressive 
or Regressive? 5 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL No. 7, ¶ 4 (2004), 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=462 (last visited June 27, 2007). 
836 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, arts. 7 (C), 8 (C), 9 (C), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
837 M. Cherif  Bassouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 INT’L 
L. J. 327, 358 (2005). 
221 
 
Environmental War Crimes and National Criminal Prosecution 
 After much criticism,838 in early August 2005, the IST’s Statute was revoked and 
was replaced by a statute establishing the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (SICT), 
formerly known as the Iraqi Special Tribunal.839 The new Statute had been passed by the 
Transnational National Assembly, an elected legislature, and ratified by the Presidency 
Council. The new statute preserves almost all of the substantive provisions of the IST’s 
Statute with increased use of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code. 
 Before reviewing the provisions of the Statute, it should be clear that there are 
several events that played a role in drafting the Statute. These events are: (1) the Iran- 
Iraq war, (2) the persecution of sections of the Iraqi population by Saddam Hussein, (3) 
the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, and (4) the terrorist attack against the United States on 
September 11, 2001. Most of the provisions of the Statute were derived from the ICC 
Statute with a few exceptions relating to jurisdiction, the death penalty, and violations of 
Iraqi law.  
 Evaluating provisions of the Statute will be limited to the principles of legality, 
jurisdiction, immunity, evidence, and the defendant’s right to be tried without undue 
delay. The Statute violates the principle of legality in different ways. In terms of offenses, 
the principle of legality is infringed by borrowing the definition of war crimes from the 
ICC statute. There are many offenses contained in the ICC statute that, when committed, 
do not acquire the status of international customary law.  
                                                 
838 The IST statute was criticized based on two arguments. First, that it was issued by an unelected 
legislature and without consultation with the international community. Second, that no international 
precedent existed to allow an occupying power to establish an exceptional tribunal. This action violates 
article 14 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967). 
839 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
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For instance, Article 13 of the ISCT’s Statute dictates that, “For the purpose of 
this law, “War Crimes” means:…Other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflicts, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts:…(E) Intentionally launching an 
attack in [with] the knowledge that such [an] attack will cause widespread, long-term, 
and severe damage to the natural environment, which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”840  
 Based upon this provision, with respect to his crimes against the environment, 
Saddam Hussein could have been held criminally responsible even though Iraq is not 
party to Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. He could have been criminally 
responsible even though those provisions regarding protection of the environment 
contained in the Protocol were not considered international customary law crimes when 
they were committed. This would have violated the principle of legality. 
Another violation of the principle of legality relates to provisions establishing an 
individual’s criminal responsibility based upon orders and superiority.841 By including 
these provisions in the Statute, Iraq violated a fundamental principle of criminal law by 
establishing a basis for criminal liability that did not exist in the Iraqi legal system at the 
time the criminal acts were committed. Consequently, this will not enhance the rule of 
law in Iraq.  
                                                 
840 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 13 (2)(E), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007).  
841The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 15 (2)(B), (4), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). Unless these two bases exist within the Iraqi Military Criminal Law, the Statute clearly violates the 
principle of legality. The text of the Iraqi Military Criminal Law was not available to the author.   
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Finally, Article 17 of the Statute confirms the rule that those offenses prescribed 
are not subject to the statute of limitations.842 This provision was viewed as a violation of 
the principles of legality.843 It was unlikely that an argument that the principle of legality 
was applicable to the statute of limitations issue would have been accepted in the case of 
Saddam Hussein because neither the Iraqi Penal Code nor the Penal Procedure Code 
prescribe the statute of limitations.  
 However, assuming that a conviction based on the above provision had been 
secured, the Statute puts the tribunal in a dilemma by stipulating that, “The penalty for 
any crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 [war crimes] which do not have a counterpart under 
Iraqi law shall be determined by the court taking into account…, guided by judicial 
precedents and relevant sentences issued by the international criminal courts”(emphasis 
added).844 
 This article violates the principle of legality because it does not prescribe in 
advance an appropriate punishment and it leaves determination of the punishment to the 
court’s discretion. In some cases, this authority might lead to infliction of an arbitrary 
punishment, especially considering the fact that the statute allows imposition of the death 
penalty, a central issue in choosing the domestic approach.845 Morover, no international 
                                                 
842 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 17, 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
843 M. Cherif  Bassouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 INT’L 
L. J. 327, 379-80 (2005). 
844 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 24 (5), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
845 Article 24 (1) of ISCT. The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 24 (1), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007).   
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precedent exists concerning crimes against the environment upon which the Court may 
rely. 
 This punishment violates the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
or the ICCPR because the Statute does not allow for pardons or for mitigating any 
punishment handed down by the tribunal.846 In the context of enforcement of sentences, 
the Statute refers to the Iraqi legal system as the controlling instrument in the execution 
of sentences. 847 
 The Statute emphasizes that, “The punishment must be executed [carried out] 
within thirty days of the date when the judgment becomes final and non-appealable.”848 
Without doubt, this provision deprives victims, witnesses, and whole interested societies 
of the opportunity to establish conclusively which individuals were legally responsible 
for crimes where the defendant is charged in several cases. This is the result of the rule 
under the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code that a criminal case concludes upon the death of 
the accused.849 
 This is a smart strategy to end many of the cases before the tribunal. 
Unfortunately, one of those cases was that of Saddam Hussein against the environment. 
                                                 
846The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, arts. 15 (6), 27 (2), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). Article 6 (4) of the ICCPR to which both Iraq and the United States are parties provides that, 
“Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, 
pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.” International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights art. 6 (4), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. 
A/6316 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967). 
847The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 27 (1), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
848 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 27 (2), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
849 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, art. 300 (Iraq).   
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This case was concluded when Saddam Hussein was executed based upon the sentence of 
his first trial before the tribunal.850 
 Enforcing Iraq’s international obligation to prosecute Saddam Hussein for crimes 
against both Kuwait and Iran, the ISCT Statute extends its jurisdiction to include “every 
natural person, whether Iraqi or non-Iraqi, resident in Iraq and accused of one of the 
crimes listed in Article 11 to 14 below, committed during the period from July 17, 1968 
until May 1, 2003 in the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere, including the following crimes:… 
(C) War Crimes”(emphasis added). 851 
 The ISCT Statute removed all types of immunity, including the immunity of the 
head of state conferred by the Interim Iraqi Constitution of 1990.852 This provision in the 
Iraqi Constitution regarding immunity is contrary to international law.853 However, 
removing immunity by the Statute concerning national crimes appears to be 
unconstitutional.  
 On the other hand, credit should be given to the ISCT Statute for protecting 
defendant’s rights and for some procedural guarantees. For instance, although giving the 
tribunal the authority to adopt a set of evidence rules was viewed as a clear violation of 
                                                 
850 The first trial before the ISCT concerned the aftermath of an assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein 
in the town of al-Dujail in 1982. It was alleged that reprisals for the assassination attempt led to the 
extrajudicial execution and disappearance of over one hundred and forty individuals at the hands of 
government security forces, and the widespread destruction of property. Saddam Hussein was convicted in 
this trial and sentenced to death. After becoming final, the sentence was executed on December 30, 2006.      
851 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 1 (2), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
852 AL-Dostor Al-Moakaat Lljomhoriah  Al-Iraqiah [The Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] 40 
[1990]. The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 15 (C), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
853 Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
(2002) ICJ Reports, 14 April 2002. Para. 61.     
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the notion of separation of powers set forth in the Iraqi Constitution,854 this authority 
permits the tribunal to establish safeguards protecting the defendants. Based on this 
authority, many evidentiary rules relating to expert witnesses were adopted and general 
rules ensuring credible evidence in the trial were established.855  
 Some of these rules have flaws. For instance, neither the Iraqi Criminal Procedure 
Code nor the ISCT’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence permit the investigative judges to 
rely on the evidence gathered by foreign authorities, either Kuwaiti or Iranian. To solve 
this problem, a judicial cooperation treaty between Iraq and these states was required. 856  
 In Saddam Hussein’s case, although there might have been reasons supporting a 
speedy trial or a slow trial,857 the Statute provides the right to be tried without undue 
delay.858 Although the Statute does not set a time limit with respect to this right and does 
not clearly provide a remedy for its violation, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
furnish the tribunal with the authority to determine an appropriate remedy to be taken 
when the provision is violated.859  
 Finally, unlike the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence,860 the Tribunal’s 
Rules do not directly mention the impact of the failure to execute arrest warrants on the 
                                                 
854 M. Cherif  Bassouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 INT’L 
L. J. 327, 348 (2005).  
855 The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, arts. 59-63, 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
856 M. Cherif  Bassouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 INT’L 
L. J. 327, 383-84 (2005). 
857 The fact that a fair rendition of Saddam Hussein’s crimes might undercut the insurgency provides a 
reason to more quickly. On the contrary, giving the people the opportunity to confront and understand the 
tragedy of the past decades is a reason to more slowly.  
858 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 19 (4)(C), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
859 The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, art. 3 (2), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
860 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 61 (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).  
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commencement of the trial.861 However, Article 45 of the Rules stipulates that, “Trial 
proceedings should comply with the provisions set forth in the Iraqi Criminal Procedure 
Code No. 23 of 1971.”862 Since the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code permits a trial to be 
conducted in absentia,863 the above provision contradicts Article 19 (4)(D) of the 
tribunal’s Statute ensuring the defendant’s right to be present when his trial is 
conducted.864   
Conclusion and Observations 
 National legal systems located in the same region share common characteristics 
and differ in others. The differences are due to several factors including the nature of the 
society and the legislative history.  
 There are common legal provisions in both the Kuwaiti and the Iraqi legal 
systems. An example is the status of international law within both systems. Adopting the 
dualist approach, neither system considers international law as a source of legality and 
criminality, except with legislative approval.  
 As a result of the absence of legislative approval in the context of war crimes, 
both systems place their courts in a dilemma when the time comes to fulfill their 
international obligations either to extradite or to prosecute. Both states may refrain from 
fulfilling their obligations to extradite due to national impediments (asylum or non-
                                                 
861 The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 36, 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
862 The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 45, 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
863 Kanon Al-Ejraat Al-Jazaeih [The Criminal Procedure Law], Law No. 23 of 1971, art. 147(D)(Iraq).   
864 The Statute of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, art. 19 (4)(D), 
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf. (last visited June 27, 
2007). 
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extradition of nationals) and to prosecute due to national guarantees as well (the principle 
of legality). 
 Alternatively, in order to compromise on the obligation to prosecute and the 
obligation to respect human rights, both national courts must resort to available national 
provisions which to some extent are similar to these international criminal provisions. 
Moreover, even though trials based upon national legislation were conducted, they must 
address some difficulties relating to evidence and to defendants’ rights. These difficulties 
render conviction and the severe punishment of the death penalty highly likely.  
 On the Kuwaiti side, although the state has an internationally recognized basis for 
jurisdiction in the territorial principle, a trial might not have been at hand because, 
according to conventional international law, this jurisdictional basis has no priority. 
Alternatively, trial in absentia was another option that could have been pursued, but 
again, the execution of a Kuwaiti sentence in Iraqi territory would have subject to the 
discretion of Iraqi authorities.  
 Finally, since the success of the immunity claim depends mainly on the 
government-recognition issue, Saddam Hussein’s claim concerning immunity was more 
likely to be rejected by Kuwaiti courts if extradition had been granted by the United 
States before handing Saddam Hussein over to Iraqi authorities.  
 On the Iraqi side, it is internationally accepted that a state has the authority to try 
its own nationals for their acts committed abroad. However, the Iraqi experience shows 
that modification of international law rules (the ICC statute) for the sake of harmony and 
to meet the needs of a national legal system and its society results in serious flaws. This 
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modification proves that changing legal provisions does not result in changing the 
enforcement of these modified provisions.  
 Moreover, the modification process infringed upon the principle of legality which 
in turn undermines the credibility of the whole proceeding. Unfortunately, the 
modification process did not include those rules governing the execution of sentences 
under the Iraqi legal system which rendered trying Saddam Hussein for his crimes against 
the environment practically, although not theoretically, impossible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Conclusion 
 Individual accountability for international environmental crimes is necessary at 
the current stage of international law. However, the manner by which this accountability 
is enforced must be carefully balanced with human rights values. Balancing those two 
values, the need for accountability and the need to protect human rights, requires a 
balance between the prosecutor’s interests and the defendant’s interests. In the milieu of 
pursuing international environmental crimes, there are often advantages and 
disadvantages for each side, the prosecutor’s side and the defendant’s side. Evaluating 
those features, whether they are advantages or disadvantages, depends on the interests 
represented.  
 The prosecutor’s advantages are the defendant’s disadvantages and the contrary is 
true. A review of Saddam Hussein’s case shows that whether his trial had been held 
internationally or nationally there were advantages and disadvantages serving the 
prosecutor’s side, the need for accountability, and the defendant’s side, the need to 
protect human rights. 
 If the trial had been held internationally, the prosecutor would have benefited 
from some advantages such as the lack of acceptance of the claim of immunity, a statute 
of limitations or the flexibility of the principle of legality. In addition, it was more likely 
that the prosecutor would have had no problem obtaining custody of the defendant. On 
the defendant’s side, the existence of human rights guarantees such as evidence rules, 
defendant’s rights, and sentencing guidelines would have made it difficult for the 
prosecutor’s side. In addition to those guarantees, political will, the main factor in most 
cases, plays a role in enhancing the defendant’s side.  
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 If the trial had been held nationally, the balance between the prosecutor’s side and 
the defendant’s side would have depended on the location of the trial. If the trial had been 
held before Kuwaiti courts, although the prosecutor would have had advantages relating 
to the lack of evidence rules, the defendant’s rights, and sentencing guidelines, and the 
availability of a trial in absentia, disadvantages would have been expected as well. Those 
disadvantages would be related to extradition, the principle of legality and execution of 
an issued sentence. In other cases, immunity may be considered a disadvantage on the 
part of the prosecutor.  
 The trial held in Iraq and its statutory basis proved that the national trial approach 
would heavily favor the prosecutor’s side. The trial caused the loss of a unique 
opportunity to establish environmental justice. This opportunity may not be available in 
the near future. In short, following the international trial approach would have served the 
question of the truth rather than the question of revenge. A review of international, Iraqi 
and Kuwaiti legal systems shows the need to follow some modifications which may assist 
in achieving uniformity. 
• On the international law side:  
o Adopting clear prosecutorial guidelines to ensure uniformity of application 
of the law. 
o Including environmental offenses committed accidentally and during 
peace time in the International Criminal Court Statute. 
o Enhancing the role of non-government organizations in the International 
Criminal Court Statute. 
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• On the Kuwaiti and Iraqi side: 
o Enacting war crimes legislation including environmental crimes. 
o Enacting evidence legislation ensuring the establishment of guilt with 
international standards. 
o Eliminating trial in absentia or at least limiting this style of trial to 
exceptional occasions. 
o Enacting immunity legislation.  
o Reaching an international agreement concerning transfer of judicial 
proceedings and execution of criminal sentences. 
o Enacting sentencing guidelines ensuring uniformity of punishments. 
o Adopting the defendant’s rights stipulated in article 14 of the Covenant 
Civil and Political Rights including the right to be tried without undue 
delay. 
• On the Kuwaiti side: 
o Adopting the Universal Jurisdiction doctrine within its Penal Code. 
o Adopting judicial supervision of the extradition process.   
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Historical Problem 
Generally, borders between states do not have very important values until natural 
sources such as ground-water, oil, and coal are discovered. This is the whole story 
between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq. The historical rights that Iraq’s 
governments claimed did not begin publicly until 1933.865 Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to examine those claims-their basis-their justifications to comprehend whether 
those damages that resulted from the Gulf armed conflict of 1990-1991 were justified 
under international law. 
The Iraqi allegations began in 1933 when King Gaze established his own radio 
station which he used as a tool to promote the idea that Kuwait was part of his region, 
Iraq.866 From that time on, the subordination idea was warmly adopted by consecutive 
Iraqi administrations. The basis for King Gaze’s claim was that Kuwait was part of the 
Basra region, the southern region of Iraq, which was subordinated to the Ottoman Turkey 
Empire. After World War I, the Ottoman Empire, as a deafted party, was divided into 
several states. One of these was Iraq. It was argued that, since Basra is part of Iraq, 
Kuwait should follow its origin (Basra).   
 As evidence that the international community has reached the correct conclusion 
in considering the State of Kuwait an independent state, and Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait 
as null and void867 it is necessary to review briefly some important events that happened 
during the last decades. These events prove the authenticity of the conclusion. They 
                                                 
865  19-year old King Gaze undertook the power in Iraq, as a successor of his father King Fisal.    
866 Dr. Mimona Al-Sabah, Tareek Al-Atmaa Al-Iraqia Fee Al-Kwiet [The history of Iraq’s greed 
concerning Kuwait], 74 Journal of The Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 79, 142 (1994) (Arabic).    
867  See S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934st mtg, P.1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990). 
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began in 1899 when Kuwait entered into a protection agreement with England against the 
Ottoman Turkey Empire’s control over the Gulf region.868 The agreement showed that 
England regarded Kuwait as an independent part of the Empire. Thirteen years later, 
England signed an agreement with the Ottoman Turkey Empire whereby the Empire 
acknowledged that Kuwait was an independent area, but the agreement did not become a 
reality because of the beginning of the War World I.869 
Until War World I ended, there was no state called Iraq. In 1922, an agreement 
was signed whereby Turkey, “a successor of the Ottoman Turkey Empire,” waived all its 
claims toward the Arabic territories including Iraq.870 Iraq, as an independent region, was 
held under the British mandate which continued until 1932. Kuwait was not considered 
part of Iraq at that time according to the agreement. In 1932, in order for Iraq to become a 
member of the League of Nations, it was required to determine its official borders. 
Consequently, Iraq sent a request along with its proposed borders between Iraq and 
Kuwait to the English delegate871 in the Gulf. This request was forwarded to the Kuwaiti 
Emir, the ruler, who accepted the proposed borders later.  
Some argued that this process constituted an international agreement.872 In 1933, 
King Gaze took power in Iraq and for the first time, the allegation that Kuwait was a part 
                                                 
868 Dr. Rasheed Al-Enizee, Mowqef Al-Qanoon Al-Dwlee mn Al-Edaa’at Al-Iraqia thd Dwlat Al-Kweit 
[The International Law’s position from Iraq’s allegations against the State of Kuwait], 72 Journal of The 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 73, 78 (1994) (Arabic).    
869 Dr. Rasheed Al-Enizee, Mowqef Al-Qanoon Al-Dwlee mn Al-Edaa’at Al-Iraqia thd Dwlat Al-Kweit 
[The International Law’s position from Iraq’s allegations against the State of Kuwait], 72 Journal of The 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 73, 79 (1994) (Arabic).  
870 Dr. Rasheed Al-Enizee, Mowqef Al-Qanoon Al-Dwlee mn Al-Edaa’at Al-Iraqia thd Dwlat Al-Kweit 
[The International Law’s position from Iraq’s allegations against the State of Kuwait], 72 Journal of The 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 73, 85-89 (1994) (Arabic).   
871 At that time, England was in charge of deciding external affairs regarding Kuwait according, to the 1899 
agreement between Kuwait and England.  
872  Dr. Rasheed Al-Enizee, Mowqef Al-Qanoon Al-Dwlee mn Al-Edaa’at Al-Iraqia thd Dwlat Al-Kweit 
[The International Law’s position from Iraq’s allegations against the State of Kuwait], 72 Journal of The 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 73, 91 (1994) (Arabic).  
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of Iraq began publicly. This was the seed for continuous allegations toward Kuwait over 
57 years.  
Some believed that the roots of these allegations lay in the following reasons: 1) 
Iraqi intentions to steal properties of the Kuwaiti people in the Iraq region; 2) in 1938, the 
Burgan oil well, “the second biggest oil well in the world,” was discovered in Kuwait; 3) 
Iraq’s failure to control the Kuwaiti economic system which in turn affected the Iraqi 
economic system; 4) Germany’s stimulation of Iraq in order to prevent England from 
controlling the region; 5) Iraq’s desire to stretch its marine shore through the Arabian 
Gulf;873 6) political and economic problems Iraq faced at that time, resulting in a strategy 
to attract the Iraqi people to what could be gained by annexing Kuwait; 7) Iraq’s desire to 
lead the Arab World; 8) a wicked plot which the Iraqi government had at that time.874 
Iraq’s endeavors to annex Kuwait continued in divising ways such as asking 
Kuwait to rent some Kuwaiti isles or by providing Kuwait with unsalted water,875 but the 
Kuwait government was wary of these attempts. Consequently, the Kuwaiti government 
stymied these attempts smartly. In 1958, the Kingdom lapsed in Iraq and the Republic of 
Iraq was established. Three years later, Kuwait sought its freedom from England and it 
succeeded. But Kuwaitis independence angered the Iraqi government which threatened to 
                                                 
873 Iraq lost part of its marine shore in an agreement signed with Iran in 1937. Dr. Mimona Al-Sabah, 
Tareek Al-Atmaa Al-Iraqia Fee Al-Kwiet [The history of Iraq’s greed concerning Kuwait], 74 Journal of 
The Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 79, 88 (1994) (Arabic).   
874 Dr. Mimona Al-Sabah, Tareek Al-Atmaa Al-Iraqia Fee Al-Kwiet [The history of Iraq’s greed 
concerning Kuwait], 74 Journal of The Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 79, 85-87 (1994) (Arabic).    
875 At that time, the region was dearth and the main source of unsalted water was the Shut Al-Arab area 
located in Iraq. Later, desalination plants were built around the Gulf region from south to north. See  Dr. 
Rasheed Al-Enizee, Mowqef Al-Qanoon Al-Dwlee mn Al-Edaa’at Al-Iraqia thd Dwlat Al-Kweit [The 
International Law’s position from Iraq’s allegations against the State of Kuwait], 72 Journal of The Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula Studies 73, 94 (1994) (Arabic).   
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use force to join Kuwait. This motivated the Soviet Union 876 to use its veto against 
Kuwaiti requests to join the United Nations orgnization.877 On July 20, 1961 Kuwait 
joined the League of Arabic States with the official acknowledgment of all Arabic States 
members except Iraq. On May14, 1963, Kuwait became the one hundred eleventh 
member of the United Nations Organization. 
 
 
876 Dr. Mimona Al-Sabah, Tareek Al-Atmaa Al-Iraqia Fee Al-Kwiet [The history of Iraq’s greed 
concerning Kuwait], 74 Journal of The Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 79, 182 (1994) (Arabic).   
877 Dr. Mimona Al-Sabah, Tareek Al-Atmaa Al-Iraqia Fee Al-Kwiet [The history of Iraq’s greed 
concerning Kuwait], 74 Journal of The Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 79, 182 (1994) (Arabic).    
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The Environmental Impact on the Arabian Gulf Region 
Environmental impacts will be reviewed according to the affected element of the 
environment: hydrosphere, lithosphere, atmosphere, and public health. The review will 
not be limited to oil well fires, but extended to all other sources of pollution so that all 
environmental consequences resulting from the Gulf armed conlflict of 1990-1991 may 
be comprehended.   
1. Hydrosphere Pollution: 
 Hydrosphere pollution will be examined through two stages. In the first part of 
this section, the focus will be on those sources that caused the pollution while the second 
part of this section is concerned with the effects resulting from the pollution.   
a.  The Sources of Hydrosphere Pollution:               
i. Oil Spill: 
 On January 25, 1991, the U.S. administration announced that Iraq had deliberately 
discharged crude oil from the Kuwaiti oil facilities into the Gulf.878 These discharges and 
the following incidents occurred from different sources. The first incident occurred on 
January 19, 1991, when Iraqi armed forces began discharging oil from five tankers 
anchored in the Kuwaiti port of Al-Ahmadi.879  
                                                 
878 Bush Access Saddam of “sick” Move in Gulf Oil Flood, Reuters, Jan. 25, 1991, available at LEXIS 
NEXIS Library, Reuters File.  
879 Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil Pollution 
in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 107 ( Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 2001)(Arabic).   
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 The oil discharged in this incident was estimated at 500,000,000 tons.880 The oil 
flow continued until January 30, 1991, and resulted in a massive oil slick, 75 by 35 
kilometers in dimension, which stretched out to cover both the southern Kuwaiti and the 
northern Saudi coastlines.881 
 The second oil spill happened on January 20, 1991, when Iraqi armed forces 
opened the pipeline connecting the mainland oil refineries at Al-Ahmadi port with the sea 
island terminal, located five miles off the Kuwaiti coast.882 This incident lasted until 
January 26, 1991, and the estimated amount of oil released was 1,100,000 tons.883 
 The third incident occurred on January 30, 1991, when an oil spill took place in 
Mina Al-Bakr.884 There were no data regarding the amount of released oil.885 A series of 
oil spills that polluted the waters and Gulf shores occurred later when Iraqi missiles hit 
the Al-Khafj886 oil storage. This incident formed a massive oil slick 6-8 kilometers 
long.887 The total amount of oil released into the Gulf was 4-7 millions barrels. It 
                                                 
880 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
881 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
882 Richard Lacayo, A War against the Earth; Torching Oil Wells and Disgorging into the Gulf, Saddam 
Makes the Plants his Latest Victim, TIME, Feb.4, 1991, at 32. 
883 See Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [ Oil 
Pollution in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 199 ( Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 
2001)(Arabic). 
884 Richard Lacayo, A War against the Earth; Torching Oil Wells and Disgorging into the Gulf, Saddam 
Makes the Plants his Latest Victim, TIME, Feb.4, 1991, at 32. 
885 See Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil 
Pollution in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 199 ( Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 
2001)(Arabic). 
886 Al-Khafj is a coastal area located in the Saudi Arabia’s territory and contains petroleum facilities.    
887 See Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil 
Pollution in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 199 ( Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 
2001)(Arabic). 
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generated an oil slick 130 kilometers in length and 25 kilometers in width.888 It was 
recorded that the amount of oil released into the Gulf was two or three times bigger than 
any previous oil spill.889  
ii. Sewage 
 Another source contributing to pollution of the Gulf as a result of the Iraqi 
invasion was sewage and the absence of technical staff.890 Before the invasion happened, 
there were four sewage treatment plants in Kuwait.891 The Iraqi armed forces destroyed 
all the sewage plants; as a result, the Kuwaiti government was forced to discharge 
untreated sewage directly into the Gulf. This process lasted about ten months after the 
liberation of Kuwait.892  
 No doubt, the sewage discharge caused pollution to the marine environment and 
the beaches. Released sewage generated an increasingly injurious bacteria level 
containing Coli form Faecal Coli form.893 The resultant viruses made the Gulf a 
dangerous body of water to swim in. In addition, these viruses affected the quality of the 
fish whose bodies might contain toxic substances.894 
 Also, the sewage played a role in decreasing the level of dissolved Oxygen in the 
water body. This process was a result of organic substances the sewage may contain. 
                                                 
888 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] 148 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic). 
889 William M. Akrin, The Environmental Threat of Military Operations, 69 Protection the Environment 
during Armed Conflict 116 (Richard J. Grunawalt ed. 1996).  
890 Dr. Yosef Al-Ebraheem ET AL., Al-eqtesadyaat Alarbia Wa Al-Kazoo al-Iraqi to Kowiet [Arabic 
Economies and Iraqi Invasion to the State of Kuwait] 31 (Arabic Planning Institution, ed. Dec. 
1992)(Arabic). 
891 Al-Regea, Filka, Al-Rega, Al-Ardia, and Shewiq plants.  
892Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 247 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
893 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 247 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
894 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 247 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
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Thus, the fishy opulence of the Gulf affected and air pollution resulted of bad smell 
release.895  
iii. Fallen Substances 
 The marine environment was not polluted only through the release of oil and 
sewage directly into the Gulf by Iraqi armed forces. It was polluted from another source, 
the air pollution caused by the oil-well fires.896 It is reasonable to assume such a 
connection causing pollution from one component of the environment, air, to another, 
water.  
 This pollution occurred through twofold sources, either through acid rain or 
through fallen substances such as soot particles.897 The oil-well fires lasted about seven 
months until the last oil well was extinguished on November 11, 1991.898 The fires used 
up approximately 4,600,000 barrels of oil daily and discharged about 1,900,000 metric 
tons of carbon dioxide, 20,000 metric tons of sulfur dioxide, and 12,000 metric tons of 
soot particles daily into the air.899  
iv. Military Operations: 
 Military operations associated with the Gulf armed conflict constituted another 
pollution source of the marine environment. These operations caused both instant and 
long-term environmental damages. For instance, thousands of marine mines planted by 
                                                 
895 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 247 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
896 Air Pollution caused by oil-well fires will be discussed later in this chapter.  
897 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic). 
898 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic). 
899 Sylvia A. Earle, Persian Gulf Pollution: Assessing the Damage One Year Later, Nat’L Geographic, Feb. 
1992, at 130.   
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Iraqi troops to prevent Coalition forces’ marine assaults severely affected the ecological 
system in the Gulf.900  
 The estimated number of mines, including marine mines, was 1,250,000.901 Also, 
vessels sunk in the Gulf as a result of military conflict were another source of pollution  
to marine life. There were about 82 of these vessels.902 During the conflict, these vessels 
were oil-supply tools for Iraqi troops. The amount of oil that escaped from these vessels 
was 1,500,000 barrels.903 These vessels were recognized as sources of other pollutants 
such as lead and heavy metals.904 Recently, there was a regional conference was held in 
Kuwait regarding these vessels and how to deal with them.905  
b. Hydrosphere Pollution Effects: 
 Apprehending the environmental impacts that struck the region requires an 
understanding of the nature of the marine environment and its features. Thus, the region’s 
features will be explored first, then how the environment was affected negatively.      
i. The Gulf and its Ecosystem Features: 
 The Gulf is a partially closed sea of salty water with an average depth of 35 
meters.906 The length of the Gulf is about 1000 kilometers and its width about 300 
                                                 
900 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] 148 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic). 
901 Al-Watan- Kuwaiti Newspaper, Feb.8, 1992, at 3. 
902 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait], at 148 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic). 
903 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic). 
904 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).   
905 Regional Organization for The Protection of The Marine Environment (ROPME), 62 Nashrat Al-Bea 
Al-Bahriya [The Marine Environment Bulletin] 4 (2004).      
906 Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil Pollution 
in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 20 (Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 2001)(Arabic).  
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kilometers.907 One of the Gulf’s disadvantages is having a weak exchange of water with 
other water bodies.908 It joins free international waters through the Strait of Hormuz. One 
of the factors threatening the Gulf environment is the higher rate of water evaporation in 
the Gulf than fresh water can replace. The annual water evaporation rate in the Gulf 
ranges from 150-400 cm.909  
 Fresh water is supplied mainly by rivers in the northwest, but the amount is 
insufficient and does not compensate for the evaporation. One of the most vital factors in 
maintaining the ecological balance in this waterway is the circulation of water. This 
process is relative and takes place every three to five years.910 The United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) declared that the Gulf is considered one of the more 
sensitive marine ecosystems a special area. UNEP promulgated specific regulations for 
its preservation.911 
 Another characteristic of the Gulf marine environment is the presence of coral 
reef colonies and plant species that thrive in areas which mark tidal movements. The 
mangrove forest in the Gulf, which is a continuation of the forest in Southeast Asia and 
the Indian Ocean, is also very important from the ecological viewpoint.912  
                                                 
907 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 199 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
908 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 199 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
909  Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [ Oil 
Pollution in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 16 ( Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 
2001)(Arabic).  
910 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 253 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
911 Kuwait Case Study: The Economic and Environmental Impact of the Gulf War on Kuwait and the 
Persian Gulf,  http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/KUWAIT.HTM (last visited July 6, 2006). 
912 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 253 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
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 Coral reefs are crucial in controlling water flow and they harbor various kinds of 
fish, especially smaller species. Mangrove and Avicenna marine plants, which are 
particular to the Gulf and to the Gulf of Oman, are among the sea resources that provide 
ideal living environments for crustaceans such as shrimp and other marine life.913 
 Coral reefs and mangroves, together with an array of other plant colonies, are 
among the marine life forms that are threatened by petroleum hydrocarbon pollutants. 
The total areas covered by Mangroves in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman exceed more 
than 20,000 square meters.914 
 Equally significant are colonies of shrimp living in the sea bed near the shore, 
which also play a significant role in the areas’ marine life cycles. The vegetation that 
results is the major food source that sustains many sea species thriving in the region.  
 The Gulf, a feeding and spawning ground for fish and other marine life, supports 
180 species of mollusks, 106 species of fish, three types of whales, five species of 
dolphin, scores of different types of seabirds, and 450 species of animals which live in its 
coral reefs.915  
 The Gulf is considered an important natural resource for the Gulf States (Kuwait, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) because it represents the 
main source of unsalted water in the region which lacks other water-supply resources 
such as rivers and rain. By 1990, there were 37 desalination plants in the Gulf. Kuwait, 
                                                 
913 Regional Organization for The Protection of The Marine Environment (ROPME), 63 Nashrat Al-Bea 
Al-Bahriya [The Marine Environment Bulletin] 20 (2005). 
914 Regional Organization for The Protection of The Marine Environment (ROPME), 63 Nashrat Al-Bea 
Al-Bahriya [The Marine Environment Bulletin] 20 (2005). 
915 Eric Schmitt, After the War: The Environment; Fouled Region is Casualty of War, N.Y. TIMES, March 
3, 1991, at A19. 
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for instance, gets 90% of its water from the Gulf.916 Finally, the Gulf plays a cardinal role 
in furnishing the population with plenty of fishy species such as shrimp. In addition, the 
Gulf is deemed the primary resort for recreational purposes. 
ii. Hydrosphere pollution effects on the Gulf: 
 Oil has a dangerous impact on any marine environment. Oil pollution may destroy 
marine life in various ways. Some of these impacts are due to the characteristics of oil. 
For example, oil is less heavy than water and that allows oil to float and spread over the 
water surface. Thus, oil will be dissolved because of sunlight exposure. This dissolution 
may generate several toxic petroleum materials which harm the marine environment.917 
By being floated over the water the oil may prevent sunlight from penetrating to the sea 
beds and, as a result, the photosynthesis process of plankton, which is deemed the main 
source of nutrition for other marine species (fish and shrimp), will be affected.918 
 Oil, no doubt, plays a role in reducing the amount of dissolved oxygen in the body 
of water. Oxygen reduction is due to the active bacteria that oil usually contains.919 The 
final result of such reduction is that fish perish because of Oxygen decrement. Oil may 
produce negative effects on species directly. 
 Seabirds were the first victims of the environmental damages caused by the Gulf 
armed conflict. Before the war, there were various seabirds living in the Gulf region and 
the number of these birds was about 260,000,000. After the war, the previous number 
was reduced to 100,000,000 birds. Around 100,000,000 to 150,000,000 were found dead 
                                                 
916 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 253 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
917 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] 149 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).   
918 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] 150 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).  
919  See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] 150 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).  
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on the Saudi Arabia coastlines.920 Death caused by oil slicks resulted from the oil which 
had been deliberately released into the Gulf by Iraqi troops. Thinking that oil slicks are 
water bodies, birds land on them. When landing is completed, the birds lose their 
capability to fly again. Thus, birds will perish either because of sinking or hunger.921     
 Sea turtles, green turtles living in the Gulf, are wounded by oil slicks. Several 
green turtles were found wounded on Garoh Island.922 Also, turtles nest areas located in 
the Kuwaiti islands were contaminated by petroleum.923 Green turtles are considered an 
endangered species.924 Ninty three dolphins were found dead during the period of 
between February-April 1991 in the region.925 These deaths were attributed to toxic 
substances penetrating these mammals’ bodies.926  
 Even fish eggs and larva were affected by air pollution. One of the studies 
reported that some dangerous petroleum materials were found in high concentration on 
                                                 
920 See Philip Elmer, Environmental Damage, A Man-Made Hell on Earth, TIMES, March 18, 1991, at36; 
See also Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [ Oil 
Pollution in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 122 ( Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 
2001)(Arabic).  
921 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] 151 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).   
922 Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil Pollution 
in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 122 (Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 2001)(Arabic).  
923 Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil Pollution 
in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 122 ( Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 2001)(Arabic);  See 
Micheal D. Lemonick, Dead Sea in the Making: A Fragile Ecosystem Brimming with Life is Headed for 
Destruction, TIME, Feb.11, 1991, at 40.  
924 Philip Shenon, U.S. Bombs Kuwait Oil Station, Seeking to Cut Flow into Gulf, More Iraqi Planes Fly to 
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, January 28, 1991, at 1. 
925 Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil Pollution 
in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 124 (Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 2001)(Arabic).  
926 See Dr. Sulman Al-Matar ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Fee Dwlat Al-Kwiet [The Marine Environment of 
the State of Kuwait] 149 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).   
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the water surface.927 It is well established that these materials cause harm to fish eggs and 
larva.928 Oil may cover and block the gills of fish which causes extinction.929  
 Water pollution caused harm to shrimp. The shrimp fishing rate was brought 
down in the 1992 season due to the Gulf pollution.930 Coral reefs were partially damaged 
because of oil pollution931 and their color became white, a well known sign that they will 
vanish. It was reported that 50% of the coral reefs were destroyed in the Gulf after the 
war.932 Coral reefs have a primary role in the absorption of carbon dioxide.933  
 The heavy oil spill in early 1991 might have reduced the survival rate of Pearl 
Oyster larva. The great amount of fallout and heavier petroleum that sank into the bottom 
of the Gulf might cover the settlement of substrate for Pearl Oyster larva.934 It is 
mentioned that the low temperature due to air pollution would retard the growth of larvae 
and increase larval mortality, further affecting recruitment.935 
                                                 
927 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 249 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).   
928Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
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932 See Dr. Lolya Nasser ET AL., Al-Talweth Al-Naftee Fee Al-Bea Al-Bahrya Bdwlat Al-Kwiet [Oil 
Pollution in Kuwaiti Marine Environment] 125 (Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed 
2001)(Arabic).  
933Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 251 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).   
934 Dr. Sulaiman Al-Matar ET AL., Possible Effects of the Gulf War on the Pearl Oyster Stocks in Kuwait 
Waters, A paper presented to the International Conferrence on the Effects of the Iraqi Aggression on the 
State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 103 (Center of the Gulf and Arbian Peninsula Studies, ed. 
1996).   
935 Dr. Sulaiman Al-Matar ET AL., Possible Effects of the Gulf War on the Pearl Oyster Stocks in Kuwait 
Waters, A paper presented to the International Conferrence on the Effects of the Iraqi Aggression on the 
State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 111 (Center of the Gulf and Arbian Peninsula Studies, ed. 
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 Mangrove forests are so important in maintaining balance for marine beaches and 
for feeding marine animals.936 It was reported that 400 kilometers of Saudi coastlines 
were heavily contaminated with oil. This contamination caused harm for both mangrove 
forests and salted marshes.937 Sediments, also, were harmed due to Iraqi troop operations 
such as land mines and defense walls built to prevent marine assaults.938  
 Oil pollution affected the process of water desalination. For instance, when oil 
oxidation occurs, toxic substances are the result. These toxic substances may harm human 
beings because of their capability to dissolve in salt water (sea). Another result might be 
anticipated as a result of the interaction between some petroleum materials, suach as 
hydrocarbon, and the chlorine usually added in the water desalination process to sterilize 
water.939 It has been expected that the Gulf’s ecological damages will last for the next 
tewenty years.940 
2. Lithosphere Pollution: 
The marine environment was not the only field affected negatively by the Iraqi 
invasion of the State of Kuwait. Soil has been victimized through several activities 
attributed to Iraqi armed forces. These activities, depending on their environmental 
damages, can be classified into three groups: oil lakes, military activities, and ground 
mines.  
                                                 
936 Thomas Y. Carby, After the Storm, NAT’ L GEOGRAPHIC, August 1991, at 25.  
937 John H. Gushman, Claims for Damages Iraq Go Begging for Data, NAT’ L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 12 
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938 Dr. M. Al-Sarawi ET AL., A Prelminary Assessment of the Impact of Iraqi Invasion on Filka Island, 
Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conferrence on the Effects of the Iraqi Aggression on the 
State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 368 (Center of the Gulf and Arbian Peninsula Studies, ed. 
1996). 
939 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 253 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
940 Bruce Nichols, Horrors Plague Wanton Mideast, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Dec.8, 1991, 
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a. The Sources of Lithosphere Pollution:   
i. Oil Lakes: 
 Oil lakes were formed by gushed oil wells. There were 77 gushed oil wells in the 
northern and southern oil fields.941 These wells were blown up, but they did not catch 
fire. Thus, oil was flowing through these wells into the desert in both northern and 
southern portions of the country.942 
 The flow was estimated at 60 million barrels.943 Others reckoned it at 24 
million.944 The oil flow formed approximately 570 oil lakes around the country.945 Some 
of these lakes are 5 kilometers in length and 500 meters in width.946 These lakes cover a 
space of 49 Km/square.947 The depth of these lakes ranged from 60 to 120 Cm.948 The 
estimated depth to which oil might reach beneath the soil is controversial. Some believe 
                                                 
941 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
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Iraqi Documents] 258 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).   
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Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 192 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).    
948 Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 266 (Kuwait University, 1992). 
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that the depth was between a few centimeters and a meter,949 while others think that the 
oil might reach a deeper area, 3,7 meters.950 
 Polluted soil can be classified in three groups depending on how much pollution 
presents in the soil. The first group was severely-polluted soil which caused death to all 
its biological capabilities.951 The second group is mid-polluted soils that affected about 
25-100% of the soil’s biota,952 while the third group is slight-polluted soil covered by 
soot which had fallen from oil smoke caused by oil-well fires.953 
ii. Military Operations: 
 No doubt, Iraqi troops’ military operations affected the soil. These military 
operations, such as off-road vehicle traffic, bunkers, and ditches lasted about seven 
months, enough to guarantee any soil changes. The movement of heavy military 
artilleries would destroy the soil surface. Building defense lines which consist of bunkers 
and ditches was another activity that might be counted as an anti-environment activity. 
 The Iraqi armed forces, following a scorched earth strategy, created a new path to 
revenge from the earth in the so called “oil ditches.” These are ditches made above the 
                                                 
949 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 258 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).  
950Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 194 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).    
951 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 192 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).     
952 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 192 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).    
953 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 192 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).    
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soil surface and filled with oil in order to prevent any ground assaults.954 Soil ditches 
extended about 200 kilometers along the southern border line of Kuwait facing the Saudi 
borders.955 There were 120 ditches,956 each one of them about 2.5-3 meters in width and 
1.5-2 meters in depth.957  
 These ditches were filled with crude oil estimated at about 3.5 million barrels.958 
It took about five months from August to January1991 to build these ditches.959 This 
process caused the movement of a tremendous amount of dust and turned over much soil.  
iii. Land Mines 
 Although land mines can be considered a result of military operations, they have 
been classified as an independent source of environmental damages inflicted on the soil. 
Mines may affect soil in a variety of ways.960 Without involving details, the number of 
land mines discovered in Kuwait by 1997 was about 1,464,514 land mines.961 1,078,829 
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anti-individual mines were planted in the southern and northern portions of Kuwait while 
567,685 anti-tank mines were scattered around the country.962 
b. Lithosphere Pollution Effects: 
 Soil was affected greatly by the Iraqi invasion of the State of Kuwait. The soil in 
areas of war activities was exposed to various impacts which left their mark in the form 
of changed soil conditions. The soil surface was pulverized by exposure to off-road 
vehicle traffic. Soil was displaced, loosened, and shattered. The digging of bunkers, 
ditches, and embankments distributed soil and exposed the hardpan present under the root 
zone in most parts of the country.963  
 The distributed soil was exposed to water and wind erosion and its productivity 
was adversely affected. All plants and animals in the affected areas were killed or very 
adversely affected. Acid rain, which fell in large areas, created a dark grey crust on the 
soil surface, which modified its physical and chemical features.964 Environmental 
damages inflicted on the soil were varied. These damages will be examined according to 
their causes. 
 Military operations affected soils in different ways. For example, the very low 
numbers of both annuals and perennials was due to the use of plants to hide military 
equipment; burial of plants during construction of bunkers, trenches, and embankments; 
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and destruction of plants due to the movements of heavy military vehicles,965 In some 
cases, the digging of bunkers harmed the soil by exposing the hardpan and parent rocks.  
 The destruction of sediments was cited as one of the negative effects of the 
military operations.966 Iraqi troop centralization above the soil caused soil compression. 
This compression brought about the blockage of soil pores, soil dryness, and an increase 
in water flow (rain).967 
 Bunkers created by the Iraqi armed forces had direct and indirect impact upon the 
soil. Direct impacts are those damages caused by the soil digging process.968 An example 
of direct impacts would be the crumbling of upper parts of the soil, destruction of 
vegetable cover, loss of rain and flood water due to water gathering inside bunkers 
created by the invader. Gathering water inside bunkers accelerates the water evaporation 
process.969 In addition, bunkers caused indirect impacts on soil.970  
 Land mines have their own effects on soil. These damages created both instant 
and long-term effects. Instant impacts are those damages which resulted after the 
implantation process occurred, changing the chemical conditions of the soil, destroying 
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969Dr. Dari Al-Ajmi ET AL., Kanadeq Al-Nafet Wa Tadmmer AlBea Al-Kwioetia [Oil Trenches and 
Kuwait Environmental Destruction as One of Iraqi Invasion Crimes] 78 (Center of Research and Studies on 
Kuwait, 2004)(Arabic). 
970Dr. Dari Al-Ajmi ET AL., Kanadeq Al-Nafet Wa Tadmmer AlBea Al-Kwioetia [Oil Trenches and 
Kuwait Environmental Destruction as One of Iraqi Invasion Crimes] 98 (Center of Research and Studies on 
Kuwait, 2004)(Arabic).  
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the coral reefs around the islands, crumbling upper parts of the soil, and destroying desert 
plants.971  
 Long-term impacts are those which resulted after a period of time had passed such 
as losing surface water, waste of soil humidity, and annihilation of desert fauna and 
flora.972 It was reported that soil suitability for land use was affected by land mines.973 
 Oil lakes played a role in affecting soil adversely. Some toxic substances resulting 
from the oil lakes may accumulate in plant tissue and constitute carcinogens which cause 
death to any animal eating such plants.974 Areas within the boundaries of the oil lakes 
were considered biologically dead.975 After drying, oil tar or sludge remains, causing 
severe disturbances in the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the soil 
environment.976  
 The dark coloration of the soil surface leads to greater heat absorbance, increased 
soil temperature, and hence increased water loss by evaporation.977 A study 
                                                 
971 Dr. Rafat Misak ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Sahrawiya Be Dawllat Al-Kowiet [Desert Environment of the State 
of Kuwait] 164 (Center of Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).  
972 Dr. Rafat Misak ET AL., Al-Bea Al-Sahrawiya Be Dawllat Al-Kowiet [Desert Environment of the State 
of Kuwait] 164-168 (Center of Research and Studies on Kuwait, ed. 2003)(Arabic).  
973 Reem Al-Nifaisi, Environmental Impact Assessment of the Iraqi Strategic Mine Fields in the Southern 
portion of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi Aggression 
on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 249 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, 
ed. 1996).  
974 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
975 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some 
Desert Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the 
Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).   
976 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some 
Desert Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the 
Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).   
977 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some 
Desert Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the 
Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 175 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).  
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acknowledged that damages to the natural vegetation were caused by the increased the 
temperature in atmosphere and soil, decreased photosynthetic activities, and the burning 
of many oil lakes.978 Finally, oil lakes affected the ground water aquifer.979 Sea water 
used to extinguish the oil-well fires is another factor contributing to loss of soil 
productivity.980   
3. Atmospheric Pollution: 
 Understanding atmospheric pollution requires apprehending both the sources of 
such pollution and its effects. 
a. The Sources of Atmospheic Pollution:  
i. Oil Fire: 
 The crime against the environment was not limited to life marine and soil, but was 
extended to the atmosphere. Burning oil wells were the stone which hit two birds or 
targets, wealth and environment. Although it is a small territory, the State of Kuwait 
contains an amount of oil estimated at about 12,960 million tons.981 Kuwaiti oil is 
                                                 
978 M. El-Din ET AL., Environmental Impacts of Burned Oil Wells and Military Operations on some 
Desert Plants and Soils of Kuwait, A paper presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the 
Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 174 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996). 
979 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 271, 296 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic); See 
also Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 202 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).   
980 The estimated amount of sea water used to extinguish the oil-well fires was about 1,5 billion gallons 
(25,000 gallons daily) Due to the temperature increase, water is evaporated and salt will remain in soils 
which prevents plant growth. The amount of salt added to the soil due to the use of sea water was about 
76,500 tons of salt. It can not be washed by a little rain water (100-150 millimeters annually). See Dr. 
Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in Iraqi 
Documents] 261, 266 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic).    
981 Muhadee Al-Ajmi, Al-Awamel Al-Bashriya Wa Athroha on Al-Bea Al-Tbeeyia Fee Al-Kowiet [Human 
Factors and their Effects on Natural Environment in the State of Kuwait] 69 (Kuwait Foundation For the 
Advancement Science, ed. 1996)(Arabic).   
255 
 
Appendix 2 
divided among eight major fields (Burgan, Manakeesh, Um-Qudair, Wafra, Mutreba, 
Rawdatain, Sabryia, and Bahra). These oil fields contain 1555 oil wells.982  
tact.986  
                                                
 The northern oil fields group (Rawdatain, Sabryia, Bahra, and Mutreba) contains 
287 oil wells.983 These oil wells were affected severely by the wicked Iraqi plan; 108 oil 
wells were on fire, nine oil wells were gushing, fourteen oil wells were severely 
damaged, and sixteen oil wells were intact.984  
 The southern oil fields group (Burgan, Manakeesh, Um-Qudair, and Wafra) 
contains 1268 oil wells.985 Their statistics were 510 oil wells on fire, 68 oil wells 
gushing, 448 oil wells severely damaged, and 140 wells in
 The amount of oil burned was estimated at from 2.5 to 6 millions barrels daily.987 
Assuming that 2.5 million barrels daily were burned, the resulting substances were: 20-40 
thousands tons of black smoke, 250 tons of carbon monoxide, 20 thousands tons of sulfur 
dioxide, 1500 tons of toxic substances, and 500 tons of nitric oxide.988  
 
982 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 23 ( 1992)(Arabic).   
983 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 23 ( 1992)(Arabic).   
984 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 23 ( 1992)(Arabic).    
985 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 23 ( 1992)(Arabic).    
986 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 23 ( 1992)(Arabic).     
987 Dr. Mustafa Al-Desouky, Impact of Oil Well Fires on the Air Quality in Kuwait, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, at 
18.    
988 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 23 ( 1992)(Arabic).  
256 
 
Appendix 2 
 Soot and oil mist were noticed on the soil as a result of the burning oil.989 Types 
of oil smoke formed were: black smoke, white smoke, and a clean flame without 
smoke.990 It was reported that the smoke reached places far away from the region 
including some areas of the former Soviet Union and the United States of America.991  
ii. Oil Lakes: 
 Although oil lakes formed above the soil, they have negative impacts on air. Oil 
lakes might be a source of toxic substances such as methane, butane, and 
hydrocarbons.992 These oil lakes were formed by oil escaping from oil wells. Either their 
damaged oil well-heads were not on fire or their oil well-heads were on fire, but gushing 
crude oil simultaneously.993 Oil lakes were different in shape, location, size, 
characteristics of oil, and depth.994 Some of these oil lakes caught fire from the oil wells 
on fire.995  
b. Atmospheric Pollution Effects: 
 Oil-well fires greatly affected the environment. Environmental impacts occurred 
in different ways. Burned oil caused harm to the atmosphere, and to animals, plants, soil, 
and construction. In light of atmospheric impacts, a high concentration of toxic and 
                                                 
989 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 30, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).    
990 Jassem Al-Besharah, The Kuwaiti Oil Fires and Oil Lakes: Facts and Numbers, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, at 
14; Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 266 (Kuwait University, 1992). 
991 Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 261 (Kuwait University, 1992). 
992 Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Awdee, Al-Mushklaat Al-Beayia Fee Al-Watan Al-Arabee Bad Tahreer Al-
Kowiet [Environmental Problems in Arabic World after Kuwait Liberation] 18 (Arab Planning Institute, ed. 
1992)(Arabic).   
993 Jassem Al-Besharah, The Kuwaiti Oil Fires and Oil Lakes: Facts and Numbers, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, 15 
994 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 25 ( 1992)(Arabic). 
995 Jassem Al-Besharah, The Kuwaiti Oil Fires and Oil Lakes: Facts and Numbers, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, 15. 
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harmful substances was recorded.996 After the liberation of Kuwait, a couple of 
monitoring stations (Al-Rega and Al-Mansoorya) were set up in order to record and 
observe any air pollution that might result from oil-well fires. These stations’ records 
revealed a high concentration of nitric oxide.997 
The sulfur dioxide concentration level exceeded the safe levels recommended by 
the World Health Organization (WHO).998 Also, hydrocarbons were found in a high 
concentration in some areas of Kuwait.999 One of the effects from the somke of the fires 
was decreasing the regional temperature.1000 This decrease is due to increasing of 
pollutants concentration in atmosphere which decreases the amount of sunlight stored by 
the soil.1001 
Plants were victimized by the oil-well fires. Oil rain killed plants in the Kuwaiti 
territory.1002 The increased of temperature of the areas surrounding the oil wells was 
another source of fatal impact on vegetation.1003 Soot caused by oil-well fires hindered 
                                                 
996 Ahmad Issa, Impact of Past Oil Fires on Atmospheric Respirable Particulates in Kuwait, A paper 
presented to the International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held 
April 2-6 1994 Kuwait, 35 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996).     
997 Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 263 (Kuwait University, 1992). 
998 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 31 ( 1992)(Arabic).   
999 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 32 ( 1992)(Arabic).   
1000 Dr. Yosef Al-Ebraheem ET AL., Al-eqtesadyaat Alarbia Wa Al-Kazoo al-Iraqi to Kowiet [Arabic 
Economies and Iraqi Invasion to the State of Kuwait] 29 (Arabic Planning Institution, ed. Dec. 
1992)(Arabic). 
1001 Dr. Yosef Al-Ebraheem ET AL., Al-eqtesadyaat Alarbia Wa Al-Kazoo al-Iraqi to Kowiet [Arabic 
Economies and Iraqi Invasion to the State of Kuwait] 29 (Arabic Planning Institution, ed. Dec. 
1992)(Arabic). 
1002 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 37, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).    
1003 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 41, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).    
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the growth of plants.1004 The lack of oxygen due to heat is an additional source which 
assisted in the destruction of the vegetation.1005  
Fauna were severely affected by the oil-well fires. Soot hindered animals’ 
movements and flight.1006 Ulcers in camels were reported as a result of soot fallen from 
the smoke.1007 Soot may smother animals.1008 It was noticed that animal’s wool became 
dark due to soot.1009 Animal’s lungs were a full of soot.1010 Oil-well fires and their smoke 
did not tolerate buildings.1011 Finally, it has been concluded that the flood that struck 
Bangladesh in 1991 was due to the oil-well fires.1012                   
4. Pollution Effects on Public Health 
 Air pollution was the most dangerous pollution that occurred since both marine 
and soil pollution can be controlled authorities by taking some precautionary steps such 
as warning signs or fences to prevent public contact with these polluted areas. But air 
may invade any place without permission.  
                                                 
1004 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 41, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).  
1005 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 34 ( 1992)(Arabic).   
1006 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 43, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).   
1007 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 43, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).   
1008 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 43, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).   
1009 A Rapid Assessment of the Impacts of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict on Terrestrial Ecosystems, A Report 
prepared for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) by Gaafar Karrar ET AL., at 41, 
(UNEP,Regional Office for West Asia, Sep. 1991).   
1010 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 22 ( 1992)(Arabic).   
1011 Hayfa Mudhaf, The Effect of Oil Pollution on Building Facades in Kuwait, A paper presented to the 
International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait held April 2-6 1994 
Kuwait, 15 (Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, ed. 1996). 
1012 Dr. Abdullah Al-Kandari, Environment and Development 262 (Kuwait University, 1992). 
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 Toxic substances such as sulfur dioxide may cause negative effects on health. By 
exposure to some level of sulfur dioxide, a human being may become susceptible to 
asthma, dyspnea, emphysema, skin and eyes irritation, or lung diseases.1013 Sulfur 
dioxide is in a high concentration in Kuwaiti crude oil.1014  
                                                
 Carbon monoxide may cause headache, eyesight weakness, general exhaustion, 
and death if exposure to such toxicity reaches a high level.1015 Nitric oxide also may do 
harm to the respiratory system.1016 Children who are ages 2-3 years are the most sensitive 
to such diseases.1017 Smog resulting from burned oil might generate cancerous 
diseases.1018 Lead, nickel, and vanadium are well-known sources of other unhealthy 
effects.1019 They may hinder childrens’ growth, or cause barrenness, liver disease, and 
brain damage.1020  
 It has been found that nickel may cause lung cancer and skin scorch.1021 
Vanadium may cause poliomyelitis and anemia.1022 Acid rain contributes to the 
 
1013 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 223 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1014 Jassem Al-Besharah, The Kuwaiti Oil Fires and Oil Lakes: Facts and Numbers, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, at 
13. 
1015 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 224 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1016 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 224 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1017 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 225 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1018 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 225 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1019 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 227 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1020 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents]  227 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1021 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 228 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1022 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 228 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
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settlement of toxic substances such as lead and mercury.1023 These substances may 
penetrate into plant tissue and cause cancer to whoever eats these plants.1024  
 After the liberation of Kuwait, a tremendous task awaited for the Kuwaiti 
government to fulfill. One of the top priorities the Kuwaiti government adopted was to 
protect public health. Steps were taken either by establishing an emergency plan or by 
planning to extinguish oil-well fires as soon as possible. However, impediments were 
there to face the government.  
 One of major impediments was the lack of the capability to deal with such an 
environmental catastrophe. The destruction and plundering of equipment used to monitor 
pollution before the invasion occurred contributed to the failure to conduct many 
scientific studies regarding this incomparable disaster. However, some studies were 
conducted regarding pollution’s instant effects. Some of these studies discovered the fact 
that asthma and respiratory system problems increased after the pollution occurred.1025 
These studies concluded that children were more vulnerable to this kind of disease than 
adults.1026 Also, an increase in eye, skin, and nose allergies was noticed during 1991.1027  
 A decrease in natural childbirth and an increase of short-weight children were 
recorded.1028 One of the studies includes air pollution as one of the causes for increased 
                                                 
1023 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
1024 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 198 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
1025 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 231 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1026  See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 232 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1027 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 234 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1028 See Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil 
Wells in Iraqi Documents] 234 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
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spontaneous abortions, and congenital deformity.1029 These are some of the diseases 
reported after the invasion occurred. Now, there is a long-term study being conducted on 
400 families in Kuwait to examine the long-term effects of air pollution. This study is 
expected to last from 15 to 25 years.1030  
     The fact that most of the studies have agreed upon is that instant and long-term 
effects on public health cannot be determined fully. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to 
point out that there were some unexpected circumstances, unrelated to the role Iraqi 
troops played, that mitigated negative health impacts on public. These circumstances 
were the high temperature,1031 the wind direction,1032 rain,1033 thermal inversion,1034 and 
the emergency plan.1035 In addition, the Kuwaiti territory is flat which allows pollutants 
to move fast by winds.1036 No doubt that the period of time (240 days) consumed in 
extinguishing the oil-well fires assisted in reduction of the effects.1037 
 
 
1029 M. Maqseed, The Effects of the Agrressive Iraqi Invasion on the Obstetric Practice in Maternity 
Hospital of Kuwait, 47 (Kuwait Foundation For the Advancment Science, ed. 1995).  
1030 Dr. Mustafa Al-Desouky, Impact of Oil Well Fires on the Air Quality in Kuwait, a paper presented to 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, 26.    
1031 Dr. Dari Al-Ajmi ET AL., Kanadeq Al-Nafet Wa Tadmmer AlBea Al-Kwioetia [Oil Trenches and 
Kuwait Environmental Destruction as One of Iraqi Invasion Crimes] 87 (Center of Research and Studies on 
Kuwait, 2004)(Arabic).   
1032 Dr. Zain Al-Dean Gneemee, Al-Athar Al-Beayia LL Gazoo Al-Iraqi Ldwlat Al-Kowiet [Environmental 
Impacts of Iraqi Aggression for the State of Kuwait], 17 Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 
Journal 20, 29 ( 1992)(Arabic). 
1033 Dr. Rafat Misaak ET AL., Al-Mawareed Al-Tabeaya Wa Al-Semaat Al-Beaya Fee Dwlat Al-Kuwiet [ 
Natural Resources and Environmental Features of the State of Kuwait] 321 ( Kuwait Institute for Scientific 
Researches, ed. 2000)(Arabic).  
1034 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 215 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1035 Dr. M. Daoud, Ahmadi City Under the Smoke, a paper presented to Proceedings of an International 
Symposium held at the University of Birmingham 17th October 1991, 27. 
1036 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 225 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
1037 Dr. Abdullah Al-Gneem ET AL., Tadmeer Abar Alnfet fee alwthaeq Aliraqya [Destruction Oil Wells in 
Iraqi Documents] 35 (Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait ed. 2004)(Arabic). 
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Document 2 
 
This document indicates the Iraqi regime's desire to safeguard Kuwait's oil wells in the hope of 
occupying Kuwait for good. 
 
Top Secret 
 
HQ 
First Regiment 
47th Mechanized Infantry Brigade Battle Group  
No. 686 
Date : 28/10/1990 
 
To : All Companies  
Subject: Infringements 
 
Top secret memo of Army Chief of Staff HQ no. 245 of 19/10/1990 
communicated to us by top secret memo of 47 Mechanized Infantry Brigade Battle Group 
no. 408 of 25/10/1990. 
 
1. It has been noticed that the personnel of some of the units deployed near the oil 
installations and utilities infringe on these establishments and fire shots at the oil pipes 
and tamper with some of their parts. This may cause the flow of oil and gas that may 
constitute grave danger to their security and the security of the nearby units . To prevent 
this phenomenon, the Army Chief of Staff has ordered the following: 
 
a. Circulate to your units down to the level of unit commanders to stay away from the oil 
installations within your area and to refrain from tampering with them in order to 
safeguard their security and the security of the sectors near them. 
 
b. The unit commander will be held responsible for any infringements against the 
installations within the sector of his jurisdiction. 
 
                Please take all required measures. 
 
 
Captain Thu'ban Khalil Hussain  
Commander 
First Regiment 
47th Infantry Brigade Battle Group 
 
cc: Movements: 47th Infantry Brigade Battle Group/ your memo above. 
 
 
263 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Document 3 
This document also shows that the Iraqi regime is desperate to preserve 
Kuwait's oil wells hoping it will occupy Kuwait permanently. 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
                                                                               Martyrs shall remain the best of us. 
Secret 
 
Third Regiment Command  
Chief of Staff 
(Movements) 
No. 2/10/5524 
Date : 15 September 1990 
 
To: 1st Mechanized Division Command  
            3rd Armored Division Command  
            7th Infantry Division Command 
            8th Infantry Division Command  
            11th Infantry Division Command  
            14th Infantry Division Command  
            15th Infantry Division Command 
            18th Infantry Division Command  
            29th Infantry Division Command 
        Subject: Damage to Gas Pipe and Infringements 
Enclosed is a photocopy of the secret and urgent memo of the Ministry of 
Petroleum no. 4332 of 4 September 1990, communicated by Army Chief of Staff 
HQ's secret memo number 4023 on 14 September 1990, regarding damage to the gas 
installa-tions and infringements on materials that belong to the said ministry in the 
southern sector. 
Please be informed and stop all infringements and conduct continuous 
surveillance to safeguard these installations. 
 
Encls.: 1 above 
Major General (Staff) 
Ali Mohammed al-Shallal 
for/ Third Regiment Commander 
 
15 September 1990 
1/1 Secret 
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Document 4 
 
Devastating oil wells and other vital Kuwaiti installations was the 
final goal of the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait 
 
HQ 
11 Division Commando Battle 
Group  
No'2/122 
Date: 25/1/1991 
 
To: All Companies 
Subject: Directives 
 
Army Chief of Staff HQ's top secret and personal memo no. 490 of 16 January 
1991, communicated by Third Regiment Command top secret and personal memo 
no. 776 of 17 January 1991, communicated to us by 42nd Division top secret and 
personal memo 206 on 22 January 1991. 
In the meeting of the Armed Forces General Command on 13 January 1991, 
our leader the President (may God keep him) ordered the following: 
1. Oil installations prepared for destruction are to be blown up when the situation is too 
dangerous in order not to leave them intact to the enemy, they should be 
completely devastated. Commanders present in the sectors of their responsibility 
should check the decision of the implementation of destruction with the division 
headquarters. In case communications are disrupted and contact is impossible, 
commanders in charge of destruction should take decisions of implementation in 
light of the situation. 
2. Kuwait Governorate is handled like any other. We defend it the way we 
defend other governorates, and we should not foresake territory except at the right 
moment. 
3. Use intensive fire while in defensive positions and do not move from them 
into combat except under well-calculated circumstances. 
4. Americans may transmit on Iraqi TV materials that are contrary to fact. Caution 
is required, and anything contrary to our aims should not be believed, 
notwithstanding the enemy's attempts. 
 
 
Captain Amir Sityat Mutlak 
pp. Commado Battle Group 
42nd Division 
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Document 5 
The Republican Guard was responsible for implementing the Deferred Destruction Plan. 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Top Secret and Personal 
Command 
Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces, Republican 
Guard  
Chief of Staff 
(Movements) 
No. 2/2 
Date: 12 August 1990 
12 Muharram 1411 
 
To:  19th Infantry Brigade, Republican Guard 
20th Infantry Republican Guard 
22nd Infantry Republican Guard 
23rd Infantry Republican Guard 
Command, Artillery, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces HQ, 
Republican Guard 
Command, Air Defence, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces HQ, 
Republican Guard 
      Armored Battalion, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces, Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces HQ, 
Republican  Guard 
 
Subject: Directives 
 
Reference to the top secret and personal memo of Republican Guard Forces 
Command no. 730 dated 12 August 1990 about the directives of the Minister of 
Industry and Military Industrialization of 12 August 1990. 
 
l. All units should actively control all sectors they occupy. Areas in front of 
defense positions are prohibited zones; no one is allowed in them or near them 
from the direction of the Saudi borders. Full control must be imposed. Mechanized 
and reconnaissance patrols should be dispatched to secure complete control. 
2. Appoint sabotage squads to mine the oil wells and power and electricity stations that 
have been prepared for deferred destruction, and prepare and finalize all the 
requirements for their destruction, so that every group is stationed in its designated 
place in order to blow up these targets as soon as orders are issued. Groups that 
fail to blow up their assigned targets will be severely penalized. 
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3. Select accurate positions for stationing artillery, which should be within the range and 
protection of our air defence units. 
4. In the event of any enemy air strike, all tanks should use smoke; mortar and artillery 
should fire smoke bombs. This will interfere with the enemy's use of laser and electronic 
weapons and reduce their chance of hitting their targets accurately. In addition to that, all 
formations should request and secure enough smoke barrels ASAP to be spread in the 
defense positions and the areas of tanks, APCs, artillery, and machinery. They 
should be immediately ignited in the event of enemy air raids. 
5. All jamming equipment dispensed to you should be used. They should be immediately 
installed on tanks; inoperative ones should be repaired. Check their suitability and 
practise on them. Also immediately list your needs thereof to secure them for the tanks 
that have not received them in order to request them for you so that they are procured and 
installed as soon as possible. 
6. Move and spread as many as possible of the broken and damaged vehicles now 
scattered all over Kuwait to the defence positions of your formations. They should be 
copiously dispersed among tanks, APCs, and artillery positions. Trenches should 
be dug for them in a way that makes it difficult to identify them. They are to be 
placed at a level higher than the armored vehicles and light artillery to warrant their 
strike by the missiles and bombs fired by the enemy aircraft. They have to look as real as 
possible. This requires the launching of a wide campaign drawing on all the resources 
available to you to move those inoperative and damaged vehicles. Utmost attention should be 
given to this in order to secure all needs ASAP. 
7. Instruct, enlighten, and urge all commanders of all sections, platoons, companies, units, 
and detachments to intensely use smoke to counter enemy electronic and laser equipment. 
8. Attention should be paid to supply areas with due emphasis to digging, deployment, 
camouflage, hiding and continuous and regular relocation to avoid their detection by 
enemy air force. 
9. Commanders at all levels from section commander to formation commander should be 
made to understand how to manage any forthcoming battle without telecommunications or 
even telephones. The duties of each one should be made clear. Due emphasis should be 
placed on their understanding and practice of duties to secure the implementation of those 
assigned to you in case of any enemy ground, air, or sea attack accompanied by 
complete jamming of our communication. Emphasis should he placed on the use of 
substitute means of communication such as liaison personnel, office boys, 
flags, light signals, megaphones and helicopters. From now on, all orders for 
countering all possibilities and emergency situations should be clear. 
Please take required measures and inform us. 
 
Colonel (Staff) 
Ghalib Abdulla Ahmed 
pp. Commander 
Nabu-Khath Nasr Forces, Republican Guard 
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12 August 1990 
 
cc: - Nabu-Khaz Nasr Command HQ, Republican Guard, to take measures required 
for no. 8 above 
- NKNC, Chief of Staff HQ, RG: to take measures required for no. 5 above 
- Al-Hussain Tanks Battalion: please take required measures. 
- Field Engineering Battalion, NKNC, RG: please take measures required for no. 
2 above, send a list of the names in the sabotage squad and inform us. 
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Document 6 
 
This document reveals that the head of the Iraqi regime is the mastermind 
of the crime of destroying and igniting the oil wells. 
 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Top Secret and Personal 
Ninth Tanks Battalion 
No. 2/2/28 
Date: 18 January 1991 
Subject: Directives 
Reference to Army Chief of Staffs top secret and personal memo 490 of 16 
January 1991, communicated by Third Regiment Command's top secret and 
personal memo 726 of 17 January 1991, communicated to us by 7th Division 
Command top secret and personal memo 52 on 17 January 1991. In this meeting of 
the Armed Forces General Command on 13 January 1991, our leader the President 
(may God keep him) gave the following orders: 
1. Oil installations prepared for destruction should be blown up when the situation 
becomes dangerous, so that they are left to the enemy destroyed, not intact. 
Commanders of regiments where there are oil installations within their positions 
of responsibility should check the decision of implementing the destruction with the 
General Command. 
In case communications are disrupted and contact is impossible, regiment 
commanders should take decisions of implementation in light of the situation. 
2. Care should be observed when using the Counter-Attack Armored Force. 
 
3. We must monitor enemy manoeuvres to shift our concentration. However, we must 
keep our sectors as they are. 
 
4. The coast road 'Aradat-Hafr al-Batin-Qaysuma - should be targeted by helicopters 
to prevent the enemy from advancing. 
5. Coordinate the operations of Squadron BC 9 aircraft in fighting the enemy 
helicopters. 
6. We handle Kuwait Governorate like any other governorate. We defend it the way 
we defended other governorates, and we do not forsake territory except at the 
right moment. 
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7. Use intensive fire while in defence positions and do not move from them into 
combat except under well-calculated circumstances. 
8. Americans may transmit on Iraqi TV materials that are contrary to fact. Caution is 
required, and anything contrary to our aims should not be believed, 
notwithstanding the enemy's attempts. 
 
Please take required measures and act accordingly. The Commander-in-Chief has 
ordered the following: 
a. Communicate the above directives to all fighters and ensure that all understand them 
well. 
b. Ensure that the oil wells are prepared for destruction. This should not be carried out 
except in the most dangerous situation. They are not to be left intact to the enemy, 
whatever the cost may be. 
c. Sections should inform us about measures for communicating this. 
d. The commander of the regiment should be personally informed. 
 
Please take all required measures. It is imperative to inform all ranks today. 
Lt. Colonel (Armor) 
Zaydan Khalaf Abdulla (Signatures) 
Commanding Officer, Ninth Tank Battalion 
18 January 1991 
 
                                                                Top Secret and Personal 
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Document 9 
 
Document 9 reveals the detonation plan concentrated mainly on the producing wells, not the closed or 
abandoned ones, and their ignition to realize the plan's aim of destroying the Kuwaiti economy. 
 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful  
Top Secret, Personal and Urgent 
 
Command 
Third Regiment 
General Staff (Movements) 
No. G2/10/10364 
 Date 23 December 1990 
 
To : Command, Third Armored Division 
Subject: Exercise Report 
 
[Reference to] Army Chief of Staff top secret personal and urgent memo no. 
7394 of 21 December 1990. It is possible that the oil gushing out of the wells may not 
combust due to the shock that occurs during closure. In view of this, the following 
measures should be taken regarding the oil installations and oil wells in your sectors 
prepared for the deferred destruction and ignition plan. 
 
1. Cooperating with Kuwait Oil Company (only through its Iraqi personnel) to identify the 
abandoned wells, those fitted with underground safety valves, and those producing ones 
which will be selected for detonation. 
 
2. As the producing wells may not ignite after the explosion, gunpowder fillings should 
be placed with the explosive charges to guarantee the burning of gas and oil after 
detonation. 
 
3. Guard and detonation personnel should withdraw to a distance of not less than 300 meters 
prior to the explosion. 
 
4. Monitor the oil well after its ignition to ensure that the fire does not extinguish, and take 
measures required to rekindle it, by using cannons and munition. This should be 
regarded as priority since the non-burning of the oil well will cause dangerous lethal 
gases to amass in minutes for a distance between 2.5 - 3 km from the well head. 
 
The degree of effect is lower for longer distances. 
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Please take all required measures and inform us.  
                                                                                                          Brigadier Staff  
                                                                                                                    Salah Mahdi 
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Document 10 
Its subject is Committee Resolution. It shows that the destructive filling charges were 
placed in the 
oil wells by representatives of the Ministry of Petroleum and Military 
Engineering. It also reveals 
the targets prepared for destruction by each of the three regiments and their 
responsibilities. 
 
Secret and Personal 
Army Staff HQ 
Office of Army Chief of Staff 
No. /6066 
Date: 11 November 1990 
 
To:   Command, Third Regiment 
        Command, Fourth Regiment 
        Command, Sixth Regiment 
 
Subject: Committee Resolution 
1. Enclosed is a copy of the resolution of the committee that visited your sectors in 
the period 27 October 1990 to 4 November 1990 and which coordinated with you 
regarding the recommendations of deferred destruction and ensuring that it is 
practical and implementable. 
2. The Army Chief of Staff has approved its content. 
 
Please take all the required measures, each in his own sector. The Committee 
will visit your sectors in the future to follow up on implementation. 
 
Encl.: Committee Resolution 
 
Major General Staff 
Sa'di Ahmed Saleh 
Secretary, Field Forces, Army Chief of Staff 
 
cc: • Operations Dept.: Your top secret and personal memo no. 1243 of Nov. 1990. 
For your information and please provide us with a report on the upcoming 
visit. 
• Training Dept. : Please provide the above regiments with fuses. 
 
                                            Secret and Personal 
Committee Resolution 
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The Committee formed in accordance with the Operations Department's secret and 
personal memo no. 706 O.D. of 17 November 1990, visited the sectors of the Third, Fourth, 
and Sixth Regiments in the period 27 Nov. 1990 - 4 Dec. 1990 and coordinated with them 
regarding the recommendations of deferred destruction plan and ensuring that it is 
practical, sound and implementable, and that their measures will achieve the 
[required] objectives. 
1. Third Regiment Sector: 
a. Targets: The regiment has prepared the targets listed below which are within its 
domain of responsibility for deferred destruction. 
No. Target Area Brigade 
Sector 
Division 
Sector 
I Assembly no. 16 (31 oil wells) al-Manaqeesh 39 Inf. 7 
2 Assembly no. 2 (40 oil wells) Burgan 19 " " 
3 Abdaliyya Water Station Abdaliyya 19 " " 
4 450 oil wells al-Wafra 12 Inf. 8 
5 Saddam's Grand Water Project Abdulla   
  Terminal 12 " " 
6 Water Water Project al-Wafra 12 " " 
7 Assembly no. 20 (49 oil wells) al-Magwa' 45 Inf. 11 
8 Assembly no. 9 (58 oil wells) " 45 viol 
9 Az-Zoor Power and Water    
 Desalination Station Ras az-Zoor 426 Inf. 14 
10 Oil Storehouse at az-Zoor Oil Terminal Ras az-Zoor 426 Inf. 14 
1 1 Gas Storehouse at az-Zoor Oil Terminal " " 18 " " 
12 Az-Zoor Water Pumping Station " " 426 " " 
13 Az-Zoor Electricity Station " " 18 " " 
14 Doha and Eastern Doha Power and    
 Water Desalination Station Doha 436 15 
 
15 Al-Rasheed Power and Water Al-Rasheed   
 Desalination Station (Shuwaikh) 76 15 
16 Al-Raghwa Water Project al-Raghwa 95 Inf. 18 
17 Assembly no. 17-27 oil wells) Um Qadeer 84 Inf. 29 
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18 Assembly no. 18 (14 oil wells) fill 84 " " 
19 Assembly points (1,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,    
 11,12,13,14,19,21,22). They form    
 505 oil wells Burgan 451 Inf. 42 
20 Petro-Chemical Compound al-Nida' 45 " " 
21 Osmosis Station 
Port 
al-Nida' 
 
" " 
22 Northern & Southern Shuaiba Power    
 and Water Desalination Station Shuaiba  " " 
b. Procedures and Remarks: 
First: The regiment headquarters prepared recommendations for the deferred 
destruction of the targets listed above, and informed the divisions of them by its secret and 
personal memo no. 3798 of 29 Nov. 1990. 
Second: All targets have been prepared for deferred destruction in two ways (electric 
deferred destruction circuit and ordinary deferred destruction circuit), except for 30% of 
the targeted oil wells which were fitted only in one way, i.e. the ordinary way, due to the 
current lack of electric fuses. Work is currently undertaken by the Regiment 
Operations Dept. to fit them in both ways. 
Third: All targets prepared for deferred destruction are in the secure position. 
Fourth: Targets of serial nos. 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 20 mentioned in a) above have been 
prepared for destruction by tanks and artillery because it is hazardous to place the 
charges in these targets, due to their high temperature when burning. 
Fifth: The filling charges have been placed in the suitable places of oil wells and 
installations by the representatives of the Ministry of Petroleum according to Army 
Chief of Staff secret, personal and urgent memo no. 5798 dated 4 November 1990, 
except for some of them which were put in the designated place. The Regiment Operations 
Corps have been informed. An actual destruction plan was conducted on a vertical well 
group in the sector of the Sixth Division by using 20 pounds of T.N.T.with good results. 
Sixth: Form 822 of the orders to the commander of the burning destruction group and 
Form 823 of the order to the detonation destruction group were not efficiently used. They 
were also not used in some of the division sectors. 
Seventh: The guards assigned to the targets are insufficient in number and 
unfamiliar with the details of their obligations as shown in the form. 
Eighth: There is no coordination whatsoever between the guard groups and the 
destruction implementation groups in all sectors. 
Ninth: The implementation groups are not clear about the context of delegating 
authority for destruction. 
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Tenth: There is no efficient system that secures delivering regiment orders to all 
targets as required. 
Eleventh: Due to the vast number of oil wells, their spacing and their location mostly in 
sandy areas, and because of the few number of engineering elements assigned to 
destruction and the few wheels [available], the destruction operation is not completely 
guaranteed at the fixed time. 
Twelfth: There is approximately a 30% shortage of fuses. 
Thirteenth: The repeated replacement of the engineering units responsible for 
destruction affects their readiness to implement this task in an accurate manner. 
Fourteenth: There is a possibility that the equipment prepared for destruction 
purposes may be stolen by some elements to be used for different purposes, especially in 
targets located inside cities and wells close to general utilities. 
Fifteenth: The awareness of the guard and destruction units is not concurrent with the 
hazardous duties for which they are commissioned. 
Sixteenth: The explosive materials are not secured due to stuffing the filling 
charges in a portion of the targets. 
Seventeenth: There are five oil wells in the sector of the 7th Infantry Division that 
have not been prepared for destruction because they are located in a mine field. 
Suggestions: 
First: Destruction recommendations should be issued by the headquarters of the divisions to 
guarantee that the implementing elements are completely familiar with them. 
Second: Fit all targets prepared for in two ways: an electric deferred destruction 
circuit and an ordinary one. 
Third: Prepare the plan to be used by the tanks and artillery to guarantee the 
destruction of the targets listed in Fourth above; assign the detonation units for these tasks 
and do not replace them or commission them for any duty other than their 
responsibility. 
Fourth: Representatives of the Ministry of Oil and Military Engineering should place 
the filling charges in the designated places in the oil wells. 
Fifth: Forms 822 and 823 should be used by everyone up to the level of the 
commander of the destruction plan and the commander of the iginition plan. 
Sixth: Assign a destruction group that is sufficient [in number] and armed, besides the 
ones shown in the above forms. 
Seventh: Establish a central-superintendent body for the deferred destruction in the 
headquarters of the divisions to guarantee coordination between the Destruction 
Guard Groups and the Destruction and Ignition Groups and the delegation of authority. 
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Eighth: Secure an effective and efficient system that guarantees communicating 
impromptu orders to the implementing elements, by using wire or wireless means or 
persons, as the situation may develop. 
Ninth: Allow sufficient time to increase preparedness from security to destruction and 
ignition when orders are given, by preparing additional engineering units and enough 
vehicles and motor-cycles to secure the quick movement of the implementors. 
Tenth: Secure the fuses still needed. (The regiment has already submitted a request 
form). 
Eleventh: It is preferred that the engineering units responsible for destruction as well as 
the guard units are not replaced except under dire conditions to ensure ease of 
implementation. 
Twelfth: Alert the different ranks of the Destruction Guard and the Destruction Units of 
the importance and danger of the duty they are assigned to shoulder through briefings and 
meetings. 
Thirteenth: Secure the materials for placing the filling charges for the targets which 
have not been supplied up to now. 
Targets: 
First: The regiment has submitted a list of 34 targets for calculating the materials 
required for deferred destruction, as per its top secret and personal memo no. 1155 of 13 
Nov. 1990. 
Second: The above list includes the targets that have been approved for preparation 
for destruction except for Martyr Adnan's Air Base as it is considered a substitute for 
Kuwait's civil airport. 
Third: The Regiment HQ has reconsidered the number of targets and deleted 26 of 
them. The number of targets prepared for deferred destruction in the regiment's sector 
stands now at eight. They are as follows: 
No. Target Area Brigade Sector 
Division 
Sector 
1 Pumps and docks Mitla' 2 Inf. 2 
2 Broadcasting and TV Station " 4 " " 
3 Telecommunications Station  58 " " 
4 Jahra-Mitla', Road  4 " " 
5 Satellite Station Urn al-'Aysh 2 " " 
6 
7 
Oil wells 
Water Tanks 
Atra 
11 
- 
- 
Rec. 1 
,. „ 
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8 Salmi-Jahra Road Salmi 108 Inf. 16 
Procedures and Remarks: 
First: Approval was obtained as per the Army Chief of Staff's top secret memo no. 
5477 of 25 Nov. 1990 to dispense the materials needed for destruction as requested by the 
regiment HQ and as shown in item First 2a above. The official was sent to receive the 
dispensed materials. 
Second: The regiment has destroyed target no. 8 listed above, i.e. Salmi-Jahra 
Road, by using engineering materials only. Other targets will be prepared for deferred 
destruction when the materials are received. 
Suggestions: 
Fist: Expedite the receiving of the destruction materials dispensed to start preparing the 
other targets for deferred destruction. 
Second: Observe what is stated in Third 1 c above when work starts, and also 
during the visit to the regiment sector to ensure that the plan is applicable when the work is 
finished and that we are informed by the regiment HQ. 
Sixth Regiment Sector 
Targets: The regiment has prepared the following targets within its sector of 
responsibility for deferred destructi 
No. Target Area Brigade 
Sector 
Division 
Sector 
1 Assembly no. 23 al-Sabriyya 78 Inf. 28 
2 
(11 oil wells) 
Assembly no. 24 
  
" " 
3 
(31 oil wells ) 
Assembly no. 15 al-Rawdatain  " " 
4 
(31 oil wells) 
Assembly no. 25 
  
" " 
5 
(17 oil wells) 
Assembly no. 32 al-Ritqa  " " 
6 
(17 oil wells) 
Assembly no. 12 
   
7 
(26 oil wells) 
Bubiyan Bridge Khawr al- 90 Inf. 34 
  Sabbiyya   
Procedures and Remarks: 
First: Forms 822 and 823 have been filled out by the regiment commander only. 
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Second: A committee has been formed in the regiment HQ to follow up the 
destructions. 
Third: Only 39 oil wells have not been finally prepared for deferred destruction 
because materials have not been received. 
Fourth: Destruction guards have not been assigned to all targets across the Bubiyan 
Bridge; instead the regiment personnel have been depended on [for that purpose]. 
Fifth: The oil wells have been fitted with one destruction method, either ordinary or 
electric, because of the current lack of wires. 
Sixth: Insufficient engineering personnel have been assigned to the targets. 
Suggestions: Same as 1 c of the Third Regiment above except for "third" because of 
the absence of electricity and water desalination stations in the regiment's sector. 
Recommendations: 
1) Inform the Regiments (3,4 and 6) of the suggestions stated in the Committee 
resolution. 
2) Appoint another time for the committee to visit the sectors of the above regiments to 
immediately check all the shortcomings mentioned above. 
 
Resolution issued on 6 November 1990 
 
Signed by 
Lt. Col. Staff (Infantry) Col. (Eng. Oper.) Col. Staff (Armor) 
Ali Sulaiman Khalaf Muwaffaq Bashir Abdul-Rahman Mohammed Abd Aziz 
Representative of Military Representative of Military Representative of Military 
Operations Dept. Operations Dept. Operations Dept. 
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Document 11 
 
Document 11's subject is a "request for an Iraqi engineer specialized in petroleum affairs" to 
identify the important positions in the targets designated for preparation for destruction. 
 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
HQ 
29th Infantry Division 
Administration and Supplies  
No. M15/1104 
Date 5 Nov., 1990. 
 
To: Command, Third Regiment (Supplies) 
Subject: Request for an Iraqi engineer specialized in petroleum affairs. 
 
Please acquire the approval of the concerned authorities to dispatch an Iraqi 
engineer specialized in petroleum affairs to identify the important places and 
equipment in the targets prepared for destruction so as to determine point of depth 
and priority when requesting the implementation of the upcoming detonation 
operations. Please inform us. 
 
Colonel (Armor) 
Riad Hassan Kazem 
Per/Commander 
29th Infantry Division 
 
cc:    29th Inf. Div.: Movements Dept.  
29th Inf. Div.: Intelligence Dept. 
29th Inf. Div.: Security Dept. 
 
Third Regiment: Field Eng. Battalion: Your 
memo no. 6464 of 3/11/1990 
 
Documents Archives (A/B) 
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Document 13 
Document 13 with the subject "Information" identifies the position of filling 
bursting charges at the heads of the wells and the types of explosives used. 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
                                                                                               
137/27/12/80 
Top Secret 
 
HQ 
18 Field Engineering Battalion Movements   
No. M/6/366 
Date: 26 December 1990 
 
To: 2nd Field Engineering Division 
18th Field Engineering Battalion 
Subject: Information 
 
[Reference to] top secret memo no. 3769 of 22 December 1990 of 18th Division 
Command (Movements). Please provide us with the following and inform us through 
a messenger: 
 
1. Number and type of explosives prepared for blowing up each installation, and 
the reserve thereof available 
 
2. A detailed plan of the destruction operation 
 
3. Provide us with a detailed report about the positive and negative aspects of 
the detonation process as regards the operation of destroying the installations. 
 
Captain Nabhan Fa'iq Hasan 
pp. Commander, 18th Field Engineering Battalion  
26/12/1990 
 
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
A list of explosives received by 2nd Field Engineering Company and 18th Field 
Engineering Battalion: 
No. Material Type Total Used Reserve Remarks 
I Explosive boxes 573 331 242  
2 Fuses 13.2 km 13.20 km -  
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3 Ignition cord 15.7 km 15.7 km -  
4 Electric igniters 530 230 300  
5 Ordinary igniters 102 -- 102  
6 Capsules 330 -- 330  
7 Safety cords 50 meters -- 50 meters  
8 Electric safety cord     
 Kindler 15 -- 15  
 
 
 
 
 
Document 13 - continued 
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Document 21 
This document shows that the officer who received the explosives 
conducted a drill to ensure that they were faultless. 
Brother Lt. Abdul-Wahed 
I carried out an experiment on the ignition cord I received from you but it did not 
kindle. My regards for the commanding officer and all the officers. 
 
                                                                                                           2nd Lt. 
                                                                                                         Abdul-Razzaq Rawdan 
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Appendix 4 
International Environmental Law: 
First of all, it is important to face the issue of whether a war has any effect on 
treaty obligations. It has been said that, in case of war, a distinction should be observed 
between the subject matter of the treaty. Therefore, if the treaty to which belligerents are 
parties concerns the war issue, the treaty obligations will continue binding on both sides. 
However, other treaties dealing with other issues, either bilateral or multilateral, 
will be suspended in case of the existence of war.1038 The suspension is only between the 
belligerents. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or Between International Organizations  rejects the notion 
that war may affect the parties’ obligations. 1039      
Discussion of the international environmental system requires dividing the 
discussion into two sections. The first section concerns the so-called soft environmental 
laws or instruments while the second section focuses on hard environmental laws. The 
differences between the two types of laws will be clarified through examining both types 
in terms of their definitions and examples.    
 
 
                                                 
1038 Rashid Al-Enezee, Al-Qanoon Al-Dwalee Al-Aam [International Public Law] 369 (Kuwait University 
1997) (Arabic).  
1039 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between 
International Organizations art. 73, 25 ILM 543 (1986).  
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I. Soft Law 
Soft Law is “Guidelines, policy declarations, or codes of conduct that set 
standards of conduct but are not legally binding.”1040 Soft Law arises from those rules 
that are neither strictly binding nor completely lacking in legal significance.1041 The 
distinction between soft and hard law is not a precise matter because in some cases it is 
possible to find soft obligations in hard law such as a framework treaty.1042  
Soft law might “…come in a richly kaleidoscopic variety of forms. Yet at their 
centre stand two primary instruments. The first instrument is the voluntary standards that 
serve as equivalent to formally legislated and ratified governmental law and regulation. 
The second instrument consists of the informal institutions at the international, 
transnational, and national levels that depend on the voluntarily applied participation, 
resources, and consensual actions of their members, rather than on the formally mandated 
participation and regularly assessed obligatory contributions, organization, resources, and 
sanctions of the institutions itself.”1043   
Soft law can be created by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As a result, 
soft laws may pave the way to create hard laws in the future.1044 Soft laws can be 
categorized or found within three groups of instruments, “(1) so called ‘non-binding’ 
agreements, such as the Helsinki records, (2) ‘voluntary’ codes of conduct for 
                                                 
1040 Black’s Law Dictionary Special Abridged Eighth Edition Created in Honor of the 100 the Anniversary 
of AALL. 1159.   
1041 David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 250 (Foundation 1998).   
1042 David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 944 (Foundation 1998).   
1043 John J. Kirton & Michael J. Triebilcock eds., Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global 
Governance 4 (Ashgate Publishing Company 2004).   
1044 Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 182 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003); 
Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 
432 (1991). 
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transnational corporations, and (3) resolutions of international organizations, of which 
General Assembly resolutions are the leading examples.”1045     
The distinction between principles based on their legal status is criticized.1046 
Thus, it has been argued that the debate over the legal status of any environmental norms 
is misplaced by claiming that these norms, regardless of their legal status, “can play a 
significant role by setting the terms of the debate, providing evaluative standards, serving 
as a basis to criticize other states’ actions, and establishing a framework of principles 
within which negotiation may take place to develop more specific norms, usually in 
treaties.”1047 There are social reasons that lead to the creation of soft law phenomena.1048 
Soft law form exists at both international and national levels.1049 Moreover, soft laws 
might have their impact on national legislation.1050 Examples of soft laws on international 
environmental issues are the Stockholm Declaration, the World Charter of Nature and the 
Rio Declaration. 
      
                                                 
1045 Quoted in Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 183 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 
2003). 
1046 Daniel Bodarsky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 105, 119 (1995). 
1047 Daniel Bodarsky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 119 (1995); Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of 
the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 434 (1991). 
1048 Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
420, 420-22 (1991).  
1049 Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
420, 422 (1991). 
1050 Pierre-Marie Dapuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
420, 434 (1991). 
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a. The Stockholm Declaration1051  
 The Stockholm Declaration was the fruit of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in 1972. This Declaration indirectly approached the protection of 
the environment during armed conflict. It is not clear whether the Declaration was meant 
to be applicable in the time of armed conflict. However, the principles set by the 
Declaration do not come into conflict with the existence of armed conflict. Thus, there is 
nothing in the Declaration that prevents its principles from applying in the time of armed 
conflict. 
 The fundamental principle in the Declaration pertinent to the destruction of the 
environment is principle 21. This principle mandates states to “ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”1052 There is no doubt that 
Kuwait, during the Iraqi invasion, can be considered as an occupied territory, within or 
under Iraq’s control. 
 Also, principle 7 requires states to “take all possible steps to prevent pollution of 
the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living 
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses 
of the sea.” 1053 Moreover, principle 26 protects the environment through restricting the 
                                                 
1051 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
1052 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
1053 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 7, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
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use of weapons, such as nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which 
negatively affect the environment.1054  
Although both Kuwait and Iraq participated in the Stockholm Conference and 
approved its Declaration, the Declaration is not an effective tool for criminal trial on 
several grounds. First, it is not a binding instrument.1055 Second, principle 22 
recommends only that the potential remedy for those activities which caused harm is civil 
in nature.1056 Third, the Declaration imposes obligations on states, not individuals. In 
sum, the Declaration might be considered an important factor to hold Iraq, as a state, 
civilly liable but not its citizens.   
b. The World Charter of Nature1057 
 The World Charter of Nature is another soft law instrument which was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1982. This instrument sets general principles 
governing activities harmful to the environment either in peace or time of armed conflict. 
Principle 5 deals explicitly with warfare activities by stating, “Nature shall be secured 
against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities.”1058 In addition, 
                                                 
1054 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 26, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
1055 See Shilpi Gupta, Iraq’s Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
251, 264 (1993).  
1056 Article 22 provides “States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability 
and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within 
the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.” Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 
1416 (1972). 
1057 World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/37/51 (1982); 22 ILM 455 (1983). 
1058 World Charter for Nature princ. 5, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. 
Doc. A/37/51 (1982); 22 ILM 455 (1983). 
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principle 20 requires states’ avoidance of those “Military activities damaging to 
nature.”1059  
 Again, the internationally customary principle which prohibits causing harm to 
another state’s territorial environment was included in the Charter. In the debate 
concerning the legal status of the Charter, some have argued that the Charter is 
considered binding because it was adopted by 111 states.1060  Regardless of the legal 
status of the Charter, the principles provided by the Charter cannot be a basis for 
prosecution of the crimes against the environment committed during the Gulf war for the 
same reasons mentioned above in regard to the Stockholm declaration.       
c. The Rio Declaration1061  
 The Rio Declaration was adopted at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. This Declaration did not advance the rules regarding protecting the environment. 
There is no doubt that the failure to provide more protection was motivated by the desire 
to reach universal agreement regarding the protection of the environment. The focus in 
this Declaration was to solve the two combating interests, economic development and the 
preservation of the environment. Thus, the effort was directed toward creating a 
mechanism in order to compromise on the interests in conflict. 
                                                 
1059 World Charter for Nature princ. 20, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. 
Doc. A/37/51 (1982); 22 ILM 455 (1983). 
1060 Resorting to “general principles recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international law, it has 
been said that such a number of adopting states (111 states) renders the Charter a binding instrument. See 
Stephanie Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International 
Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT’L L. 165 (1992) cited in  Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed 
Conflict 187 n.268 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003). 
1061 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 
(1992). 
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 However, the Declaration continues the affirmation of principles covering 
activities harming the environment, whether these activities were military or non-
military. For instance, principle 24, acknowledging the destruction of the environment 
during the Gulf War, provides, “Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable 
development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the 
environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as 
necessary.”1062 
 Principle 13 of the Declaration repeats the same remedy which should be 
expected in case of harm caused by one state to another.1063 After reviewing the 
principles of the Declaration, no one can reach the conclusion that the Declaration has 
any plain rule regarding criminal responsibility, the individual’s obligations, or the legal 
status which makes the Declaration binding for Iraq and its nationals, especially since 
Iraq did not participate in the Conference.      
II. Hard Law 
Hard laws under the international law regime represent basically the primary 
sources for international law. Sources mainly are international customs and international 
conventions. Since international environmental law has been recently developed, custom 
has not played a significant role yet. Consequently, the focus will be on international 
                                                 
1062 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 
ILM 874 (1992). 
1063 Principle 13 provides, “States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the 
victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and 
more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for 
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas 
beyond their jurisdiction.” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 13, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
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conventional law. The review will focus on major environmental problems facing the 
international community.      
a. Land–Based Pollution 
It has been reported that 80% of all marine pollution comes from sources that are 
located on land.1064 Pollutants generated on land travel in many ways through the 
atmosphere, rivers, canals, underground watercourses, and outfalls. Moreover, urban 
expansion into coastal areas has exacerbated the problem of land-based marine pollution. 
In sum, the problem of land-based pollution has loomed as more problematic due to 
urban and economic growth.  
Oil is one of eight groups of pollutants that are deposited into the sea and the 
ocean.1065 The sources of these pollutants are various. For instance, nutrients are 
introduced into the marine environment through runoff from agricultural lands, discharge 
of domestic sewage, industrial effluents, and atmospheric emissions.1066 Increased 
amounts of nutrients in the sea leads to phytoplankton growth which causes 
decomposition of organic materials. This process ends up with depletion of oxygen 
causing the death of fish and other marine life.  
The control of land-based pollution is one of the hardest tasks on several grounds. 
First, it requires controlling domestic pollution which leads to control of the sovereign 
                                                 
1064 Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26, Ch.17.  
1065 Other chemicals are chemical nutrients, sewage and bacterial agents, organic chemicals, metals, 
sediments and litter, radioactive substances, and heat.”  IMO/FAO/UN.ESCO-
ICO/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP: Joint Group of Exports on the Scientific Aspects of Marine 
Environmental Protection, Protecting the Ocean from Land-Based Activities, 2.2.1 (June 2001).     
1066 IMO/FAO/UN.ESCO-ICO/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP: Joint Group of Exports on the Scientific 
Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection, Protecting the Ocean from Land-Based Activities, 2.2.3 (June 
2001).   
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rights of states to pollute their own territory states rarely accept that. Secondly, the 
scientific difficulties of demonstrating pathways and sources are immense. Thirdly, 
controlling land-based pollution demands generally expensive measures which sacrifice 
states’ economy. The international community’s legal response to such a problem was 
through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Montreal 
Guidelines. 
i. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea1067 
Article 207 (1) of the Convention requires states to adopt measures “to prevent, 
reduce and control…” land-based pollution, “taking into account internationally agreed 
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.”1068 However, no formal 
standards even exist at the global level for land-based pollution. Article 122-123 controls 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, like the Gulf.  
Looking for standards regarding land-based pollution, states resort to the 
Montreal Guidelines.1069 The Montreal Guidelines are a set of recommendations 
compiled by a Working Group of Experts under UNEP auspices. It suggested that states 
adopt national legislation, regional agreements or any future global agreements on land-
based pollution. 
                                                 
1067 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982) (entered into 
force Nov. 16, 1994). 
1068 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 207 (1), 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982) 
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
1069 Montreal Guidelines for the Protection Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based 
Pollution, UNEP/GC.13/9/add.3, UNEP/GC/DEC/13/1811., UNEP ELPG No.7 (1985).  
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Neither the Convention nor the guidelines set up any provision for criminal 
responsibility in case of any violation of these standards. No doubt, states can adopt 
legislation or regulations containing criminal remedies for a violation of land-based 
pollution standards. However, neither Kuwait nor Iraq has adopted these remedies upon 
which criminal responsibility can be based.  
ii. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution and its Protocols 1070  
The only regional convention which exists, relating to the environment in the Gulf 
and to which both Iraq and Kuwait are parties, is the Kuwait Regional Convention for the 
Cooperation on the Protections of the Marine Environment from Pollution and its 
protocols.    
The Convention is the fruit of the Kuwait Regional Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries held on April 23, 1978. The Convention entered into force on June 30, 
1979. The parties are: Bahrain, Qatar, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates. The Convention is a comprehensive umbrella agreement for the 
protection of the marine environment. It identifies the pollution sources and requires 
controlling these sources. The sources are ships, dumping, land-based sources, 
exploration and exploitation of the sea bed, and other human activities.   
 It also identifies other environmental management issues for which co-operative 
efforts are to be made. The convention contains provisions dealing with technical 
assistance and liability. Article III of the convention provides, “The Contracting States 
                                                 
1070 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution, April 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 (on file with author).  
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shall, individually and/or jointly, take all appropriate measures…to prevent, abate and 
combat pollution of the marine environment in the Sea Area….”1071 In addition, Article 
XIII laid down, “The Contracting States undertake to co-operate in the formulation and 
adoption of appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of: (a) Civil Liability 
and compensation for damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment, 
bearing in mind applicable international rules and procedures relating to those matters; 
and (b) liability and compensation for damage resulting from violation of obligations 
under the Convention and its Protocols.”1072   
 With the Convention, the Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in 
Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in case of Emergency1073 was 
adopted.  Article I (2) of the Protocol defines “Marine Emergency” as “[A]ny casualty, 
incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in substantial pollution or 
imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine environment by oil or other 
harmful substances and including, inter alia, collisions, strandings and other incidents 
involving ships, includes tankers, blow-outs arising from petroleum drilling and 
production activities, and the presence of oil or other harmful substances arising from the 
failure of industrial installations.”1074 The Protocol aims for cooperation in case the 
occurence of a marine emergency. Parties to the Convention are parties to the Protocol.  
                                                 
1071 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution art. III, April 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 (on file with author). 
1072 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution art. XIII, April 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 (on file with author). 
1073 Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and other Harmful 
Substances in Case of Emergency, April 24, 1978 (on file with author).  
1074 Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances in Case of Emergency art. I (2), April 24, 1978 (on file with author).  
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 Neither the Convention nor the Protocol contains any indication of an individual 
criminal responsibility in case of a violation. Obligations under the instruments are 
imposed on states, but not individuals.  In other words, they rely on states to cooperate in 
formulating the rules to determine liability. Such a lack of an effective mechanism has 
rendered the Convention and the Protocol unsuitable as a substantive basis for criminal 
responsibility. Although it might be considered that Iraq violated the Convention, this 
violation does not raise the criminal responsibility of the Contracting states’ citizens.      
b. Biodiversity 
Biodiversity means “the variability among living organisms from all sources 
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems.”1075 The problem of biodiversity exists because species are driven to 
extinction by predators that over hunt them; by competitors that co-opt their habitat, or 
food sources; by disease; and by natural disasters, and this mass extinction is not natural. 
The extinction rate is very high, estimated at a thousand times the natural rate. The value 
of biodiversity is very important.1076 The causes of biodiversity loss are various.1077 
In brief, human activities cause species loss either directly by consumption (food, 
clothing, ornament, pets, and raw materials) or indirectly by destroying their habitats 
(logging, slash and burn agriculture, damming rivers, draining wetlands, and 
contaminating the air and the water).  
                                                 
1075 Convention on Biological Diversity art. 2, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 
1993).  
1076 David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 939 (Foundation 1998).   
1077 David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 944 (Foundation 1998).   
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In addition, climate change and ozone depletion contribute as well to biodiversity 
loss. The consequences of biodiversity loss are based on the fact that all life on the earth 
depends for its existence on the ecosystem services such as the cycling of oxygen, carbon 
and nitrogen, maintenance of soil fertility, recycling of nutrients, decomposition of waste, 
stabilization of climate and water purification. In sum, biodiversity is essential to human 
survival and prosperity.   
 The international effort to solve this problem resulted in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD).1078 The objectives of this Convention are “the conservation 
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.”1079  
Article 3 of the Convention provides that “States have, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right 
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.”1080 Since this rule is part of international customary law, it is applicable in 
both peace and armed conflict times.  
However, this Convention cannot be a basis for individual criminal responsibility 
in case of violation of its terms. First, the Convention does not provide a criminal remedy 
                                                 
1078 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993). 
1079 Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 
1993).  
1080 The Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 
1993).  
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in case of the violation. Second, the Convention entered into force on December 29, 
1993. Therefore, assuming it has criminal provisions, adopting this Convention as a basis 
for criminal prosecution will clearly violate the basic criminal rule prohibiting retroactive 
application of the criminal law. Third, Iraq is not party to the Convention and Kuwait 
became a party on August 2, 2002. The same thing can be said regarding the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety 1081 which is considered the supplementary agreement for CBD. 
  The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) 1082 attempts to protect endangered species through restrictions on 
international trade. Its aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild 
animals and plants does not threaten their survival. It imposes on state parties an 
obligation to penalize the trade or possess the endangered species.1083 The subject matter 
of the convention does not relate to environmental destruction during armed conflict. 
However, this does not mean that the convention does not apply in the time of armed 
conflict. Such a trade can be anticipated in both peace and armed conflict times.  
    Moreover, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and 
Natural Heritage is also an international endeavor to protect another aspect of the 
environment.1084 It protects the sites which are considered both “cultural heritage” and 
“natural heritage.”1085 The Convention prohibits each state party from taking any 
                                                 
1081 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, January 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027. 
1082 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 27 UST 1087; 
TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243 (1973) (entered into force July 1, 1975). 
1083 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora art. VIII (1), 27 
UST 1087; TIAS 8249; 993 UNTS 243 (1973) (entered into force July 1, 1975). 
1084 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1073 
U.N.T.S. 151.  
1085 Article 1 of the Convention defines “cultural heritage” as “monuments: architectural works, works of 
monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave 
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measure which directly or indirectly causes the destruction of the protected sites which 
are located in another state party’s territory.1086 The Convention recognizes and protects 
examples of natural and cultural sites. Most of the listed sites are national parks. In 
addition, Article 11(4) of the Convention contains a “list of World Heritage in 
danger.”1087 
World Heritage List,” Kuwait had no 
properties which were included in that list.1088     
                                                                                                                                                
 The Convention does not provide a criminal remedy for its violation. As a matter 
of fact, the nature of the adopted remedy to fulfill the Convention obligations is a national 
policy issue. Iraq accepted the Convention in March 3, 1974 and Kuwait ratified it on 
June 6, 2002. In addition, after reviewing the “
To protect the wetlands, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention) was adopted.1089 Article 4 (1) 
provides that, “Each Contracting Party shall promote the conservation of wetlands and 
 
dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of 
history, art or science; groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of 
their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from 
the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, 
and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, 
aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.” While article 2 defines the “natural heritage” as 
“natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are 
of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; geological and physiographical 
formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and 
plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; natural sites or 
precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, 
conservation or natural beauty.” Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural 
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1073 U.N.T.S. 151.  
1086 Article 6 (3) of the convention provides “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to take any 
deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage referred to 
in Articles 1 and 2 situated on the territory of other States Parties to this Convention.” Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1073 U.N.T.S. 151.  
1087 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Culture and Natural Heritage art. 11 (4), Nov. 16, 
1972, 1073 U.N.T.S. 151. 
1088 For the list of these sites, visit  http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2006). 
1089 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 996 UNTS 245; 
TIAS 11084; 11 ILM 963 (1972) (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975). 
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waterfowl by establishing nature reserves on wetlands, whether they are included in the 
List or not, and provide adequately for their wardening.”1090 The violation of this 
Convention might raise without doubt the international responsibility of the state which 
violated the Convention’s provisions. However, individual criminal responsibility 
requires a clear and precise expression concerning the parties’ intention.    
 animal species 
including birds, mammals, reptiles, and fish. Article III (4) (a) laid down: 
r endanger the species, 
including strictly controlling the introduction of, or controlling or 
nternational legal 
instruments in this field, cannot be used to try its violators criminally.    
 
                                                
Finally, the Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
or the Bonn Convention1091 was adopted to protect the entire spectrum of
Parties that are Range States of a migratory species listed in Appendix I 
shall endeavour: a) to conserve and, where feasible and appropriate, 
restore those habitats of the species which are of importance in removing 
the species from danger of extinction; b) to prevent, remove, compensate 
for or minimize, as appropriate, the adverse effects of activities or 
obstacles that seriously impede or prevent the migration of the species; 
and c) to the extent feasible and appropriate, to prevent, reduce or control 
factors that are endangering or are likely to furthe
eliminating, already introduced exotic species.1092  
   Although some of the animals affected during the Gulf armed conflict of 1990 
are listed as endangered species, such as the Green Turtle, neither Kuwait nor Iraq are 
parties to this Convention. In sum, the Convention, as previously cited i
 
1090 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat art. 4 (1), 996 
UNTS 245; TIAS 11084; 11 ILM 963 (1972) (entered into force Dec. 21, 1975). 
1091 Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 19 ILM 15 (1980); ATS 1991/32; 
BTS 87 (1990), Cm. 1332. (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983). 
1092 Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals art. III (4)(a), 19 ILM 15 (1980); 
ATS 1991/32; BTS 87 (1990), Cm. 1332 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983). 
300 
 
Appendix 4 
 
c. G
Human activities are changing the global climate which causes unpredictable 
consequences for global weather patterns, ecosystems and human health. Human 
activities have resulted in increased concentration of gases in the atmosphere, causing 
increased global temperature. Increased temperature leads to an increase in the number of 
extreme weather events such as floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes. In addition, the 
increase of temperature might cause biodiversity loss through affected forests and 
habitats. Moreover, increasing the temperature may spread those species carrying fatal 
disease
An international effort to deal with this problem has been made through the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  All parties 
have a duty to “promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as 
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases.”  In sum, all governments 
under the Convention are obligated to gather and share information on greenhouse gas 
emissions, national policies and best practices and to launch national strategies for 
addressing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to expected impacts, including the 
provision of financial and technological support to developing countries, and to cooperate 
in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.  
                                                
lobal Climate Change 
s such as malaria and typhus.1093 
1094
1095
 
1093 David Hunter ET Al., International Environmental Law and Policy 2-3 (Foundation 1998).   
1094 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 
102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994). 
1095 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4 (1)(d), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty 
Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849, (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 
1994). 
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Each party must take climate change considerations into account in domestic 
policies and actions.1096 Article 3 (3) adopts the Precautionary Approach. It states “the 
parties shall take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.”1097 Such an article applies equally to 
both military and non-military actions. However, this Convention does not include a 
direct rule which criminalizes the action of creating emissions. In addition, Kuwait 
became a party to the treaty in 1994 while Iraq is not a party. Moreover, the Convention 
entered into force on March 21, 1994. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change1098 does not provide any provision in 
criminal matters as well. 
d. Ozone Depletion 
The ozone layer shields the Earth from high-energy ultra-violet radiation (UV-B) 
from the sun. UV-B is extremely harmful to human health and the environment. 
Synthetic chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) destroy the ozone layer more 
quickly than it can be replenished. The increased amount of UV-B radiation striking the 
earth’s surface may increase the rates of skin cancer, suppress the body’s immune 
response system, inhibit the growth of many plants such as cotton, soybeans, and certain 
trees, alter the biodiversity terrestrial ecosystems, and cause developmental abnormalities 
in fish and other species. 
                                                 
1096 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4 (1)(f), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty 
Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849, (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 
1994). 
1097 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3 (3), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty 
Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849, (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 
1994).  
1098 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998) ( entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).  
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Through the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna 
Convention)1099 the international community effort began to reduce the global production 
and consumption of ozone layer depleting substances. Article 2 (1) of the Convention 
asserts that nations agree to take “appropriate measures to protect human health and the 
environment against adverse effects resulting from human activities which modify or are 
more likely to modify the ozone layer.”1100 Neither specified measures nor substances 
harmful to the ozone layer are mentioned by the Convention. Thus, the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was adopted.1101 
Its goal is to eliminate the ozone-depleting substances. (Preamble) It has been 
amended five times: London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Vienna (1995), Montreal 
(1997) and Beijing (1999). The military use of chlorofluorocarbons is deemed a breach of 
both the Vienna Convention1102 and the Montreal Protocol and London Adjustments.1103 
Neither the Convention nor its Protocols provide a basis for individual criminal 
responsibility.  
 
 
                                                 
1099 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, TIAS No. 11,097; 1513 U.N.T.S. 323; 26 ILM 1529 
(1987) (entered into force Sep. 22, 1988). 
1100 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 2 (1), TIAS No. 11,097; 1513 U.N.T.S. 323; 26 
ILM 1529 (1987) (entered into force Sep. 22, 1988). 
1101 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1; 26 ILM 1550 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). 
1102 John S. Hannah, Chlorofluorocarbon: A Scientific Environmental, and Regulatory Assessment, 31 
A.F.L. REV. 85, 92 (1989) cited in Nada Al-Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 157 n. 74 
(Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003).    
1103 David D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of International 
Environmental Law Lawmaking, 14 HOUS. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 755, 760 (1991) cited in Nada Al-
Duaij, Environmental Law of Armed Conflict 157 n. 75 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003).    
303 
 
Appendix 4 
e. Toxic and Hazardous Substances  
Despite the fact that toxic and hazardous substances are responsible for air and 
water pollution, unlike in some national legal systems,1104 there is no universally adopted 
or accepted definition of hazardous substances. However, a toxic substance can be 
identified by a number of factors including the length of time it will persist in the 
environment , how it tends to build up in the tissue of lower species, the extent to which it 
reacts with other substances to form a more harmful contaminant, and whether it 
produces effects in humans.1105  
The international legal response to this problem was the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.1106 The 
Convention aims to control the movement, by either importing or exporting, of hazardous 
waste between the state parties. The Convention considers the movement criminal.1107  
The Convention defines hazardous waste as those substances which are explosive, 
flammable, oxidizing, poisonous, infectious, corrosive, toxic, or any substances capable 
of forming other materials which possess any of the previous characteristics after 
                                                 
1104 In national legal systems, like that of the United States, toxic and chemical substances have been 
identified differently for each class of pollutant and for differing regulatory schemes. Hazardous waste, 
defined under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, is any solid waste which because of its 
concentration, quantity, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or significantly 
contribute to an increase in mortality or to irreversible illness. See Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §6903; Hazardous air pollutants, under the Clean Air Act, are those substances which 
may be carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogentic, neurotoxin, or those that cause adverse environmental effects 
through bioaccumulation. See the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4712 (b)(2)(B). For the hazardous waste 
definition in the hazardous waste statute, see Jeffrey G. Miller ET Al, The Law of Hazardous Waste 
Disposal and Remediation, Cases-Legislation-Regulations-Policies 131-191 (West Publishing Co. 1996).           
1105 G. Tyler Miller, Living In the Environment 397-402 (12th ed. 2002). 
1106 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992).  
1107 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal art. 4 (3), 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992).  
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disposal.1108 Although oil can be considered waste under the Convention,1109 Kuwait has 
been a party to the Basel convention since 1993 while Iraq is not a party. There is another 
convention which has lists of wastes.1110 However, the jurisdiction of this Convention 
covers only those activities which end in Africa.        
f. Transboundary Air Pollution 
Three specific problems can be singled out: (1) Particulate matter (airborne dust 
and smoke), (2) Lead which is produced primarily from vehicle emissions, and (3) Indoor 
air pollution. The migration of air pollutants has created major global problems such as 
climate change, ozone layer depletion, and nuclear fallout. Examples of air pollutants are 
sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides. Pollutants emitted into the atmosphere from industrial 
and commercial sources and automobile exhausts can form gases or become dissolved in 
cloud vapor and raindrops. Those pollutants may produce new toxic chemicals that can 
be transported many hundreds miles by winds, deposited on the soil or in the water or 
returned to the earth by rainfall. Acid rain represents a classic example of the global 
transportation of pollutants.  
The prevailing rule in this issue is that one country may not cause significant 
transboundary environmental harm to another.1111 Although there is no global 
international treaty dealing with air pollution, the international community’s legal 
                                                 
1108 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992) Annex III. 
1109 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126; 28 ILM 657 (1989) (entered into force May. 5, 1992) Annex I. 
1110 Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement 
and Management of Hazardous Waste within Africa art. 2, ann. I, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 775.    
1111 Thomas W. Merril, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L. J. 931, 951 n. 106-07 
(1997). 
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response to this problem is the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution.1112 The Convention was created under the auspices of the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Europe in 1979 and counts most countries in the Northern Hemisphere 
as parties, including the United States, Canada, and Russia. The Convention embraces a 
duty not to cause transboundary harm.1113 It focuses generally on combating acid rain.  
Long-Range air pollution is air pollution “which has adverse effects in the area 
under the jurisdiction of another state at such a distance that it is not generally possible to 
distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources.”1114 
Article 2 of the Convention mandates that states endeavor to limit, reduce, and prevent air 
pollution.1115  
Eight protocols have been added to the Convention. These protocols require 
specific emission limitations for sulphur dioxide (1985, 1994), nitrogen oxide (1988), and 
volatile organic pollutants (1998), and include a protocol which set 2010 emissions 
ceilings for four pollutants: sulphur, NOx, VOCs and ammonia. Neither Kuwait nor Iraq 
are parties to this convention. This Convention and its protocols do not adopt individual 
criminal responsibility in case of their violation.   
 
 
1112 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, TIAS 10541; 1302 U.N.T.S. 217; 18 ILM 
1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983). 
1113 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution preamble ¶ 5, TIAS 10541; 1302 UNTS 217; 
18 ILM 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).  
1114 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 1 (b), TIAS 10541; 1302 U.N.T.S. 217; 
18 ILM 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).  
1115 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 2, TIAS 10541; 1302 U.N.T.S. 217; 18 
ILM 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983). 
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Documentary Evidence 
Nationally and internationally, criminal conviction can be secured by proving 
beyond reasonable doubt that an accused committed the criminal action with which he is 
charged. This conviction can be obtained by different types of evidence, either oral or 
written evidence. The evidence has to be admitted by a court after being the subject of 
arguments by parties.1116 In international criminal law, evidence rules are set by those 
international instruments constituting criminal proceedings. For instance, article (89) of 
ICTY’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure sets the general principles concerning 
evidentiary issues.1117 
By and large, international judges, unlike national judges, are not bound by these 
national technical and strict rules governing evidence.1118 Therefore, in case of the 
absence of evidence rules in an international instrument creating an international criminal 
tribunal, a chamber “[S]hall apply rules of evidence which will best favour a fair 
determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute 
[ICTY statute] and the general principles of law.”1119 
                                                 
1116 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 421 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
1117 Article 89 of ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides “(A) A Chamber shall apply the rules of 
evidence set forth in this section, and shall not be bound by national rules of evidence. (B) In cases not 
otherwise provided for in this section, a Chamber shall apply rules of evidence which will best favour a fair 
determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general 
principles of law. (C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value. 
(D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to 
ensure a fair trial. (E) A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of 
court. (F) A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow, 
in written form. ” Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).  
1118 See generally Gideon Boas, Admissibility of Evidence under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the ICTY: Development of the ‘Flexibility Principle’ in Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence 263 
(Richard May et. al. eds., 2001). 
1119 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89 (A)(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006).  
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As a result of this flexibility, international criminal tribunals or courts may create 
some evidence rules to preserve other provisions of their legislation. For example, a court 
may take a judicial notice concerning facts of common knowledge.1120 In Saddam 
Hussein’s case, an ad hoc international criminal tribunal might have taken a judicial 
notice, from U.N. records, regarding issues relating to the nature of the armed conflict 
and the damage that resulted. No doubt this tool, judicial notice, contributes to expediting 
the judicial proceedings, preserving the defendant’s right to be tried without undue delay. 
In terms of evidence, there are several types of evidence, oral and written or 
documentary evidence. Documentary evidence is mainly reviewed in the following part 
as this type of evidence is at hand at the current time in the case of Saddam Hussein.1121 
Documentary evidence includes both written statements offered in lieu of oral evidence 
and “anything on which information is recorded.”1122 Thus, documentary evidence 
encompasses photographs, video-tapes, audio-tapes, digital records, sketches, maps, other 
written documents containing military orders and reports, letters, diaries, books, journals, 
newspapers and dossiers.  
In one aspect, documentary evidence might be better than oral evidence 
(witnesses’ testimony). This is true when a trial is held years after the alleged events and 
witnesses have difficulties remembering details of the events. Moreover, it is said that, 
“A challenge for the prosecution therefore is to connect the accused with the crimes 
charged. There may be many witnesses to testify as to the occurrence of a particular 
atrocity, but very few to link that atrocity to a particular accused at a higher level of 
                                                 
1120 See generally Eugene O’Sullivan, Judicial Notice in Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence 263 
(Richard May et. Al. eds., 2001). 
1121 See infra Ch.III. 
1122 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 53 (January 27, 
2000).  
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authority.”1123 On the contrary, documentary evidence, like military orders, speaks for 
itself. In addition, it is no surprise that international criminal practice has proved that 
documentary evidence is deemed to be a necessary path to expedite the trial.1124   
In international criminal law, documentary evidence has been used to prove 
several issues such as ‘crime-base’ evidence, whether there were widespread and 
systemic attacks on the civilian population or property, issues of command structure, and 
crimes that occurred in the context of an international armed conflict. Plus, it is used to 
corroborate, support, prove or disprove case circumstances.  
Within international criminal practice, distinguishing between two stages, 
admissibility and evidence weighing stages, should be noted. In light of the admissibility 
stage, documentary evidence can be admitted either before or during the trial1125 and its 
sources can be individuals, states, and non-governmental organizations.1126  
Concerning the standard of admissibility of documentary evidence, it is ruled that, 
“[T]he standard of proof required for admissibility [of documentary evidence] should be 
lower than the standard of proof required in the final determination of the matter at hand 
through the weighing up of the probative value of the evidence by the Chamber: that 
comes later. Admission requires simply the proof that evidence has some probative 
                                                 
1123 Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 11 (Transnational Publishers 
2002).  
1124 Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 256 (Transnational Publishers 
2002).  
1125 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 657 (Transnational Publishers 2003).               
1126 For instance, article 18 (1) of ICTY statute states “The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio 
or on the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations 
organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.” Statute of the International Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 18 (1), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 
48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993).   
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values.”1127 Therefore, as a general rule, evidence to be admitted needs to be relevant and 
have probative value.1128  
As a result, there are three challenges or objections the defense can raise 
regarding documentary evidence. These challenges relate to relevance, reliability, and 
repetition.1129 The practice concerning these challenges is beyond the scope of this paper. 
On the other side, weighing documentary evidence requires considering the 
source and the authenticity of a document. The source of the document might affect its 
credibility. However, it does not follow that if the source is the party which itself adduces 
the document, the document is considered unreliable.1130 
By and large, the authenticity of a document is an issue a defense might raise 
during a trial. Moreover, if the defense did not raise this issue, the trial court “may 
request verification of the authenticity of the evidence obtained out of court.”1131 In order 
to determine the authenticity of a document, several considerations, such as the form, 
content and purported use of the document, plus the position of the parties on the matter, 
should be taken into account.1132 Moreover, it is not sufficient to rely on one of the 
previous considerations to prove or disprove the authenticity of the document.1133 
In terms of the form of a document, several elements should be considered such 
as whether a document is an original copy; whether it is enrolled with institutional 
                                                 
1127 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶56 (January 27, 
2000).  
1128 Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89 (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). 
1129 Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 239-40 (Transnational 
Publishers 2002). 
1130 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 61-63  (January 27, 
2000).  
1131 Rules of Procedure and Evidence art. 89 (E), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (2006). 
1132 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 66 (January 27, 
2000). 
1133 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 72 (January 27, 
2000).  
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authorities; whether it contains a signature; whether it is sealed, certified, or stamped; 
whether it is officially authorized by an authority; and whether it is duly executed.1134 
The content of the document is another factor to be considered, especially with 
“its relation to oral testimony given before the Chamber pertaining to the content of the 
document.”1135 In the same context, it is ruled that the absence of a signature or a stamp 
from the document does not necessarily mean it lacks authenticity.1136  
Internationally, documentary evidence does not need to be produced through a 
witness. However, it should be noted that, “[T]he defense’s rights include: how the 
evidence was obtained, the chain of custody, potential tampering, and confronting and 
cross-examining those who obtained the evidence and those who handled it.”1137 
Moreover, international criminal conviction does not require a corroboration rule. 
Therefore, conviction can be obtained based upon, “[A] single testimony provided such 
testimony is, in its opinion [Chamber’s opinion], relevant and credible.”1138 This rule 
extends to all types of evidence, including documentary evidence. In short, evidence 
needs to be reasonable and reliable.1139  
                                                 
1134 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 67 (January 27, 
2000).  
1135 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 70 (January 27, 
2000).  
1136 Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-1, Admission of Evidence Order, ¶ 20  (February 
15, 2002). 
1137 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 657 (Transnational Publishers 2003); 
Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 245 (Transnational Publishers 
2002).             
1138 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 2, 1998) ¶ 135; 
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence (January 27, 2000) ¶ 43; 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment and Sentence (December 6, 1999) ¶ 18. 
1139 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (June 1, 
2001) ¶ 320-22.  
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Documents containing military orders, reports, maps and photographs are 
admitted before international criminal tribunals.1140 In addition to paper documents, 
video-tapes, audio-tapes, and digital records are included within this accepted evidence.  
Real evidence is another source for obtaining criminal conviction. This evidence 
“consists of any object presented to the court as evidence”1141 and can be gathered by 
visiting the locus of the crime. Even though, in the case of those trials held years after the 
events, it might be thought that real evidence will not play a critical role, this is not true. 
Depending on the ability of the prosecution, the real evidence might be admitted if the 
prosecution can demonstrate that this evidence has probative value, a strong chain of 
custody, and there is no possibility of evidence tampering.  
Finally, in the near future, pursuing crimes against the environment before the 
International Criminal Court will depend extensively upon expert witnesses. This type of 
evidence is necessary to determine environmental impacts and their causes.  
 
1140 Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 246-52 (Transnational 
Publishers 2002).             
1141 Judge Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence 256 (Transnational Publishers 
2002).              
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International Armed Conflict Instruments that are inapplicable to Saddam 
Hussein’s Case  
As a matter of fact, the laws of armed conflict have a long history1142 and, during 
that history, they have expanded from the protection of objects to the protection of people 
and the environment. In the context of environmental protection, the protection was 
indirect at the beginning. Later on, explicit protection became clear.1143 In the light of 
indirect protection of the environment, this protection can be accomplished by other 
conventions controlling the means of warfare. For example, the protection of the 
environment can be achieved through other conventions which limit the right of 
belligerents to use certain weapons. 
However, this study is meant to explore the gaps in the international law regime 
concerning the explicit protection of the environment as an object. Such explicit 
protection is required and essential for closing any future debate that might be raised 
regarding whether laws of armed conflict adequately protect the environment.   
Moreover, in terms of the general principles applicable to any military action regardless 
of its target, people or properties including the environment, one of the main goals the 
laws of armed conflict have tried to accomplish is to limit the belligerent’s right to apply 
any means of injuring the enemy’s property, including the environment. In achievement 
of such a goal, there are four main principles that control war. Those principles are: [1] 
                                                 
1142 Rerigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition in International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 87,89 
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999). 
1143 David Hunter ET AL., International Environmental Law and Policy 1368 (Foundation Press 1998).  
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Military necessity, [2] proportionality, [3] prevention of unnecessary suffering, and [4] 
discrimination between civilian and military targets.1144 
With regard to international environmental offenses committed during warfare, 
some of these principles, such as the military necessity and proportionality principles, lost 
their independence and distinction by inclusion within those articles or codes which 
protect the environment directly.1145 
Therefore, the subject of this review is trying to accomplish is to address 
international instruments protecting the environment as objects in respect to their 
applicability to the deliberate destruction of the environment committed in the Gulf War 
of 1991. The main international conventions which will be reviewed in this part of the 
paper are the Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 and 
relating to the Protection of Victims in Times of International Armed Conflict, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict.  
                                                 
1144 David Hunter ET AL., International Environmental Law and Policy 1368 (Foundation Press 1998). 
1145 For instance, compare among article 8(2)(b)(iv) of ICC statute provides “.  2. For the purpose of this 
Statute, "war crimes" means:… (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts: ….(iv)  Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause….. 
injury to …. damage to…. widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” 
See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998); and article 20 (g) of Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides  “ Any of the following war crimes 
constitute a crime against the peace and the security of mankind when committed in a systematic manner or 
on a large scale: (g) in the case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by 
military necessity with the intent to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment and thereby gravely prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage 
occurs.”  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 20 (g), 1996, 51 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).  
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In addition, recommendations and directions concerning protection of the 
environment are not exclusive to binding instruments such as conventions and judicial 
decisions. They might be located in non-binding instruments or so called soft laws as 
well. Although soft laws are not binding instruments, they play an essential role in 
assisting international courts in interpreting the provisions related to these instruments. 
Therefore, the beginning of this review will deal with those instruments which are not 
deemed to be binding instruments. The non-binding instruments are the draft Code of 
Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross Manual regarding Protection of the Environment during the time of Armed 
Conflict.        
Soft laws can be those drafts issued by the International Law Commission (ILC) 
concerning the laws of armed conflicts or war crimes such as the Draft Code of Crimes 
against Peace and Security of Mankind.1146 The Draft considers an intentional attack 
against the environment in international armed conflict without military necessity as a 
war crime.1147 The positive feature that can be attributed to the Draft is that it does not 
make a distinction, in light of the protection of the environment, between internal and 
international armed conflict. In addition, commentary paragraphs included and attached 
                                                 
1146 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) 
at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).  
1147 Article 20 (g) provides the fruit of 24-year development regarding environmental protection during 
armed conflict. Article 20 (g) provides “Any of the following war crimes constitute a crime against the 
peace and the security of mankind when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale: (g) in the 
case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the intent 
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby gravely 
prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage occurs.”  Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, 
corr.1, corr.3 (1996).  
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with the Draft are useful tools for international judges to use to comprehend the elements 
and extent of the offense.  
Other examples of soft laws in the field of armed conflict will be those 
recommendations, manuals, and guidelines issued by non-governmental organizations 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC.) For instance, in 1993, 
ICRC issued the "Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of 
the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict."1148 The guidelines are meant "to 
contribute in a practical and effective way to raising awareness of a precious asset which 
merits respect and protection …in time of armed conflict: the natural environment."1149 
The guidelines reaffirmed those principles protecting the environment in international 
agreements such as distinction and proportionality.  
In addition, the guidelines provide examples of international protection of the 
environment such as prohibition of transplanting indiscriminate landmines, attacks on 
historic monuments, using plants to cover military objectives, and destruction of cultural 
properties. Finally, the guidelines recommend that "the parties thereto are encouraged to 
facilitate and protect the work of impartial organizations contributing to preventing or 
repairing damage to the environment"1150 and disseminate the guideline rules by making 
them known as widely as possible.      
                                                 
1148 The guidleines are available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn38?opendocument 
(last visited Nov.11, 2006). 
1149 Paragraph 19 of the Guidelines,  
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn38?opendocument ( last visited Nov.11, 2006). 
1150 Paragraph 17 of the Guidelines, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn38?opendocument (last visited Nov.11, 2006). 
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I. The Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, 
relating to the Protection of Victims in Times of International Armed 
Conflict1151 
The Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, relating 
to the Protection of Victims in Times of International Armed Conflict is the first 
international instrument that deals with or protects the environment explicitly during 
armed conflict time.1152 It came into force in 1978.  
The Protocol applies to international armed conflicts. Its general aim is to make 
warfare less brutal and inhuman. In addition, the Protocol was drafted by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross1153 in response to the large-scale use of “Agent 
Orange” by U.S. armed forces in the Vietnam War. The pertinent articles of the Protocol 
are 35 and 55. Article 35 (1) and (3) provides: 
In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose 
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited…..3. It is prohibited to 
employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.1154 
 From the above text, it is plain that it did not address the incidental damages that 
occurred during armed conflict. In addition, it requires, in order for the Protocol to be 
violated, that three elements (widespread, long-term, and severe) be present. Long-term 
                                                 
1151 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). 
1152 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 .U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). 
1153 Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting from the Nato Military Action against 
Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117, 126 (2000). 
1154 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 35 (1),(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). 
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damage is understood as damage which lasts a period of years, if not decades.1155 The 
missing element in this text is military necessity which is a traditional justification for 
most military actions. The Protocol, at least in respect to the above article and the relative 
time of the commission of the Iraq offenses, is not considered a part of customary 
international law.1156  
 The second article is 55 which lays down: 
 Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a 
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended 
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and 
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population….. Attacks 
against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.1157 
Generally, protection of the environment can be accomplished through a couple of 
approaches. The first protects those elements of nature which are necessary to human 
survival. Therefore, this link between human suffering and the environment injures the 
protection since it requires a higher standard of proof and injuries. The second is to 
extend protection to all elements of nature, regardless of their link to human life.1158  
It seems that the Protocol adopts both approaches since the difference between 
article 55 and 35 is “Article 35… broaches the problem from the point of view of 
methods of warfare, Article 55 concentrates on the survival of the population, so that 
even though the two provisions overlap to some extent, and their tenor is similar, they do 
                                                 
1155 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary. ¶ 1452 available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750044?OpenDocument (Last visited Aug. 31, 2006). 
1156 See Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for 
International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67, 113 (1992). 
1157 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 55, 1125 UNTS 3 (1977). 
1158 Stephen C. MaCaffrey, Crimes against the Environment in International Criminal Law, Vol. I, 983 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2ed 1999). 
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not duplicate each other. (9) It will be noted that the text begins with the words "care 
shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment.”1159 
In other words, article 35 concerns this environmental destruction regardless of its 
humanitarian effects while article 55 considers the environment as a protected object and 
recognizes the link between the environment and human survival. The Protocol does not 
consider environmental destruction as a grave breach.1160 Moreover, other protection can 
be derived from the Protocol. This protection is indirect through protecting other 
objects.1161 The Protocol imposes both civil and criminal responsibility.1162 
  There is no need to examine whether the two articles, 35 and 55, are applicable to 
Iraqi action during the Gulf war, since Iraq is not party to the Protocol and the provisions 
protecting the environment were not considered part of international customary law at 
                                                 
1159 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary, ¶ 2133 available at    
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750070?OpenDocument ((Last visited Aug. 31, 2006) 
1160 See article 85 (3) of the Protocol.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). Article 
85 (5) provides that “Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, grave 
breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.” This provision is confusing regarding these 
provisions of the Protocol which are considered grave breaches; are they constituted crimes? are they only 
military crimes and thus left to local authorities to decide the fate of their actors? They only fact that can be 
inferred from the paragraph is that these are war crimes and the universal jurisdiction doctrine will not be 
applicable to them.     
1161 For instance article 54 (2) of the Protocol provides “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render 
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas 
for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to 
the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to 
move away, or for any other motive…” In addition, article 56(1) provides “Works or installations 
containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be 
made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the 
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military 
objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack 
if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent 
severe losses among the civilian population.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). 
1162 Article 86 of the Protocol deals with criminal responsibility and article 91 provides the basis for the 
civil responsibility Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). 
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least when those actions were committed. Therefore, there was no way to implement the 
provisions of the Protocol in the facts of the case without violating the principle of 
legality.  
II. ENMOD Convention1163 
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, or ENMOD Convention, was adopted by a 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution1164 ratified by thirty six countries. Like 
Protocol I, the Convention is deemed to be a response to the actions of United States 
armed forces during the Vietnam War.1165 The Convention has not gained the status of an 
international customary norm yet.1166 It entered into force October 5, 1978.  
Article I (1) of the Convention lays down the basic obligation on state parties. 
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or 
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”1167 
The Convention defines the damage requirements as: "widespread": 
encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers; "long-lasting": 
lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; and "severe": involving serious 
                                                 
1163 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.   
1164 G.A. Res. 31/72, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No.39, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).  
1165 Peter J. Richard & Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protection the Environment during 
Armed Conflict, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1047, 1063 (1999).   
1166 See Anthony Leibler, Delibrate Wartime Environmental Destruction: New Challenges for International 
Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 67, 81 (1992). 
1167 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques art. I (1), May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.   
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or significant disruption or harm to human life, and natural and economic resources or 
other assets.”1168 
The Convention is broader than Protocol I in two aspects at least. First, it does not 
require for its violation all the three conditions or adjectives (widespread, long-lasting, or 
severe). Any of these conditions may cause the violation of the Convention if it resulted 
from the use of environmental modification techniques. Secondly, the Convention does 
not apply only in armed conflict time. It covers any military activities whether in armed 
conflict, international or internal, or in peace time.  
The Convention defines environmental modification techniques as “any technique 
for changing -- through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes -- the dynamics, 
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and 
atmosphere, or of outer space.”1169 The Convention does not consider military necessity, 
self-defense, or distress as justifications to violate its terms. However, it protects only a 
party state’s territory and does not provide explicitly civil or criminal responsibility as 
remedies for its violation.   
The remedy that can be taken by the complaining state concerning a violation of 
the Convention against its territory is bilateral consultation and cooperation, an inquiry 
commission, or filing a complaint with the U.N. Security Council.1170 It seems that the 
Convention imposes its obligations on states, not individuals. Thus, the expected remedy 
                                                 
1168 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152, Understandings Regarding the Convention, 
Understanding relating Article I.   
1169 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques art. II, May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.   
1170 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques art. V (2), May 18, 1977, 31 UST 333, 1108 UNTS 152.  
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is a remedy which can be taken against the states. Finally, Iraq just signed, but has not 
ratified.1171 As a result, Iraq is not bound by the Convention’s provisions. 
III. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict 1172  
 
The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, adopted at The Hague (Netherlands) in 1954 in the wake of massive destruction 
of the cultural heritage in the Second World War, is the first international treaty of a 
world-wide nature focusing exclusively on the protection of cultural heritage in the event 
of armed conflict. The Convention has two protocols. 
It covers immovable and movable objects, including monuments of architecture, 
art or history; archaeological sites; works of art; manuscripts; books and other objects of 
artistic; historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections of all kinds 
regardless of their origin or ownership.1173 
States which are party to the Convention benefit from a network of more than a 
hundred States that have undertaken to lessen the consequences of armed conflict for the 
cultural heritage and to take preventive measures for such protection not only in time of 
hostility, when it is usually too late, but also in time of peace, by a variety of measures. 
These measures safeguard and respect cultural property during both international 
and non-international armed conflicts; consider registering a limited number of refuges, 
monumental centers and other immovable cultural property of very great importance 
                                                 
1171 Countries which are parties to the Convention available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Prohibition_of_Military_or_Any_Other_Hostile_Use_of_
Environmental_Modification_Techniques (last visited July 10, 2007).  
1172 The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of armed conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 
240 (1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).  
1173 See article (1) of the Convention. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of armed conflict, 249 UNTS 240(1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).  
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listed in the International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection and 
obtaining special protection for such property; consider marking certain important 
buildings and monuments with the special protective emblem of the Convention; and set 
up special units within the military forces to be responsible for the protection of the 
cultural heritage.  
Article 18 (2), determining the scope of the application of the Convention, lays 
down, “The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance.”1174 According to article 5 of the Convention, in the case of occupation, the 
occupying power: 
1. shall as far as possible support the competent national authorities of the 
occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property. 2. 
Should it prove necessary to take measures to preserve cultural property 
situated in occupied territory and damaged by military operations, and 
should the competent national authorities be unable to take such measures, 
the Occupying Power shall, as far as possible, and in close co-operation 
with such authorities, take the most necessary measures of preservation.  
3. Any High Contracting Party whose government is considered their 
legitimate government by members of a resistance movement, shall, if 
possible, draw their attention to the obligation to comply with those 
provisions of the Conventions dealing with respect for cultural 
property.1175 
 
The Convention penalizes violations of the Convention and promotes its 
provisions widely to the general public and to target groups such as cultural heritage 
professionals, the military or law-enforcement.1176 
                                                 
1174 The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 18 (2), 249 
U.N.T.S. 240 (1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).  
1175 The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 5, 249 
U.N.T.S. 240 (1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956). 
1176 Article 28 of the Convention provides, “The High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the 
framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or 
disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a 
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Both Kuwait and Iraq are parties to the Convention and Saddam Hussein could 
have been held responsible based upon the Convention for those actions taken against 
museums and centers containing a large amount of cultural property such as scientific 
collections and collections of books or archives. However, it is obvious that using oil is 
not included within the definition of cultural property proscribed by the Convention. 
Therefore, unless a connection or causation is established between the action of using oil 
and the destruction of cultural property (using oil or land mines in destroying 
archaeological sites), this Convention could not have been a basis for criminal conviction 
in the case of Saddam Hussein.    
 
 
breach of the present Convention.” The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
armed conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 240(1954) (entered into force Aug.7, 1956).  
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